Mary Kate Nguyen, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1319

Mary Kate Nguyen,
Appellant,

vs.

Drew Evans, Superintendent,
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension in his official capacity,
Respondent.

Filed April 25, 2022
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-20-1212

Bradford Colbert, Martin Sandberg (certified student attorney), Legal Assistance to
Minnesota Prisoners, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that she must register as a
predatory offender based on a juvenile-delinquency adjudication that arose out of the same
set of circumstances as dismissed predatory-offense charges. Appellant argues that the
2
dismissed charges were not supported by probable cause, that the registration requirement
violates her rights to procedural and substantive due process, that the registration
requirement denies her finality in sentencing, and that the predatory-offender-registration
statute, as applied in this case, is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. We affirm.
FACTS
This case comes before us on appeal from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in a ppellant Mary Kate Nguyen ’s lawsu it against respondent Drew Evans,
superintendent of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) , in his official
capacity. In her lawsuit, Nguyen challenged the BCA’s determination that she must
register as a predatory offender based on charges th at were dismissed when she pleaded
guilty to aiding and abetting simple robbery in juvenile court . Nguyen alleged that the
registration requirement violates her rights to procedural and substantive due process and
that the predatory -offender-registration statute constitutes an unconstitutional bill of
attainder. She requested a declaration that the predatory -offender-registration statute was
unconstitutional as applied to her. She also requested an injunction prevent ing the BCA
from requiring her to regi ster and direct ing the BCA to remove her from the predatory -
offender registry.
The relevant facts are undisputed. In 2005, the State of Minnesota charged Nguyen
with aiding and abetting the crimes of first -degree aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and
false imprisonment, as well as commission of check forgery and offering a forged check,
in Scott County juvenile court. Nguyen was 17 years old at that time, and the state moved
3
to certify her for prosecution as an adult. The juvenile court determined that t here was
probable cause to support the charges against Nguyen.
Nguyen pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting simple robbery, and the state
dismissed the remaining charges. In October 2006, the juvenile court adjudicated Nguyen
delinquent for simple robbery, pronounced a stayed 23-month prison sentence, and placed
her on extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) probation. No one told Nguyen that she would
have to register as a predatory offender, and none of the documents filed with the juvenile
court mentioned predatory -offender registration. Nguyen was successfully discharged
from EJJ probation in 2008 when she turned 21.
In November 2016, the BCA determined that Nguyen was required to register as a
predatory offender based on the dismissed charges of aiding and abetting kidnapping and
aiding and abetting false imprisonment. The BCA notified Nguyen, and she registered as
a predatory offender in March 2017. The BCA anticipates that Nguyen’s registration
requirement will expire in 2031, which is ten years from her most recent release from
incarceration.
The BCA moved for summary judgment on Nguyen’s claims, and the district court
granted that motion. Nguyen appeals.
DECISION
On appeal from summary judgment, appellate courts “determine whether there are
any genuine issues of material fact and whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” In re Collier, 726 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2007). If the material facts are not in
dispute, appellate courts review the district court’s application of the law de novo. Id.
4
I.
Nguyen contends that she should not be required to register as a predatory offender
because the charges that formed the basis for the registration requirement—aiding and
abetting kidnapping and false imprisonment—were not supported by probable cause.
Under Minnesota’s predatory-offender-registration statute, a person must register if
she was charged with aiding and abetting certain offenses and “convicted of or adjudicated
delinquent for that offense or another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances.”
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1), (2) (2020). Kidnapping and false imprisonment are
offenses for which registration is required. Id., subd. 1b(a)(1)(ii), (2)(ii). The BCA
directed Nguyen to register as a predatory offender because she was adjudicated delinquent
for aiding and abetting simple robbery, and the simple robbery arose out of the same set of
circumstances as the dismissed kidnapping and false imprisonment charges.
The purpose of requiring offenders to register when they are merely charged with,
but not convicted of, a predatory offense is “to ensure that true predatory offenders cannot
plead out of the registration requirements.” State v. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn.
2010). However, “a qualifying charge may trigger the registration requirement under
Minn. Stat. § 243.166 only if it is supported by probable cause.” State v. Haukos , 847
N.W.2d 270, 274 (Minn. App. 2014); see also Lopez, 778 N.W.2d at 703 (stating that “[a]
person may be charged with a crime only where there is probable cause to believe that the
person is guilty ”). T he judiciary’s determination of probable cause, and not the state’s
filing of a charge, triggers the statutory registration requirement. Haukos, 847 N.W.2d at
5
273. Thus, “the district court may relieve defendants of the registration requirement by
determining that probable cause does not exist to support the triggering charge.” Id. at 274.
“Probable cause exists where the facts would lead a person of ordinary care and
prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person under consideration is
guilty of a crime.” Id. (quotation omitted). It requires “only a probability or substantial
chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Id. (quotation
omitted). We review the issue of probable cause de novo. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d at 703.
When doing so, we view the evidence and all resulting inferences in favor of the state.
State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 770 n.1 (Minn. 2009).
The record in this case includes an affidavit that Nguyen submitted in opposition to
summary judgment, which describes her version of the events underlying the charged
offenses. We consider Nguyen’s affidavit, as well as the verified charging document, when
reviewing the issue of probable cause. See State v. Florence, 239 N.W.2d 892, 903 (Minn.
1976) (stating that if the state elects to rely on the verified charging document as proof of
probable cause , the defendant produces exonerating witness testimony, and the state
presents no rebuttal testimony, a motion to dismiss for lack of probabl e cause “will be
granted unless there is substantial evidence admissible at trial in the record which would
justify denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal”).
According to the charging document in this case, a delinquency petition , Nguyen
participated in a robbery with her brother and another man, Joshua Meyer . The three
individuals planned the robbery at Nguyen’s home. They then drove to the Little Six
6
Casino. Nguyen drove one vehicle, and her brother and Meyer drove a separate vehicle.
Meyer was armed with a handgun that came from Nguyen’s house.
The trio arrived at the casino parking lot around 12:00 a.m. Meyer approached a
woman who was exiting her vehicle, pointed the handgun at her, and told her that “they
were going for a drive.” The victim drove Meyer a few blocks away from the casino .
Meyer ordered the victim to exit the vehicle and to give him her purse, cell phone, and
money. Meyer then pushed the victim out of the vehicle , and he hit her in the face with
the gun. He told the victim that he would drive to the end of the block and leave her vehicle
there. After Meyer left the scene, the victim found her vehicle unattended, drove back to
the casino, and reported the robbery.
The petition indicates that Nguyen provided multiple statements to the police
regarding her involvement in the crime. She said that she, Meyer, and her brother planned
the robbery at her house and that they selected the Little Six Casino because it has less
security and surveillance. Nguyen said she drove to the casino parking lot in one vehicle
and that her brother and Meyer drove there in another vehicle. Nguyen told the police that
she watched the parking lot and saw Meyer enter the victim’s vehicle. She also told the
police that after the robbery, she met her brother and Meyer in another parking lot. Nguyen
stated that they went through the victim’s purse and that Meyer told her about the robbery.
Nguyen reported that the gun that was used in the robbery wa s at her house, and she later
turned the gun into the police. Nguyen admitted that Meyer gave her the victim’s
checkbook and that she used the victim’s checks to purchase several items. She also
admitted that she obtained $3,080 in cash from the victim’s account.
7
In Nguyen’s affidavit opposing summary judgment, she stated that she and Meyer
“did not discuss getting into anyone’s car or anything remotely close to kidnapping or false
imprisonment.” Nguyen also made several statements that contradict statements attributed
to her in the charging document. For example, Nguyen’s affidavit states that she drove
Meyer to the casino, dropped him off, and immediately drove back to her home. It also
states that the first time she heard about the robbery was at her home when Meyer returned.
Nguyen argues that her affidavit raises “a material issue of fact” regarding whether there
was probable cause to support the charges against her.
“The evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause is significantly less
than that required to support a conviction.” State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 790 (Minn.
1999). “Unlike proof beyond a reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence,
probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity.” Id. at 790-91 (quotation omitted). Thus, the production
of “exonerating evidence by a defendant at the probable cause hearing does not justify the
dismissal of the charges if the record establishes that the prosecutor possesses substantial
evidence that will be admissible at trial and that would justify denial of a motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal. ” State v. Rud , 359 N.W.2d 573 , 579 (Minn. 1984). If “the
facts before the district court present a fact question for the jury’s determination,” the
district court should not dismiss the case for lack of probable cause. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d
at 704 (quotation omitted). In sum, although Nguyen’s affidavit ra ises a factual dispute
regarding her guilt or innocence, it does not prevent a determination that there was probable
cause for the dismissed charges.
8
We now turn our attention to the contested charges. We first consider , de novo,
whether there was probabl e cause to believe that Meyer committed the offenses of
kidnapping and false imprisonment, as alleged in the petition. We then consider whether
there was probable cause to believe that Nguyen aided and abetted those offenses.
Kidnapping
As charged in th is case, a person commits kidnapping if he confines or removes a
person from one place to another, without the person’s consent , for the purpose of
committing great bodily harm or terroriz ing the victim or another. Minn. Stat. § 609.25,
subd. 1(3) (2004). To constitute a kidnapping, the confinement or removal must be “more
than merely incidental to the underlying crime.” State v. Earl, 702 N.W.2d 711, 722 (Minn.
2005) (quotation omitted).
Nguyen argues that there is no evidence that Meyer acted with a purpose to terrorize
the victim. She therefore argues that there was no probable cause for the charge of aiding
and abetting kidnapping with the intent to terrorize.
Minnesota’s criminal statutes use the terms “intent” and “purpose” synonymously.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) ( 2004) (“‘With intent to’ or ‘with intent that’ means
that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes
that the act, if successful, will cause that result.”). The state rarely establishes a defendant’s
state of mind through direct evidence. State v. McAllister , 862 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn.
2015). Because intent is a state of mind, it is usually proved “circumstantially—by drawing
inferences from the defendant ’s words and actions in light of the totality of the
9
circumstances.” State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). It may be inferred
that “a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.” Id.
The supreme court has defined “te rrorize” as “to cause extreme fear by use of
violence or threats.” State v. Schweppe , 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975) (discussing
the term in the context of making threats of violence); see also State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d
68, 73 -74 (Minn. 2009) (interpr eting the statutory phrase “feel terrorized” as to “feel
extreme fear resulting from violence or threats”). According to the petition, Meyer
approached the victim in a casino parking lot late at night, pointed a gun at her, entered her
vehicle, ordered he r to drive away from the parking lot, took her property, hit her in the
face with the gun, and forced her out of the vehicle. Extreme fear is the natural and
probable consequence of Meyer’s actions. Thus, the petition sets forth circumstantial
evidence that would support an inference that Meyer intended to terrorize the victim.
Nguyen also argues that the kidnapping charge was not supported by probable cause
because the victim’s confinement was “incidental” to the robbery. Nguyen cites State v.
Smith as support, a case in which the supreme court reversed a conviction of first -degree
murder while committing kidnapping because the only evidence to support the kidnapping
component was an accomplice’s act of blocking the doorway when the victim tried to flee
the room during a deadly assault. 669 N.W.2d 19, 23, 32-33 (Minn. 2003), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 2005). In doing so, the supreme
court stated, “[b]ecause a conviction for the crime of kidnapping now carries with it
significant consequences,” the “confinement or removal must be criminally significant in
the sense of being more than merely incidental to the underlying crime” and that if “the
10
confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the perpetration of a
separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.” Id. at 32.
In State v. Juarez, the supreme court concluded that the defendant’s act of dragging
a victim 209 feet from an area outside of a bar where she had been with friends to an alley
where he attempted to sexually assault her was not “completely incidental to his criminal
sexual conduct.” 837 N.W.2d 473, 478, 484-85 (Minn. 2013). The supreme court reasoned
that the act of removing the victim to the alley constituted “culpable conduct separate and
distinct from [the] criminal sexual conduct ,” noting that the defendant moved the victim
away from “a safe location—in which she was out in the open an d close to her friends —
and transported her to a place that was confined and isolated, and where she would be more
vulnerable to him.” Id. at 484-85. The petition in this case alleges a removal that is similar
to the one in Juarez, and it was not merely incidental to the robbery.
In sum, there was probable cause to believe Meyer kidnapped the victim with the
purpose to terrorize.
False Imprisonment
A person commits false imprisonment if he “ intentionally confines or restrains”
another person without that person’s consent. Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (2004).
Nguyen concedes that “there was at least some evidence that Meyer committed the crime
of false imprisonment” because he entered the victim’s vehicle and told her to drive. There
was probable cause to believe that Meyer falsely imprisoned the victim.
11
Aiding and Abetting
We now consider whether there was probable cause to believe that Nguyen aided
and abetted the alleged kidnapping and false-imprisonment offenses. “A person is
criminally liable for a crime committed by another if [she] intentionally aids, advises, hires,
counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2004). For the defendant to have the requisite intent for accomplice
liability, she must (1) know that her alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime,
and (2) intend her presence or actions to further the commission of that crime. McAllister,
862 N.W.2d at 52. The requisite state of mind for accomplice liability may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime,
a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection
or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with the
principal offender. State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011).
Under Minnesota’s aiding and abetting statute, a person is also liable “for any other
crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person
as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2 (2004). Reasonable foreseeability is an objective standard
based on the perspective of a person in the defendant’s position. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d
at 56.
Nguyen argues that even if she, her brother, and Meyer planned to commit robbery,
it was not reasonably foreseeable that Meyer would kidnap or falsely imprison someone in
pursuance of the intended crime and that, therefore, the charges of aiding and abetting the
12
offenses of kidnapping and false imprisonment were not supported by probable cause.
Based on the following caselaw, we disagree.
In McAllister, the supreme court concluded that the state presented sufficient
evidence that a murder was reasonably foreseeable as a probable consequence of an
aggravated robbery. Id. The defendant had argued that the ultimate cause of death —a
shooting during the robbery—was not reasonably foreseeable because he did not know that
one of his accomplices was carrying a gun and would use it during the robbery. Id. at 57.
The supreme court rejected that argument , reasoning that e ven if the defendant did not
initially know that his accomplice had a gun, one of his accomplices fired at least one shot
at the victim before they fled from the crime scene. Id. Thus, it was reasonable to infer
that the defendant knew that the victim would die of a gunshot wound. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Atkins, the supreme court concluded that there was “more than
sufficient evidence to conclude that [a] murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of [an] aggravated robbery.” 543 N.W.2d 642, 6 47 (Minn. 1996). The supreme court
described as “crucial” the fact that, even if one of the accomplices did not know the other
was armed, he surely knew the other was armed “from the moment [the first] shot was
fired.” Id.
Under the reasoning of McAllister and Atkins, we conclude that once Nguyen
allegedly observed Meyer enter the victim’s vehicle with a gun intending to rob her, it was
reasonably foreseeable that Meyer would falsely imprison the victim, that is, intentionally
confine or restrain her without her consent. See Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2. And for
the reasons explained above, the evidence supports an inference that Meyer would do so
13
for the purpose of terrorizing the victim. See Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1 (3). Thus, the
kidnapping was also a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the planned robbery. We
therefore conclude that the charges of aiding and abetting kidnapping and false
imprisonment were supported by probable cause.
Our finding of probable cause is buttressed by evidence indicating that Nguyen did
not abandon the planned robbery. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 3 (2004) (“A person
who intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsel s, or conspires with or otherwise procures
another to commit a crime and thereafter abandons that purpose and makes a reasonable
effort to prevent the commission of the crime prior to its commission is not liable if the
crime is thereafter committed.”). T he record evidence indicates that Nguyen met with
Meyer and her brother after the robbery as planned, and that Meyer told Nguyen about the
robbery. It is reasonable to infer that Meyer told Nguyen that he forced the victim to drive
away from the casino pa rking lot. Nguyen nonetheless accepted the victim’s stolen
checkbook from Meyer and used the victim’s checks to make purchases and to obtain cash
from the victim’s account.
In sum, although Nguyen’s recent affidavit professes her innocence and contradicts
admissions that she reportedly made to the police around the time of the crime, “the
production of exonerating evidence by a defendant . . . does not justify the dismissal of the
charges if the record establishes that the prosecutor possesses substantial evidence that will
be admissible at trial and that would justify denial of a motion for a directed verdict of
acquittal.” Rud, 359 N.W.2d at 579. The petition in this case sets forth such evidence, and
that evidence could lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and
14
strong suspicion that Nguyen aided and abetted the charged offenses of kidnapping and
false imprisonment. Because those charges were supported by probable cause and Nguyen
was adjudicated delinquent for an offense arising out of the same set of circumstances, she
is required to register as a predatory offender.
II.
Nguyen contends that the BCA violated her right to procedural due process. The
United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that the state may not deprive a person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn.
Const. art. I, § 7. Appellate courts review an alleged procedural -due-process violation de
novo. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012).
Nguyen’s briefing asserts that the state deprived her of her right to due process by
requiring her to register based on “non-existent” procedures. But at oral argument, Nguyen
agreed that this court’s de novo review of the existence of probable cause for kidnapping
and false-imprisonment charges would provide procedural due process. We agree.
In fact, Nguyen has now had two opportunities to challenge probable cause for
kidnapping and false-imprisonment charges. The first was in the underlying juvenile-court
proceeding, in which the state moved to certify Nguyen for prosecution as an adult . That
motion triggered a statutorily required probable-cause determination: “[T]he juvenile court
may order a certification only if . . . the court finds that there is probable cause, as defined
by the Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . , to believe the child committed the offense alleged
by [the] delinquency petition.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 2(5) (2020). The relevant
rules of criminal procedure require the district court to “determine whether probable cause
15
exists to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.04, subd. 1(a). The rules fu rther provide that “[t]he prosecutor and
defendant may offer evidence at the probable cause hearing.” Id., subd. 1(b). Lastly, the
rules provide that “[t]he court may find probable cause based on the complaint or the entire
record, including reliable hearsay.” Id., subd. 1(c).
In addition, the rules governing juvenile -delinquency proceedings provide that
“[u]nless waived by the child or based upon an indictment, a hearing and court
determination on the issue of probable cause shall be completed within fourteen (14) days
of filing the certification motion.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.05, subd. 3(A). “A showing
of probable cause to believe the child committed the offense alleged by the delinquency
petition shall be made pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 11.” Id., subd.
3(B).
Consistent with the procedures mandated in statutes and rules, the juvenile court
held a pretrial hearing on the charges against Nguyen in November 2005 , at which “the
parties requested that the petition be reviewed for probable cause in relation to the [s]tate’s
motion for certification.” The juvenile court found probable cause for all of the charges
against Nguyen, based on the allegations in the petition.
In sum, the record refutes Nguyen’s assertion that she “was never given the
opportunity to challenge the dismissed charges” and, therefore, the registration
requirement. Moreover, this court has now determined —de novo and based on a record
that Nguyen developed in t he underlying proceeding —that the charges of aiding and
abetting kidnapping and false imprisonment were supported by probable cause. Because
16
Nguyen has now had two opportunities to challenge the charges that triggered her
registration requirement, we reje ct her procedural -due-process argument on its face,
without determining whether she has been deprived of a protected liberty interest . See
Sawh, 823 N.W.2d at 632 (setting forth two -step process that considers “whether the
government has deprived the indi vidual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest”
and if so, whether the government’s procedures were constitutionally sufficient); Boutin v.
LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 71 8 (Minn. 1999) (applying the “stigma -plus” test, which
provides that “a liberty interest is implicated when a loss of reputation is coupled with the
loss of some other tangible interest”).
III.
Nguyen contends that the registration requirement violates her right to substantive
due process. The Due Process Clauses of the Unit ed States and Minnesota Constitutions
prohibit “certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions, regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.” Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 716 (quotation omitted). The
level of judicial scrutiny for a subs tantive-due-process challenge depends on whether the
statute at issue implicates a fundamental right. If the statute involves a fundamental right,
“the state must show a legitimate and compelling interest for abridging that right.” Id. But
if the statut e does not affect a fundamental right, the statute merely “must provide a
reasonable means to a permissible objective” and must “not be arbitrary or capricious.” Id.
In Boutin, the supreme court concluded that the predatory-offender-registration
statute did not implicate fundamental rights because it was a civil, regulatory statute and
that the rational-basis test was the proper standard for determining the constitutionality of
17
the statute. Id. Nguyen recognizes that Boutin is binding on this court and that the statute
need only satisfy the rational -basis test. Under the rational -basis standard of review, the
statute must “serve to promote a public purpose”; the statute must “not be an unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious interference with a private interest”; and “the means chosen [must]
bear a rational relation to the public purpose sought to be served.” Id. at 718 (quotations
omitted).
Nguyen argues that there is no rational basis for requiring her to regist er as a
predatory offender. She claims that (1) registration does not serve a public purpose because
it is based on the erroneous assumption that people who commit sex crimes are
significantly more likely to commit another sex crime in the future; (2) the statute is
arbitrary because it requires people to register when they have been charged with, but not
convicted of, an offense ; and (3) there is no rational relation between assisting police
investigations and requiring her to register.
In Boutin, t he su preme court upheld the predatory-offender-registration statute
against a substantive-due-process challenge. It explained that “the primary purpose of the
statute is to create an offender registry to assist law enforcement with investigations” and
that keeping a list of offenders was “rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
solving crimes.” Id. at 717-18. Moreover, the purpose of requiring people to register as
predatory offenders based only on charges is “to ensure that true predatory offenders cannot
plead out of the registration requirements.” Lopez, 778 N.W.2d at 704.
Given recent expansions of the predatory-offender-registration statute, Boutin does
not foreclose all constitutional challenges. Werlich v. Schnell , 958 N.W.2d 354, 374
18
(Minn. 2021). But Nguyen does not point to any of those expansions as support for her
substantive-due-process claim or explain how those expansions have affected her.
In sum, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the registration requirement
satisfies the rational-basis test, and Nguyen has not persuaded us to conclude otherwise in
this case.
IV.
Nguyen contends that the requirement to register as a predatory offender nearly a
decade after she was discharged from EJJ probation violates her right to substantive due
process by denying her finality in sentencing. Nguyen relies on caselaw regarding sentence
modifications. “[T]here are due process limits on a court’s ability to modify a sentence to
correct an error.” State v. Calmes , 632 N.W.2d 641, 647 (Minn. 2001). A defendant’s
due-process rights may be violated if her sentence is enhanced after she “has develop ed a
crystallized expectation of finality in the earlier sentence.” Id. at 645.
Nguyen’s argument is unpersuasive because the supreme court has consistently held
that the requirement to register as a predatory offender is not a component of a criminal
sentence. The predatory -offender-registration statute is a “civil, regulatory statute” and
“does not promote the traditional aims of punishment.” Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 717. In
Kaiser v. State , the supreme court stated that b ecause the registration requi rement is
regulatory and not punitive, it is a collateral consequence of a sentence. 641 N.W.2d 900,
907 (Minn. 2002). The supreme court has reaffirmed that principle and declined to
overrule Kaiser. Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. 2016).
19
In sum, because the registration requirement is not a component of a criminal
sentence, Nguyen’s registration requirement does not deny Nguyen finality in sentencing.
V.
Finally, Nguyen contends that requiring compliance with Minnesota’s predatory-
registration law based only on a charge, and not a conviction, results in an unconstitutional
bill of attainder. Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit bills of
attainder. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Minn. Const. art. I, § 11. A bill of attainder is a
statute that “specifically singles out an identifiable group or individual for the infliction of
punishment by other than judicial authority.” Rsrv. Mining Co. v. State, 310 N.W.2d 487,
490 (Minn. 1981). Nguyen argues that by requiring individuals to register when they have
been charged with, but not convicted of, predatory offenses, “the legislature is determining
that these persons are guilty and imposing punishment without any judicial process.”
The primary issue here is whethe r the registration requirement constitutes
punishment. To determine whether a law has a punitive purpose, the court considers
“(1) whether the law imposes punishment such as death, imprisonment, banishment,
confiscation of property, or barring participati on in certain employment or occupations;
(2) whether the law furthers a non -punitive legislative purpose; and (3) whether the
legislative body had a punitive motive in passing the law.” Council of Indep. Tobacco
Mfrs. of Am. v. State, 685 N.W.2d 467, 474-75 (Minn. App. 2004), aff’d, 713 N.W.2d 300
(Minn. 2006) ; see also Rsrv. Mining Co. , 310 N.W.2d at 490 ( stating that , when
determining whether a statute is a bill of attainder, courts look to the “historical experience
20
with laws similar to the statute in question,” the function of the statute, and the legislative
intent to punish).
As discussed above, the supreme court has stated that the registration requirement
is regulatory, and not punitive. Registration does not promote the traditional purposes of
punishment. Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 717. Indeed, it does not impose a punishment such as
death, imprisonment, banishment, or confiscation of property. As for barring participation
in certain employment or occupations, Nguyen claimed in her affidavit that her status as a
predatory offender prevents her from participating in a work -release program and will
make it more difficult to obtain employment . We disagree that those outcomes make
registration punitive. Cf. Werlich, 958 N.W.2d at 367 -69 (concluding that a defendant’s
ineligibility for the Challenge Incarceration Program , based on his status as a predatory
offender, was not punitive and therefore did not violate due process).
Additionally, the purpose of t he registration requirement is to assist law
enforcement with investigations and to help solve crimes. Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 717-18.
Despite the recent expansions of the predatory-offender-registration statute, the supreme
court has indicated that the registration requirement is regulatory rather than penal . See
Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 825 -26. Accordingly, the predatory-offender-registration statute
furthers a non-punitive legislative purpose , and that purpose does not reflect a punitive
motive. In sum, application of the predatory-offender-registration statute based on a charge
supported by probable cause does not result in an unconstitutional bill of attainder.
In conclusion, courts have recognized that the predatory -offender-registration
statute “may lead to unfair results in some cases.” Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 645
21
(8th Cir. 2003). Even if that may seem to be the case here, we are not persuaded that
Nguyen’s registration is unlawful or unconstitutional. The BCA is therefore entitled to
judgment as a matter of law in Nguyen’s action to avoid predatory -offender-registration
requirements.
Affirmed.