Andrew D. Forsgren, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1547

Andrew D. Forsgren,
Relator,

vs.

University of Minnesota Physicians Corp.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed September 19, 2022
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 47072549-3

Peter B. Knapp, Kyle J. Edwards (certified student attorney), Mitchell Hamline Law Clinic,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

University of Minnesota Physicians Corp., Minneapolis, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Anne Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and de cided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Andrew D. Forsgren quit his job to avoid being fired. He gave a four-week notice
of his intent to resign. His employer required him to resign immediately and paid him for
the remainder of that pay period. An unemployment-law judge concluded that Forsgren
was eligible for unemployment benefits as of the week in which the employer required him
to stop working but was ineligible as of the week in which he had intended to quit. We
conclude that the unemployment-law judge properly applied the applicable statute.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Forsgren was employed by University of Minnesota Physicians Corporation
(UMPC) from early 2020 until mid 2021 as a physician assistant in its orthopedic surgery
department. At the end of his employment, Forsgren’s salary was $115,258 per year.
Forsgren’s primary duty was to assist surgeons and medical residents with surgical
procedures in an operating room. His secondary duty was to perform “day-call” work at
other UMPC worksites on short notice upon being paged. At the beginning of his
employment, day-call work was intended to be only an occasional duty. But in March
2021, Forsgren was asked to do day-call work more often, once each week , while a
colleague was on a three-month maternity leave.
In a performance review in late March or early April 2021, Forsgren ’s supervisor
gave him negative feedback. Specifically, the supervisor said that Forsgren too often was
late in arriving at the operating room, had not sufficiently memorized procedures, and was
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inefficient in suturing patients. After his performance review, Forsgren made an effort to
improve his performance. But he struggled with day-call work, which was fast-paced and
stressful for him. In the spring of 2021, Forsgren was informed that his weekly day- call
duty would be extended indefinitely. Forsgren considered quitting because the day-call
work was starting to take a toll on his mental health, but he did not believe that he needed
to quit imminently and instead began looking for other jobs.
On June 21, 2021, Forsgren’s supervisor told him that his performance had not
sufficiently improved and that he would be terminated within two weeks. On June 24,
2021, Forsgren gave notice that he would resign on July 23, 2021. The next day, June 25,
2021, a person in UMPC’s human resources department told Forsgren that he could not
remain employed until July 23, 2021, that he would be relieved of his duties that day, and
that he could remain on the payroll through the end of that pay period on July 1, 2021.
Forsgren was given the option of accelerat ing his resignation in th at manner or being
discharged immediately. He chose to resign, effective July 1, 2021.
Forsgren applied for unemployment benefits. T he department of employment and
economic development made an initial determination that he was ineligible for benefits on
the ground that he quit his job. Forsgren filed an administrative appeal. An
unemployment-law judge (ULJ) conducted a hearing on two days in September 2021.
Forsgren testified on his own behalf and called his therapist to provide testimony
concerning the effects of his performing day-call work. UMPC did not appear at the
hearing.
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The ULJ found that Forsgren quit his employment effective July 23, 2021. The ULJ
also found that Forsgren was discharged for reasons other than misconduct on June 25,
2021. Accordingly, the ULJ concluded that Forsgren was eligible for benefits beginning
the week of his discharge but ineligible for benefits beginning the week of his intended quit
date. Forsgren requested reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed the earlier decision.
Forsgren appeals by way of a writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Forsgren argues that the ULJ erred by concluding that he is ineligible for
unemployment benefits as of the week of his intended quit date.
In general, this court reviews a ULJ’s decision denying benefits to determine
whether the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decision are affected by an error of law
or are “unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the hearing record.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d)(4), (5) (2020). The evidentiary hearing is an evidence-gathering
inquiry and is conducted without regard to any particular burden of proof. See Minn. Stat.
§ 268.069, subd. 2 (2020); Vargas v. Northwest Area Found., 673 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Minn.
App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004). We view a ULJ’s factual findings in the
light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision. Skarhus v. Davanni’ s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340,
344 (Minn. App. 2006). If the relevant facts are undisputed, we apply a de novo standard
of review to the question whether an applicant is eligible for benefits. Grunow v. Walser
Auto. Grp. LLC, 779 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Minn. App. 2010).
Unemployment benefits are intended to provide financial assistance to persons who
have been discharged from employment “through no fault of their own.” Stagg v. Vintage
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Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Thus, a person who
quits employment generally is ineligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1 (2020). “A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the
employment was, at the time the employment ended, the employee’s.” Id., subd. 2(a). But
a person may be eligible for benefits despite having quit if one of several statutory
exceptions applies. Id., subd. 1(1)-(9).
Forsgren makes three arguments for reversal, which we address in turn.
I. Good-Reason Exception
Forsgren first argues that the ULJ erred by not finding that he quit for a good reason
caused by UMPC.
One of the statutory exceptions to the quit rule applies if “the applicant quit the
employment because of a good reason caused by the employer.” Id., subd. 1(1). “A good
reason caused by the employer . . . is a reason (1) that is directly related to the employment
and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that
would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than
remaining in the employment.” Id., subd. 3(a).
Forsgren contends that he quit for a good reason caused by UMPC because, in June
2021, he was assigned to day-call work once per week, which was more than what was
intended at the beginning of his employment. In response, the department contends that
the exception does not apply because the ULJ found, as a matter of fact, that Forsgren did
not quit because he was assigned to additional day-call work.
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The ULJ found that Forsgren quit because he expected to be involuntarily
terminated and did not want a discharge on his employment record. Forsgren does not
challenge that finding. We nonetheless note that the finding is supported by Forsgren’s
testimony that he preferred to resign instead of being fired. In addition, Forsgren
previously had answered a questionnaire by stating that he quit because he had been
informed that he would be terminated within two weeks. The relevant statute expressly
states that Forsgren’s reason for quitting is not a good reason caused by the employer:
“Notification of discharge in the future . . . is not a good reason caused by the employer for
quitting.” Id., subd. 3(e); see also Ward v. Delta Airlines, 973 N.W.2d 649, 652-53 (Minn.
App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 2022). Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider
whether each of the three requirements of subdivision 3(a) is satisfied.
Thus, the ULJ did not err by concluding that Forsgren quit for a reason other than a
good reason caused by the employer.
II. Medical-Necessity Exception
Forsgren next argues that the ULJ erred by not finding that he quit because of a
medical necessity.
A person may be eligible for unemployment benefits despite having quit
employment if he or she quit “because the applicant’s serious illness or injury made it
medically necessary that the applicant quit.” Id., subd. 1(7). “This exception only applies
if the applicant informs the employer of the medical problem and requests accommodation
and no reasonable accommodation is made available.” Id.
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Forsgren contends that it was medically necessary for him to quit because he had a
medical condition that was exacerbated by the unexpected increase in his day-call duties.
In response, the department contends that this exception does not apply for the same reason
that the good- reason exception does not apply. Indeed, the ULJ mentioned the medical-
necessity exception but found that Forsgren “quit his employment because he wanted to
avoid being discharged,” not because it was medically necessary. Again, Forsgren does
not challenge that finding. In addition, the ULJ found in the alternative that “the evidence
does not show that it was medically necessary for Forsgren to quit.” That alternative
finding is supported by Forsgren’s testimony that he might have quit in the future because
of his medical condition but that, on the day he gave notice of his resignation, “it wasn’t to
that point quite yet.”
Thus, the ULJ did not err by concluding that Forsgren did not quit because of a
medical necessity.
III. Timing of Quit and Discharge
Forsgren last argues that the ULJ erred by concluding that his quit made him
ineligible as of July 23, 2021, the date on which he intended his quit to be effective.
The circumstances of this case are governed by multiple statutory provisions. “An
employee who has been notified that the employee will be discharged in the future, who
chooses to end the employment while employment in any capacity is still available, has
quit the employment.” Id., subd. 2(c). “An employee who gives notice of intention to quit
the employment and is not allowed by the employer to work the entire notice period is
discharged from the employment as of the date the employer will no longer allow the
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employee to work.” Id., subd. 5(d). “If the discharge occurs within 30 calendar days before
the intended date of quitting, then, as of the intended date of quitting, the separation from
employment is a quit from employment . . . .” Id. In light of these statutory provisions,
the ULJ concluded that Forsgren was eligible for unemployment benefits as of the week of
June 25, 2021, when UMPC required him to stop working, but became ineligible for
unemployment benefits as of the week of July 23, 2021, when he intended his quit to be
effective.
Forsgren contends that the ULJ should not have applied section 268.095,
subdivision 5(d), on the ground that UMPC encouraged him to give a four-week notice of
his resignation (instead of an eight- week notice, which is the norm at UMPC) and that
UMPC led him to believe that he would be allowed to work all of the four-week period.
His argument is based on his testimony that UMPC’s policies require an employee in
Forsgren’s position to give an eight-week notice of resignation and provide that if a person
fails to do so, the termination is deemed involuntary, and the employee is not eligible to be
rehired. Forsgren testified that he had asked his manager several weeks earlier whether he
could be allowed to give less than eight weeks of notice and still be eligible for rehire and
was told that a four-week notice would be acceptable. But when Forsgren actually gave
his notice of resignation, UMPC decided that Forsgren should stop working immediately
and remain on the payroll only until the end of the pay period.
Forsgren does not dispute that section 268.095, subdivision 5(d), speaks directly to
the facts of this case. Instead, he notes that a different set of facts (such as an eight-week
notice or an involuntary termination) would have led to a different outcome, and he
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contends that the statute gives employers the opportunity “to manipulate situations like this
one to deprive individuals of unemployment benefits.” Yet he does not contend that, in
late June 2021, UMPC acted with the intent to deny him unemployment benefits. It appears
that Forsgren is urging the court to rule in his favor on an equitable basis that is contrary
to the applicable statute. But the unemployment statutes provide, “There is no equitable or
common law denial or allowance of unemployment benefits.” Minn. Stat. § 268.069,
subd. 3 (2020). Accordingly, we do not have authority to order the payments of benefits
“as a matter of equity.” Irvine v. St. John’s Lutheran Church, 779 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Minn.
App. 2010).
Thus, the ULJ did not err by concluding that Forsgren is ineligible for
unemployment benefits as of the week of July 23, 2021.
Affirmed.