In re the Marriage of: Allison Catherine Buckner, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1549

In re the Marriage of: Allison Catherine Buckner, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Bernard Joseph Robichaud, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed June 6, 2022
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-13-6791

Alan C. Eidsness, Benjamin J. Hamborg, Henson & Efron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Robert A. Gust, Gust Law Firm, PLLC, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding J udge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Bernard Joseph Robichaud, Jr., a licensed attorney, challenges the district
court’s order awarding attorney fees to respondent Allison Catherine Buckner, arguing that

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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the district court (1) does not have the inhere nt authority to award a ttorney fees based on
conduct occurring outside of a proceeding; (2) made findings not supported by the record;
and (3) erred by awarding all the fees claime d without making adequate findings on the
reasonableness of the fees. We affirm.
DECISION
I. Inherent Authority
“[D]istrict courts possess inhe rent authority to impose sanctions as necessary to
protect their ‘vital function—the disposition of individual cases to deliver remedies for
wrongs and justice freely and without purchase; completely and without denial; promptly
and without delay, conformable to the laws.’” Peterson v. 2004 Ford Crown Victoria, 792
N.W.2d 454, 462 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116,
118 (Minn. 1995)). This authority includes the power to award attorney fees as sanctions
when a party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id.
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991 )). We review a district
court’s use of inherent authority to award sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard,
which is only met “when it is clear that no reasonable person would agree with the [district]
court’s assessment of what sanctions are appropriate.” Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119. But
we review questions of law arising from an attorney-fee award de novo. Sanvick v. Sanvick,
850 N.W.2d 732, 737 (Minn. App. 2014).
Here, after the dissolution of the par ties’ marriage, Robichaud and Buckner
executed a binding mediation settlement agreement (“MSA”), which provided that
Robichaud would transf er a college savings account (“colle ge account”) to the parties’
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daughter when she turned twenty-one years old on August 17, 2019.1 Robichaud ignored
his legal obligation for nearly one year. Then, in June 2020, Buckner’s attorney contacted
Robichaud to obtain a medallio n guarantee signature, needed to transfer the college
account. Robichaud was uncooper ative. Over the next several months, Robichaud and
Buckner’s attorney corresponded through ema il regarding the transfer. In his emails,
Robichaud made disparaging remarks, in sults, and baseless demands for payment,
including that he be compensated for his serv ices in effectuating the transfer and that
daughter gift back half the funds in the college account. Robichaud eventually transferred
the college account to daughter on February 24, 2021.
Subsequently, Buckner moved for attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1
(2020) and such other relief as the court deemed just and equitable. The district court found
that Robichaud’s conduct occurred outside the litigation process and thus could not support
an award of conduct-based attorney-fees under section 518.14.2 It then determined it was

1 A mediated settlement agreement is a species of stipulation. In a family case, a stipulation
is the agreement between the spouses before it is adopted or rejected by the district court,
while a stipulated judgment is the judgment the district court enters based on that
agreement. See Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638 n.1 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting
that “[t]he district court is a third party to dissolution proceedings and has the authority to
refuse to accept the terms of a stipulation in part or in toto” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). If a district court adopts a stipulation and enters a judgment based on
that stipulation, the stipulation ceases to exist as a separate creature and is merged into the
judgment. See Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1997). Although the district
court did not adopt the parties’ stipulation here, that does not preclude the parties from
litigating their claims. See Toughill, 609 N.W.2d at 638 n.1.
2 While conduct occurring outside the litigation process cannot be the basis for a conduct-
based fee award under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1, Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813,
818-19 (Minn. App. 2001), this court has identified circumst ances under which a district
court can award attorney fees generated in litigation ancillary to a dissolution under Minn.
Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. See Brodsky v. Brodsky , 733 N.W.2d 471, 477-78 (Minn. App.
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appropriate to award attorney fees under its inherent authority because the rules and statutes
did not fully allow for an appropriate remedy for Robichaud’s “dilatory, non-cooperative,
and unreasonable” conduct.
On appeal, Robichaud argues that the distri ct court lacks the inherent authority to
award attorney fees for con duct outside of a proceeding. While the supreme court has
never specifically addressed the scope of the di strict court’s authority to award attorney
fees for conduct occurring outside of the litiga tion process, it has repeatedly recognized
that “courts are vested with consider able inherent judicial authority.” See Patton , 538
N.W.2d at 118 (affirming the district court’s use of its inherent authority to sanction a party
for conduct that occurred approximately three years before the proceeding began). It has
also acknowledged that the “task of determining what, if any, sanction is to be imposed is
implicated by the broad authority provided the [district] court.” Id. at 119. Based on this
acknowledgement, and absent any specific ex clusion of attorney fees from possible
sanctions, we conclude that it is within the di strict court’s discretion to use its inherent
authority to award attorney fe es as a sanction for conduct that occurred outside of the
litigation process.
II. Factual Findings
To award attorney fees under its inherent authority, there must be a finding of bad
faith that the record supports. Peterson, 792 N.W.2d at 462. Robichaud does not dispute

2007). Here, the district court determined th at the appropriate analysis for addressing
whether to award sanctions was the analysis a ssociated with the exercise of its inherent
authority. Because that determ ination is not challenged on appeal, this court is not
addressing the propriety of that determination.
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that his behavior meets the bad-faith standard for sanctions, but he challenges the district
court’s finding that he breached the MSA and argues that there was not a readily apparent
way to transfer the college acco unt in the summer and fall of 2020. We will set aside a
district court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Tornstrom v. Tornstrom,
887 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Minn. App. 2016), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 2017). “Factual
findings are clearly erroneous when they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence
or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole. When de termining whether the
district court’s findings are clearly erroneou s, we view the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s findings.” Id. (citations omitted).3
Robichaud argues that the district court mi sinterpreted the plain language of the
MSA by reading it to require Robichaud to transfer the college account to daughter on her
twenty-first birthday. He asserts that the MSA merely awarded the college account to
daughter once she reached twenty-one, that she did not request a transfer at that time, and
that there were logical tax reasons for leavin g the college account in place. A mediated
settlement agreement is a contract, so it is s ubject to rules of contract interpretation and
enforcement. Theis v. Theis, 135 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Minn. 1965). “When the language is
clear and unambiguous, we enfo rce the agreement of the pa rties as expressed in the

3 Robichaud asserts that this court should apply the standard of review for summary
judgment and interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the losing party because the
district court’s factual findings were ba sed only on a written re cord. But because
Robichaud cites no legal authority to support hi s assertion, that assertion is not properly
before this court. See State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558
N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed question);
Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d at 479 (applying Wintz in a family law appeal). Moreover, we are
aware of no authority supporting his assertion.
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language of the contract.” Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn. 2010).
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a legal question reviewed de novo. Id.
The MSA states: “[Robichaud] shall pa y [daughter’s] fall 2018 tuition from the
[college account]; the remainder of the account shall be maintained , subject to market
gains/losses, and awarded to [daughter] on her 21st birthday.” There is no language in the
MSA indicating that daughter needed to request the transfer. Instead, the MSA provides a
specific date on which Robichaud was to transfer the account. Thus, the MSA’s language
unambiguously shows that Robichaud had an affirmative duty to tr ansfer the college
account to daughter on August 17, 2019.
Robichaud argues that the pe rformance could not have reasonably occurred in the
summer or fall of 2020 due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. However, contrary to
Robichaud’s assertion, Buckner’s attorney proposed two ways to obtain the medallion
signature in an email dated July 29, 2020. Robichaud addressed neither suggestion in his
response, rather, he accused Buckner of fra ud, made disparaging remarks, and again
demanded compensation. Thus, the district court did not err in rejecting Robichaud’s
excuse for not transferring the college account sooner.
The record supports the district court’s finding that Robichaud acted in bad faith to
justify the award of attorney fees. Robichaud, a veteran a ttorney, willfully ignored his
legal obligation to transfer the college account to daughter on her twenty-first birthday and
then engaged in “dilatory, n on-cooperative, and unreasonable” conduct. Although the
district court’s order did not quote Robich aud’s language, the c ourt summarized his
inappropriate comments:
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Throughout his emails from June through August of 2020, []
Robichaud repeatedly disparaged [] Buckner, [Buckner’s
attorney,] and [daughter] (if she would not agree to “gift” him
half of the college account). He accused [] Buckner and [her
attorney] of fraud; implied that [] Buckner intentionally waited
until the pandemic began to request the transfer in order to
threaten [] Robichaud’s health; and disparaged [] Buckner for
not working.

Our review of the record supports the distri ct court’s finding. In his emails, Robichaud
referred to Buckner as a “rentier,” a “lazy fraud,” and “an unrepentant descendant of slave
owners” and accused Buc kner of committing tax and divorce fraud. He also stated that
Buckner and daughter “will do anything for money except work,” and that “it’s not healthy
that [daughter] has been modeled cowardly rentier behavior by [Buckner].” Further,
Robichaud made several comments directed at Buckner’s attorney referring to his
professional ethics and rates.
In sum, the district court’s finding of a bad-faith basis to justify the attorney-fee
award is supported by the record.
III. Reasonableness
Robichaud next argues that the fees awar ded here were excessive and that the
district court’s failure to make findings on the reasonablen ess of the time spent and the
rates charged requires remand. District cour ts have broad authority to determine what
sanction is to be imposed. See Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119. And the party “challenging the
[district] court’s choice of a sanction has th e difficult burden of convincing an appellate
court that the [district] court abused its discretion—a burden which is met only when it is
clear that no reasonable person would agree with the [district] court’s assessment of what
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sanctions are appropriate.” Id. (quotation omitted). The distri ct court awarded attorney
fees as a sanction base d in part on its desire to preclu de Robichaud, a veteran attorney,
from engaging in similar misconduct in the future. On this record, we cannot agree that all
reasonable persons would disagree with the dist rict court’s assessment. Accordingly, the
district court adequately justified the sancti on imposed here as being necessary to deter
future improper conduct.
Affirmed.