State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1416

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tamarr Brayon Long,
Appellant.

Filed September 6, 2022
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-22848

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of possession of ammunition by an ineligible
person, arguing that the district court erred by not suppressing evidence that resulted from
an unlawful seizure and that the seizure was not attenuated by the discovery of a warrant
for his arrest. We affirm.
FACTS
On October 24, 2020 at 2:00 a.m., Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office deputies
responded to “a suspicious persons report” made in a residential neighborhood of Golden
Valley. The deputies approached two cars with lights off, but still running, parked on the
side of the road. Appellant Tamarr Brayon Long was a passenger sitting in the rear right
seat of a Honda. The encounter ended with Long’s seizure and arrest. After being arrested,
deputies found ammunition on his person and a firearm under the seat directly in front of
where he had been sitting.
Long was initially charged with one count of ineligible possession of ammunition
or firearm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713 subd. 1(2) (2020). A Rasmussen hearing
was held to address Long’s motion to suppress the evidence as a result of an unlawful
seizure. Long argued that the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to
contact Long nor probable cause to seize him. At the Rasmussen hearing, the deputy who
initiated Long’s seizure testified, describing the information that he received from dispatch
about the reporting party’s call as follows:
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As I was heading to the call, the notes indicated that the
RP, which is the reporting party, said there was a vehicle
outside of her house bearing—I think they gave three digits of
the license plate. . . .

But she called in worried because her mother’s driver’s
license was recently stolen and was kind of nervous and
worried that it might be related that there is a car parked outside
in front of her house.

The reporting party noted that the car had been running for about five minutes before she
called the police. The deputy described the neighborhood as “purely residential” without
many streetlights, near a freeway but not directly off of it. The deputy testified that when
he and his partner arrived at the scene he found two running cars, one—a Honda— with a
license plate matching the description given by the reporting party. He approached the
Honda and found that it contained three people, not one as the reporting party had stated.
His partner approached the second car.
The deputy stated that he walked up to the Honda and asked if everyone was okay .
The deputy asked the car’s occupants why they were in the area, and the driver responded
that they were looking for a hotel. The driver said that she was from Anoka but that they
were coming from Brooklyn Park, looking for a hotel because her grandparents would not
allow her to return to the home due to the risk of spreading COVID-19. The deputy testified
that this response drew his suspicion because the cars were “pulled into not a well-lit area.
It was a neighborhood fully residential. And if you were an individual looking for a hotel,
off of Highway 169 if you went a little more south, for instance, 394, you probably could
have just pulled into a hotel parking lot.” The driver had her phone in her lap when the
deputy approached.
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The deputy identified the driver of the Honda and ran warrant checks on her as well
as the driver of the second car. The driver of the second car had an outstanding sign-and-
release warrant. While the deputy handled that warrant, his partner conducted field
sobriety testing of the driver of the Honda. When the driver of the second car had signed
the warrant and got back in her car, the deputy decided to get identification of the two
passengers in the Honda. The deputy explained his justification:
[A]fter the collaboration of the stories, we went to identify the
rest of the occupants because the time of day, the area where
the vehicles were parked, and the prior knowledge that the RP
reported that her mother’s driver’s license was stolen led me to
identify the rest of the occupants in that vehicle.

Approximately 15 minutes after he arrived on the scene, the deputy got verbal
identification from Long and the other passenger. He checked their names for warrants,
telling them to “hang tight” while he did so. Two more police cars with at least one officer
in each arrived on the scene while the deputy checked for warrants. About “a minute or
two” after receiving Long’s information, the deputy discovered that Long had an
outstanding felony warrant.
The deputy arrested Long and searched him incident to his arrest. Long had a “Bersa
magazine” in his front pocket, and a Bersa 1 firearm was found under the seat directly in
front of him.
On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the deputy for specifics about
the reporting party’s call, including if the officer knew when and where the alleged stolen

1 “Bersa” is a brand of firearm.
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driver’s license had been taken. The deputy responded that the crime he had been
“dispatched to investigate” “was just suspicious activity.” He clarified this answer by
stating: “the referring party said that the mother’s driver’s license was stolen and that she
was just kind of nervous that there was a vehicle parked outside for the last five minutes
with the lights off.” On re-direct examination, the state asked the deputy whether he was
concerned about burglary or robbery, or some “suspicion that something was afoot
regarding this vehicle.” The deputy responded:
given the information from . . . the reporting party, you know,
it could have been a potential burglary or casing of a place. It
is very suspicious of a car at that time being parked in front of
someone’s house who just had their license stolen. So I guess
we’re investigating . . . a potential crime that may or may not
have been committed.

He also testified that, based on his training and experience, it was common for a burglar to
have a getaway car “just waiting and running for them to return [to] and drive off quickly.”
He testified that at the time of the incident he did not think this was a high drug or high
crime area.
No other witnesses were called, and both parties submitted written closing
arguments. The district court denied Long’s suppression motion, concluding that Long
was seized when the driver was seized, and that the deputy had “reasonable particular
suspicion” of criminal activity because the deputy became suspicious of the answers
provided during his initial questioning. In sum:
Based on the late hour, the idling of the cars without their lights
on, the lack of light in the area, the suspicious answers, and his
knowledge that an occupant of a nearby house had their ID
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with their home address on it stolen earlier that day, [the
deputy] became suspicious of a possible burglary.

The district court denied Long’s suppression motion on an additional basis,
concluding that “the attenuation doctrine applies and would purge the taint of any
unconstitutionally obtained evidence against [Long].”
The state amended its complaint, charging Long with one count of ineligible
possession of ammunition and one count of ineligible possession of a firearm in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 624.713 subd. 1(2). A jury convicted Long of possession of ammunition
by an ineligible person. He was sentenced to prison for 60 months. This appeal follows.
DECISION
When reviewing a challenge to a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this
court’s review is limited to the district court’s pretrial order denying the motion to suppress.
State v. Busse, 644 N.W.2d 79, 88-89 (Minn. 2002). In considering a challenge to such an
order, appellate courts review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous
if, on the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
occurred.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010). A determination as to
the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause is reviewed de novo.
State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Minn. 1999).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10
of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless
searches and seizures are unreasonable under both the state and federal constitutions unless
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a recognized warrant exception applies. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474
(1971); State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). The state must show that an
exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn.
2003).
Under Minnesota law, a seizure occurs when “in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was
neither free to disregard the police questions nor free to terminate the encounter.” State v.
Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999) (citing Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 497-98
(1983) and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)) (other citation omitted).
A police officer may temporarily seize an individual to investigate possible criminal
activity, provided that the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
individual is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364, 368
(Minn. 2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). “[T]he reasonable suspicion
showing ‘is not high.’” State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (quoting
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997)). But it does “require[] at least a minimal
level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123 (2000). The justification must be more than an “inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch” that criminal activity may occur. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. An officer
cannot rely on “whim, caprice, or idle curiosity” as grounds for a stop. State v. Pike, 551
N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Moreover, an officer
must have “objective evidentiary justification” for the belief that an individual is involved
in criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. A police officer must be able to point to
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“specific, articulable facts” that allow the officer to articulate a “particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d
at 842-43.
The district court concluded that Long was seized when the driver of the Honda was
seized, and on appeal, neither party challenges that conclusion. The district court further
determined that the deputy had reasonable, articulable suspicion that there may be a
possible burglary because of “the late hour, the idling of the cars without their lights on,
the lack of light in the area, the suspicious answers, and his knowledge that an occupant of
a nearby house had their ID with their home address on it stolen earlier that day.” 2 Long
concedes that the information given by the reporting party during the 911 call was
sufficient to justify the police approaching the Honda to determine why the occupants were
there. But Long argues that once the officer received the information that the occupants
were looking for a hotel, the encounter should have ended. The deputy testified that the
answers to his questions were suspicious because he thought that it was a “weird” place to
look for a hotel. He testified that the area was not well lit, it was residential, and hotels

2 The district court made a factual finding that “the [reporting party] was concerned that
the middle-of-the-night arrival of the car was related to the theft of her mother’s purse that
day. The purse contained an ID which had the 911 caller’ s address on it.” Long argues
that the district court’s findings that the reporting person’s mother’s purse and driver’s
license had been stolen earlier that day was error. In its principal brief, the state concedes
that the district court clearly erred because the record only points to a stolen driver’s license
that had been taken “recently,” not a purse stolen the same day. We conclude that these
factual findings, while erroneous, were not material to the conclusion that the deputy had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize and investigate Long.
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were located further south along the freeway where the driver could have “just pulled into
a hotel parking lot.”
Long does not agree with the characterization of the driver’s answers as
“suspicious.” He argues that the driver may not have had the same knowledge about the
location of hotels as the deputy. And he contends that the evidence that the driver had her
phone on her lap corroborated that she was looking for hotels online. But the deputy was
entitled to have suspicion about the driver’s answers. The late hour and the cars idling
where there was little light in a residential neighborhood, along with the proximity of hotels
close by are facts sufficient for the deputy to find the answers suspicious.
Long attempts to make a distinction between the deputy supporting his suspicion on
the driver’s answers rather than on what Long was doing during the encounter. He states
that by doing so, the deputy’s suspicion was not particularized to Long. See United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (concluding that “detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity”).
But, as the state argues, the deputy’s suspicions were justified under the totality of
the circumstances. The deputy believed that the cars idling in front of the reporting party’s
house in a purely residential neighborhood was unusual. Combined with the fact that the
reporting party’s mother’s identification had recently been stolen, the deputy reasonably
believed that the house might be being cased or about to be burglarized. The deputy
testified that, in his experience, burglars often keep a running vehicle nearby to escape.
And his suspicions grew throughout the course of the brief seizure. After receiving the
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“suspicious” answers to his questions, the officer helped his partner determine that the
driver of the second vehicle had an outstanding warrant. This added to the officer’s
suspicions under the totality of the circumstances. The deputy’s return to the passengers
in the Honda in order to continue his investigation was reasonable and justified under the
circumstances.
Long also argues that the reporting party did not give the deputy sufficient
information to “objectively and reasonably” link Long in the Honda to the stolen driver’s
license. Long cites to Brown v. Texas where officers stopped a man who had been walking
in an alley in an area known for high drug traffic. 443 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1979). The officers
stopped the man after they observed him and another man walking in opposite directions
away from one another in an alley. Id. at 48. The officers thought that the situation “looked
suspicious” and noted that they had never seen that man in the area before. Id. at 49. In
concluding that the officers’ reasonable suspicion that the man was involved in criminal
activity was not supported by the preceding circumstances, the Supreme Court stated:
Officer Venegas testified at appellant’s trial that the situation
in the alley “looked suspicious,” but he was unable to point to
any facts supporting that conclusion. There is no indication in
the record that it was unusual for people to be in the alley. The
fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug
users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that
appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct. In short,
the appellant’s activity was no different from the activity of
other pedestrians in that neighborhood. When pressed, Officer
Venegas acknowledged that the only reason he stopped
appellant was to ascertain his identity.

Id. at 52.
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Long argues that his case is similar to Brown because the reporting party “did not
articulate a single fact that objectively and reasonably linked the Honda, lawfully parked
on a residential city street, to the stolen driver’s license.” Long argues that the facts
articulated to police by the reporting party are important because they were what the deputy
would have known when approaching the Honda. He contends that the reporting party
merely imagined a link between the stolen driver’s license and the car parked outside her
house, but gave no indication that it was unusual for there to be “traffic on the street at that
time of day.” However, the time of day is different here than in Brown. The Honda was
parked idling outside of the reporting party’s house at 2:00 a.m. in a purely residential
neighborhood. Brown was walking in an alley at midday. And the recently stolen driver’s
license coupled with the suspicious answers to the deputy’s questions in this case add
justification under the totality of the circumstances.
Citing State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505 (Minn. 2002), Long asserts that the deputy
should have simply verified his identity rather than run a warrant check. In Johnson, we
addressed whether an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion that a passenger was
involved in criminal activity to justify seizing him and running a warrant check. Id. at 507.
The officers had pulled over the car for an equipment violation. Id. When it was
determined that the driver had only a permit to drive, the officer asked another passenger
and Johnson whether they had a valid driver’s license. Id. The officer took Johnson’s
identification and instead of merely establishing that the license was valid, ran a warrant
check. Id. This court determined that the officer could have legally established that the
license was valid, as this would have pertained to the driver having only a permit that
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required a licensed passenger in the car. Id. at 508. But since the warrant check was not
justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion that Johnson was involved in criminal
activity, the seizure was not valid. Id. at 510.
Here, the deputy testified that he believed that Long and the other people present in
the Honda were engaged in casing or burglarizing the house. As articulated, the totality of
the circumstances supplied the deputy with the necessary reasonable, articulable suspicion
to justify the warrant check.
Finally, because we conclude that the search and seizure of Long was justified by
reasonable, articulable suspicion, we decline to address Long’s argument that the district
court erred when it denied his suppression motion on the alternative basis of the attenuation
doctrine.
3 We conclude that Long was lawfully seized and that the district court did not
err by denying his motion to suppression.
Affirmed.

3 Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has “consistently declined to adopt, much less
even address, the [federal] ‘good faith’ exception” to the exclusionary rule. State v.
Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 180 n.10 (Minn. 2007).