In the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1526

In the Matter of:

Gabrielle Elizabeth Shanley, and on behalf of minor child,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin James Osgood,
Appellant.

Filed June 20, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-FA-21-5499

Xavier J. Martine, Martine Law, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

John G. Westrick, Savage Westrick, P.L.L.P., Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chie f Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this challenge to an order for prot ection (OFP) issued against him for the
protection of his minor child, appellant argues that the district court erred (1) by admitting

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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evidence of prior domestic conduct against th e child’s mother as relationship evidence
under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2020) and (2) by granting the OFP based on findings that he
contends are not supported by the record. Because any evidentiary error was not prejudicial
and because the factual findings are supported by the record, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Justin Osgood and respondent Gabrielle Shanley are parents who share
joint custody of a minor child who was born in 2017. Around 11:00 a.m. on July 30, 2021,
at an appointment for the child, Shanley a nd Osgood exchanged the child for Osgood to
begin his parenting time. It is undisputed that the child had no injuries at that time. Osgood
cared for the child for a few hours before heading to work in the early afternoon.
Osgood lived in a house with his father and mother. Osg ood’s father testified that
he (that is, Osgood’s father) arrived home from work around 6:00 p.m. on July 30 and that
the child had no injuries at th at time. Osgood’s then-girlfrie nd, J.P., testified that she
arrived at the Osgood home ar ound 7:00 p.m. and that the child had no injuries. Around
8:00 p.m., Osgood’s father and mother left the home to go fo r a drink. J.P. cared for the
child while they were gone an d put the child to bed around 8:30 p.m. Around 9:00 p.m.,
Osgood’s father and mother returned to the house. Osgood’s father testified that he did not
see the child until the next morning.
Around 2:00 a.m. on July 31, Osgood arrived home from work. He testified that he
had a slice of pizza and discovered J.P. in the living room compla ining of chest pain.
Osgood testified that he took J.P. to the hospital around 2:30 a.m. and that he remained
with her there until later that morning.
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Osgood’s father testified that he disc overed bruising on the child’s face on the
morning of July 31. He texted Osgood at 8:30 a.m., asking, “What the hell happened to her
face she did not look like that when we went out last night.” He sent a photo of the child,
which showed the bruising. Osgood respo nded, “I don’t know. I got home and left.”
Osgood’s father responded, “Sure looks like she got hit really hard,” and sent another photo
of the bruising, and Osgood texted back, “It does look that way.”
The following morning, Osgood texted Shanley, saying, “[The child] has marks on
her face. No idea why. Possibly a doorknob.” That afternoon, Shanley picked the child up
at the exchange. She took the child to an emergency room, and the bruising was
photographed and documented. Os good’s father later testifie d that the child was not tall
enough to run into a doorknob.
Shanley petitioned for an OFP against Osgo od on behalf of the child. The district
court granted an ex parte OFP, and the matte r was scheduled for an evidentiary hearing.
Before the hearing, Osgood moved to excl ude, as inadmissible character evidence,
testimony that Osgood had committed domestic a buse against Shanley. The district court
denied the motion, concluding that evidence of past incidents of domestic abuse by Osgood
against Shanley was admissible under Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
At the hearing, Shanley testified that, on their second date, Osgood had sexually
assaulted her while she was intoxicated, which resulted in the conception of the child. She
further testified that Osgood repeatedly physically and se xually assaulted her during the
remainder of their relationship, including at times when the child was present in the room.
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Both Shanley and her father testified that, prior to the incident with the bruising, the child
had returned from parenting time with Osgood with scratches on her face.
The district court granted the OFP, finding the testimony by Shanley and her father
credible and the testimony by Osgood, J.P., and Osgood’s father not credible.
Osgood appeals.
DECISION
A person who alleges domestic abuse may petition for an OFP under Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 4. (2020). Domestic abuse in cludes “physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault,” when “committed against a family or household member by a family or household
member.” Minn. Stat. § 518.01, subd. 2(a) (2020). The petitioner must show that domestic
abuse occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. Oberg ex rel. Minor Child v. Bradley,
868 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. App. 2015). “[O]nce ‘domestic abuse’ has been established, the
district court may examine all of the releva nt circumstances proven to determine whether
to grant or deny the petition for an OFP.” Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500
(Minn. 2018). “[Appellate courts] review the decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of
discretion. A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against lo gic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation and citation
omitted).
Osgood argues that the district court abused its discretion. He first contends that the
district court received inadmissible evidence. He then asserts that the evidence was too
speculative for the district court to find that he injured the child. We address each argument
in turn.
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I. Any error by the district court in admitting evidence of prior domestic conduct
was harmless.

Osgood argues that the district court a bused its discretion by allowing Shanley to
testify about domestic abuse committed against her by Osgood. Shanley contends that the
evidence was properly admitted as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 and
that any error from the admission of the evidence was not prejudicial.
“Rulings [in domestic-abus e proceedings] on the admissi bility of evidence lie
within the district court’s discretion, and th is court will not disturb an evidentiary ruling
unless it is based on an erroneous view of th e law or is an abuse of that discretion.”
Aljubailah v. James , 903 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Minn. A pp. 2017). “An OFP is a civil
remedy[,]” and, “[i]n civil cases, the complaining party must demonstrate prejudicial error
to be entitled to a new trial or hearing based on an erroneous evidentiary ruling.” Olson ex
rel. A.C.O. v. Olson , 892 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. Ap p. 2017) (quotation omitted). “An
evidentiary error is prejudicial if it might reasonably have influenced the fact-finder and
changed the result of the proceeding.” Id. at 842.
Osgood argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the domestic-
conduct evidence because Minn. Stat. § 634.20 applies only in criminal cases and this is a
civil case. But we need not decide whether section 634.20 applies in the context of a
petition for an order for protection if Osgo od has not demonstrated prejudice from the
admission of the evidence. We turn to that question.
The district court based its issuance of an OFP on several factual findings. It
explained that it based its determination on
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the text messages (narrowing down the time when the abuse
occurred), the relationship evidence demonstrating [Osgood]’s
history of domestic abuse, the tone and content of [Osgood]’s
responsive text messages to [his father] after being alerted to
the child’s injuries (suggesting that he already knew about the
assault), and his testimony duri ng the hearing, which lacked
credibility.

In light of these findings, any error in admitting the challenged domestic-conduct
evidence could not reasonably have changed the result. See id. The timeframe surrounding
the child’s injury, Osgood’s reaction to his father’s questions about the child’s injury, and
Osgood’s lack of credibility as a witness convincingly esta blished that he committed the
abuse against the child, even without the evidence of past abuse against Shanley. Any error
in admitting the evidence was therefore not prejudicial and does not support reversal. See
id. at 841.
II. The district court’s factual findings are supported by the record.
Osgood next argues that the finding that he committed an act of domestic abuse
against the child is unsupported by record ev idence, so the district court abused its
discretion by issuing the OFP. He asserts that the evidence is too speculative because there
were several caretakers of the child during the night and none of Shanley’s witnesses at the
hearing were present at the house to be able to identify which caretaker perpetrated the
abuse. Shanley contends that the record sup ports the district court’s issuance of an OFP
based on its determination of the witnesses’ credibility.
Osgood challenges only the factual findi ng that he committed an act of domestic
abuse, and not the application of law to the facts. “We review [factual] findings for clear
error, which means that the district court’s fi ndings must be ‘manifestly contrary to the
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weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.’” Ekman
v. Miller, 812 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. App. 2012) (quoting Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d
512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004)); see In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-
23 (Minn. 2021) (discussing clear-error standard of review). On appeal from a district
court’s decision regarding whether to grant an OFP, “[a]n appellate court will ‘neither
reconcile conflicting evidence nor deci de issues of witness credibility.’” Aljubailah, 903
N.W.2d at 643 (quoting Gada, 684 N.W.2d at 514). “[W]e vi ew the evidence in the light
most favorable to the decision.” Ekman, 812 N.W.2d at 895. And, “[w]hen the record
reasonably supports the findings at issue on appe al, it is immaterial th at the record might
also provide a reasonable basis for infere nces and findings to the contrary.” Kenney, 963
N.W.2d at 223 (quotation omitted).
The district court’s factual finding that Osgood perpetrated the abuse is supported
by the record. The child was injured—she had bruising on her face. Because of the child’s
size, that injury could not have been caused by running into a doorknob, as Osgood initially
suggested in his text messages to Shanley. Th ere is no dispute that this injury occurred
during Osgood’s parenting time. The district court found that J.P. (who testified that
Osgood never saw the child during the night) and Osgood’s father (who testified—contrary
to Osgood’s testimony—that Osgood was not in the house during the night) were not
credible witnesses. In addition, Osgood testified that he did not give the child the bruises,
but the district court found that Osgood’s testimony lacked credib ility. In contrast, the
district court found Shanley and her father to be credible witnesses, and they both testified
to previous instances where the child was injured during Osgood’s parenting time. Thus,
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deferring to the district court’s credibility dete rminations and reviewing the record in the
light most favorable to the district court’s fi ndings, we conclude that the district court’s
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. As a result, even if the record could be read as
Osgood suggests, that fact would be “immaterial.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The record evidence, even without the testimony of the prior domestic conduct
against Shanley, supports the district court’s finding that Osgood abused the child. In light
of its factual findings, the district court di d not abuse its discreti on by issuing an OFP
against Osgood on behalf of the child.
Affirmed.