In the Matter of the Contested Case Hearing Request by W. Lorentz & Sons Construction.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1359

In the Matter of the Contested Case Hearing Request
by W. Lorentz & Sons Construction.

Filed July 11, 2022
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Minnesota Pollution Control Agency

Matthew C. Berger, Gislason & Hunter LLP, New Ulm, Minnesota (for relator W. Lorentz
& Sons Construction, Inc.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter J. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Pollution Control Agency)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges respondent’s revocation of relator’s
coverage under the state’s general industrial stormwater permit and respondent’s
subsequent denial of a contested-case hearing. Relator asserts that (1) respondent revoked
the permit without 30 days’ notice and based its decision on unlawful procedure and errors
of law; (2) respondent violated relator’s due-process rights; and (3) respondent’s decisions

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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were arbitrary and capricious. We determine that (1) respondent granted permit coverage
to relator under a mistake of fact or law and therefore properly revoked relator’s permit
coverage without notice, and, alternatively, any procedural error was harmless; (2) relator’s
coverage under the permit was not a protected property interest; and (3) respondent’s
decisions were neither arbitrary nor capricious because the record establishes a rational
connection between the facts found and re spondent’s decisions to revoke the permit
coverage and to deny the contested-case hearing. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
These facts are taken from respondent Minnesota Pollution Control Agency’s
(MPCA) September 2021 order denying the request of relator W. Lorentz & Sons
Construction Inc. (Lorentz) for a contested-case hearing and are supplemented by the
record when helpful to the issues on appeal.
Lorentz is an excavation and underground-utilities construction company. In August
2020, Cottonwood County granted Lorentz a conditional-use permit (CUP) for a quarry
project in Amboy Township. The quarry project would involve extraction of Sioux
Quartzite, mining, blasting, crushing, washing, stockpiling, and dewatering.
In November 2020, a citizen group petitio ned the Environmental Quality Board
(EQB) requesting preparation of an environmental-assessment worksheet (EAW) on the
quarry project (EAW petition). The EAW petition alleged three potential environmental
impacts: (1) project activities, including dewatering, drainage ponds, berms, culverts, and
forced drainage, would be in “close proximity [to] protected wetlands”; (2) planned
excavation of 30 acres would affect the habitat of “endangered and threatened rare plant
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species” that are in “the Minnesota Prairie Conservation Plan”; and (3) the quarry’s
location was within one mile of two archaeological sites with rare examples of Native
American petroforms and within two miles of “two documented Native American Burial
sites” that are protected by Minnesota statute.
On November 12, 2020, EQB assigned Cottonwood County as the responsible
governmental unit (RGU) to review the EAW petition and decide whether preparation of
an EAW was required.
On November 30, 2020, Lorentz used MPCA’s online “e-Services portal” to apply
for permit coverage to discharge stormwater from the quarry project under the National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)/State Disposal System (SDS) General
Permit for Industrial Stormwater (general permit). The e- Services portal allows facilities
to submit online applications for general-permit coverage, and MPCA may automatically
grant or deny coverage via the portal, depending on the facility’s application responses.
For example, the application asks whether the facility’s project requires environmental
review. If a facility answers yes, then MPCA does not grant permit coverage until the
environmental review is complete. “Lorentz answered ‘no’ when asked whether
environmental review was required” for the quarry project.
On December 1, 2020, MPCA’s portal automatically granted Lorentz
general-permit coverage for the quarry project.
On December 7, 2020, Cottonwood County notified EQB that the county board
voted to deny the EAW petition, but the vote would not be final until December 15.
Cottonwood County explained it had determined that the quarry project “was exempt [from
4
an EAW] because there was final governmental approval of the project” when the county
granted Lorentz’s CUP in August 2020.
On December 9, 2020, MPCA received a complaint of groundbreaking activity at
the quarry-project site that was “endangering plant life, waterways, and native burials.”
MPCA investigated this complaint, and an investigator spoke with a Lorentz representative
at the quarry-project site. Lorentz admitted its general-permit application had two
inaccuracies: (1) the quarry project’s industrial activity would cover 35.6 acr es, not 160
acres; and (2) the quarry project would not include dewatering.
On December 11, 2020, EQB informed Cottonwood County that it was erroneously
assigned as the RGU for the EAW petition. On the same day, MPCA notified Lorentz that
its general-permit coverage was revoked because of the pending EAW petition. MPCA
also informed Lorentz that its application was inaccurate.
Lorentz responded to MPCA’s permit-revocation notice by asking for “three
‘amendments’ to its existing permit”: (1) the EAW petition was denied on December 1,
2020; (2) the quarry project covers 36 acres; and (3) the quarry-project activities do not
include dewatering or washing.
On December 16, 2020, EQB reassigned the EAW petition to MPCA and published
notice saying so. MPCA requested an extra 15 days to evaluate the EAW petition.
On January 14, 2021, Lorentz appealed MPCA’s “decision on permit revocation
dated 12-11-2020 and request[ed] a contested case hearing on it.”
In February 2021, MPCA notified EQB, Cottonwood County, and Lorentz that it
could not evaluate the EAW petition because (1) MPCA revoked Lorentz’s general-permit
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coverage, and (2) Lorentz did not reapply for general-permit coverage, so “there was no
active project for purposes of environmental review.” MPCA advised that if Lorentz
reapplied for coverage, MPCA “would determine whether an EAW needed to be prepared.”
In a September 2021 order, MPCA denied Lorentz’s request for a contested-case
hearing because (1) Lorentz’s petition for a contested-case hearing lacked the information
required under Minn. R. 7000.1800, and (2) MPCA interpreted Minn. R. 7001.0010-.0210
“to not require a contested-case hearing when [MPCA] revokes coverage under an
auto-issued general permit based on the permittee’s inaccurate representations about the
status of environmental review.” Similarly, MPCA concluded that when it “became aware”
that Lorentz’s general-permit coverage was granted under a mistake of fact, it “was entitled
to revoke the permit immediately.”
Lorentz seeks review by writ of certiorari.1
DECISION
We review MPCA’s decisions involving environmental review under the Minnesota
Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA). Minn. Stat. §§ 115.05, subd. 11(4) (granting
judicial review under MAPA of an agency’s final decision denying a contested -case
hearing), 14.69 (scope of judicial review under MAPA ) (2020); see Minn. Ctr. for Env’t.

1 On April 4, 2022, MPCA moved to postpone oral arguments before this court until May 9,
2022, or later “because this appeal could become moot shortly after oral argument .”
MPCA’s motion asserted that, after MPCA’s revocation decision, Lorentz requested
coverage under a different general permit, and an EAW petition was pending before MPCA
as the RGU. MPCA explained that if MPCA denies the EAW petition and grants Lorentz
coverage, then this appeal may become moot. Lorentz opposed the motion. This court
denied MPCA’s request because “MPCA [did] not assert that the appeal is currently moot.
Whether future developments will actually render the appeal moot is currently unknown.”
6
Advoc. v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn. 2002) (holding
that MAPA applies to “an area such as environmental review, uniquely involving
application of an agency’s expertise, technical training, and experience”). Under MAPA,
“we may affirm, remand, or reverse an agency decision if the agency’s findings of fact are
unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, or affected by an error of law”
or unlawful procedure. In re NorthMet Project Permit to Mine Application, 959 N.W.2d
731, 749 (Minn. 2021). When an agency’s decision relies on the application of its technical
knowledge and expertise to the facts presented, deference should be afforded to the agency.
In re Rev. of 2005 Ann. Automatic Adjustment of Charges for All Elec. & Gas Utils.,
768 N.W.2d 112, 119 (Minn. 2009) (In re 2005 Adjustment).
Lorentz’s challenges to MPCA’s decisions in this appeal require us to understand
relevant statutes and regulations. The federal Clean Water Act (CWA) aims to “restore and
maintain the . . . integrity of the Nation’s waters” and prohibits the discharge of any
pollutant without a permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1311 (2018). The CWA authorizes states
with approved permit programs to grant NPDES permits. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1342(b)
(2018).
Under the Minnesota Water Pollution Control Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 115.01-.09
(2020), MPCA has authority to “administer and enforce all laws relating to the pollution
of any waters of the state,” including authority to grant permits requiring compliance with
the CWA. Minn. Stat. § 115.03, subd. 1(a), (e). MPCA administers the NPDES and SDS
permit programs. Companies like Lorentz may receive a combined NPDES/SDS permit
from MPCA. Minn. Stat. § 115.07; Minn. R. 7001.1010 (2021).
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Chapter 7001 of the Minnesota Rules governs how MPCA grants permits and issues
certifications, including NPDES permits. See Minn. R. 7001.1000-.11 90 (2021)
(describing the NPDES permitting process). The rules governing NPDES permits “shall be
construed” as complementary to the rules governing permit requirements in general—rules
7001.0010-.0210. Minn. R. 7001.1000. The rules also describe revocation procedures.
Minn. R. 7001.0170-.0190 (2021).
Based on this record, we focus on the EAW, which “is a brief document” prepared
to “rapidly assess the environmental effects” that could be linked to a project. Minn. R.
4410.1000, subp. 1 (2021). The process for determining whether an EAW is required is
outlined in chapter 4410 of the Minnesota Rules. One way to obtain an EAW is by petition.
Minn. Stat. § 116D.04 (2020); Minn. R. 4410.1000, subps. 2, 3, .1100, subp. 1 (2021).
Citizens may “request the preparation of an EAW on a project by filing a petition” with
signatures from “at least 100” property owners or residents of the state. Minn. R.
4410.1100, subp. 1. Citizens file an EAW petition with EQB, which then assigns an RGU
to resolve the petition. Id., subps. 3, 5 (2021).2
Lorentz raises three issues on appeal: MPCA’s revocation of its general-permit
coverage and its subsequent denial of a contested-case hearing (1) was based on unlawful

2 After an RGU is assigned to resolve an EAW petition, “[t]he RGU shall order the
preparation of an EAW if the evidence . . . demonstrates that . . . the project may have the
potential for significant environmental effects.” Minn. R. 4410.1100, subp. 6 (2021). If an
EAW is necessary, the RGU shall prepare the EAW “as early as practicable” and then
distribute the completed EAW to EQB and all other parties. Minn. R. 4410.1400, .1500
(2021). After the EAW is distributed, there is a 30-day review period for comments, after
which the RGU “shall” determine whether an EIS is necessary. Minn. R. 4410.1600, .1700,
subp. 3 (2021).
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procedure and “affected by errors of law,” 3 (2) violated Lorentz’s constitutional
due-process rights, and (3) was arbitrary and capricious. We discuss each issue in turn.
I. MPCA’s decisions to revo ke Lorentz’s permit coverage and to deny a
contested-case hearing were not based on unlawful procedure or affected by an
error of law.
The parties emphasize two rules governing the revocation and issuance of permits.
Lorentz points to Minnesota Rule 7001.0190, subpart 4, which states that MPCA “shall
give notice to the permittee of a proposal to revoke a permit without reissuance,” this notice
must give the permittee 30 days to request a contested-case hearing, and the hearing “shall”
be held if requested.
MPCA directs us to Minnesota Rule 7001.0140, subpart 4, which states that MPCA
“shall not make its final decision” on a proposed permit “[w]hen an environmental impact
statement is required to be prepared” until “25 days or more after the adequacy decision is
made.” Minn. R. 7001.0140, subp. 4 (2021). Similarly, the Minnesota Environmental
Protection Act (MEPA) states that if an EAW or environmental-impact statement (EIS) is
required, no “final governmental decision” can be made “to grant a permit” until the EAW
petition is resolved. Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2b.
Lorentz argues MPCA violated rule 7001.0190, subpart 4, by revoking its
general-permit coverage without notice and denying its contested-case -hearing request.
MPCA offers a three-part response. Conceding it did not notify Lorentz before it revoked

3 Lorentz’s brief to this court separates its arguments about unlawful procedure and errors
of law. But Lorentz’s brief argues that the analysis supporting those arguments is the same.
Thus, we combine these two arguments into one issue.
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the permit coverage, MPCA contends notice was not required for two reasons: (1) permit
coverage was granted under a mistake of law and fact because an EAW petition was
pending when MPCA’s portal automatically granted coverage to Lorentz, and (2) rule
7001.0190, subpart 4, applies to individual permits and does not apply to general-permit
coverage such as that granted to Lorentz. Lastly, MPCA contends, in the alternative, that
if rule 7001.0190, subpart 4, applies to general-permit coverage, then any procedural error
was harmless under the facts in this case.
Because we determine that caselaw permits MPCA to immediately revoke a permit
granted under a mistake of fact or law, and MPCA granted Lorentz’s general -permit
coverage under a mistake of fact or law, we need not consider MPCA’s second argument
that subpart 4 applies only to individual permits. We discuss the parties’ other arguments
in turn.
A. MPCA granted general-permit coverage to Lorentz under a mistake of
law and fact ; therefore, MPCA properly revoked permit coverage
without notice.
MPCA contends that Lorentz’s general-permit coverage could be immediately
revoked because of “the longstanding rule” that a permit “is void ab initio” when “issued
under a mistake of fact and in violation of the law.” MPCA cites caselaw dating to 1955 in
support of its position: State ex rel. Howard v. Vill. of Roseville, 70 N.W.2d 404, 408-09
(Minn. 1955); Jasaka Co. v. City of St. Paul, 309 N.W.2d 40, 43-44 (Minn. 1981);
Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 791-92 (Minn. 1989); Halla Nursery, Inc.
v. City of Chanhassen, 781 N.W.2d 880, 885-87 (Minn. 2010).
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In Howard, the relator sought a permit to construct cesspools and septic tanks on
his property. 70 N.W.2d at 406. The village clerk granted this permit, believing that the
cesspools and septic tanks would be installed near the relator’s home for residential
purposes. Id. One day after granting the permit, the clerk discovered that the relator
intended to install a sewage system for a trailer park, and then “pursuant to direction of the
village council, the permit was revoked and the work stopped.” Id. The supreme court
rejected the relator’s argument that the revocation was unlawful. Id. at 408. The supreme
court stated, “Generally, it is held that, where a permit has been issued by an authorized
officer under a mistake of fact and contrary to [law], it confers no privilege on the
[permittee] and even though the latter may have . . . incurr[ed] expenses, it may,
nevertheless, be revoked.” Id. The supreme court determined the permit was granted “under
a mistake of fact and in direct violation of the ordinance,” and when the council discovered
this issue, it acted within its authority to “revoke [the permit] the following day.” Id. at
409.
In Snyder, the property owner obtained a permit to build a large structure, and less
than a month later, the deputy director of the city’s department of inspections informed the
contractor that “the building permit was revoked and to stop work” because the permit was
granted in violation of zoning ordinances. 441 N.W.2d 781, 783-84. The district court
entered a judgment for the property owner, finding reliance damages and negligent
issuance of the permit, and this court affirmed the negligence judgment as modified. Id. at
785. On appeal, the supreme court considered and rejected the property owner’s
due-process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 793. Rel ying on Howard, the supreme
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court held the revocation did not violate the property owner’s due-process rights. Snyder,
441 N.W.2d at 792. The supreme court reasoned that a permit granted under a mistake of
fact and contrary to law confers no privilege on the permittee. Id. The supreme court also
determined the property owner was not deprived of a protected property interest even
though the city failed to provide notice or a hearing before revoking the building permit.
Id.
While this caselaw does not specifically address revocation of coverage under a
general permit, Lorentz does not contend that the caselaw is inapplicable. Rather, Lorentz
“concedes that the MPCA may revoke a permit if it establishes that the permit was issued
based on inaccurate information.” Still, Lorentz urges this court to conclude that MPCA
should have followed rule 7001.0190, subpart 4, before revoking its general-permit
coverage. Both parties agree that MPCA granted general-permit coverage to Lorentz
because Lorentz denied that environmental review was required for the quarry project.
Lorentz contends this was not a mistake of fact because the quarry project did not require
environmental review when Lorentz applied for general-permit coverage.
We are not persuaded. MPCA is precluded from granting a permit while an EAW
petition is pending. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2b; Minn. R. 7001.0140, subp. 4.
Because an EAW petition was pending when MPCA granted general-permit coverage to
Lorentz, the permit was granted under a mistake of fact and law. See Howard, 70 N.W.2d
at 409 (holding that city council may immediately revoke a permit granted under mistake
of fact and law); see also McKee v. County of Ramsey, 245 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Minn. 1976)
(stating an administrative agency’s powers consist only “of the powers granted it by
12
statute . . . therefore . . . a determination of an administrative agency is void and subject to
collateral attack where it is made either without statutory power or in excess thereof”).
Lorentz also argued orally to this court that no mistake of fact occurred because the
Cottonwood County board voted to deny the EAW petition before MPCA revoked
Lorentz’s general-permit coverage. Lorentz did not raise this argument in its brief to this
court, so we need not address the issue. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn.
1982) (stating issues not argued in a party’s briefs are waived).
Even so, we note two reasons why the record does not support Lorentz’s claim that
Cottonwood County rejected the EAW petition. First, EQB erroneously assigned
Cottonwood County as the RGU for the EAW. Cottonwood County made a final decision
to issue a CUP to Lorentz in August 2020, and the EAW petition was filed in November
2020. The relevant rules preclude EQB from designating the county as the RGU for a
later-filed EAW petition. See Minn. R. 4410.0500, subp. 3 (2021) (stating that EQB “shall
not designate as the RGU” a governmental unit that “already made its final decision [] to
grant all permits” required for the project). Second, on December 11, 2020, Cottonwood
County asked EQB not to publish notice of its decision to deny the EAW petition because
the county board’s official vote to deny the petition would not occur until December 15,
2020. In response, EQB notified Cottonwood County that it was erroneously assigned as
the RGU and that it need not take further action on the petition.
Because MPCA granted general-permit coverage to Lorentz under a mistake of fact
and law, the permit “confer[red] no privileges” on Lorentz. Howard, 70 N.W.2d at 409.
Thus, MPCA properly revoked the permit without notice. See id. (holding that the city
13
council acted within its authority when revoking a permit without notice one day after the
permit’s issuance where “the permit was issued under a mistake o f fact and in direct
violation of [an] ordinance”); Snyder, 441 N.W.2d at 783- 84, 792 (holding that a permit
issued under a mistake of fact and contrary to law conferred no privileges on the permittee
and upholding the city’s revocation of the permit without notice or a hearing).
B. Alternatively, any procedural error was harmless.
MPCA contends that even if rule 7001.0190, subpart 4, applied to its revocation of
Lorentz’s permit coverage, Lorentz is not entitled to reversal because it “has not shown
that its substantial rights have been prejudiced.”
“[A]n agency’s decision which is made upon unlawful procedure mandates reversal
only if a party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced.” Deli v. Univ. of Minn.,
511 N.W.2d 46, 49-50 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 23, 1994). In Deli, we
determined the appellants were not substantially prejudiced by the university’s failure to
follow proper procedures in terminating their employment because the failure to follow
procedures “did not affect the eventual outcome of th[e] case.” Id. at 50. We reasoned that
the record did not suggest that termination would not have occurred had the university
followed the proper procedures. Id.
Likewise, if MPCA had given Lorentz 30 days’ notice and a contested-case hearing,
MPCA still would have revoked permit coverage because, as explained, MPCA lacked
statutory authority to grant Lorentz coverage under the permit while an EAW petition was
pending. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2b; Minn. R. 7001.0140, subp. 4; McKee,
245 N.W.2d at 462. Additionally, following the revocation, MPCA invited Lorentz to
14
reapply for general-permit coverage, but Lorentz chose not to do so. Thus, Lorentz fails to
show it was prejudiced by MPCA’s failure to provide 30 days’ notice before revoking
Lorentz’s permit coverage. We conclude any error was harmless and does not require
reversal.
II. MPCA’s revocation of Lorentz’s permit coverage and den ial of its
contested-case hearing request did not violate Lorentz’s due-process rights.
Lorentz contends MPCA violated its due-process rights by failing to give notice of
its permit revocation and denying Lorentz’s request for a contested- case hearing. MPCA
argues it did not violate Lorentz’s due-process rights because “under federal and state law,
a permittee has no property interest in a NPDES permit,” and “a property owner has no
protected property interest in a permit that is issued based on a mistake of fact and in
violation of the law.”
To determine whether due-process rights have been violated, courts conduct a
two-step analysis. In re Decision to Deny Petitions for Contested Case Hearing,
924 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Minn. App. 2019) (Deny Petitions) (citing Rew v. Bergstrom,
845 N.W.2d 764, 785 (Minn. 2014)), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 2019). “First, we identify
whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property
interest.” Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 785. Second, we “determine ‘whether the procedures
followed by the [government] were constitutionally sufficient.’” Id. (quoting Swarthout v.
Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011)).
Caselaw guides our analysis under the first step. In Snyder, the property owner
claimed that when he received a building permit, he also acquired a protected property
15
interest that could not be revoked without due process. 441 N.W.2d at 791. The supreme
court determined “Snyder suffered no deprivation of a protected property interest” when
the city revoked his permit without notice or a hearing because “where a permit has been
issued by an authorized officer under a mistake of fact and contrary to zoning ordinances,
it confers no privilege on the person to whom it is issued.” Id. at 792 (quoting Howard,
70 N.W.2d at 408).
Also, as MPCA points out, under the federal regulations, NPDES permits “do not
convey any property rights of any sort, or any exclusive privilege.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.5(b)
(2021). Similarly, the Minnesota Rules provide that a permit does “not convey a property
right or an exclusive privilege.” Minn. R. 7001.0150, subp. 3(c) (2021).
Based on Snyder and relevant statutes and rules, we conclude Lorentz had no
property interest in the general permit because MPCA granted coverage under a mistake
of fact and law and because permits do not confer a property right. Because Lorentz’s claim
fails under the first step in the due- process analysis, we do not consider the second step.
See Deny Petitions, 924 N.W.2d at 644 (“If the government’s action does not deprive an
individual of such an interest, then no process is due.”).
III. MPCA’s decisions to revoke Lorentz’s permit coverage and to deny a
contested-case hearing were not arbitrary and capricious.
Lorentz contends MPCA’s decisions were arbitrary and capricious because MPCA
“undertook extraordinary steps to investigate” the EAW petition after it was denied and
then “scheme[d] to resurrect the [EAW] petition.” Lorentz argues that MPCA’s decisions
“were corrupted by outside political influences and were not made based solely on the facts
16
in the record” and that after revoking Lorentz’s permit coverage , MPCA “repeatedly
ignored statutory deadlines to delay any resolution” of the case. Lorentz claims this is proof
that “MPCA was exercising its will, rather than engaging in reasoned decision-making.”
MPCA disagrees and contends the record shows that citizens were concerned about
the quarry project, MPCA investigated these complaints , and MPCA’s “decisions do not
reflect MPCA exercising its will, but rather its best judgment on how the agency could
discharge its statutory obligations under [Minnesota statutes] and its permitting
responsibilities.”
An “agency’s conclusions are not arbitrary and capricious so long as a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made has been articulated.” In re Excess
Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Minn. 2001)
(Blue Cross) (quotation omitted). But “[i]f the agency’s decision represents its will, rather
than its judgment, the decision is arbitrary and capricious.” Pope Cnty. Mothers v. Minn.
Pollution Control Agency, 594 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. App. 1999). An agency’s decision
is arbitrary and capricious if the agency (a) relied on factors not
intended by the legislature; (b) entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem; (c) offered an explanation that
runs counter to the evidence; or (d) the decision is so
implausible that it could not be explained as a difference in
view or the result of the agency’s expertise.

Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d
817, 832 (Minn. 2006) (CARD). Importantly, “[i]f there is room for two opinions on a
matter, the [agency’s] decision is not arbitrary and capricious, even though the court may
17
believe that an erroneous conclusion was reached.” In re 2005 Adjustment, 768 N.W.2d at
118.
MPCA’s actions were not arbitrary and capricious because its decisions to revoke
Lorentz’s permit and to deny a contested-case hearing are rationally connected to the facts
MPCA found, and MPCA clearly articulated its decision in its September 2021 order. See
Blue Cross, 624 N.W.2d at 277 (“[An] agency’s conclusions are not arbitrary and
capricious so long as a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made
has been articulated.”). Shortly after MPCA automatically granted Lorentz general-permit
coverage through an online portal, MPCA began investigating the quarry project because
of a citizen complaint that Lorentz broke ground on the quarry project and that its activities
had potential environmental impacts. MPCA sent a representative to the quarry-project
site, where Lorentz disclosed inaccuracies in its general-permit application. MPCA’s
investigation was rational given that the agency has the duty to administer and enforce all
laws relating to pollution of any of the state’s waters and to investigate the extent, character,
and effect of pollution to the state’s waters. Minn. Stat. § 115.03, subd. 1(a), (b).
Shortly after MPCA’s visit to the quarry site, EQB notified Cottonwood County it
was erroneously assigned as the RGU, instructed the county that it need not act on the
EAW petition, and appointed MPCA as the RGU to the EAW petition. MPCA revoked
Lorentz’s general-permit coverage because the EAW petition was pending. Later, MPCA
notified Lorentz it did not evaluate the EAW petition because Lorentz’s permit coverage
was revoked and informed Lorentz it could reapply. Lorentz did not reapply. Lorentz does
not dispute MPCA’s finding that “[w]ithout a pending permit application, there was no
18
active project for the purposes of environmental review.” See Minn. R. 4410.0200, subp.
65 (defining “project” as “a governmental action, the results of which would cause physical
manipulation of the environment, directly or indirectly”), .0300, subp. 2 (describing the
scope of environmental-review rules and stating that these rules “shall apply” to various
types of “projects”) (2021). Finally, MPCA denied Lorentz’s request for a contested-case
hearing because it determined Lorentz received permit coverage under a mistake of fact.
In sum, MPCA’s decisions to revoke Lorentz’s general-permit coverage and to deny
a contested-case hearing were based on statutes and regulations MPCA is tasked with
following. MPCA did not ignore any aspect of the case; nor does Lorentz assert that any
important factor went unconsidered. MPCA’s decisions do not conflict with the evidence
or with the statutes and rules at issue. Finally, MPCA’s determination is not “so implausible
that it could not be explained as a difference in view or the result of the agency’s expertise.”
CARD, 713 N.W.2d at 832.
Affirmed.