State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1511

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Mark Weets,
Appellant.

Filed August 15, 2022
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CR-19-1308

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Rick Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Abby Wikelius, Assistant County Attorney, Marshall,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this appeal following a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm in
Minnesota, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
conviction because the crime of violence preventing him from possessing firearms
occurred in South Dakota and his civil right to possess firearms has been restored in South
Dakota. We affirm appellant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm because
appellant’s right to possess a firearm in Minnesota has not been restored.
FACTS
In 1992, appellant Daniel Mark Weets pleaded guilty and was convicted of
attempted rob bery in South Dakota. Under South Dakota law and Minnesota law,
attempted robbery constitutes a “crime of violence,” a conviction which prohibits the
offender from possessing firearms. After serving three years in a South Dakota prison,
Weets was discharged and had his civil rights restored under South Dakota law, apart from
the right to possess firearms. By 2009, 15 years had passed since his release from prison,
and Weets was considered eligible to possess a firearm under South Dakota law.
In 2019, the Lyon County Minnesota Sheriff’s Department executed a search of
Weets’s residence in Russell, Minnesota, and seized multiple firearms, rounds of
ammunition, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. The state charged Weets with one count of
being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm and one count of being an ineligible
person in possession of ammunition under Minn. Stat. § 624.713 (2020) (“the firearm
charges”), among other charges.
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The district court at first dismissed the firearm charges based on lack of probable
cause, finding there was no information presented “that would indicate on November 24,
2019, [Weets] was ineligible to possess firearms and ammunition.” The state requested
reconsideration of the district court’s order dismissing the fire arm charges and Weets
opposed the motion. The district court allowed the renewal motion, citing the dismissal of
the charges for lack of probable cause as a “misunderstanding.” Both parties submitted
briefs to the district court. In July 2020, the district court reinstated the firearm charges,
concluding that “his right to possess or control a firearm in the State of South Dakota . . .
does not impact his right to possess a firearm or ammunition in the State of Minnesota.”
Weets requested reconsideration of the order, and the district court denied the request.
The parties agreed to proceed to trial on stipulated facts pursuant to Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 4 to obtain review of a pretrial ruling. Following a district court trial on the
stipulated facts, the district court convicted Weets of being a person ineligible for
possession of a firearm and sentenced Weets to 60 months in prison, stayed pending this
appeal.
DECISION
Weets argues that the district court erred by finding him guilty of being a person
ineligible for possession of a firearm in Minnesota because his conviction barring him from
possessing firearms occurred in South Dakota and his firearm rights were restored in South
Dakota. This issue here is one of statutory interpretation. T he goal of statutory
interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16 (2020). The first question in any statutory interpretation analysis “is whether the
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statute’s language is ambiguous.” State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009). A
statute is ambiguous only when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.
Id. But “[i]f the language of a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, the court’s role is
to apply the language of the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law.”
Toyota-Lift of Minn., Inc. v. Am. Warehouse Sys., LLC, 886 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 2016).
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884
N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016).
In Minnesota, a person convicted of a crime of violence is ineligible to possess a
firearm. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). A “crime of violence” includes a felony
conviction for attempted robbery. Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2020). Additionally,
“crimes in other states or jurisdictions which would have been crimes of violence as herein
defined if they had been committed in this state” constitute crimes of violence. Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2). Both parties agree that Weets’s 1992 conviction for attempted
robbery constitutes a crime of violence in Minnesota. And both parties agree that Weets’s
right to possess firearms is restored in South Dakota. But the parties disagree on whether
the restoration of a firearm under South Dakota law precluded Minnesota from convicting
him as a person ineligible to possess a firearm.
Weets primarily relies on the firearm restoration provision, Minn. Stat. § 609.165
(2020). He argues that this statutory provision allows for the restoration of firearm rights
in Minnesota when a person’s civil rights were fully restored in another state. The relevant
subdivision states:
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When a person has been deprived of civil rights by reason of
conviction of a crime and is thereafter discharged, such
discharge shall restore the person to all civil rights and to full
citizenship, with full right to vote and hold office, the same as
if such conviction had not taken place, and the order of
discharge shall so provide.

Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1. But subdivision 1d of the same statute states that a person
convicted of a crime of violence and thus prohibited from possessing a firearm “may
petition a court to restore the person’s ability to possess, receive, ship, or transport firearms
and otherwise deal with firearms and ammunition.” Id., subd. 1d. We must not read a
statutory provision in isolation, but “rather, all provisions in the statute must be read and
interpreted as a whole.” State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019). Here,
Weets has never petitioned the district court to restore his ability to possess firearms or
otherwise deal with firearms. Therefore, based on the statute’s unambiguous meaning,
Weets remains subject to the lifetime prohibition under Minnesota law. Thus, Weets’s
civil right to possess firearms and ammunition has not been restored in Minnesota and
subdivision 1 does not apply in this case.
Weets also cites Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 10 (2020) (the expungement
exception), which states:
Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside, or for
which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights
restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of
this definition, unless such pardon, expungement, or
restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person
may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

In a recent nonprecedential opinion, this court addressed a similar issue. See Davis v.
Empting, No. A21-1495, 2022 WL 1751340 (Minn. App. May 31, 2022). In Davis,
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appellant was convicted of a crime of violence in North Dakota but had his firearm rights
restored under North Dakota law. Id. at *2. Appellant applied for a permit to carry a
handgun in Minnesota and Minnesota denied his permit request based on his North Dakota
conviction. Id. at *1. Appellant argued that the expungement exception prevent s
Minnesota from denying his permit application. Id. at *2. This court determined the
expungement exception did not apply to a crime of violence and that the “Minnesota
legislature, not the North Dakota judiciary and not a federal statute, determined which
crimes are indicative of future dangerousness in Minnesota.” Id. Thus, this court affirmed
the denial of appellant’s application for a permit to carry a firearm in Minnesota. Id.
This court expressly concluded in Davis that, “[b]ecause the expungement exception
is self-contained in a separate subdivision and does not indicate or suggest in any way that
it applies to the crime- of-violence subdivision, we cannot conclude that the expungement
exception applies to convictions for crimes of violence.” Id. We agree. If the legislature
intended to apply this exception to other subdivisions in the statute, it would have done so
expressly. See Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012) (stating that this
court will not “add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently
omitted”). We conclude that the Davis opinion correctly determined that the expungement
exception does not apply to the crime of violence subdivision. Though nonprecedential,
the Davis opinion’s reasoning is persuasive, and we will follow it in this case.
In sum, Weets’s right to possess firearms was restored in South Dakota, but Weets
never petitioned to have his firearm rights restored in Minnesota. South Dakota’s
prohibition on firearm possession following a crime of violence expires after 15 years
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following a person’s discharge from prison. But Minnesota’s prohibition on firearm
possession following a crime of violence is a lifetime prohibition, and Minnesota law
controls who is eligible to possess firearms in the state. Therefore, because Weets never
petitioned for his firearm rights to be restored in Minnesota, the lifetime prohibition applies
to him, and he is a person ineligible to possess a firearm under Minnesota law. Thus, we
conclude that the district court did not err by holding that Weets was ineligible to possess
a firearm and convicting Weets for unlawfully possessing a firearm.
Affirmed.