In the Matter of the Estate of: Mathew Joseph Tomczik, Deceased.

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A21-1420

Court of Appeals Anderson, J.

In the Matter of the Estate of:
Mathew Joseph Tomczik, Deceased.

Filed: July 5, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Chad M. Roggeman, Matthew W. Moehrle, Rajkowski Hansmeier, Ltd., Saint Cloud,
Minnesota, for appellant Michael Tomczik.

Richard L. Hendrickson, Richard L. Hendrickson, P.A., Osseo, Minnesota; and

Karen R. Cole, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondents Calvin Headley and Patricia
Headley.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S

An alternate residuary clause of a will containing a devise to the heirs of the
testator’s spouse was nullified after dissolution of the testator’s marriage because the class
of heirs ceased to exist.
Reversed.

2
O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
This case involves the interpretation of an alternate residuary clause in a will
devising half of the testator’s estate to his heirs-at-law and the other half to his wife’s
heirs-at-law.1 In 1995, Mathew Joseph Tomczik executed a will naming his then-wife
Sara, if she survived him, as the primary beneficiary of the residue of his estate, with an
alternate residuary clause devising one-half of his estate to his wife’s “heirs-at-law.” The
couple’s marriage was dissolved in 2019, and Mathew passed away in 2021 without
revising his will. Appellant Michael Tomczik, Mathew’s brother and the personal
representative of his estate, petitioned for formal probate of the will, identifying only
Mathew’s siblings as heirs and devisees. Sara’s parents, respondents Calvin and Patricia
Headley, objected, claiming that they are Sara’s heirs and were wrongfully omitted as
devisees in the petition. The district court ruled that the devise to Sara’s heirs failed as a
matter of law. A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed. Because we conclude that
the devise to the class of the former wife’s heirs fails as a matter of law, we reverse the
court of appeals.
FACTS
The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. Mathew and Sara were married in
1992. Mathew and Sara had no children, and the marriage was dissolved in February 2019.

1 A residuary clause in a will “disposes of any estate property remaining after the
satisfaction of all other gifts,” Residuary Clause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019),
and an alternate residuary clause comes into force when, for some reason, the residuary
clause cannot take effect as the testator intended.
3
After the dissolution of their marriage, Mathew never revised his will and died in
January 2021, unmarried and with no children. Sara also did not remarry and has no
children. The couple had executed reciprocal wills, with Mathew’s will executed in 1995.
The parties do not dispute that the devise to Sara is revoked by operation of the Minnesota
Uniform Probate Code, which provides that a former spouse who remains named in a will
is deemed to have died immediately before the marriage was dissolved. See Minn. Stat.
§ 524.2-804, subds. 1–2 (2022). Because neither Mathew nor Sara had any children, and
any devise to Sara is revoked, the alternate residuary clause of the will is applicable. That
alternate residuary clause provides as follows:
3. I give the residue of my estate, consisting of all property which I can
dispose of by Will and not effectively disposed of by the preceding articles
of this Will, except any property over which I may then have a testamentary
power of appointment, as follows:

. . . .

3.4 If any interest is not effectively disposed of by the preceding
provisions of this article, one half (1/2) [sic] to my heirs-at-law and one-half
(1/2) to my wife’s heirs-at -law. The heirs-at-law of each of us shall be
determined (as of the date of death of the survivor of my [wife
2] and me)
under, and take the shares prescribed by, Minnesota statutes of intestate
succession in force at the execution of this Will, applied as if each of us had
then died intestate.

2 The parties do not dispute that article 3.4 of the will contains a typographical error.
In that paragraph, the will states that “[t]he heirs-at -law of each of us shall be determined
(as of the date of death of the survivor of my husband and me) under, and take the shares
prescribed by, Minnesota statutes of intestate succession.” The parties do not dispute that
the word “husband” in this provision should be “wife.”

4
The will also contains a similar provision, article 4.4, for Mathew’s life-insurance trust.3
After Mathew’s death, Michael Tomczik, Mathew’s brother and personal
representative of his estate, petitioned the district court for formal probate of the will. The
petition identified Mathew’s siblings as his heirs and devisees. The petition also stated that
Sara had no legal interest because of the dissolution of the marriage and did not identify
the Headleys, Sara’s parents, as having any legal interest.
Sara did not claim to be a devisee, but the Headleys objected to the petition, claiming
that, as Sara’s heirs, they were wrongfully omitted as devisees under Mathew’s will. Under
the intestate-succession statute in operation when Mathew executed the will, which
remains unchanged to the present, Sara’s current heirs4 would be her parents. See Minn.
Stat. § 524.2-103(2) (2022).
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the personal representative. The district court explained that, at the
time of his death, Mathew “did not have a wife due to the dissolution of marriage,” so the

3 Article 3.4 of the will uses the phrase “my wife’s heirs-at-law,” and article 4.4 uses
the phrase “my wife’s heirs,” which are equivalent terms. See Heir, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (stating that an “heir” is “[a]lso termed legal heir, heir at law,”
as well as several other terms); see also Mark B. Dunnell, Mason’s Dunnell on Minnesota
Probate Law 293 (3d ed. 1969) (“The words ‘heirs,’ ‘heirs at law,’ ‘lawful heirs’ and the
like in a will are to be construed as meaning those who would take if the testator or other
ancestor died intestate, unless they were obviously used in a different sense by the testator.”
(footnote omitted)).

4 Heirs are, in fact, determined at the time of death. See In re Fretheim’s Est.,
194 N.W. 766 (Minn. 1923) (“The legal relation or status of ‘heir’ . . . arises only upon the
death of the ancestor . . . .” (quoting Tuttle v. Woolworth, 50 A. 445, 447 (N.J. Ch. 1901))).
Sara is in fact alive, however, so this determination presumes the legal fiction of Sara’s
death by operation of Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-804, subdivision 2.
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“devise to ‘my wife’ is null and void.” The district court therefore ruled that “any purported
devise to ‘my wife’s’ heirs fails” as a matter of law and that the Headleys are not devisees
of the will.
A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed in a precedential opinion. In re Est.
of Tomczik, 976 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Minn. App. 2022). The court of appeals concluded that,
because “a former spouse who remains named in a will is deemed to have died immediately
before the dissolution of the marriage,” and “the residual-beneficiary terms of the will
unambiguously devise one-half of the residual estate to the former spouse’s heirs,” the
unambiguous will demonstrates that “the former spouse’s heirs are devisees.” Id. at 145,
149. Although “[m]any may agree . . . that devises to a former spouse’s heirs should be
revoked following dissolution,” the court of appeals noted that “the legislature has not
adopted a statute reflecting that policy.” Id. at 149.
We granted the personal representative’s petition for review to determine whether a
gift to a spouse’s heirs, none of whom are identified by name, fails if the marriage dissolves
after execution of the will.
ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, examining
whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court properly
applied the law. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020).
This case requires us to interpret the meaning of a will within the framework of the
Minnesota Uniform Probate Code, Minnesota Statutes sections 524.1-100 to 524.8- 103
(2022). We also review issues of statutory and will interpretation de novo. Hagen v. Steven
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Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn. 2021) (statutory interpretation); In re Est.
of Bach, 979 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Minn. 2022) (will interpretation). “Under the de novo
standard, we do not defer to the analysis of the courts below, but instead we exercise
independent review.” Wheeler v. State, 909 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 2018).
Our “cardinal rule of construction . . . is that the intention of the testator, as
expressed in the language used in the will, shall prevail, if it is not inconsistent with the
rules of law.” Bach, 979 N.W.2d at 434 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting In re Tr. Created by Will of Tuthill, 76 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 1956)).
Therefore, when construing a will, the primary purpose is to discern the testator’s intent.
In re Wyman , 308 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1981). If a will is unambiguous, extrinsic
evidence may not be used to show “that [a] testator meant to say something more.” In re
Silverson’s Will, 8 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Minn. 1943). Nonetheless, the court “ascertain[s] the
actual intention of the testator as it appears from a full and complete consideration of the
entire will when read in light of the surrounding circumstances at the time of the execution
of the will.” In re Hartman, 347 N.W.2d 480, 482–83 (Minn. 1984); see also Bach,
979 N.W.2d at 434 (explaining that we discern intent from the language of the will in view
of surrounding circumstances and “do not focus on isolated words”); Tuthill, 76 N.W.2d at
502.
Historically, under the common law, a divorce did not operate to revoke a
testamentary disposition in favor of a former spouse. See Mark B. Dunnell, Mason’s
Dunnell on Minnesota Probate Law 207 (3d ed. 1969). Because this “led to unsatisfactory
results as a divorced spouse generally was no longer a natural object of the testator’s
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bounty,” many states enacted statutes revoking provisions to a former spouse in a will.
Calloway v. Est. of Gasser, 558 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (“In order to
rectify the situation, the legislature of this State, as well as a number of other states, enacted
statutes specifying that, as a matter of law, a divorce operates as a revocation of that part
of a will making provi sions for a former spouse.”). Recognizing that “[t]he legal system
has long used default rules to resolve estate litigation in a way that conforms to decedents’
presumed intent,” rising rates of divorce by the 1980s led almost all states to
enact “revocation-on-divorce statutes,” such as section 524.2-804, which “treat an
individual’s divorce as voiding a testamentary bequest to a former spouse.” Sveen v.
Melin, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1819 (2018). These statutes “rest on a ‘judgment
about the typical testator’s probable intent.’ ” Id. (quoting R. Sitkoff & J. Dukeminier,
Wills, Trusts, and Estates 239 (10th ed. 2017)).
When a marriage is dissolved, the Minnesota Uniform Probate Code generally
revokes any “disposition, beneficiary designation, or appointment of property made by an
individual to the individual’s former spouse” when a will was executed before the marriage
was dissolved. Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804, subd. 1. The statute explains that the effect of
revocation is that provisions of a will “are given effect as if the former spouse died
immediately before the dissolution.” Id., subd. 2.
5 The statute does not specifically

5 The parties neither cite nor argue about the effect of this provision, but it is worth
noting that Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-802, in turn, provides that “[a] person whose
marriage to the decedent has been dissolved . . . is not a surviving spouse.”
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address devises to relatives or heirs of a former spouse. The statute specifies that no other
change of circumstances “effects a revocation.” Id., subd. 4.
The personal representative argues that section 524.2-804 is irrelevant here because
that section addresses a devise to a former spouse; here, the issue involves the heirs of the
former spouse. Because Sara was no longer Mathew’s “wife” at the time of his death, the
personal representative argues that the phrase “my wife’s heirs-at-law” refers to a group of
individuals that no longer exists; if Mathew had no wife, the class of his wife’s heirs is a
class of zero. The Headleys, on the other hand, acknowledge that section 524.2-804
revokes any devise to a former spouse— here, their daughter Sara—but they argue that the
statute does not operate to nullify any provisions of the will benefiting the heirs of the
former spouse. Moreover, the Headleys argue that this class of heirs still exists because
the will provides that “[m]y wife’s name is Sara Tomczik and all references in this Will to
my wife or my spouse are to her only.” According to the Headleys, the word “wife” is a
descriptive term rather than a limiting term, so a gift to the heirs of Mathew’s “wife” does
not fail merely because Sara ceased being his wife.
We agree with the personal representative. We begin with the observation that,
although we have not previously addressed this issue, our court of appeals, as well as other
jurisdictions, have concluded that when a will both names an individual and refers to that
individual by his or her relationship to the testator, a gift to that individual does not
necessarily become invalid if the individual no longer has that same relationship with the
testator at the time of the testator’s death. See In re Est. of Kerr , 520 N.W.2d 512, 514
(Minn. App. 1994) (explaining that a bequest to “my stepdaughter, Dawn M. Valentine”
9
was not rendered invalid by the testator’s dissolution of marriage, which meant that Dawn
M. Valentine was no longer his stepdaughter, because the word “stepdaughter” was a
descriptive term rather than a limiting term (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the
court of appeals concluded that “my wife’s heirs-at-law” was just such a reference and was
“not persuaded . . . that a failure to specially name Sara’s heirs in the will . . . is critical.”
Tomczik, 976 N.W.2d at 147. But in cases in which courts, both in our own and in other
jurisdictions, have deemed a relational term to be merely descriptive and not limiting, not
only has the relational term been a descriptor of the specific individual or individuals
actually entitled to take (unlike here, where it is the unascertained heirs of the “wife” who
argue they have a right to take under the will), but the term has generally been used in
conjunction with the name of an individual or individuals. See, e.g. , In re Will of Dezell,
194 N.W.2d 190, 191–92 (Minn. 1972) (holding that the language “to my daughter-in-law,
Margaret Dezell,” entitled the former daughter-in-law to take despite the dissolution of her
marriage); Kerr, 520 N.W.2d at 514; In re Est. of McGlone, 436 So.2d 441, 441 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the terms “husband” or “wife” are descriptio personae
6
“where he or she is named as well as described as ‘husband’ or ‘wife,’ ” (quoting 80 Am.
Jur. 2d Wills § 1224 (1975))); In re Application of Carleton, 432 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 (N.Y.
Surr. Ct. 1980) (holding that after dissolution, language that bequeathed items to “my
nephew and wife, Carl R. Baker and Helen L. Baker” entitled the former wife to take under
the will). That is not the circumstance here.

6 Descriptio personae refers to a description of a person to identify someone in a legal
instrument. See Descriptio Personae, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
10
Inclusion of Sara only in the definitions section of the will, section 7.1.1,
distinguishes the will at issue here from this line of cases. The use of the phrase “my wife’s
heirs-at-law” is not used in the operative portions of the will as a descriptor of any named
individual or individuals; rather, it “signal[s] the testator’s paramount intention to describe
the beneficiaries not as individuals but as members of a group identified by familial ties.”
Est. of Hermon, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577, 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). As such, “the matter of
relationship to the testator at the time of the testator’ s death should be taken into
consideration.” Id. The only identifier present in the operative provisions of this will is
the marriage-based group “my wife’s heirs-at-law.” Mathew had no wife at the time of his
death when his will became operative. Because Mathew had no wife at the time of his
death, the class of his “wife’s heirs-at-law” no longer existed, and any gift to them must
therefore fail.
In the circumstances of this probate matter, this conclusion is consistent with the
intent of the testator. See id. (concluding that, based on the intent of the testator, “my
spouse’s children” referred to a class that ceased to exist after the marital dissolution). At
the time the will was executed, Mathew and Sara “intended to be married until ‘death do
they part,’ ” after which “their property would be equally divided between their respective
families under the terms of the al ternate residuary clause.” In re Est. of Danca,
No. C1-98-1497, 1999 WL 232664, at *3 (Minn. App. Apr. 20, 1999). When a marriage
ends in dissolution rather than death, and property is then divided between the two upon
the dissolution, “[t]o now distribute another share of testator’s property to h[is] ex-spouse’s
family would be contrary to the intent demonstrated by the will and surrounding
11
circumstances at the time of execution.” Id. Because the assets of a married couple are
divided between the two upon the dissolution of their marriage— a circumstance testators
are presumed to know —we conclude that when the will was executed, Mathew clearly
intended the phrase “my wife’s heirs-at-law” to refer only to members of a group defined
by familial ties and not individually contemplated beneficiaries. See In re Tr. Created by
Will of Patrick, 106 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1960) (explaining that “[i]t has been said that
in the construction of wills every testator is presumed to know the law,” which means that
“the words of a will should be construed in accordance with precedents and statutes unless
it is established by a preponderance of evidence that a testator intended some other
meaning”). These circumstances at the creation of Mathew’ s will—that Mathew was
married and intended to be married until death, with the knowledge that his assets would
be divided between him and Sara in the event of dissolution—are significant.
The court of appeals concluded, however, that because the will provided for a class
gift, a “principal attribute” of which is “that the number of beneficiaries in the class may
increase by birth or decrease by death between the time the instrument is executed and the
time it takes effect,” then “[n]aming ‘my wife’s heirs’ would have been impossible when
Mathew executed the will because the members of the class were determined on his death.”
Tomczik, 976 N.W.2d at 147 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
According to the court of appeals, because “ ‘heirs’ identifies a devisee, in this case a
devisee class, and the will expresses no intent to exclude the class if the marriage ended in
dissolution,” the gift to Sara’s heirs is valid. Id. at 148.
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This inference —that the will reflects an intent to give to the heirs of Mathew’s
former spouse should his marriage dissolve —is inconsistent with the facts in light of the
surrounding circumstances explained above. In construing a will to effectuate the intent of
the testator, the court does not read the language of the instrument in a vacuum. Rather,
“[i]f the court is to determine the testator’s intent based on the language of the will in light
of the surrounding circumstances, it should draw those inferences from the surrounding
circumstances that most closely reflect the plain meaning of the language.” Hartman,
347 N.W.2d at 484. The reasonable inference in light of the surrounding circumstances at
the time the will was executed is that Mathew intended for the beneficiaries under the
alternate residuary clause to be defined in terms of their familial relation to him and that,
should his and Sara’s assets be divided at dissolution (at which point Sara ceased to be his
“wife”), her heirs would not take under the will.
Here, moreover, the fact that the will’s alternate residuary clause provides for a class
gift makes it clear that no particular relationships with any identified individual
beneficiaries were contemplated, further belying any contention that Mathew specifically
intended for the Headleys to collect under the will should his marriage dissolve. As
explained previously, the devise made in the alternate residuary clause here was to a class
of heirs, who were unascertained at the time the will was executed and could only be
ascertained upon the death of both Mathew and Sara. When the will was executed, the
devise in sections 3.4 and 4.4 to a class of unascertained heirs to be determined based on
“Minnesota statutes of intestate succession” negates any argument that Mathew’s intent
was to specifically give to the Headleys based on any close relationship to his mother- and
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father-in-law. Mathew could not have known whether the Headleys would continue to be
Sara’s heirs when his will became effective. Instead, the circumstances in which the will
was executed —that Mathew and Sara were married and intended to be married until
death—and the will’s language creating a class gift to unascertained heirs, defined only by
reference to Mathew’s “wife,” reinforces our conclusion that the alternate residuary
clause was only intended to devise to a group restricted by familial relations. Again, the
reasonable inference in light of the surrounding circumstances at the time the will was
created is that that group—Mathew’s “wife’s heirs-at -law”—ceased to exist after Mathew
and Sara’s marriage ended by dissolution.
Section 524.2-804 does not compel a different result. That law provides a “default
rule” the Legislature adopted “to resolve estate litigation in a way that conforms to
decedents’ presumed intent.” Sveen, 584 U.S. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1818–19, 1822. It would
be unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to revoke a devise to a former
spouse but leave untouched a devise to the relatives of the former spouse—which could
include the parents of the former spouse, as is the case here —to the detriment of the
testator’s own heirs. See Stevens v. Fed. Cartridge Corp., 32 N.W.2d 312, 315
(Minn. 1948) (“It is the duty of the court so to construe statutory enactments as to give
effect to the obvious legislative intent.”). The Headleys’ status as beneficiaries is derived
solely from their relationship to their daughter, Mathew’s former spouse, whose disposition
is specifically revoked under the Minnesota Uniform Probate Code due to the dissolution
of their marriage. See Minn. Stat. § 524.2-804. Revoking a devise to a former spouse’s
relatives is the “logical inference” of the revocation of a devise to the former spouse. See
14
Emerson v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 199, 809 N.W.2d 679, 683 n.5 (Minn. 2012)
(declining to adopt a narrower statutory interpretation based on legislative silence, but
instead “draw[ing] a logical inference from words that do appear in the statute” to
determine statutory meaning). By passing such a statute revoking a devise to a former
spouse upon divorce, the Legislature concluded “that the average Joe does not want his ex
inheriting what he leaves behind,” Sveen, 584 U.S. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1819, and it would
be unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature at the same time concluded that the typical
decedent wants his former spouse’s relatives inheriting what he leaves behind. See Knopp
v. Gutterman, 102 N.W.2d 689, 695 (Minn. 1960) (“Statutes must be construed with
reference to the objects sought to be accomplished and that which is implied in a statute is
as much a part of it as that which is expressed.”).
7
Our mandate is to effectuate the intent of the decedent; we require no further express
statutory sanction to act when this intent is clear. The language of Mathew’s will, read in
the light of the surrounding circumstances at the time of the will’s creation, reveals that
Mathew only intended for the residue of his estate to pass, by operation of the will’s
alternate residuary clause, to a group of his spouse’s heirs defined through their familial

7 The court of appeals also concluded that it “cannot ignore the legislature’s omission
of this provision” voiding testamentary gifts to the relatives of a former spouse and
declined to hold that a devise to the heirs of a former spouse was revoked because the
Legislature has not amended the statute to that effect. Tomczik, 976 N.W.2d at 148. But
we generally do not ascribe any legislative intent to the Legislature’s failure to enact
legislation. See Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 521 n.11
(Minn. 2005) (reasoning that “it is impossible to accurately speculate as to the meaning
that should be ascribed to such inaction”). Therefore, the Legislature’s failure to amend
the statute with a specific provision voiding testamentary gifts to relatives of a former
spouse does not affect our analysis.
15
relationship to Mathew as the heirs of his “wife”—a relationship that would cease to exist
if Mathew’s marriage ended in dissolution.
If we were to hold otherwise, a number of problematic circumstances could arise.
For example, as the dissent in the court of appeals explained, if Sara had remarried, “Sara’s
new husband would be a beneficiary of a portion of Mathew’s residual estate,” which
“would undoubtedly be contrary to both the testamentary intent of the decedent and Minn.
Stat. § 524.2-804.” Tomczik, 976 N.W.2d at 150 (Segal, C.J., dissenting). In another
scenario, if Sara had living children from a previous marriage, those children would inherit
a portion of the residue of Mathew’s estate because they would be her heirs. See In re Est.
of Coffed, 387 N.E.2d 1209, 1209, 1211 (N.Y. 1979). Given that the intent of the testator
is of central importance, the application of a rule leading to results so clearly contrary to
that intent would fail to fulfill the purpose of the courts under the Minnesota Uniform
Probate Code. See Wyman, 308 N.W.2d at 315 (“The primary purpose of construing a
will . . . is to discern the testator’s intent.”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
Reversed.