Kari Anne Visser and on behalf of Desirae Mae McPhail and D.J.M., minor child, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1467

Kari Anne Visser and on behalf of Desirae Mae McPhail and D.J.M., minor child,
Respondent,

vs.

Blair E. Willprecht,
Appellant.

Filed July 25, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Swift County District Court
File No. 76-CV-21-264

Kari Anne Visser, Murdock, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

John E. Mack, New London Law, P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges a harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that the district
court erred by determining that he engaged in “harassment” within the meaning of the HRO
statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2020). He also seeks reversal based on the district court’s
use of a form order to issue the HRO. We affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant Blair Willprecht and respondent Kari Visser are neighbors. In July 2021,
Visser filed a petition for an HRO against Willprecht on behalf of herself, her adult child
ward, and her minor child. The district court issued a temporary, ex parte HRO. Willprecht
requested and was granted a hearing on the matter.
At the hearing, the district court heard testimony from both Visser and Willprecht.
Visser testified to the events that caused her to file the HRO petition against Willprecht.
Visser explained that Willprecht lives nearby and uses a gravel road that runs along the
back of Visser’s property to get to his house. Visser has a garden near the gravel road.
Visser testified that beginning in the spring of 2020, Willprecht engaged in a series
of acts that resulted in Visser becoming fearful for her safety and the safety of her children.
On one occasion, Visser’s son was planting a tree in their garden. Willprecht pulled up on
his motorcycle and began “screaming and swearing” at Visser’s son, telling him that he
“can’t plant that f-ing tree there.” After this incident, Willprecht’s behavior “started to
escalate.” Visser stated that Willprecht would drive his motorcycle very close to her while
she was working in her garden, would accelerate excessively, causing gravel to fly into the
air, and would scream swear words “in [her] direction.” Because she was concerned about
Willprecht driving his vehicles too close to her, Visser had a friend put stakes in the ground
around the garden. On multiple occasions in July and August 2020, Willprecht either
attempted to remove or did remove stakes. And, on one occasion, after Willprecht had
tried to remove some of the stakes, Willprecht approached Visser’s son, yelled at him to
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“get the f-ing stakes— give ’em to me,” and then spun the wheels on his van, kicking up
rocks.
On another occasion in mid-July, Visser was attempting to move a trailer that she
had parked on her property. Willprecht began “screaming and swearing” at her and said
to her “you have an f-ing death wish.” That same day, Visser saw Willprecht digging in
her yard with a shovel. During another incident, Willprecht swung a shovel around in an
aggressive manner while swearing at her. Visser also testified that in August, Willprecht
parked several vehicles along the gravel road that “block[ed] over half the street” while he
washed a vehicle for several hours while walking along her property line. She stated that
this prevented her from going into her garden and she “felt like it was in a threatening
manner.”
During the hearing, Visser submitted a photograph and videos to the district court
of several of her interactions with Willprecht. She testified that Willprecht’s behavior
made her feel threatened, uncomfortable, and concerned for the safety of herself and her
children.
Willprecht testified that Visser had fabricated or provided misleading accounts of
several of the incidents. He stated that his problems with Visser began when she pounded
stakes around his van and along his driveway. He testified that none of the stakes were
placed on Visser’s property and that he twice almost ran into the stakes on his motorcycle.
He denied threatening Visser’s children, aggressively approaching Visser’s son, or
swinging a shovel at Visser.
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Following the hearing, the district court issued an HRO that is effective until
July 22, 2023. The district court issued its order using a form order entitled “Order
Granting Harassment Restraining Order after Hearing (Minn. Stat. § 609.748).” The form
contains standard language that the district court may utilize by placing an “x,” as well as
space for the district court to include its own findings of fact and ordering provisions. Here,
the district court checked a box indicating that it found reasonable grounds to believe that
Willprecht had “engaged in harassment which has or is intended to have a substantial
adverse effect on [the] safety, security, or privacy” of Visser and her children. The district
court also included specific findings of fact to support this determination. Those findings
included that Willprecht: (1) made multiple uninvited visits by approaching Visser and her
children; (2) frightened Visser and her children with threatening behavior by engaging in
“aggressive verbal conduct with frequent use of the ‘F’ word, accompanied by quick body
movements”; and (3) damaged Visser’s property by removing or damaging stakes that
Visser placed along the property boundary line. The district court also checked another
box on the HRO order form indicating its finding that “[t]he harassment has or is intended
to have a substantial adverse effect on Petitioner’s safety, security, or privacy.” Based on
these findings, the district court ordered Willprecht to refrain from harassing Visser (and
her children) and prohibited Willprecht from coming within 100 feet of Visser’s home.
Willprecht appeals.
DECISION
We review a district court’s decision to issue an HRO for an abuse of discretion.
Borth v. Borth, 970 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Minn. App. 2022). “A district court abuses its
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discretion if it makes findings of fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies the
law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.”
Id. (quotation omitted). We will not set aside a district court’s findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. App. 2004), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). We review the district court’s application of law de novo.
Harris ex rel. Banks v. Gellerman, 954 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. App. 2021).
Willprecht argues that the district court abused its discretion by issuing the HRO for
three separate reasons. First, he contends that the record does not support issuance of the
HRO. Second, Willprecht argues that the district court should have applied a heightened
standard to determine whether his conduct met the definition of “harassment” under section
609.748. Third, Willprecht appears to contend that the district court failed to make the
factual findings necessary to support issuing the HRO because it used a form order. We
address each argument in turn.
I. The HRO is supported by the record.
A district court may issue an HRO after a hearing if it finds “that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(b)(3). “Harassment” is defined in relevant part as “repeated incidents of intrusive
or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended
to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another.” Id.,
subd. 1(a)(1). A determination of harassment under section 609.748 “requires both
objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser and an objectively
reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to harassing conduct.” Dunham v. Roer,
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708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006). Objectively
unreasonable conduct includes conduct that “goes beyond an acceptable expression of
outrage and civilized conduct, and instead causes a substantial adverse effect on another’s
safety, security or privacy.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 846.
Willprecht argues that the record does not support the district court’s finding that
his conduct had or was intended to have “a substantial adverse effect on [the] safety,
security, or privacy” of Visser and her children. In the HRO, the district court identified
the following underlying facts to support its finding of a substantial adverse
effect: Willprecht made multiple uninvited visits to Visser and her family members,
Willprecht frightened Visser with threatening behavior including “aggressive verbal
conduct” and “quick body movements,” and Willprecht damaged Visser’s property.
Willprecht does not challenge any of these underlying factual findings regarding his
conduct. Instead, Willprecht asserts that his conduct did not have a substantial adverse
effect on Visser and her family because “none” of his actions “were directed against
Ms. Visser’s safety, security or privacy.” He contends that the evidence reflects that his
conduct was at most “rude[]” and “extremely annoying.” We are not persuaded.
The district court’s finding that Willprecht’s conduct had or was intended to have a
substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of Visser and her family is
reasonably supported by the record. Visser’s testimony at the HRO hearing detailed
several incidents in which Willprecht approached Visser or her son near their property line,
screamed and swore at them—including making the statement “you have an f-ing death
wish”—and repeatedly removed or damaged the stakes Visser placed near her property
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line. Visser further testified that Willprecht’s behavior made her feel threatened,
uncomfortable, and concerned for the safety of herself and her children. Willprecht’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable and caused an objectively reasonable belief on the
part of Visser that her safety, security, or privacy was threatened. See Dunham,
708 N.W.2d at 567. His conduct went “beyond an acceptable expression of outrage and
civilized conduct, and instead cause[d] a substantial adverse effect on another’ s safety,
security or privacy.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 846. Consequently, the record contains
sufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that Willprecht’s conduct had “a
substantial adverse effect on [the] safety, security, or privacy” of Visser and her family.
Willprecht further argues that the record does not support a finding that he intended
to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of Visser and her
children. Because section 609.748 establishes a disjunctive rule, which requires either an
objective effect on the victim or the subjective intent of the harasser, we need not reach
this issue. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd.1(a)(1) (including incidents “that have . . . or
are intended to have a substantial adverse effect”). For the reasons set forth above, we
conclude that the record supports the district court’s finding that Willprecht’s conduct
objectively had a substantial adverse effect on Visser and her children’s safety, security, or
privacy.
II. Strict scrutiny does not apply to the district court’s determination of whether
Willprecht’s conduct constitutes “harassment.”

Willprecht next argues that the district court should have applied a “heightened
definiteness” standard to determine whether his conduct met the statutory definition of
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harassment. In support of this argument, Willprecht contends that “[b]ecause § 609.748
implicates the First Amendment, questions of whether given acts fall under that statute are
subject to strict scrutiny.” On that basis, Willprecht appears to argue that his actions against
Visser were not clearly enough directed at her “safety, security, or privacy” within the
meaning of section 609.748 to constitute harassment. This argument is unavailing.
Willprecht cites only one case, Dunham, to support his argument. He contends that
Dunham requires courts to apply a “heightened definiteness” standard to determine
whether a given action affects another’s “security” or “privacy” as those terms are used in
the HRO statute, section 609.748. But Dunham does not stand for that proposition. Rather,
the portion of Dunham on which Willprecht relies addresses the legal standard used by this
court to determine whether the definition of “harassment” in section 609.748 is
unconstitutionally vague on its face. See 708 N.W.2d at 567- 68 (concluding that a
“heightened definiteness” standard applies to determine whether section 609.748,
subdivision 1(a)(1), is unconstitutionally vague because the statute is “quasi-criminal”).
Willprecht does not raise a constitutional challenge to section 609.748. Accordingly,
Dunham is inapposite to the issue presented in this case: whether Willprecht’s conduct
constituted harassment within the meaning of the statute. Moreover, as Willprecht
acknowledges, Dunham held that the definition of “harassment” included in section
609.748, subdivision 1(a)(1), is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 568.
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III. The district court’s use of a form order does not constitute an abuse of
discretion.

Finally, Willprecht argues that he “has significant problems with the ‘form letter’
order” issued by the district court. Willprecht appears to contend that a district court cannot
meet its obligation to make the findings necessary to support an HRO issued after a hearing
by using a form order with standard HRO language . See Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(b)(3) (authorizing a district court to issue an HRO if “the court finds at the hearing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in
harassment”). But Willprecht does not identify any legal authority that precludes the use
of a form order for purposes of granting an HRO. Appellate courts “generally decline to
consider issues that are not adequately briefed.” Carlson v. Simon, 888 N.W.2d 467, 470
n.3 (Minn. 2016).
Regardless, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its use of the
form order. The district court did check several of the boxes indicating that it was making
various findings based on the evidence at the hearing including one stating that “[t]here are
reasonable grounds to believe that Respondent has engaged in harassment which has or is
intended to have a substantial adverse effect on [the] safety, security, or privacy of
Petitioner.” But the district court did not rely solely on the standard language. Instead, the
district court made specific factual findings that it included in the order to support its
determination that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Willprecht engaged in
harassment. The district court’s order contai ns sufficient factual findings to support its
issuance of the HRO.
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Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that the record supports the district court’s factual finding that
Willprecht’s conduct had a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of
Visser and her children. We also conclude that the district court did not err in its application
of the law. And we conclude that Willprecht’s concerns regarding the form order do not
demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the district court. Accordingly, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in issuing an HRO in favor of Visser.
Affirmed.