State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1539

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joel Patrick Rodriguez,
Appellant.

Filed July 25, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-20-679

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Michael D. Leeser, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defende r, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by ordering restitution for an offense
that was dismissed as part of appellant’s global plea agreement to different offense s.
Because appellant forfeited this issue by not raising it below, and because appellant is not
entitled to relief on the merits, we affirm .
FACTS
Between 2019 and 2021, respondent State of Minnesota filed multiple charges
against appellant Joel Patrick Rodriguez in seven different case files. Following plea
negotiations, the parties reached a global resolution of the criminal complaints against
appellant. Appellant pleaded guilty to offenses in four case files. In exchange, the state
agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of these complaints and further agreed not to pursue
potential charges under review in other case files . The parties also reached an agreement
regarding sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, counsel informed the district court that
the victim in one of the dismissed cases had filed a request for restitution. The district
court agreed to leave restitution unresolved for thirty days to give appellant time to decide
whether to object to the restitution request. The district court then imposed a sentence
consistent with the parties’ plea agreement. The victim later filed a restitution claim form.
The district court ordered appellant to pay restitution to cover damages to the victim in one
of the dismissed cases. This appeal follows.
3
DECISION
I. Appellant forfeited review of the restitution issue.
We first consider whether appellant forfeited his challenge to the district court’s
restitution order by failing to raise it before the district court. A reviewing court generally
will not consider restitution arguments not raised below. State v. Johnson, 851 N.W.2d 60,
64 (Minn. 2014) (declining to consider a restitution argument raised for the first time on
appeal).
A restitution order must be challenged within 30 days of receipt of written notice of
the amount of restitution or within 30 days of sentencing, whichever is later. Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2020). “A defendant may not challenge the restitution after the
30-day time period has passed.” Id. Here, the district court filed its restitution order in
August 2021. Appellant acknowledges he did not file an objection to the restitution
request. Even so, appellant argues that because he is challenging the district court’s
authority to award restitution on a dismissed claim, rather than on the type or amount of
restitution, his challenge is timely. The 30-day statutory deadline precludes our review on
appeal when a defendant disputes either the amount, or the type, of restitution. State v.
Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011). But t he 30-day time bar does not apply to
a challenge to the district court ’s legal authority to award restitution. Id. at 648. Gaiovnik
states that the 30-day time limit does not apply under “the narrow circumstances” where
the “only challenge is to the legal authority of the court to order restitution and that
challenge was raised in the district court.” Id. The supreme court stated:
4
Because the ti me deadline in [Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd.
3(b)] does not govern [the defendant’s] challenge, we hold that
his failure to submit a written challenge within 30 days after
the sentencing hearing does not preclude [him] from
challenging in a direct appeal the district court’s legal authority
to award restitution when he raised this legal issue with the
district court at the sentencing hearing.

Id. at 649.
Here, appellant concedes that he did not raise this legal issue with the district court
at any point, as required by Gaiovnik. Instead, appellant raised his challenge for the first
time on appeal. Because appellant failed to properly raise this challenge in district court,
he has forfeited his right to challenge restitution on appeal.
Appellant asserts that his claim can be raised for the first time on appeal under
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, which provides that “[t] he court may at any
time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. A n
appellant may use the procedure in this rule to challenge a restitution award. Evans v.
State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359- 60 (Minn. 2016). But “a challenge to a sentence imposed as
part of a plea agreement involves more than simply the sentence.” State v. Col es, 862
N.W.2d 477, 481 (Minn. 2015). When an appellant’s motion to correct sentence implicates
a plea agreement, including the state’s dismissal of other pending charges, the exclusive
remedy is a petition for postconviction relief. Id. at 480-81. Here, appellant’s challenge
to the restitution order implicates his other charges and case files , which were resolved as
part of a global plea agreement. Thus, appellant cannot properly bring his challenge under
rule 27.03 because restitution was part of his plea agreement. See Evans, 880 N.W.2d at
5
360 (holding that a rule 27 motion is not the proper method to challenge a restitution award
if payment of restitution is a material part of the negotiation).
In sum, because appellant failed to raise a challenge to the restitution order in district
court, we deem this argument forfeited .
II. Appellant’s argument fails on the merits.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that appellant’s failure to raise this
challenge in district court bars relief on appeal. While we need not consider the merits of
appellant’s argument, we hold that they would not support relief in any event .
Appellant challenges the district court’s restitution order. W e review a restitution
order for an abuse of the district court’s “broad discretion.” State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d
910, 913 (Minn. 2015). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
an erroneous interpretation or application of the law. State v. Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d 376,
380 (Minn. 2019). A challenge to the district court ’s authority to order restitution
represents a legal question subject to de novo review. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 913.
Appellant argues the district court “erred” by ordering restitution for an offense that
was dismissed as part of a global plea agreement. We do not agree. A district court may
order restitution for the losses of victims harmed by the offender in instances separate from
the case the offender pleads guilty to as a part of a plea agreement. State v. Kennedy , 327
N.W.2d 3, 5 (Minn. 1982). Kennedy is instructive. In that case, the state charged the
defendant with 32 felony counts of theft and securities -law violations. Id. at 4. The
defendant entered into a plea agreement with the state in which he pleaded guilty to three
counts, and the state agreed to dismis s the remaining 29 counts and refrain from charging
6
the defendant with more crimes. Id. The defendant also agreed to pay restitution based on
the losses of all the victims of his underlying crimes, not just the victims named in the
counts to which the de fendant pleaded guilty. Id . Further , “it became clear at the
sentencing hearing that what was contemplated was reasonable restitution based not just
on the losses of the parties named in the three counts but on the losses of all the victims of
defendant’s criminal scheme.” Id. Three years later, the defendant argued to the district
court that he should only be required to pay restitution for three victims. Id. The district
court rejected this argument and ordered the defendant to pay reasonable restitution “based
on losses of all victims of defendant ’s Minnesota activities.” Id. The supreme court
affirmed, stating that
[a]lthough the record made at the time defendant entered his
guilty pleas did not make it clear what the parties meant the
scope of r estitution to be, the record made at the time of the
sentencing hearing establishes that the parties contemplated
that restitution would be based on the losses of all the victims
of the underlying criminal scheme.

Id. The supreme court noted that if the defendant had objected to this global resolution of
his many claims, then he either “should have stated it at that time” or “withdrawn his guilty
pleas and stood trial.” Id. at 4-5.
Here, the parties agreed that appellant would plead guilty to certain counts of his
seven outstanding complaints, and, in exchange, the state would dismiss the remaining
complaints and charges. Appellant agreed to pay restitution and fines. During the
sentencing hearing, it bec ame clear that there was a request for restitution in one of the
cases to be dismissed. Counsel informed the district court that “there is a[n] Affidavit of
7
Loss in the file [to be dismissed].” The district court inquired, “So, in [the dismissed case],
you’re asking for restitution to be ordered in the amount of [$1,750] to [the victim] because
the—the file for which . . . that money is owed is a file to be dismissed. Is that accurate?”
Counsel answered, “Correct.” Counsel asked the district court to leave restitution open for
30 days to give appellant time to decide whether he wanted to file an objection to the
amount of restitution. Counsel did not object to ordering restitution on a dismissed case
file. The district court agreed to hold the issue open for 30 days . The district court then
asked appellant if he wished to address the court. Appellant did not have any comments
related to restitution. The district court imposed sentence and later awarded the victim
$2,750 in damages.1
As in Kennedy, the issue of restitution was specifically addressed at the sentencing
hearing. The parties contemplated that appellant would pay restitution in a dismissed court
file. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing restitution as part of
the global plea agreement.
Affirmed.

1 Appellant argues the restitution amount of $2,750 does not match the damages described
at the sentencing hearing. This is a challenge to the type or amount of restitution and is not
reviewable for the first time on appeal.