Teamsters Local 320, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1315

Teamsters Local 320,
Appellant,

vs.

Minnesota Judicial Branch,
Respondent.

Filed May 2, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-21-5146

Kevin M. Beck, Joseph A. Kelly, Patrick J. Kelly, Kelly & Lemm ons, P.A., St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jason Marisa m, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Josie Hegarty, Staff Attorney, South St. Pa ul, Minnesota (for amic us curiae American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 5)

Considered and decide d by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this interlocutory appeal, appellant-un ion challenges the district court’s decision
to deny its motion for a temporary restrainin g order (TRO) or temporary injunction.
Appellant argues that the district court ab used its discretion by denying the motion.
Appellant also argues that the district court order should be vacated because the presiding
district court judge was biased. Because we c onclude that the district court acted within
its discretion by denying the mo tion and that appellant’s j udicial-bias argument is not
properly before us on appeal, we affirm.
FACTS
This case arises from a labor dispute between appellant Teamsters Local 320
(Teamsters) and respondent Minnesota Judicial Branch (MJB). Teamsters is a labor union
that represents all official court reporters employed by MJB. The parties’ employment
relationship is governed by the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn.
Stat. §§ 179A.01-.60 (2020), and by the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA).
The dispute underlying this action concerns how MJB compensates court reporters
for the preparation of certain transcripts. Under state law, court reporters are authorized to
charge a fee to prepare a tran script “ordered by any person ot her than the judge.” Minn.
Stat. § 486.06 (2020). When a person other than the judge requests a transcript, the court
reporter performs that work as an independent contractor, doing the work outside of their
regular workday for a per-page fee. The per-page fee rate is “set by the chief justice.” Id.
The chief justice, in turn, has delegated the authority to set transcript rates to the Minnesota
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Judicial Council. Authority to Set Transcript Rates, No. C1-84-2137 (Minn. Mar. 30, 2006)
(order).
In contrast to transcripts ordered by an y person other than a judge, state law does
not provide for separate compensation for a transcript ordered by a judge. When a
transcript is ordered by a judge, a court repor ter performs that work “without charge”
during their regular business hours. Minn. Stat. § 486.02 (2020). A court reporter’s regular
hourly wage covers the production of transcripts ordered by a judge.
At issue in this case is a change to an MJB policy regarding the preparation of
in forma pauperis (IFP) transcripts. IFP transcripts are prepared at the state’s expense for
litigants who are “financially unable to pay the fees, costs and security for costs” of
participating in civil court proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subds. 2-3(a), 7 (2020).
Court reporters have traditionally prepared IFP transcripts as independent contractors: they
performed that work outside of the regular workday and ch arged the state a per-page fee.
The judicial council set that per-page fee in its Policy 221.
On June 17, 2021, the judi cial council amended Policy 22 1. Effective October 1,
2021, the amendments e liminated the fee rate for most IFP transcripts and established a
one-year pilot project to have those transc ripts produced by cour t reporters during the
regular workday without charge. The amendmen ts applied to all IFP transcripts except
those in cases involving se xual psychopathic personality /sexually dangerous persons
(SPP/SDP). On September 15, 2021, the chie f justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court
issued an order consistent with the amendmen ts to Policy 221. Sp ecifically, the order
directed that “[a]ll official court reporters shall prepare [IFP] transcripts ordered by a
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district court judge on behalf of a party during normal business hours, excluding transcripts
in [SPP/SDP] cases.” The order clarified th at, under the pilot project, IFP transcripts
constitute transcripts ordered by a judge on behalf of a party. The order provided that MJB
would implement the pilot project between October 1, 2021, and September 30, 2022.
In July 2021, after the amendment of Policy 221 and prior to issuance of the order,
Teamsters and MJB attended a meet-and-confer regarding the amendment of Policy 221.
At that meeting, Teamsters asserted that the IFP pilot project constituted a change to a term
and condition of the court reporters’ empl oyment that required mandatory collective
bargaining. Thereafter MJB refused Teamsters’ repeated requests to bargain regarding the
pilot project, maintaining th at the change to Policy 221 is not subject to collective
bargaining because it involves a matter of inherent managerial policy and does not affect a
term or condition of employment.
In late September 2021, Teamsters filed a civil complaint against MJB alleging a
violation of Minn. Stat. § 486.06 relating to court reporters’ compensation for IFP
transcripts and an unfair-labor-practice claim under section 179A.13, subdivision 2(5), of
PELRA for failing to meet and negotiate concer ning the IFP pilot project. The same day
it filed its complaint, Teamst ers moved for a TRO or a temp orary injunction, seeking to
prevent MJB from implementing the IFP pilot project prior to a judgment on the merits of
its claims. Teamsters’ motion centered on its unfair-labor-practice claim, arguing that a
TRO or temporary injunction wa s necessary to preserve the status quo. Teamsters also
argued that the union and its members would su ffer irreparable harm if temporary relief
was not granted. MJB opposed the motion.
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On September 30, 2021, th e district court held a hearing on Teamsters’
TRO/temporary-injunction motion. It issued an order later that day denying the motion.
Following the district court’s order, Teamsters filed a notice of appeal on
October 12, 2021. In its statement of the case to this court, Teamst ers stated that it was
appealing from the “[o]rder denying injunction filed September 30, 2021.” On October 12,
Teamsters also moved the district court to di squalify the presiding district court judge on
the ground of bias and vacate the September 30, 2021 order. The district court thereafter
issued notice that the district court action had been reassigned to a different judge, but it
did not rule on Teamsters’ motion to disqualify the originally assigned judge or vacate the
September 30, 2021 order.
Teamsters appeals.
DECISION
Teamsters raises two arguments on appeal. Fi rst, it contends that the district court
abused its discretion by denying its motion for a TRO or temporary injunction. Second, it
asserts that we must vacate the district court’s September 30, 2021 order denying its
TRO/temporary-injunction motion based on its contention that the district court judge was
biased. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by denying Teamsters’ motion
for a TRO or temporary injunction.

TROs and temporary injunctions are extraordinary remedies. In re Commitment of
Hand, 878 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn. App. 2016), rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 2016).
“Whether to grant a TRO or temporary injuncti on is left to the discretion of the district
6
court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” Id. In reviewing the
district court’s decision whether to grant an in junction, we consider the facts in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party. See In re Peer Rev. Action , 749 N.W.2d 822, 827
(Minn. App. 2008), rev. dismissed (Minn. Aug. 21, 2008). We will not set aside a district
court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Haley v. Forcelle, 669 N.W.2d 48, 55
(Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).
In denying Teamsters’ motion for a TRO or temporary injunction, the district court
determined that Teamsters failed to meet its burden under either Minn.
Stat. § 185.13 (2020) or rules 65.01 and 65.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court explained that section 185.13 applies to requests for an injunction in cases
involving a labor dispute and sets forth certai n factors that must be met for an injunction
to issue. And it noted that the court’s considerations are “similar” when deciding whether
to issue a temporary injunction under rule 65.02.
The district court determined that Teamsters was not entitled to a TRO or temporary
injunction under either section 185.13 or the court rules because the union and its members
“will not suffer irreparable harm” without such relief. In addition, the court specifically
considered the factors set forth in Dahlberg Bros. v. Ford Motor Co. , 137 N.W.2d 314
(Minn. 1965), which are applicable to TRO/ temporary-injunction motions brought under
rules 65.01 and 65.02. Those factors include:
(1) The nature and background of the relationship
between the parties preexisting the dispute giving rise to the
request for relief.
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(2) The harm to be suffe red by plaintiff if the
temporary restraint is denied as compared to that inflicted on
defendant if the injunction issues pending trial.
(3) The likelihood that one party or the other will
prevail on the merits when the fact situation is viewed in light
of established precedents fixing the limits of equitable relief.
(4) The aspects of the fact situation, if any, which
permit or require consideration of public policy expressed in
the statutes, State and Federal.
(5) The administrative burdens involved in judicial
supervision and enforcement of the temporary decree.

Dahlberg Bros. , 137 N.W.2d at 321-22. The distri ct court determined that all five
Dahlberg factors weighed against granting a TRO or temporary injunction and denied
Teamsters’ motion on that basis as well.
A. The district court properly evaluated Teamsters’ request for an injunction
under section 185.13.

As an initial matter, we consider Teamsters’ argument that section 185.13 does not
apply to its unfair-labor-practice claim under Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subdivision 2(5), and
its contention that the district court should have limited its consideration of Teamsters’
motion to the Dahlberg factors. Section 185.13(a) govern s the issuance of an injunction
“in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.” Minn. Stat. § 185.13(a). Under
that statute, a court may not issue a temporary or permanen t injunction in any such case
except after making each of the following findings of fact:
(1) that unlawful acts have been threatened and will
be committed unless restrained, or have been committed and
will be continued unless restrained . . . ;
(2) that substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant’s property will follow;
(3) that as to each item of relief granted greater
injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief
than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
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(4) that complainan t has no adequate remedy at law;
and
(5) that the public officers charged with the duty to
protect complainant’s property have failed to furnish adequate
protection.

Id.
Teamsters argues that the legislature did not intend chapter 185 to apply to
unfair-labor-practice claims br ought under section 179A.13 of PELRA. To support this
argument, Teamsters relies on language in a nother section of PELR A, section 179A.24,
which provides that “[s]ections 185.07 to 185.19, apply to all public employees . . . except
as sections 185.07 to 185.19 are inconsistent with section 179A.13.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.24
(emphasis added). Teamsters contends that section 185.13(a) is inconsistent with section
179A.13, subdivision 1(o), and therefore inapplicable to its claim. MJB disagrees, arguing
that section 185.13(a) “applies to labor disputes generally and those arising under PELRA
specifically.”
We conclude that Teamsters’ argument misses the mark. When it is read in context,
it is clear that section 179A.13, subdivision 1(o), is not inconsistent with section 185.13(a).
Section 179A.13, subdivision 1, governs unfair-labor-practic e “charge[s]” filed with the
Public Employment Relations Board (PE RB). Minn. Stat. § 179A.13, subd. 1.
Subdivision 1(o) of section 179A.13 addresses whether a party who has filed a charge with
PERB may also seek injunctive relief in district court. It states: “Nothing in this paragraph
precludes a charging party from seeking injunctiv e relief in district court after filing the
unfair labor practice charge.” Section 185.13(a), on the other hand, addresses a district
court’s jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction in a case involving a labor dispute.
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Minn. Stat. § 183.13(a)(1)-(5). In other words, section 179A.13, subdivision 1(o), makes
clear that an employee can both file a char ge with PERB and seek injunctive relief in
district court, and section 185.13(a) addresse s the court’s jurisdiction to issue injunctions
in cases involving labor disputes. There is no inconsistency betw een section 179A.13,
subdivision 1(o), and section 185.13(a). Moreover, Teamsters did not file a charge with
PERB under section 179A.13, subdivision 1. Teamsters filed a complaint in district court
alleging, in part, a violation of section 179A .13, subdivision 2(5). Accordingly, section
179A.13, subdivision 1( o), does not apply in this case. We therefore conclude that the
district court properly considered the factor s set forth in section 185.13(a) in deciding
whether to grant a temporary injunction in this case.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for
a TRO or an injunction.

Teamsters challenges only two aspects of th e district court’s decision to deny its
TRO/temporary-injunction motion. It contends that the district court abused its discretion
by determining that (1) Teamsters will not suffer irreparable harm without a TRO or
temporary injunction and (2) Teamsters is not likely to succeed on the merits of its claims.
As noted above, in denying Teamsters’ motion, the district court analyzed the motion under
both section 185.13(a) and applicable court rules.
Irreparable Harm
We begin by addressing Team sters’ argument regarding irreparable harm. Both
section 185.13(a) and court rules governing the issuance of a TRO or temporary injunction
require consideration of irreparable harm. Minn. Stat. § 185.13(a)(2); Minn. R. Civ.
10
P. 65.01; DSCC v. Simon, 950 N.W.2d 280, 286 (Minn. 2020) . Under section 185.13(a),
failure to show irreparable harm is, by its elf, a sufficient ground on which to deny a
temporary injunction. 1 Minn. Stat. § 185.13(a)(2) (requi ring a district court, before
granting injunctive relief in a labor case, to find “that substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant’s property will follow”). Similarly, to warrant a temporary injunction or TRO
under court rules, the movant must demonstrate that “an injunction is necessary to prevent
great and irreparable injury.” Haley, 669 N.W.2d at 56; see also DSCC, 950 N.W.2d at
286 (providing that movant must make “a sh owing of irreparable harm”). The injury to
the moving party typically “must be of such a nature that money damages alone would not
provide adequate relief.” Haley, 669 N.W.2d at 56. “The temporary loss of income,
ultimately to be recovered, does not us ually constitute irreparable injury.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Teamsters argued to the district court that it would suffer irreparable harm absent a
TRO or temporary injunction because MJB’s refusal to negotiate regarding the pilot project
would result in a loss of collective bargaining rights and would threaten employee support
for the union. It argued that if the pilot proj ect were allowed to go in to effect prior to a
decision on the merits, union members “may question the union’s efficacy” and “may cease
paying union dues or petition to decertify” the union. It further argued that the lack of

1 Similar to the temporary-injunction an alysis required by section 185.13, Minn.
Stat. § 185.02 (2020) provides that a district court may issue a TRO in a case involving a
labor dispute only upon finding that a restraining order is “necessary to prevent irreparable
injury.” While the district court’s order referenced only section 185.13, it did consider the
requirement of irreparable harm.
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negotiation over the pilot project would “irrepa rably impede and impair the ability [of]
Local 320 to bargain on behalf of its members” by “effectively giv[ing] the MJB a ‘green
light’ to unilaterally change the terms and conditions of employment without meeting and
negotiating with the certified exclusive representative.”
The district court rejected Teamsters’ argument, determining that implementing the
pilot project would not irreparably harm the collective-bargaining relationship between the
parties. It found that the parties “have been in an ongoing bargaining relationship,
achieving a number of collective bargaini ng agreements and negotiating terms and
modifications to those terms.” It further found that MJB’s refusal to bargain regarding the
pilot project is not in bad faith and that, therefore, MJB’s “position is not so unreasonable
as to indicate a collapse of the bargaining relationship with respect to this issue or others.”
The district court determined instead that th e “primary impact” of the pilot project on the
court reporters “is the availab ility of independent contractor fees and work outside the
scope of their workday with the MJB.” It concluded that such an impact constitutes a
temporary loss of income, which is “calculable” and “clearly can be remedied at law.”
Accordingly, the district court concluded that Teamsters would not suffer irreparable harm
without a temporary injunction.
We discern no clear error in the district court’s finding that the principal effect of
the pilot project on the court reporters is mo netary in nature and can be remedied if
Teamsters prevails on the merits of its clai ms. The pilot project’ s elimination of the
per-page fees for most IFP transcripts constitutes a calculable loss of income. If the district
court ultimately rules that MJB’s unilateral decision to implement the IFP pilot project was
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an unfair labor practice, the court reporters will recover their lost income and the parties
will bargain over the pilot project then. Because money damages would provide adequate
relief in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Teamsters’
TRO/temporary-injunction motion on that basis.
Nor do we discern any abuse of discretion by the district court in its determination
that Teamsters failed to demonstrate that its ability to negotia te with MJB will be
irreparably harmed by implementation of the pilot project. The record supports the district
court’s determination that Teamsters and MJB “have been in an ongoing bargaining
relationship, achieving a number of collective bargaining agreements and negotiating terms
and modifications to those te rms.” The record further supports the district court’s
determination that MJB’s refusal to negotiate is not in bad faith. Based on the record before
it, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that Teamsters
failed to demonstrate that implementation of the pilot project will impair the union’s ability
to negotiate on this and future labor issues.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Teamst ers’ argument to this court that
“[d]enying the injunction and changing the status quo weakens [Teamsters’] collective
bargaining position, destroys or severely inhibits employee interest in [Teamsters’] union
representation and collective bargaining, a nd undermines PELRA’s express purpose of
‘requiring public employers to meet and ne gotiate . . . ’ with respect to terms and
conditions of employment.” Teamsters relies on numerous federal ca ses to support this
argument, all involving alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act. But, in
addition to not having precedentia l value, these case s are inapposite. Most of the cases
13
cited by Teamsters involve an employer that entirely refused to recognize and bargain with
a certified union. See, e.g., Small v. Avanti Health Sys., LLC , 661 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th
Cir. 2011); Lineback v. Irving Ready-Mix, Inc. , 653 F.3d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 2011);
Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334, 1 358 (9th Cir. 2011); Blyer ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. One
Stop Kosher Supermarket, Inc. , 720 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223-24 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Others
involve employers that attempted to undermine employee efforts to unionize, see
Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc., 276 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 2001); N.L.R.B. v. Electro-
Voice, Inc. , 83 F.3d 1559 , 1563-65 (7th Cir. 1996); Angle v. Sacks ex rel. N.L.R.B. ,
382 F.2d 655, 658 (10th Cir. 1967), and employers that terminated active union members,
Chester ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Eichorn Motors, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625 (D. Minn. 2007).
Unlike in those cases, there are no allegations or evidence in this case that MJB has
declined to recognize Teamsters, entirely refused to bargain with Teamsters, fired active
union members, or otherwise engaged in a concerted effort to undermine employee support
for the union. To the contrary, as Teamsters concedes, the record in this case demonstrates
that Teamsters and MJB have had an ongoing bargaining relationship that has resulted in
the successful negotiation of a number of CBAs over several years. None of the cases that
Teamsters cites establishes th at an employer’s refusal to bargain over a discrete issue
constitutes irreparable harm to the collective-bargaining relationship.
Teamsters further relies on the Ei ghth Circuit’s 1967 decision in Minnesota
Mining & Mfg., Co. v. Meter ex rel. N.L.R.B. , 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967). But, to the
extent that we look to Meter for guidance, the decision refutes, rather than supports,
Teamsters’ position that a TRO or temporary injunction is warranted in this case. In Meter,
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while negotiating with a union that represen ted employees from one of its plants, the
employer excluded from bargaining sessions multiple unions that represented employees
from other plants. Meter, 385 F.2d at 267-69. The distri ct court granted a temporary
injunction, but the Eighth Circuit reversed. Id. at 273. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged
that there was reasonable cause to believe that the employer had engaged in an unfair labor
practice. Id. But it nonetheless concluded that the alleged injury to the union was not “of
such compelling significance as to warrant c ourt intervention” pending a decision on the
merits. Id. This conclusion was based in part on the court’s determination that, “[i]n view
of the past history of acceptable contracts negotiated between [the parties],” it was “highly
unlikely” that the uni on would “sustain any injury in its bargaining pos ition” without a
temporary injunction. Id. As in Meter, MJB’s refusal to bargain over the IFP pilot project,
in the context of an otherwise productive colle ctive-bargaining relationship, does not rise
to the level of interference with the uni on’s interests that would warrant a TRO or
temporary injunction. We ther efore conclude that the dist rict court acted within its
discretion when it determined that Teamster s would not suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of a TRO or temporary injunction.
Success on the Merits
We next turn to Teamsters’ argument that the district court abused its discretion
when it determined that Teamsters had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits. For two reasons, we conclude that this argument does not warrant reversal of the
district court’s denial of the motion for a TRO/temporary injunction. First, under the
conjunctive test set forth in section 185.13, we need not reach Teamsters’ argument about
15
the merits because Team sters’ failure to demonstrate irre parable harm was sufficient, by
itself, to deny its temporary-injunction motion. See Minn. Stat. § 185.13(a) (requiring all
statutory factors to be met for a temporary injunction to issue).
Second, and likewise, application of the Dahlberg factors does not require us to
reverse the district court’s decision. In its order, the district court analyzed all five
Dahlberg factors. With respect to Teamsters’ likelihood of success on the merits, the
district court determined that the merits of the case presented a “close” question but that it
was “persuaded that the MJB has the stronger position with respect to prevailing on the
merits of the case.” Even if the district court erred by deciding this factor against
Teamsters, that error would not require reversal of the court’s decision to deny Teamsters’
TRO/temporary-injunction motion because Team sters failed to show that implementing
the pilot project would cause it to suffer irreparable harm. As discussed above, irreparable
harm is necessary to warrant issuing a TRO or temporary injunction. DSCC, 950 N.W.2d
at 286; see Morse v. City of Waterville , 458 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Minn. App. 1990),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990) (reversing decision to gr ant temporary injunction
despite possibility of success on the merits because movant failed to demonstrate
irreparable harm); see also Meter, 385 F.2d at 273 (reversing decision to grant temporary
injunction despite reasonable ca use to believe employer enga ged in unfair labor practice
16
because movant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm). As a result, Teamsters’ argument
regarding the merits of its claim does not require us to reverse the district court’s decision.2
We therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion when
it denied Teamsters’ motion for a TRO or temporary injunction.
II. Teamsters’ judicial-bias argument is not properly before us on appeal.
Teamsters next argues that we must vaca te the district court’s September 30, 2021
order denying its motion for a TRO or temporary injunction because the presiding district
court judge was biased. MJB contends that this issue is not properly before us on appeal.
We agree with MJB.
Following the district court’s September 30, 2021 order, Teamsters filed a notice of
appeal with this court on Octo ber 12, 2021. Teamsters’ stat ement of the case, filed with
this court, states that its appeal was ta ken from the “[o]rder denying injunction filed
September 30, 2021.” Also on October 12, 2021, Teamsters moved the district court to
disqualify the presiding district court judge for bias and vacate the September 30, 2021
order. The district court later notified the pa rties that the district court case was being
reassigned to a different judge, but it did not rule on Teamsters’ motion to disqualify the
judge or vacate the order.
Where a party appeals from a district court order, our scope of review is generally
limited to the “order appealed from” and “a ny order affecting the order from which the

2 We also note that it may no t have been necessary for the district court to address the
Dahlberg factors because chapter 185 of the Mi nnesota Statutes governs the issuance of
TROs and temporary injunctions in labor disputes. See Minn. Stat. §§ 185.02, .13.
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appeal is taken.” Minn. R. Ci v. App. P. 103.04. In review ing a district court’s decision,
we “must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented and
considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v. Stich ,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). Here, as reflected in Teamsters’
own statement of the case, the order on appeal is the district court’s September 30, 2021
order denying Teamsters’ TRO/temporary-injunction motion. That order does not address
the judicial-bias issue that T eamsters raised in its October 12, 2021 motion to vacate and
that it now seeks to raise on appeal. More over, Teamsters’ counsel conceded at oral
argument that the issue was largely rendered moot when the district court reassigned the
case to a different judge. Accordingly, we decline to address Teamsters’ argument that the
September 30, 2021 order must be vacated on the ground of judicial bias.
Affirmed.