State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1443

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Hassan Abdi,
Appellant.

Filed September 12, 2022
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-20-5040

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this direct appeal from the district court’s judgment of conviction for threats of
violence, appellant argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting (1) expert
testimony on the common characteristics of battered women and (2) hearsay evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement by a witness. Because the expert testimony was helpful to the
jury, and the hearsay evidence was admissible, we conclude the district court did not abuse
its discretion. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the record, including the evidence received during trial.
On July 30, 2020, police officers responded to an apartment in Waite Park to investigate a
woman’s 911 call describing physical abuse by her husband. Shortly after police arrived ,
the victim, N.A., gave one officer a recorded statement. 1 N.A. stated that her husband,
appellant Hassan Abdi, slapped her with an open hand and punched her with a closed fist
four times on both sides of her neck and head , and threatened to get a knife and kill her.
N.A. said Abdi confronted her about 30 minutes earlier in front of their three children, who
began crying. N.A. explained that she was pregnant and afraid for herself and her children.
N.A. also stated that Abdi had beaten her before, and she called the police, who let Abdi

1 This statement was recorded on the officer’s body camera and is referred to as “recorded
police statement” throughout this opinion. The recording was received as an exhibit during
trial and was played for the jury.
3
stay in their home. Police arrested Abdi and transported him to the Stearns County Jail.
Abdi denied assaulting or threatening N.A.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Abdi with (1) felony-level threats of
violence under Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2018), (2) misdemeanor-level domestic
assault for acts causing fear of immediate bodily harm or death under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2422, subd. 1(1) (2018), and (3) misdemeanor-level domestic assault for intentional
infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm on another under Minn. Stat. § 609.2422,
subd. 1(2) (2018). The district court entered a pretrial domestic-abuse no-contact order
(DANCO) directing Abdi to have no contact with N.A. and to stay away from their home.
In May 2021, the district court ruled on the parties’ motions in limine . Relevant to
the issues on appeal, the district court reserved ruling on the state’s motion to introduce
expert testimony. The district court’s order stated, “It is likely that the Court will grant the
State’s request to introduce expert testimony limited to general characteristics of victim
behavior and counterintuitive behaviors provided that the State lays foundation that the
testimony is relevant.” The district court also preliminarily granted the state’s motion to
introduce N.A.’s statements during the 911 call as an excited utterance “provided that
foundation [was] laid.”
During the July 2021 jury trial, N.A. testified that she and Abdi have a “very good”
relationship. She explained that on the day of the 911 call, their son was injured, after which
she and Abdi argued. N.A. denied that Abdi threatened or assaulted her. During their
argument, N.A. asked Abdi to leave the apartment, but after he refused, she called the
police. She gave the recorded police statement “because at the time all [she] want[ed] them
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to do [was] just get [Abdi] out of [her] apartment.” N.A. testified that “[she] did lie” about
Abdi hitting her and threatening her with a knife. N.A. answered, “Yes,” when Abdi’s
attorney asked if she lied because her “hormones” made her “irrational at the time.” N.A.
explained that “[a]nytime [she] became pregnant,” she would ask Abdi to leave the
apartment and that Abdi has “never” hit her.
After N.A. testified, the state sought to introduce her recorded police statement.
Abdi objected to the evidence as inadmissible hearsay. The district court overruled the
objection and admitted the recorded police statement under Minnesota Rule of Evidence
807, the residual hearsay exception. The recorded police statement was played for the jury.
The jury heard testimony from two police officers, the 911 operator, and a
domestic-violence expert. Abdi renewed his objection to the expert testimony, which the
district court overruled. Melissa Scaia testified about common characteristics of
domestic-violence victims, including the reasons for which a victim may recant accusations
of abuse and common behaviors of domestic abusers as those behaviors relate to the
victim.2

2 Abdi’s brief to this court does not challenge Scaia’s qualifications to testify or the
foundation for her opinion testimony. The record establishes that Scaia is the director of
international training for Global Rights for Women, “worked as the executive director of
Advocates for Family Peace . . . an organization that provides advocacy services to
women and children affected by domestic violence,” “conducts training to
international . . . audiences on domestic violence theory, public awareness and domestic
violence, and the co-occurrence of domestic violence and child abuse,” “has provided peer
counseling, legal advocacy, and support to over 500 battered women and has conducted
focus groups with battered women as an academic and consultant,” and “is familiar with
the current literature on victim behaviors in domestic violence situations.”
5
On June 30, 2021, the jury found Abdi guilty of all three counts. The district court
cancelled the pretrial DANCO and instructed Abdi to contact probation immediately and
follow all recommendations made as part of the presentence-investigation process before
sentencing. On August 19, 2021, the district court stayed imposition of Abdi’s sentence
and placed him on probation for five years with conditions.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony on
battered-woman syndrome, including the common reasons for which a victim
recants an allegation of domestic violence.
Abdi argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Scaia to testify
because evidence about domestic-violence victims and abusers was not helpful to the jury.
Essentially, Abdi argues that the district court should have granted his motion in limine
and erred by allowing Scaia to testify at all. The state contends that the district court
correctly determined that Scaia’s testimony was helpful to the jury. We review a district
court’s decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion. State v. Garland,
942 N.W.2d 732, 742 (Minn. 2020). Abdi must show both that the district court abused its
discretion and that he was prejudiced as a result. State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 907
(Minn. 1997).
When considering whether to admit expert testimony, a district court must
determine whether the testimony will help the jury resolve relevant factual questions
presented at trial. Minn. R. Evid. 702; State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Minn.
1997). A court determines helpfulness by considering whether the testimony “will assist
6
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” and whether the
subject “is within the knowledge and experience of a lay jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 702; State
v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980). A district court must also balance the
relevance and probative value of the testimony against the danger of creating unfair
prejudice, the potential for confusing or misleading the jury, and other concerns. Minn. R.
Evid. 401, 403.
A court determines the relevance of expert testimony on domestic violence, also
described as “battered-woman syndrome,” by considering “whether the proffered evidence
demonstrated that the proponent had the type of relationship about which the expert will
testify.” State v. Hanks , 817 N.W.2d 663, 668 (Minn. 2012) (citing State v. MacLennan ,
702 N.W.2d 219, 235 (Minn. 2005)). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that expert
testimony on battered- woman syndrome passes the helpfulness test when it “help[s] the
jury to understand the behavior of a woman suffering from the syndrome, which might
otherwise be interpreted as a lack of credibility” and which is “not within the understanding
of an ordinary lay person.” Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d at 195 (citing State v. Hennum,
441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989)).
Abdi claims the state failed to show his relationship with N.A. fits with
battered-woman syndrome. Abdi relies on Hanks, where the supreme court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony offered by the
defendant because she failed “to establish the type of relationship that would give rise to
battered woman syndrome.” 817 N.W.2d at 669.
7
In Hanks, the state charged Hanks with the murder of her domestic partner. Id. at
666. To support her defense, Hanks described the male victim as abusive because he tried
to control Hanks by urging her to stay home with the children, managing their finances,
becoming angry when she had social plans, disabling her vehicle so she could not drive it,
and making verbal threats against her. Id. at 666, 669. The supreme court reasoned that
expert testimony on battered women was not helpful because Hanks “never claimed that
[the victim] physically abused her or even that she was afraid of [him]. At most, she was
afraid that [he] would hurt her children if she left him.” Id. at 669.
We are not persuaded by Abdi’s argument. Here, the record includes evidence
showing Abdi had abused N.A. repeatedly. During her call to 911 , N.A. said that Abdi
“will beat [her] up” and “is killing [her].” When N.A. gave the recorded police statement,
she stated that Abdi hit her “about four times” on her head and neck, by first slapping her
and then punching her . N.A. also told police that Abdi threatened to “stab [her] with a
knife.” When the officer asked whether it was “the first time” Abdi had beaten her, N.A.
responded, “No,” and stated that Abdi assaulted her “once before. ” N.A. continued to
explain that when she called the police, they told Abdi that “he can stay home.” Thus,
unlike the relationship in Hanks, N.A. and Abdi’s relationship is “the type of relationship
that would give rise to battered woman syndrome.” See id.
The state also points out that N.A.’s credibility was a central issue in the case, and
Scaia’s testimony was helpful to the jury because it “shed[] light on why” N.A. would
recant her statements to police to remain in an abusive relationship.
8
Grecinger supports the state’s argument. There, the supreme court determined that
expert testimony on battered-woman syndrome was admissible “ because it could help the
jury understand behavior that might otherwise undermine the complainant’s credibility”:
the victim returned to a relationship with her abuser, told contradictory stories about how
her injuries were inflicted, waited three years to pursue prosecution, and recanted the
statement she made to police about the abuse. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d at 195-96. When
expert testimony on domestic violence was admitted in Grecinger, the victim’s credibility
was at issue because the defense attorney attacked the victim’s credibility in opening
statements and questioned the victim about why she returned to her relationship with the
defendant and why she recanted her allegations against the defendant. Id. at 194.
Like the victim’s credibility in Grecinger, N.A.’s credibility was a central issue at
trial. In opening statements, the defense attorney stated that N.A. “fabricated a story to get
her husband out of the apartment because she was upset with him” and that since the
allegations, N.A. “has told the prosecution over and over again that what she told the police
was a lie, and now she is going to come in here under oath and tell you the truth.” N.A.
later testified that she and Abdi have a “very good” relationship, denied that Abdi
threatened or assaulted her, and testified that “[she] did lie” about Abdi hitting her. N.A.
also testified that she did not “believe that [she] said he threatened [her] with a knife,” but
if she did, it was “also a lie.”
Thus, N.A.’s credibility was a central issue because the jury was presented with two
versions of what happened—N.A.’s recorded police statement, during which she alleged
Abdi’s abuse, and N.A.’s testimony, during which she recanted those accusations.
9
Grecinger suggests this is exactly the situation when expert testimony may help the jury.
569 N.W.2d at 195 (“[I]t seems clear that the expert ’s testimony on battered woman
syndrome could help the jury understand why [the victim] returned to the
relationship . . . after the incident, told contradictory stories about how her injuries were
inflicted, . . . and recanted statements she made to the police and the district court regarding
[the] abuse.”); see also State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 639 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating
that the “state may elicit expert testimony about battered-woman syndrome to explain a
victim’s counterintuitive behavior and exculpatory account of an incident” if the testimony
is limited to a description of “the syndrome and its characteristics,” and the expert does not
opine about whether the victim suffers from the syndrome). We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Scaia’s testimony “ would help
the jury to understand the behavior of a woman suffering from the syndrome, which might
otherwise be interpreted as a lack of credibility.” Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d at 195.
Abdi makes two more arguments about Scaia’s expert testimony. First, he argues
that because the district court lifted the pretrial DANCO, did not impose a probationary
DANCO, and did not give Abdi any jail time at sentencing, it was “strongly impl[ied] that
the judge did not view . . . Abdi’s conviction as a particularly serious offense.” Abdi
contends this is “absolutely inconsistent with a conclusion that the relationship was one
with long-term and frequent physical abuse . . . [or] that Abdi was involved in victim
intimidation and witness tampering.”
Abdi’s argument is not supported by the record. Although the district court lifted
the pretrial DANCO at N.A.’s request and did not impose a probationary DANCO, the
10
district court instructed Abdi “to follow up with corrections by the end of business
tomorrow to complete [his] PSI as quickly as possible and to start programming as quickly
as possible” and warned Abdi that if the district court received a report that Abdi did not
abide by these instructions, the district court would “consider changing [its] order.” The
district court also imposed five years of probation and ordered Abdi to complete 24
sessions of domestic-abuse counseling or educational programming.
Second, Abdi argues that Scaia “improperly injected the issue of religious
community pressure causing victim recantations in a case with an all-white Stearns County
jury, with a Somali defendant, and with an alleged victim wearing clothing identified as
Islamic female dress— a hijab with a face veil.” We are troubled that Abdi’s brief includes
no citation to the record to support his claim of an “all-white” jury or any references to the
defendant’s or victim’s religion, nationality, or attire. We may disregard any argument that
is not supported by the record. See State v. Breaux, 620 N.W.2d 326, 334 (Minn. App.
2001) (“A reviewing court cannot base its decision on matters outside the record on
appeal.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772
(Minn. App. 1997) (stating that a party’s failure to support an argument with proper
“argument or authorities” will not be considered on appeal (quotation omitted)).
Even so, Abdi correctly cites caselaw that cautions about the admission of expert
testimony on domestic violence as it relates to a defendant’s nationality or ethnicity. In
State v. Vue, the expert testified that “the Hmong culture . . . is slower to change than other
cultures” and that he strongly agreed “that, particularly among older Hmong citizens where
English is nonexistent or very difficult at best . . . the isolation that comes from not being
11
able to go to a mall and shop and exchange normal conversation with shopkeepers or other
people in society has kept Hmong women . . . prisoners in their homes.” 606 N.W.2d 719,
722-23 (Minn. App. 2000). We determined that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting this expert testimony because the testimony “went far beyond describing Hmong
cultural practices that would help explain the alleged victim’s behavior.” Id. at 723.
Still, Scaia’s testimony is unlike the testimony Abdi highlights from Vue. Scaia
made one statement in over thirteen pages of testimony about how religious beliefs,
generally, could affect a victim’s decision to recant an abuse allegation. 3 Scaia did not
mention Somali culture, Islam, or a hijab. Abdi, therefore, has not demonstrated that the
expert testimony went beyond what was helpful to the jury.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Scaia’s testimony
as helpful to the jury because her testimony offered information on issues central to N.A.’s

3 Scaia’s only testimony discussing religion is in the following:

Yeah, I think they do that just— once, again, whatever
they need at the time, whether, you know, it’s safety, whether
it’s the car, whether they need him to be good to the kid
because, you know, he's threatened that not to go well, you
know, a whole bunch of reasons, but you know, there’s a whole
bunch of things in terms of—sometimes for people it’s faith,
right, it’s their religious beliefs.
Religious beliefs can be big in terms of my sense of
family is “I’m not going to be seen in my community as
breaking up this family. That would ostracize me, you know,
in my community.” I remember a number of times meeting
with victims and this one time her phone was ringing just—I
said “You can answer that.” And she said “Well, I’m going to,
but I want you to listen because I want you to know what I’ m
dealing with.”
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credibility, including the common characteristics of domestic-abuse victims and the
common reasons for which a victim decides to recant abuse allegations. Because we
determine the district court did not abuse its discretion, we need not address Abdi’s
arguments on prejudice.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting N.A.’s hearsay
statement.
Abdi argues that the district court erred by admitting N.A.’s recorded police
statement over Abdi’s objection, contending the statement was hearsay and did not fall
under any of the exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay. “We review a district court’s
evidentiary ruling on hearsay for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Vangrevenhof,
941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision
is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.”
State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). “A defendant claiming error in the
trial court’s reception of evidence has the burden of showing both the error and the
prejudice resulting from the error.” State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981).
Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible. Minn. R. Evid. 802. But Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 807, the residual hearsay exception, provides that “[a] statement not
specifically covered by rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule” if certain conditions are met. The
analysis under rule 807 has two parts: (1) examination of the proffered statement’s
trustworthiness and (2) consideration of the three other criteria enumerated in the rule.
State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 292-93 (Minn. 2019).
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The district court admitted N.A.’s recorded police statement under rule 807,
reasoning that “admission of the statement does serve the general purposes of the rules of
evidence and it does bear a number of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” and
stating that credibility would be left to the jury. We consider the district court’s decision to
admit the challenged evidence under both parts of the rule 807 analysis.
A. Trustworthiness
In evaluating the statement’s trustworthiness, “the district court must examine the
circumstances actually surrounding the making of the statements,” id. at 292, including,
but not limited to (1) whether the declarant testifies, admits making the prior statement,
and is available for cross-examination; (2) whether the statement is recorded, establishing
what the declarant said; (3) whether the statement is against the declarant’s penal interest;
(4) the extent of evidence corroborating the statement; (5) the extent to which the declarant
made the statement voluntarily; (6) whether the declarant made the statement under oath
and subject to cross-examination; (7) the declarant’s relationships to the parties in the
litigation; (8) the declarant’s “motivation to make the statement” ; (9) the declarant’s
“personal knowledge” of the statement; (10) whether the declarant recanted; and (11) the
declarant’s character for truthfulness and honesty, Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d at 736 n.1.
As this list suggests, circumstances showing a witness has recanted a prior statement
may detract from trustworthiness. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d at 293. When considering
whether to admit a recanted statement, a court should consider whether “(1) other
uncontradicted evidence discredits the declarant’s recantation; (2) the declarant possesses
a motive to falsely recant; (3) the declarant’s recantation is itself inconsistent; and (4) the
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prior hearsay statements are strongly corroborated by evidence admitted at trial. ” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Abdi claims the district court failed to properly evaluate the recorded police
statement because it did not have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
Abdi argues the statement was made the night of the alleged incident when N.A. was
“furious with Abdi for criticizing her parenting,” “telling her brother to leave,” and “telling
her that she could not take their children to her mother’s apartment”; N.A. was pregnant
and testified that pregnancy made her “hormones” difficult to control and caused her to
want Abdi out of the home; and there was no physical evidence of Abdi’s assault of N.A.
We are not persuaded. The district court stated that it considered the totality of the
circumstances before determining whether N.A.’s statement was trustworthy under rule
807. The district court considered many factors that affected the trustworthiness of N.A.’s
statement to police, including circumstances both favorable and unfavorable to admission.
Chief among these considerations were that (1) N.A. testified under oath and was subject
to cross-examination on her prior statement; (2) N.A. voluntarily gave the statement to
police; (3) the officer asked open-ended questions, and N.A. provided a detailed
explanation about the abuse; (4) N.A.’s recorded police statement tracks N.A.’s 911 call;
(5) N.A.’s recorded police statement at the apartment i s consistent with the more formal
statement she later gave to police; (6) N.A.’s recorded police statement occurred shortly
after the 911 call and shortly after the abuse; (7) N.A.’s motive for lying to police includes
wanting Abdi out of the apartment; (8) N.A.’s motive to recant was to protect Abdi, on
whom she depended financially; and (9) N.A.’s statement that Abdi had previously
15
assaulted her. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion as it properly considered
the totality of the circumstances to determine N.A.’s recorded police statement had
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
B. Rule 807 admissibility and harmless error
The second step in determining whether evidence is admissible under the residual
hearsay exception considers the three factors the rule provides. A district court may admit
trustworthy hearsay if (1) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (2) it is more probative
than any other evidence the proponent can find with reasonable effort; and (3) “the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 807.
Abdi does not address the first two rule 807 factors. Rather, he argues that N.A.’s
recorded police statement did not satisfy the third factor. The state responds that the district
court properly considered all three factors under rule 807 and determined N.A.’s recorded
police statement served the rules and interests of justice as the statement was trustworthy.
The state also argues that any error was harmless because N.A.’s statement is admissible
under the excited-utterance exception.
We are persuaded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determinizing
that the recorded police statement satisfied all three factors under rule 807. Alternatively,
any error in admitting the recorded police statement under rule 807 was harmless because
it was also admissible as an excited utterance.
“A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition” is admissible under the
16
excited-utterance hearsay exception. Minn. R. Evid. 803(2). To be admissible, an excited
utterance must meet three requirements: (1) “there must be a startling event or condition”;
(2) “the statement must relate to the startling event or condition”; and (3) “the declarant
must be under a sufficient aura of excitement caused by the event or condition to insure the
trustworthiness of the statement.” State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1986).
“The lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement is not always
determinative.” State v. Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied
(Minn. May 29, 2001).
Here, N.A. was involved in a startling event because Abdi assaulted her, and her
recorded police statement was directly related to Abdi’s assault, so the first two
requirements are satisfied. See Minn. R. Evid. 803(2). Caselaw explains that the third
requirement is also satisfied. N.A. was still under the aura of excitement of the startling
event when she spoke with police 30 minutes after the assault. The interviewing officer
testified that N.A. was “a little upset,” that “she seemed like she really wanted to talk to
[him], let [him] know what was going on,” that she repeated her story multiple times, that
N.A. was “[v]ery rapid with her speech patterns,” and that “[a] lot of things were reiterated,
she seemed very concerned about her safety and the safety of her children.” See Hogetvedt,
623 N.W.2d at 913 ( holding it was “reasonable to conclude [the victim] was still under
stress from the incident” three hours after an assault occurred given the extent of her
injuries and the nature of the assault). We specifically reject Abdi’s argument that physical
injury is needed to show a declarant is under the aura of excitement. Caselaw does not
support Abdi’s position. See Daniels, 380 N.W.2d at 782-83 (holding statements made an
17
hour after the startling event were admissible as excited utterances even though the children
sustained no physical injuries).
Thus, the district court did not abuse its direction when it considered rule 807
admissibility requirements and determined N.A.’s recorded police statement was
admissible. Alternatively, we conclude that any error was harmless.
Affirmed.