State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1514

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Algene Leeland Vossen,
Respondent.

Filed May 16, 2022
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-20-658

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Julianna F. Passe, Assistant County
Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for appellant)

Judie Marshall, Kent D. Marshall, Judie Marshall Law LLC, Manchester, Connecticut (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order finding respondent not competent to
stand trial, appellant State of Minnesota argues that the district court impr operly weighed
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the evidence to conclude that respondent could not rationally consult with his counsel.
Respondent asserts that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court’s
competency order is not final. We accept jurisdiction and affirm.
FACTS
In July 2020, appellant State of Minnesota charged then-80-year-old respondent
Algene Leeland Vossen with one count of second-degree murder related to a January 1974
death that occurred in Willmar. Pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, t he district court
ordered a psychological evaluation to determine Vossen’s competency to stand trial. The
court-appointed forensic psychologist , Dr. Tricia Aiken , concluded that Vossen was not
competent to stand trial . Pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(a)(1), t he state
requested and received a contested competency hearing. In anticipation of the hearing, the
state and Vossen each retained their own expert to conduct an evaluation of Vossen’s
competency. The state’s expert, Dr. Harlan Gilbertson, determined that Vossen was
competent to stand trial. Vossen’s expert, Dr. Sara Vaccarella, concluded that Vossen was
not competent to stand trial. At the hearing, the district court heard testimony from each
of the three experts and received each expert’s report regarding Vossen’s competency to
stand trial.
Dr. Aiken evaluated Vossen first in March 2021 and again in August 2021. In the
first evaluation, Dr. Aiken stated that, although Vossen had a fair factual understanding of
the court proceedings and the charge he faced, she was concerned that he would be unable
to rationally consult with his counsel. Her concern was based on Vossen’s inability to
chronologically discuss events and devise a workable defense strategy. She observed that
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Vossen had “obvious problems with confusion,” often responding to direct questions with
irrelevant or changing answers. She testified that she did not think that Vossen could pay
sufficient attention during a trial because he gets distracted or confused, and he “would be
extremely vulnerable in testimony.” Based on Vossen’s inability to rationally consult with
counsel, Dr. Aiken concluded that Vossen was not competent to stand trial. In the second
evaluation, Dr. Aiken found that Vossen looked stronger, was more alert, and gave more
detailed answers. Even so, she observed that Vossen had the same difficulties with
answering questions. She again concluded that Vossen was not competent to stand trial
because he is unable to consult rationally with counsel.
In July 2021, Dr. Vaccarella evaluated Vossen. Dr. Vaccarella similarly concluded
that Vossen exhibited satisfactory factual knowledge of the legal system but lacked rational
understanding. She testified that Vossen struggles to take in new information , and he
instead fixates on previously learned infor mation, even if it is false, and repeats that
information until it “becomes his reality.” She concluded that Vossen’s inability to grasp
new information is a significant impairment. She also testified that Vossen has trouble
retrieving information without cues and often gives irrelevant answers. She reported that ,
while there are modifications that the district court could make to accommodate Vossen’s
impairment during trial , like cues, reminders, or avoiding compound questions, she
believed that these modifications would be “unrealistic and place significant burden on the
legal system.” Dr. Vaccarella also concluded that Vossen was not competent to stand trial
because he is unable to rationally consult with counsel.
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In August 2021, Dr. Gilbertson evaluated Vossen. Like Dr. Aiken and
Dr. Vaccarella, Dr. Gilbertson also opined that Vossen ha s an acceptable factual
understanding of the judicial process. But unlike the other two experts, Dr. Gilbertson
opined that Vossen could rationally consult with his counsel based on Vossen’s ability to
articulate specific benefits and drawbacks of different pleas, plea agreements, and jury
versus bench trials. He explained that Vossen’s intellectual abilities “remain within the
broad average range” and that, although Vossen has limited verbal learning and verbal
retrieval skills, his “recall improves to within the average range” if he is provided cues.
Dr. Gilbertson concluded that Vossen is competent to stand trial.
In all three evaluations, Vossen was adamant that he would plead not guilty and take
his case to trial. Dr. Aiken concluded that Vossen’s insistence to plead not guilty reflected
that he has “very rigid thinking.” She was concerned that he lack s a defense strategy and
did not recognize that he lack s one. Dr. Vaccarella expressed similar concerns. She
observed that Vossen could not form realistic expectations about the outcome of his case.
Dr. Gilbertson interpreted Vossen’s insistence to plead not guilty differently. He observed
that a defendant’s decision contradicting their self-interest may still be reasoned and
informed. Dr. Gilbertson determined that Vossen is able to make thought -out legal
decisions. Dr. Gilbertson also credited Vossen’s extens ive legal history and courtroom
exposure as weighing in favor of his competency.
The district court found that Vossen is too cognitively impaired to adequately assist
his counsel in his defense. The district court noted that the testimony from all three experts
established that Vossen suffers from significant short -term memory impairment. The
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district court reasoned that Vossen’s ability to recall newly learned information is
“essential” to his participation in his defense, and the experts who evaluated Vossen opined
that his ability to do so is deficient. The district court found that the experts’ opinions
established other impairments that also impede Vossen’s ability to consult with and assist
counsel in his own defense . The district court specifica lly noted Vossen’s poor
concentration and attention span, struggle to convey accurate information, and
susceptibility to suggestion. The district court found that those impairments would also
make it difficult for Vossen to convey relevant details to his counsel. The district court
determined that Vossen is not competent to stand trial.
The state appeals.
DECISION
Vossen argues that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal because a competency
determination is reviewable every six months. Because the juris dictional question is
dispositive, we address that argument before turning to the state’s argument that the district
court improperly weighed the evidence regarding Vossen’s competency. We conclude that
neither argument is persuasive and affirm the district court’s competency determination.
I. The district court’s competency determination is immediately appealable.
Vossen argues that we lack jurisdiction because “[t]he state has the opportunity to
request further review regarding [Vossen’s] competency separate from this appeal,”
rendering the order not final under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 (final-judgment rule). We
disagree.
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Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.01, subd. 2, the civil appellate rules govern unless the
criminal rules direct otherwise. And here, Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1), directs
otherwise because it permits the state to appeal “any pretrial order ,” which necessarily
includes the district court’s order finding that Vossen is not competent to stand trial. The
final-judgment rule therefore does not apply to this case.
Instead, to appeal a pretrial order under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1), the
state must show that “the district court’s ruling will have a critical impact on its case.”
State v. Obeta , 796 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. 2011). “Critical impact” requires that the
effect of the pretrial ruling “seriously impede” the prosecution’s case. State v. Norberg ,
423 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. App. 1988). We agree with the state that the district court’s
competency ruling critically impacts its case. The state is currently unable to prosecute
Vossen because he is not competent to stand trial, notwithstanding the possibility that this
circumstance could change at some undefined point in the future. Indeed, it is possible that
Vossen will never be found competent, and the state may never be able to prosecute its
case. We conclude that the district court’s competency determination critically impacts the
state’s case and accept appellate jurisdiction.
II. The district court properly weighed the evidence of Vossen’s competency.
The state argues that the district court improperly weighed the evidence when
concluding that V ossen is not competent. The state contends that, while Vossen has
cognitive impairments, the evidence presented to the district court nevertheless establishes
that he is able to rationally consult with counsel.
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The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require the suspension of criminal
proceedings when a defendant is not legally competent. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2.
“A defendant is incompetent and must not . . . be tried . . . if the defendant due to mental
illness or cognitive impairment lack s ability to: (a) rationally consult with counsel; or
(b) understand the proceedings or participate in the defense.” Id.; see Bonga v. State, 797
N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011).
“[W]hen the State is the party asserting that the defendant is competent, the State
bears the burden of proving competency” by the greater weight of the evidence. State v.
Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 2018) (discussing Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5).
Because Rule 20.01 requires suspension of the proceedings if the defenda nt lacks either
capacity, the state must prove that the defendant has the ability to both “rationally consult
with counsel” and “understand the proceedings or participate in the defense.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2; see Curtis, 921 N.W.2d at 348.
On review of a competency determination, we defer to the district court’s factual
findings unless such findings are clearly erroneous, State v. O’Neill , 945 N.W.2d 71, 82
(Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2020), and we “independently review the
record to determine if the district court gave proper weight to the evidence produced and if
its finding of competency is adequately supported by the record,” Curtis, 921 N.W.2d at
346 (quotations omitted).
In a thorough and detailed order, t he district court evaluated each expert’s report
and their testimony and concluded that they unanimously support the conclusion that
Vossen has significant short-term memory problems, which “present a substantial obstacle
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in [his] ability to consult with counsel or participate in his defense.” There is sufficient
record evidence from all three expert s that Vossen has significant short -term
memory-impairment issues barring him from rationally consulting with counsel, as
demonstrated by Vossen confusing dates and the chronology of events, provid ing
inaccurate information, and his inability to process newly learned information.
In his evaluation with Dr. Aiken, Vossen misidentified the current month and the
day of the week and could not specify when his wife died, when he was charged with the
current offense, and when he moved to his most recent residence. Dr. Aiken reported that
Vossen also provide d irrelevant answers to questions. In his evaluation with
Dr. Vaccarella, Vossen struggled to provide timelines, endorsed conspiracies surrounding
the allegations, and when asked complex questions, would simply state “right.” In
Dr. Gilbertson’s evaluation, Vossen incorrectly identified the current date and failed to
recall his attorney’s name, wrongly believing that it was “John.” Dr. Gilbertson reported
that Vossen’s ability to recall new verbal information after a delay was “severely
impaired.” Dr. Gilbertson also testified that he did not see much of the “cognitive
confusion and lack of clarity” that Dr. Aiken and Dr. Vaccarella saw in Vossen. By relying
on their testimony, the district court implicitly found that Dr. Aiken’s and Dr. Vaccarella’s
testimonies credibly established Vossen’s state of mental impairment . See Umphlett v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 533 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. App. 1995) (providing appellate
courts defer to a district court’s implicit credibility determinations), rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 30, 1995 ). I t is not our role to reevaluate what relative weight to assign to the
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evidence or to competing expert opinion s. See O’Neill, 945 N.W.2d at 83. The record
therefore supports the district court’s finding that Vossen is not competent.
The state’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise . The state points to evidence
that Vossen’s “in -depth understanding of the proceedings” means that he can rationally
consult with his attorney. But evidence that Vossen understood the charge, the roles of
court personnel, the pros and cons of certain plea arrangements, and the range of possible
consequences, relate to the second part of the Rule 20.01 analysis —that Vossen is able to
“understand the proceedings or participate in the defense.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01,
subd. 2(b). The district court found that the state failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the first part of the Rule 20.01 analysis—that Vossen is able to “rationally consult
with counsel.” Id., subd. 2(a). In making its determination, the district court found that
Vossen’s short -term memory impairment and inability to retain new information are
determinative of his inability to rationally consult with counsel, a finding that the record
supports.
The state counters that Dr. Gilbertson’s testimony establishes that Vossen can learn
new information and accurately answer questions if provided prompts, and he is therefore
able to rationally consult with his counsel. Dr. Gilbertson reported that when Vossen is
given a recognition cue, he performs in the average range, meaning that he can overcome
some of the issues with information retrieval that Dr. Aiken and Dr. Vaccarella observed.
But Dr. Gilbertson also testified that Vossen’s inability to recall new information is based
primarily on bereavement issues from the loss of his wife. Dr. Gilbertson opined that as
the bereavement process continues, Vossen’s memory impairment will lessen.
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The district court, however, discredited that theory based on Vossen’s medical
history and Dr. Aiken’s opinion. Dr. Aiken testified that Vossen’s inability to learn new
information cannot be explained by bereavement because she observed the same confused
behavior from Vossen in both of her evaluations five months apart. She also testified that
even when she rephrased certain questions or gave him cues, Vossen would still reply with
irrelevant answers. Although Dr. Gilbertson’s and Dr. Aiken’s assessments may conflict
in certain respects, we afford broad deference to the fact-finder’s determination of how to
weigh expert testimony, and the state does not argue that the district court clearly erred in
its findings. See State v. Roberts, 876 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2016); O’Neill, 945 N.W.2d
at 83.
The state finally argues that the dis trict court erroneously determined that Vossen
lacks the ability to rationally consult with counsel because of poor concentration. The state
points to Dr. Vaccarella’s report which provides that Vossen maintained “good attention
and was able to complete the [5.5 hour] interview and testing in a timely manner.” But
Dr. Vaccarella also reported that Vossen “has clear problems in maintaining attention and
concentration.” And that assessment is corroborated by Dr. Aiken’s report , which also
observed that it would be “unlikely [Vossen] would be able to maintain his attention for
very long during cou rtroom proceedings.” While the record supports the assertion that
Vossen maintained his attention during Dr. Vaccarella’s evaluation, the record also
supports the experts’ opinions that Vossen would be unable to maintain his attention
throughout a trial.
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In sum, we conclude that the district court properly and demonstrably weighed the
evidence, articulated its reasoning for the competency determination, and that
determination is adequately supported by the record.
Affirmed.