State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1444

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ishman Lashaunn Richmond,
Appellant.

Filed August 22, 2022
Reversed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-29157

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Francis J. Rondoni, Golden Valley City Attorney, Nicole J. Appelbaum, Assistant City
Attorney, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Reyes , Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Ishman Lashaunn Richmond argues that his conviction for violating a
domestic-abuse no-contact order must be reversed because respondent State of Minnesota
did not prove that he was aware of the order. The state contends that it proved that
2
Richmond knew the no-contact order existed with evidence in the form of a court record
indicating Richmond was “cc’d” with the order. Applying the heightened standard of
scrutiny with which we examine convictions based on circumstantial evidence, we
conclude that the state did not prove that Richmond was aware of the order beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTS
In November 2019, a police officer pulled over a car and discovered Richmond and
his wife together. After running their identities through the police computer system, the
officer discovered that a domestic-abuse no -contact order prohibited Richmond from
having any contact with his wife. The officer then arrested Richmond, and the state
charged him with violating the order. The matter proceeded to trial.
At trial, the state called only the officer who arrested Richmond. Through the
officer, the state introduced a copy of the no-contact order and a redacted copy of the
Register of Actions for a separate criminal case in which the order was issued.
1 The officer
testified that when he checked the order in the police computer system before arresting
Richmond, the system indicated that the order was valid and had been served. But the line
on the no-contact order itself that designates when the defendant had been served had been
left blank and crossed out.

1 A Register of Actions is a record of the events that occur in district court proceedings.
Minn. Stat. § 485.07(1) (2020). Most of the information contained in the Register of
Actions introduced in evidence here is redacted, with only a few legible notations relating
to the no-contact order and another form created the same day.
3
In closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that the Register of Actions
conclusively proved that Richmond knew of the order. The Register of Actions contains a
notation for the no-contact-order entry that states that Richmond—along with the county
attorney, sheriff’s office, and local police department—was “cc[’d]” with the order. It also
showed that the court prepared a pretrial-release evaluation form for Richmond on the same
day as the no-contact order. The prosecutor argued that the Register of Actions showed
that Richmond appeared in court and was personally served with the order. Richmond
contended that he never received the order and was not aware it existed until his arrest, and
that at most the Register of Actions showed that the court mailed the order to him —not
that he actually received it.
Before reaching a verdict, the jury asked four questions of the district
court: (1) “What is pretrial release evaluation?” (2) “What are the acceptable legal means
of notifying someone of an order [for] protection?” (3) “Does the defendant still need to be
served the order of protection if they are present at a pretrial release evaluation?” and
(4) “Does the defendant need to be present for a pretrial release evaluation?” In discussing
the questions with the attorneys, the court noted “I think they’re asking for more evidence
essentially.” In response to the jury questions, the court stated:
All of the evidence has already been presented to you,
and I can’t provide you with any additional evidence. I am
going to direct your attention again to the instructions that I
gave you, and I’m going to particularly address your attention
to one, the definition of words.

During these instructions, I have defined certain words
and phrases. If so, you are to use those definitions in your
deliberations. If I have not defined a word or phrase, you
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should apply the common, ordinary meaning of that word or
phrase.

I’m not going to reread all the instructions to you. You
have them. But that is the most I can do for you, because that’s
the way the rules work here. The evidence is what it is.

After further deliberation, the jury found Richmond guilty of violating the
no-contact order. He appeals.
DECISION
Richmond challenges his conviction of violating the no-contact order. Due process
requires the state to prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Minn. 2019). To determine whether the state
met this burden here, we consider whether Richmond’s conviction is supported by
sufficient evidence.
When evaluating whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we carefully
examine the record to determine whether the facts—and legitimate inferences drawn from
them—would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the state proved the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d 178, 186 (Minn. 2021).
But we apply heightened scrutiny to a conviction based on circumstantial evidence. Id.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence which the jury can use to infer whether the facts in
dispute existed or not. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017). A conviction
is supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence if the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and “inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 598 (quotation omitted).
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We apply a two-step analysis to determine whether sufficient circumstantial
evidence supports a conviction. State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Minn. 2016).
The first step is to identify the circumstances proved by the state. State v. Silvernail ,
831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). In identifying the circumstances proved, we consider
only the facts proved that are consistent with the jury’s verdict. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d at
186. The second step is to examine independently the reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from the circumstances proved. State v. Fox, 868 N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015).
During the second step, we do not defer to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences.
Allwine, 963 N.W.2d at 186. With this in mind, we turn to the elements of violating a
no-contact order.
A “person who knows of the existence of a domestic abuse no contact order issued
against the person and violates the order is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Minn. Stat. § 629.75,
subd. 2(b) (2018) (emphasis added). To prove Richmond guilty of violating the no-contact
order, the state had to prove that (1) there was a no-contact order, (2) Richmond knew the
order existed, and (3) he violated the order. State v. Shaka, 927 N.W.2d 762, 771 (Minn.
App. 2019), rev. granted (Minn. Jul. 16, 2019) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Nov. 19,
2019). Because the parties agree that the only issue here is whether the state provided
sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that Richmond knew the no-contact order
existed, we consider the circumstances proved only with respect to Richmond’s knowledge
of the order.
At trial, the state proved the following circumstances. First, in November 2019 a
police officer pulled over a car and found Richmond and his wife together. Second, a
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domestic-abuse no-contact order issued in August 2019 prohibits Richmond from having
any contact with his wife. Third, a redacted copy of the Register of Actions from the case
in which the no-contact order was issued notes that Richmond, along with the county
attorney, his attorney, and the relevant police department were “cc[’d]” with the no-contact
order. Fourth, the Register of Actions also notes that a “Pretrial Release Evaluation Form”
was created for Richmond on the same day as the no-contact order. Fifth, according to the
arresting officer, the police database ind icated that the no-contact order had been served.
Mindful of this evidence, we now consider whether the circumstances proved are consistent
with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis.
One reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that Richmond
appeared at a court hearing at which a domestic-abuse no-contact order was issued and
received a copy of that order at the hearing. The creation of a pretrial-release form suggests
that Richmond was arrested for the offense in the underlying criminal case and then
released upon conditions. If Richmond was released from custody, he could have been
given a copy of the no-contact order. This hypothesis is consistent with Richmond’s guilt,
and if the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis,
sufficient evidence supports Richmond’s conviction. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 598.
But there is another rational hypothesis consistent with the evidence and
inconsistent with guilt: it could be that the domestic-abuse no-contact order was issued
after Richmond was released from custody, the order was mailed to Richmond, and he
never received it. The address that the court had for Richmond at the time is redacted and
the state introduced no evidence of his then-current address. Although the pretrial-release-
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evaluation form was created on the same day as the no-contact order, there is no evidence
in the record showing that the two documents were created simultaneously. If the order
was mailed to Richmond later, as well as to the county attorney, police department, his
attorney, and others, it would make sense that the Register of Actions would reflect that all
participants were “cc’d” with the order. The entry in the police database indicating that
Richmond had been served with the order could also be based on the “cc” line in the
Register of Actions. And if Richmond never received the mailed order—and no evidence
suggests that he did —then the circumstances proved are rationally consistent with a
hypothesis other than guilt.
The state argues that this second hypothesis is not rational for two reasons. First,
the state contends that the Register of Actions shows that Richmond appeared for a hearing
and was given a copy of the no-contact order at the hearing. But while the Register of
Actions supports this inference, it also supports an inference that the no-contact order was
issued after Richmond was released and was mailed to him. And the state presented no
evidence suggesting that complying with the no-contact order was a condition of
Richmond’s release from custody. Because we do not defer to the jury’s choice between
inferences drawn from the circumstances proved, Allwine, 963 N.W.2d at 186, the Register
of Actions alone does not prove that Richmond was aware of the order.
2

2 Further, as Richmond observes, if the state’s hypothesis was accurate, it could have called
a witness who witnessed Richmond being served with the order, produced a transcript of
proceedings showing Richmond’s presence in court the day the no-contact order was
issued, produced a registered mail receipt showing Richmond received a mailed or emailed
copy of the order, called the clerk of court to testify what the “cc” notation on the Register
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Second, the state asserts on appeal that the police officer’s testimony, in
combination with the Register of Actions, proves that Richmond was aware of the
no-contact order. But the state did not introduce the officer’s testimony to prove
Richmond’s knowledge of the order at trial. The officer only testified that the police system
listed the order as served in the course of explaining why he arrested Richmond. And in
her closing argument, the prosecutor relied exclusively on the redacted Register of Actions
to prove that Richmond knew about the no-contact order, not the officer’s testimony about
the contents of the police database.3
Further, the officer’s testimony does not exclude the reasonable possibility that
Richmond was not aware of the no-contact order. Although the entry in the police database
could be consistent with Richmond’s guilt, the state did not provide any foundation for
what information that entry was based on. And the Register of Actions, standing alone,
does not show that Richmond personally received a copy of the no-contact order.
Accordingly, because the circumstances proved by the state at trial are consistent
with the rational hypothesis that Richmond did not receive the no-contact order, the state

of Actions meant, or introduced a transcript of a court proceeding in which Richmond
acknowledged being served with the order. The state did not.

3 Nor could the state have used this testimony to prove Richmond knew about the order at
trial. Had the state sought to do so, it would have violated the rule against hearsay because
the officer would have testified about an out-of-court statement (the contents of the police
computer system) to prove the truth of the matter asserted (that Richmond had actually
been served with the order). Minn. R. Evid. 801. Hearsay is generally inadmissible and
the state points to no exception that would have applied. Minn. R. Evid. 802-04.
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did not prove that he knew the no-contact order existed beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence underlying Richmond’s conviction is insufficient.
Reversed.