State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1544

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Richard Alan Quarles,
Appellant.

Filed October 31, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-18-1662

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Richard Alan Quarles challenges his conviction, following a court trial,
for possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, arguing that the trial evidence was
insufficient to establish that he possessed a gun found under the passenger seat of an
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unoccupied car. Because respondent State of Minnesota proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Quarles constructively possessed the gun, we affirm.
FACTS
After D.K. reported to police that Quarles was using D.K.’s townhouse to make and
sell crack cocaine, police obtained a warrant and searched the home. They found several
guns, magazines, bullets, cocaine, scales, and evidence of drug manufacturing. Quarles
was charged with multiple offenses based on this evidence. Following a court trial, the
district court found Quarles guilty of two crimes—third -degree drug sale and possession
of a firearm by an ineligible person. On appeal, Quarles only challenges the gun-
possession conviction, arguing that the trial evidence was insufficient to prove that he
possessed a gun that police found under the passenger seat of D.K.’s parked car.
The trial evidence was as follows. In June 2018, D.K. went to the Eagan Police
Department to speak with officers about illicit activity happening at his townhome. D.K.
reported that he was addicted to crack cocaine, that Quarles was his drug dealer, and that
he had allowed Quarles to move into his home when he could not pay his drug debt. He
informed the police that Quarles “cooked” crack cocaine in the residence. D.K. also told
the police that he was required to drive Quarles to drug transactions using his Toyota
Camry. He asked the police to help him with his situation.
When the police entered D.K.’s home with a search warrant, they found Quarles and
his partner sleeping in a bedroom. In the adjoining bathroom, the police found a coffee
filter containing a large amount of suspected cocaine. A Toyota Camry was parked in the
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garage. The car was registered to D.K., but the title had been transferred to Quarles.
Officers found a gun under the Camry’s front passenger seat.
Quarles admitted to the police that he had signed the title to the Camry; he said he
was in the process of purchasing it. He told officers that he had been in the passenger seat
of the Camry the day before the search. Quarles explained that he was a passenger because
he does not have a valid driver’s license. He also stated, “I ride in that car.” But Quarles
denied knowing about the gun, and he insisted that his DNA would not be on it.
Forensic analysis of the gun revealed that the grip contained a mixture of DNA from
three or more individuals. The major DNA profile matched Quarles’s DNA. That profile
would not be expected to occur more than once among unrelated individuals.
At Quarles’s court trial, D.K., police officers, and forensic analysts testified for the
state. The state also presented evidence that Quarles had a previous felony conviction,
which prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Quarles waived his right to testify and
did not call witnesses or present evidence.
In a detailed order, the district court concluded that the evidence proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Quarles possessed the gun found under the passenger seat of the
Camry.1 The district court entered a conviction for possession of a firearm by an ineligible

1 D.K. was given use immunity for his testimony, which prevented the state from using his
incriminating testimony against him in any criminal case. See Minn. Stat. § 609.09, subd.
1 (2020). The district court accordingly noted that it viewed D.K.’s testimony with “great
scrutiny.”
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person, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2016), and sentenced Quarles to 60 months in
prison for this offense.2
DECISION
Quarles argues that the trial evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
possession of a firearm by an ineligible person. He contends that the evidence that he
possessed the firearm found under the passenger seat of the Toyota Camry was purely
circumstantial. And, according to Quarles, because the circumstantial evidence was
equally consistent with his trial theory that D.K. or someone else possessed the gun, his
conviction must be reversed. We conclude that the circumstantial evidence only supports
one reasonable theory—that Quarles possess ed the gun—and we affirm.
In a criminal case, due process requires the prosecution to prove every element of
the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn.
2020). Quarles challenges the sufficiency of the state’s evidence underlying one element
of the gun-possession offense —the element of possession. To convict Quarles of
possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, the state was required to prove —among
other elements—that Quarles knowingly possessed a firearm. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(2); see also 10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 32.17 (Supp. 2021). “Possession
may be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession.” State v. Harris,
895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Here, Quarles was not in actual, physical possession
of the gun when the police found it. See State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn.

2 The district court also imposed a concurrent sentence of 21 months for the third- degree
drug offense that is not at issue in this appeal.
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App. 2016) (defining actual possession as the exercise of “direct physical control” over an
object). Thus, to establish the element of possession, the state was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Quarles constructively possessed the gun.
Constructive possession may be established in two ways. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at
601. The state must show either (1) the “police found the item in a place under the
defendant’s exclusive control to which other people normally did not have access,” or (2) if
others had access, “there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the
time the defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion and control over
it.” Id. “[C]onstructive possession need not be exclusive, but may be shared.” State v.
Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001).
We next identify the standard of review that we must apply in considering whether
the state’s evidence was sufficient to prove that Quarles constructively possessed the gun.
“[Appellate courts] use the same standard of review in bench trials and in jury trials in
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn.
2011). As a general matter, we must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the
verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted
with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (citing Palmer, 803
N.W.2d at 733).
But the level of scrutiny that the appellate court applies turns on whether the
elements of an offense are supported by direct or circumstantial evidence. State v.
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). Direct evidence is “based on pers onal
knowledge or observation and . . . proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Harris,
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895 N.W.2d at 599 (quotations omitted). Circumstantial evidence “always requires an
inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.” Id. When the trial
evidence supporting an element of an offense was entirely circumstantial, an appellate
court more closely scrutinizes the sufficiency of that evidence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d 469, 474-75 (Minn. 2010). The state concedes that the evidence that Quarles
constructively possessed the gun was entirely circumstantial. Thus, the state agrees that,
in reviewing the sufficiency of that evidence, we must apply the heightened standard of
review for circumstantial evidence.
The circumstantial-evidence standard requires a two-step process. Silvernail, 831
N.W.2d at 598. “The first step is to identify the circumstances proved.” Id. A reviewing
court assumes the trier of fact believed the state’s witnesses and rejected all evidence
contrary to the verdict; all conflicting evidence is resolved in the state’s favor. See State v.
Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 857-58 (Minn. 2008). In the case of a trial to the court, we defer
to the district court’s conclusions and reject evidence in the record that conflicts with those
conclusions. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d at 733. The second step is to “determine whether the
circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). During this step of the analysis,
we do not defer to the factfinder’s choice between reasonable inferences. State v.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-30 (Minn. 2010). “Circumstantial evidence must form a
complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to guilt of the
defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than
guilt.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (quotation omitted).
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Applying this standard of review, we consider whether the state’s trial evidence
established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Quarles constructively possessed the gun
found under the passenger seat of the Toyota Camry. We first identify the circumstances
proved as follows. Quarles was in the business of selling illegal controlled substances.
Trial testimony established that the use of weapons is often associated with the sale of
illegal controlled substances. The last time Quarles rode in the Camry, he was seated in
the passenger seat. The gun was located under the passenger seat of the Camry. Quarles
signed the title to the Camry. He told the police he did not drive the car because his driver’s
license was not valid. Quarles also admitted to the police that he was in the car the previous
day. Forensic analysis revealed that Quarles’s DNA was the major profile in a mixture of
DNA found on the gun’s grip. Accidental or inadvertent transfer of Quarles’s DNA onto
the grip of the gun was unlikely due to the location of the gun under the passenger seat, an
area that is typically accessed intentionally.
We next examine the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
circumstances proved. These inferences are consistent with Quarles’s guilt. As a drug
seller, Quarles had a reason to possess a gun. By taking title to the Camry and using it for
drug errands, Quarles exercised control over the car. The location of the gun—under the
seat that Quarles typically occupied—indicates that Quarles exercised control over the gun .
And the evidence of Quarles’s DNA on the gun’s grip is consistent with the inference that
Quarles handled the gun.
Quarles argues that the circumstances proved also support a reasonable inference
that someone else possessed the gun. He points out that more than one person had access
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to the Camry, noting the trial testimony that both D.K. and Quarles’s partner had access to
the car. He highlights the evidence that three or more DNA profiles were found on the gun
grip. And he notes that, even if he touched the gun, “fleeting possession” does not establish
unlawful possession. See State v. Houston, 654 N.W.2d 727, 735 (Minn. App. 2003),
(holding that defendant was entitled t o a jury instruction on “fleeting control” under the
particular facts of the case), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2003). Given these circumstances,
Quarles argues that our decision in State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. App. 2015) —
where we found insufficient circumstantial evidence to support a drug conviction —
requires reversal here. We disagree.
Initially, we note that the facts in Sam are quite different than the circumstances
here. In Sam, police stopped a car occupied by two people. 859 N.W.2d at 828. Sam was
the driver, although he was not the car’s owner. Id. Before the car stopped, police observed
the passenger make a sudden movement toward the center of the car. Id. Police searched
the car , finding drugs and a gun in the center console. Id. at 829. At trial, Sam was
convicted for possessing the illicit items in the car. Id. In reversing Sam’s convictions for
insufficient evidence, we stated that Sam’s status as the driver of the car was not alone
sufficient to prove his “exercise of dominion and control over the drugs and the gun found
therein.” Id. at 834. Here, unlike Sam, Quarles had title to the Toyota Camry. And unlike
Sam, the illegal item was found directly under the car seat that Quarles used. We therefore
are not persuaded that Sam requires reversal of his conviction.
Nor are we persuaded that it is reasonable to infer from the circumstances proved
that someone other than Quarles possessed the gun. In addition to the evidence about the
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gun’s location, the state’s other evidence tied the gun to Quarles. Quarles’s DNA was on
the grip of the gun. And the state established that Quarles, who was in the drug business,
had a reason for possessing a gun.
But even if someone else also could have possessed the gun, this inference alone
does not support a reasonable hypothesis that Quarles did not possess the gun. Because
constructive possession can be joint, Sam, 859 N.W.2d at 834, speculation that another
person also may have possessed the gun does not establish a reasonable inference other
than guilt.
Quarles also challenges some of the district court’s factual findings. He contends
that the district court should not have relied on the DNA evidence to conclude that he
handled the gun because it is possible that it was “transfer DNA.” But the district court
specifically considered and rejected this theory as unreasonable. Additionally, Quarles
argues that the record does not support the district court’s finding that Quarles was the last
person to ride in the passenger seat of the Camry because D.K. testified that both Quarles
and his partner used the car immediately before the search. Based on our review of the
record, however, the district court’s finding is well founded. D.K. testified that he always
drove while Quarles sat in the passenger seat of the car. Quarles also told the police that
he did not drive because his license was invalid and that he had recently been in the
passenger seat.
A reviewing court should not “overturn a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (quotation
omitted). Quarles’s argument that he did not possess the gun is based on conjecture alone.
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The record contains no evidence that reasonably supports Quarles’s theory that someone
else—D.K., Quarles’s partner, or another person—possessed the gun.
Instead, the circumstantial evidence leads directly to the conclusion that Quarles
possessed the gun while excluding, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference
other than guilt. See id. We therefore reject Quarles’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying his conviction for possession of a firearm by an ineligible person.
Affirmed.