Roger Reyes Victoria, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1364

Roger Reyes Victoria,
Relator,

vs.

Long Prairie Packing Company Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed May 16, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 46550143-2

Roger Reyes Victoria, Long Prairie, Minnesota (pro se relator)

William Moody, Fitch, Johnson, Larson & Held, P.A., Roseville, Minnesota (for
respondent employer)

Keri Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Empl oyment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Relator challenges an unemployment-law judge’s (ULJ) determination that he filed
an untimely appeal of the denial of his unemployment benefits. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In May 2021, relator Roger Reyes Victoria applied for unemployment benefits and
created a benefit account with respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development (DEED). On June 30, 2021, DEED mailed a determination of
ineligibility to the address on file for Reye s Victoria. The mai ling provided that the
determination would become final unless Reyes Victoria filed an administrative appeal by
July 20, 2021. On A ugust 2, 2021, 13 days after the filing deadline, Reyes Victoria
appealed the eligibility determin ation. The next day, a UL J issued an order summarily
dismissing Reyes Victoria’s appeal as untimely because it was not filed by July 20.
Reyes Victoria filed a timely request fo r reconsideration. His request for
reconsideration explained that he “do[es] not speak very good En glish an[d] needed
assistance with the appeal and unfortunately was not able to get help until after the appeal
date to file.” In a written order, the ULJ denied the request for reconsideration and affirmed
the dismissal of Reyes Victoria’s appeal as untimely.
Reyes Victoria appeals by a writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Reyes Victoria challenges the ULJ’s decisi on to dismiss his administrative appeal
of DEED’s ineligibility determination as untimely. In his in formal brief, he relies on the
3
grounds asserted in his request for reconsidera tion, arguing that he was unable to file an
administrative appeal before the deadline be cause he does not speak English well and it
was hard for him to find a translator to help w ith the process. He also asserts for the first
time on appeal that the inelig ibility determination was sent to the wrong a ddress and/or
returned to sender, so he did not receive it “until after a while.” DEED argues that the ULJ
did not err by dismissing the appeal as untimely because Reyes Victoria did not strictly or
substantially comply with the appeal deadline.
A ULJ’s decision to dismiss an appeal as untimely raises a question of law, which
we review de novo. In re Murack , 957 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Mi nn. App. 2021). We may
reverse a ULJ’s decision if the substantial ri ghts of the relator have been prejudiced
because, among other things, the decision is affected by an error of law or is unsupported
by substantial evidence. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
“A determination of eligibility or determination of inel igibility is final unless an
appeal is filed by the applicant or employer within 20 calendar days after sending.” Minn.
Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f) (20 20). Generally, this 20-day tim eline is “strictly construed,
regardless of mitigating circumstances.” King v. Univ. of Minn. , 387 N.W.2d 675, 677
(Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 13, 1986).
However, strict compliance with the 20-da y appeal deadline set forth in Minn.
Stat. § 268.101, subdivision 2(f), was suspended effectiv e March 16, 2020, by Executive
Order 20-05 (EEO 20-05). Emer g. Exec. Ord. No. 20-05, Providing Immediate Relief to
Employers & Unemployed Workers During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency
(Mar. 16, 2020) (providing in relevant part that “strict compliance with Minnesota Statutes
4
2019, Chapter 268, Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law is suspended”). The
governor issued EEO 20-05 in response to the challenges faced by unemployed workers
and employers alike from the ongoing pandemic. Id. As a result of EEO 20-05, an
untimely appeal of a DEED ineligibility dete rmination could proceed so long as the
applicant “substantially complied” with the statutory appeal timeframe. See Murack ,
957 N.W.2d at 131 (stating that, under EEO 20-05, relators need not strictly comply with
the 20-day appeal period and remanding for a determination of whether the relator
substantially complied with the statutory timeline). And, in Murack, this court specified
that an applicant could show “substantial compliance” with the statute if the applicant
“ha[d] a reasonable explanation for failing to strictly comply, ha[d] taken steps to comply
with the statute, and ha[d] generally complied with the statute’s purpose; and there [was]
reasonable notice and a lack of prejudice to other parties.” Id. at 130. On July 1, 2021, at
11:59 p.m., EEO 20-05 and its suspension of strict compliance expired. 2021 Minn. Laws
1st Spec. Sess. ch. 12, art. 2, § 23.
Here, the waiver of strict compliance under EEO 20-05 was in effect at the start of
Reyes Victoria’s 20-day appeal period on June 30, 2021. Murack was also established
precedent at that time, having been issued by this court on March 8, 2021. But the ULJ’s
order dismissing Reyes Victoria’s appeal as untimely did not address whether Reyes
Victoria had substantially complied with th e statutory appeal period. And the ULJ’s
subsequent order on reconsideration only brie fly mentioned substantial compliance. The
order stated only that Reyes Victoria “made no efforts to file an appeal within the 20-day
5
appeal period” and therefore “did not substantially comply with the deadline under [EEO]
20-05, which expired on July 1, 2021.”
For purposes of this nonprecedential opini on, we assume that Reyes Victoria was
required to substantially, rather than stric tly, comply with the 20 -day appeal timeline
because EEO 20-05 was in effect at the start of his appeal period. On that basis, we
conclude that the ULJ applied an incorrect legal standard to determine whether Reyes
Victoria substantially comp lied. In analyzing the que stion, the ULJ considered only
whether Reyes Victoria substantially complied within the 20-day appeal period. In
Murack, however, we recognized that “[a] party may be said to have substantially complied
with a statute where she has a reasonable e xplanation for failing to strictly comply, has
taken steps to comply with the statute , and has generally complied with the statute’s
purpose; and there is reasonable notice and a lack of prejudice to other parties.” Murack,
957 N.W.2d at 130 (emphasis added). Our language in Murack does contemplate a
showing of steps taken to comply with the statute, but the language does not require that
the steps be taken within the 20-day appeal period. See id. Because the ULJ applied a
stricter substantial-compliance standa rd than the standa rd set forth in Murack, the ULJ
erred as a matter of law.
We next address whether the ULJ’s le gal error prejudiced Reyes Victoria’s
substantial rights. Reversal and remand is not warr anted unless the error prejudiced
relator’s substantial rights. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d).
We conclude that the ULJ’s legal error prejudiced Reyes Victoria’s substantial
rights because the ULJ determined that Reyes Victoria’s appeal could not proceed based
6
on the ULJ’s application of the erroneous legal standard. In addition, not only did the ULJ
apply the incorrect legal standard regardi ng the steps that Reyes Victoria “ha[d]
taken . . . to comply with the statute,” but the ULJ also did not address any of the other
substantial-compliance factors specified in Murack. See Murack , 957 N.W.2d at 130
(listing factors). As a result, the ULJ ignored relevant factual assertions made by Reyes
Victoria including that he filed the appeal 13 days past the statut ory deadline because he
does not speak English well, needed assistance with the appeal, and was unable to obtain
assistance until after the appeal deadline.1 In doing so, the ULJ prejudiced Reyes Victoria’s
substantial rights.
Because the ULJ erred by applying a too-narrow legal standard and Reyes Victoria’s
substantial rights were prejudiced as a result, we reverse and remand with instructions for
the ULJ to re-examine the s ubstantial-compliance question based on a proper application
of Murack. On remand, the ULJ is permitted to open the record and conduct a hearing.
See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(c) (2020).
Reversed and remanded.

1 Reyes Victoria also asserts for the first time on appeal that the ineligibility determination
was sent to the wrong address and/or returned to sender, so he did not timely receive it.
Because he did not raise this as a basis fo r reconsideration before the ULJ, we do not
consider it on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that
an appellate court “must genera lly consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented and considered by th e trial court in deciding th e matter before it” (quotation
omitted)). Nothing in this opinion should be construe d to preclude the ULJ from
considering this argument and the related assertions on remand if the record is reopened.