Keshaun Pierre Guy, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1376

Keshaun Pierre Guy, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 6, 2022
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-18827

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2019, Keshaun Pierre Guy was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and
ammunition. In 2021, he petitioned for post-conviction relief on the ground that the search
warrant that led to the discovery of the firearm and the ammunition was not supported by
probable cause. The post-conviction court denied the petition. We conclude that the search
warrant was supported by probable cause and, therefore, affirm.
FACTS
In July 2018, Sergeant Biederman of the Minneapolis Police Department applied
for warrants for searches of a house and a vehicle. Each warrant application included the
following statements:
Through the course of my employment, I was contacted
by a confidential reliable informant (CRI) who stated that a
male, known to them as “Kasun Guy” possessed a firearm.
This CRI was able to identify Keshaun Pierre GUY . . . as the
male they were talking about. The CRI stated that GUY lived
at [address omitted] and described the home physically. I
drove past the house and noted that the description and the
appearance were the same. This CRI stated that GUY
possessed firearms and drugs in the house. The CRI stated that
GUY sold the narcotics in north Minneapolis.

Within the last 72 hours, I was again contacted by the
CRI, who stated that GUY was in possession of a firearm in a
vehicle. The CRI stated that they had observed GUY in a gray
SUV with Minnesota plates [letters and numbers omitted] with
the firearm. The CRI was able to direct me to the location
where GUY was and I noted that GUY was in the driver’s seat
of the Dodge Journey with Minnesota plates [same letters and
numbers omitted]. GUY was followed to [same address
omitted] in the vehicle.

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The Dodge Journey with Minnesota plates [same letters
and numbers omitted] lists to GUY at [same address omitted]
in the Department of Motor Vehicle records.

GUY has a criminal history that would prevent the legal
possession of a firearm, specifically, he has a first-degree
burglary conviction . . . and a domestic assault conviction . . . .

A district court judge approved the applications and issued the search warrants.
Law-enforcement officers executed the search warrants three days later. Guy was
present at the house identified in the search warrant at the time of the search. In an upstairs
bedroom, officers found a loaded .45- caliber handgun and numerous loose rounds of
ammunition. Officers also found two boxes of ammunition in the bedroom closet: one box
of .45 caliber ammunition and one box of .38 caliber ammunition. In a subsequent
interview, Guy admitted that he owned and possessed the handgun and that the bedroom
where it was found is his bedroom. No contraband was found in Guy’s vehicle.
The state charged Guy with one count of being an ineligible person in possession of
a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016). In October 2018, Guy
moved to suppress the evidence of the firearm and the ammunition on the ground that the
warrant application was not supported by probable cause. The district court held a hearing
on the motion in November 2018. Neither party presented any testimony. In December
2018, the district court filed an order in which it denied the motion on the ground that the
search warrant was supported by probable cause.
In April 2019, on the first day of trial, the state amended the complaint to add two
counts of being an ineligible person in possession of ammunition, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). A jury found Guy guilty of all three charges. In June 2019,
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the district court imposed a sentence of 60 months of imprisonment on count 1. Guy did
not pursue a direct appeal.
In June 2021, Guy petitioned for post-conviction relief on the ground that the search
warrant for his residence was not supported by probable cause. Guy’ s petition expressly
states that he was not requesting an evidentiary hearing. The state opposed the petition by
filing an answer and memorandum of law, and Guy filed a reply memorandum. In August
2021, the post-conviction court denied Guy’s petition on the ground that the search warrant
was supported by probable cause. Guy appeals.
DECISION
Guy argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his post-conviction
petition. He contends that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures” and states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. “Probable cause exists if the judge issuing a warrant determines that ‘there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’” State v. Yarbrough,
841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
Whether probable cause exists is a “practical, common-sense decision” based on the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 622-23. If the facts and circumstances establishing
probable cause are supplied by a confidential informant, the “informant’s ‘veracity,’
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‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in determining the value of
his report.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. These characteristics are not “entirely separate and
independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case” but, rather, are “closely
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question
whether there is ‘probable cause.’” Id.
If there is a challenge to an issuing court’s determination of probable cause, the
reviewing court is limited to the information contained in the warrant application. State v.
Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998). The reviewing court “should afford the district
court’s determination great deference” and should consider only “whether the issuing judge
had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” State v. Rochefort, 631
N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001); see also Rugendorf v. United States , 376 U.S. 528, 533
(1964). Because the issuing judge’s determination should be based on the “totality of the
circumstances,” the reviewing court must be careful not to review each component of the
application in isolation. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1984). The
resolution of doubtful or marginal cases “should be largely determined by the preference
to be accorded to warrants.” Id. at 734 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
109 (1965)).
In this case, the post-conviction court determined that the warrant application stated
facts and circumstances that established probable cause. The post-conviction court reached
this conclusion by reasoning that the informant voluntarily provided information to
Sergeant Beiderman, that the informant’s basis of knowledge was demonstrated by his or
her personal observation, and that the informant’s tip was corroborated by Sergeant
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Beiderman. Guy contends that the post-conviction court erred with respect to each of its
reasons.
Our review of the warrant application reveals that, based on the t otality of the
circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that the warrant
application was supported by probable cause. We reach this conclusion for three reasons.
First, the informant’s veracity was supported by the undisputed fact that the
informant was known to Sergeant Biederman. The post-conviction court expressly stated
that the informant was known to Sergeant Beiderman, and Guy does not challenge that
point on appeal. That fact tends to support the accuracy of the informant’s tips because the
informant was “in a position to be held accountable” for the information provided. See
State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1990).
Second, the informant’s basis of knowledge is evident from the warrant application.
“Recent personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the preferred
basis for an informant’s knowledge.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985).
In addition, an informant’s “statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his
tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 234. In this
case, the warrant application indicated that the confidential informant had personally
observed, on multipl e occasions, facts that were relevant to the probable-cause
determination. The informant’s first tip indicated first-hand knowledge because it included
both an address and a physical description of Guy’s home. The informant’s second tip
more strongly indicated first-hand knowledge because the informant stated that he or she
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had observed Guy driving a particular vehicle (which was identified by its color, type, and
license plate) in a particular location at that particular time.
Third, the reliability of the informant’s tips was enhanced by Sergeant Beiderman’s
corroboration of some of the informant’s information. The United States Supreme Court
has “consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by
independent police work.” Id. at 241-43 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269
(1960), Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964), and Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307, 309, 313 (1959)). “[C]orroboration through other sources of information reduce[s]
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale.” Id. at 244-45 (quotation omitted). To
establish reliability by corroboration, “there is no mandate that every fact in the
[informant’s report] be corroborated, that a certain number of facts be corroborated, or that
certain types of facts must be corroborated.” State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Minn.
App. 2008). The corroboration of even minor details can lend credence to an informant’s
report. Draper, 358 U.S. at 313; McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at 704; State v. Siegfried, 274
N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 1978). In this case, Sergeant Biederman confirmed that Guy was
the registered owner of the vehicle specifically described by the informant, that Guy’s
vehicle registration included the same address where the informant said that Guy lived, and
that the informant’s description of Guy’s home was accurate. In addition, after the
informant’s second tip, Sergeant Biederman confirmed that Guy was then in his vehicle at
the location described by the informant, and Sergeant Biederman followed the vehicle to
the address provided by the informant, which tended to corroborate the informant’s
statement that Guy lived there.
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Guy challenges the value of Sergeant Biederman’s corroboration by contending that
the corroborated facts were “easily obtainable” and, thus, did not meaningfully add to the
probable-cause analysis. It is true that some of the information provided (such as Guy’s
address, a description of his residence, and his ownership of a grey SUV with a particular
license plate) likely was known by some persons other than the informant. But the
informant’s second tip —that Guy was in a particular vehicle at a particular place at a
particular time—is not the type of information that many persons we re likely to know.
Consequently, Sergeant Biederman’s corroboration of that information provided stronger
support for the reliability of the informant’s tips.
Guy contends more generally that this case is similar to State v. Albrecht, 465
N.W.2d 107 (Minn. App. 1991), in which this court concluded that a search warrant was
not supported by probable cause. Id. at 109. But Albrecht is distinguishable in at least two
significant ways. First, the informant in Albrecht was anonymous, which meant that law-
enforcement officers had no inherent reason to believe in the informant’s veracity. Id. at
108-09. Second, the officers in Albrecht corroborated only some of the information
provided by the informant: the location of the defendant’s home and a description of the
defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 108. In this case, the informant was known to Sergeant
Biederman, and Sergeant Biederman corroborated more information than in Albrecht,
including information about Guy’s location at the time of the second tip. Accordingly, the
Albrecht opinion does not compel reversal in this case.
In sum, given the information contained in the warrant application, the issuing judge
had a substantial basis to conclude that the totality of the circumstances indicated that there
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was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in Guy’s
home. Thus, the post-conviction court did not err by concluding that the warrant
application was supported by probable cause and did not err by denying Guy’s petition for
post-conviction relief.
Affirmed.