Sharon Powers-Potter, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1331

Sharon Powers-Potter,
Relator,

vs.

Data Recognition Corporation,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed May 16, 2022
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 46994571-5

Sharon Powers-Potter, Champlin, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Data Recognition Corporation, Maple Grove, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Katie Conlin, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Em ployment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Relator seeks reversal of the determination by an unemployment -law judge (ULJ)
that she is ineligible for unemployment benefits. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts of this case are undisputed. In 2008, after the death of her husband, relator
Sharon Powers -Potter began receiving Social Security survivor benefits. Starting in
January 2018, Powers-Potter was seasonally employed as a test scorer by respondent Data
Recognition Corporation (DRC). In 2020, due to the COVID -19 pandemic, DRC
terminated Powers-Potter’s employment. In January 2021, Powers-Potter elected to switch
her Social Security benefits from survivor benefits to old-age retirement benefits.
On June 27, 2021, Powers -Potter established a n unemployment -benefits account
with respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development
(DEED). This acco unt initially showed that Powers -Potter would receive weekly
unemployment benefits of $265. But in early July , DEED issued Powers -Potter a
determination of ineligibility, concluding that her retirement benefits were deductible
against her unemployment benefits and that this deduction exceeded her total benefits.
Powers-Potter appealed this determination to DEED. In late July, a ULJ held an
evidentiary hearing. In early August, the ULJ determined that Powers-Potter’s retirement
benefits were deductible a gainst her unemployment benefits, and that this deduction
exceeded her total unemployment benefits. Therefore, the ULJ determined that
Powers-Potter was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.
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Powers-Potter appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Powers-Potter argues for reversal of the ULJ’s determination of ineligibility.
Specifically, Powers-Potter argues that reversal is a fair and just result and that Governor
Tim Walz’s executive order suspend ing strict compliance with chapter 268, the
unemployment-law chapter, renders her eligible for unemployment benefits. See Emerg.
Exec. Ord. No. 20-05, Providing Immediate Relief to Employers & Unemployed Workers
During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency (Mar. 16, 2020). DEED disagrees, arguing
that the ULJ correctly applied th e law by determining that she was ineligible for benefits
and that the executive order “has no bearing on this case.”
We may reverse or remand a ULJ’s decision if the substantial rights of the relator
were prejudiced because the decision was affected by an error of law, was unsupported by
substantial evidence , or was arbitrary and capricious . Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(d)(4)-(6) (2020). “We review the ULJ’s findings in the light most favorable to the
decision and will not reverse if there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends to
sustain them.” Hasledalen v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev. , 811 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn.
App. 2012) (quotation omitted). We review legal questions, such as the interpretation of a
statute, de novo. Emerson v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 199, 809 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn.
2012).
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I. The ULJ correctly applied the law when it determined that Powers-Potter was
ineligible for benefits.

Powers-Potter seeks reversal of the ULJ’s determination that she is ineligible for
unemployment benefits. Her entitlement to benefits is governed by Minn. Stat. § 268.085,
subd. 4 (2020),1 which provides, in part:
(a) If all of the applicant’s wage credits [from the base
period] were earned while the applicant was claiming Social
Security old age [retirement] benefits, there is no deduction of
the Social Security benefits from the applicant’s weekly
unemployment benefit amount.

(b) Unless paragraph (a) applies, 50 percent of the
weekly equivalent of the primary Social Security old age
[retirement] benefit the applicant has received . . . with respect
to that week must be deducted from an applicant’s weekly
unemployment benefit amount.

(Emphasis added.)
This statut ory scheme requires the following analysis: (1) does the applicant
currently receive retirement benefits and , if so, (2) did the applicant receive retirement
benefits during the base period. Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 4(a)-(b). If the applicant
currently receives retirement benefits but did not receive those benefits during the base
period, the statute provides that the applicant’s unemployment benefits “must” be reduced
by 50% of the applicant’s retirement benefits. Id., subd. 4(b). We have previously stated
that this statutory scheme creates “a bright-line rule.” Horan v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ.

1 Powers-Potter notes that the Minnesota Legislature decided to repeal subdivision 4 of
Minnesota Statutes section 268.085. Even so, Powers -Potter acknowledges that the
legislature’s repeal of subdivision 4 does not take effect until July 3, 2022. 2021 Minn.
Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 10, art. 4, § 9, at 69. Thus, this repeal does not affect our analysis.
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Dev., No. A16-0675, 2016 WL 7438717, at *2-3 (Minn. App. Dec. 27, 2016) (holding that
the applicant’s unemployment benefits must be deducted by 50% of their retirement
benefits when the applicant received Social Security disability benefits, not retirement
benefits, during the base period).
Here, Powers -Potter received retirement benefits at the time o f her
unemployment-benefits application. She did not receive any retirement benefits during the
base period of January 1 to December 31, 2020. Therefore, 50% of her retirement benefits
“must” be deducted from her prospective unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.085,
subd. 4(b). Because 50% of her weekly retirement benefits ($297.52) exceed ed the total
amount of her weekly unemployment benefits ($265), the ULJ correctly determined that
Powers-Potter was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
Powers-Potter argues that, notwithstanding the statute, it would be fair and just to
render her eligible for unemployment benefits. But our review is limited to whether the
ULJ committed an error of law , made findings unsupported by the evidence , or was
arbitrary and capricious . We conclude that the ULJ’s findings are supported by the law
and the facts of this case, and the decision was not arbitrary and capricious.
II. Powers-Potter’s substantial-compliance argument is forfeited.

Powers-Potter summarily argues that, because the governor’s executive order
suspended strict compliance with chapter 268, the ULJ erred by finding her ineligible for
unemployment benefits. See Emerg. Exec. Ord. No. 20-05.
We decline to address the merits of Powers-Potter’s argument because she failed to
preserve the issue for appeal and adequately brief the issue . “Although some
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accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized
that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply
with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). “A
reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted); see In re A.D., 883 N.W.2d 251,
261 (Minn. 2016) (applying Thiele to a certiorari appeal). Appellate courts decline to reach
issues that are inadequately briefed. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers,
Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997); see Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn.
1982) (providing that inadequately briefe d issues are not properly before an appellate
court); Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc. , 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987) (“While an
appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court
rules, [s]he is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the
court what it is [s]he wants accomplished and by whom.”).
Here, Powers-Potter did not make her substantial-compliance argument to DEED
or the ULJ in the underlying proceedings . Indeed, Powers -Potter admits that she was
unaware of the executive order until after her hearing with the ULJ. Because she did not
raise this issue in the underlying forums, we do not consider her argument on appeal.
In addition, Powers-Potter does not explain in her brie fing how the application of
the substantial-compliance standard would impact the determination of her eligibility for
unemployment benefits. Instead, she summarily asserts that the suspension of strict
compliance with chapter 268 allows her to receive benefits. But Powers-Potter does not
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explain how we must , or even can , reach that result. 2 Because the issue is inadequately
briefed, it is not properly before us , and we decline to consider it on the merits . Wintz
Parcel Drivers, 558 N.W.2d at 480; see also Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65
(Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear
affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon
the one who relies upon it.”).
Because the application of the substantial-compliance standard to the determination
of eligibility was not raised below and is otherwise inadequately briefed, we decline to
consider this argument.
Affirmed.

2 We observe that the executive order suspending strict compliance with chapter 268 was
terminated by the time that DEED determined Powers-Potter’s eligibility for benefits. See
Emerg. Exec. Ord. No. 20-05 (suspending “strict compliance” with chapter 268 “until the
peacetime emergency . . . is terminated”); 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 12, art. 2,
§ 23, at 30 (terminating the peacetime emergency effective July 1, 2021). We also note
that we have applied the substantial-compliance standard to the procedures or timelines to
perfect unemployment claims, and we have not applied the substantial -compliance
standard to the substantive determination of eligibility for unemployment benefits under
the statute. See In re Murack , 957 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying the
substantial-compliance standard to a party who failed to appeal within the 20-day
administrative-appeal deadline for unemployment-benefits cases as required by Minn. Stat.
§ 268.101, subd. 2(f) (2020)); see also In re Moose, No. A21-0881, 2022 WL 433340, a t
*1-2 (Minn. App. Feb. 14, 2022) (same); Iraad v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. A21-0100,
2021 WL 3027633, at *1-2 (Minn. App. July 19, 2021) (same).