Nathan M. Christenson, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1550

Nathan M. Christenson,
Relator,

vs.

RIHM Motor Company,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed August 8, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 45657033-2

Nathan M. Christenson, Albert Lea, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

RIHM Motor Company, South St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Relator Nathan M. Christenson challenges the determination of an unemployment-
law judge (ULJ) that he was discharged for employment misconduct. We affirm.
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FACTS
Christenson began working for respondent -employer RIHM Motor Company
(RIHM) in April 2018. He worked in shipping and receiving. On March 4, 2021,
Christenson was instructed to dispose of a pallet of diesel particulate filters (filters), 1 but
he instead put them in his personal vehicle. Christenson was discharged on March 8 for
violating the company policy that prohibits “theft or unauthorized removal or possession
of company property.”
Subsequently, Christenson applied for unemployment benefits with respondent
Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) .
Christenson’s application for unemployment benefits stated that he had taken “nuts, bolts,
and some washers that were to be thrown in the garbage,” but that he was unaware of a
policy “saying you cannot take trash home with you.” It stated that “there were several
employees doing the same thing and not a single one has been let go.” And Christenson’s
response to a request for additional fact-finding stated that he had told his manager,
“[M]aybe I’ll just take them and see if I can do something with them,” and the manager
responded, “I don’t care what you do with them; I just need the room so I can order more
parts.” DEED found that RIHM had discharged Christenson for employment misconduct
and issued a determination of ineligibility for employment benefits.
Christenson appealed the determination and had an evidentiary hearing before a
ULJ. At the hearing, Christenson’s manager testified that another employee reported that

1 Diesel particulate filters are similar to catalytic converters.
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Christenson had taken the pallet of filters. The manager testified that he then reviewed
security-camera footage, which showed Christenson loading the pallet containing six to
eight filters into Christenson’s personal vehicle with a forklift. He estimated that the filters
had a total value between $5,000 and $6,000. The manager testified that an employee
policy required employees to obtain written approval from upper management to take items
that were to be scrapped or discarded. This policy helped the company manage inventory
and tax write-offs. Although the manager did not know whether the policy was explained
to employees, he testified that it was in the employee handbook. Christenson had signed
an updated version of that handbook in February 2021. The manager also gave a recent
example of how the policy was used during a store relocation. According to the manager’s
testimony, Christenson did not request permission from him or any other managers to take
the filters.
Christenson also testified at the evidentiary hearing. He admitted that he removed
six filters, but he testified that he had obtained permission from his manager. Christenson
also testified that “to [his] knowledge, everyone had access to everything that was being
scrapped or thrown away.” Christenson acknowledged receiving an employee handbook.
But he denied knowing about RIHM’s policy prohibiting the unauthorized removal of
company property.
Following the hearing, the ULJ determined that RIHM discharged Christenson for
employment misconduct and that Christenson was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
The ULJ found that the manager’s testimony had been credible “because it was detailed,
logical, and based on first-hand information,” and that “the credible evidence supports that
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Christenson did not have permission to remove the items he took from the employer.”
Additionally, the ULJ determined that Christenson’s conduct in removing the filters
without permission was “intentional and a serious violation of the standards of behavior
the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.”
Christenson requested reconsideration. The ULJ affirmed the decision on
reconsideration.
Christenson appeals.
DECISION
When reviewing the decision of the ULJ, we may affirm, remand for further
proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the relator may
have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are “(1) in
violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the department; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the hearing record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).
“We view the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision,
giving deference to the credibility determinations made by the ULJ. In doing so, we will
not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the evidence substantially sustains them.”
Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006) (citations omitted).
“Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Posey v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 879 N.W.2d
5
662, 665 (Minn. App. 2016) (quoting Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul
Terminal Warehouse Co., 180 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. 1970)).
Whether an employee committed employment misconduct “is a mixed question of
fact and law.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011). But
whether a particular act amounts to employment misconduct is a question of law that
appellate courts review de novo. Id.
Here, the ULJ found:

An employer has the right to reasonably expect that an
employee will not take the employer’s property from the scrap
bin without permission. RIHM’s policy requiring prior written
approval is based on a reasonable business need. Christenson
did not know he needed formal written approval. However, he
was aware that he needed to ask the employer for permission
before taking any items from the scrap b in. He removed a
pallet of scrapped filters on March 5, 2021 without permission.
The preponderance of the evidence shows that Christenson’s
conduct was intentional and is a serious violation of the
standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably
expect of the employee.

Christenson challenges the ULJ’s finding. He argues that the ULJ erred by finding
the manager’s testimony credible. Generally, “[c]redibility determinations are the
exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed on appeal.” Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d
at 345. But “[w]hen the credibility of a witness testifying in a hearing has a significant
effect on the outcome of a decision, the [ULJ] must set out the reason for crediting or
discrediting that testimony.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2020). If the parties
presented conflicting evidence, this court must defer to the ULJ’s findings and not reweigh
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the evidence on review. Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352
(Minn. App. 1995).
The manager’s testimony clearly had a significant effect on the ULJ’s decision. In
turn, the ULJ explained the decision to credit the manager’s testimony. Specifically, the
ULJ found the manager’s testimony credible “because it was detailed, logical, and based
on first-hand information.” This explanation satisfied section 268.105, subdivision 1a(a),
which requires the ULJ to identify the reasons for a credibility determination that
significantly impacts the ultimate decision. Thus, the ULJ did not err in crediting the
manager’s testimony.
Although Christenson argues that his account of the events was more accurate than
the manager’s, as a reviewing court, we cannot reweigh the evidence. See Whitehead, 529
N.W.2d at 352. Given our standard of review, we must defer to the ULJ’s credibility
determinations, and we do so here. See id.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the ULJ’s findings regarding Christenson’s conduct. The manager’s testimony established
that Christenson took filters without obtaining the employer’s permission.
Christenson also contends that the ULJ erred by concluding that he engaged in
employment misconduct. Employment misconduct is “any intentional, negligent, or
indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job, that is a serious violation of the standards of
behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2020). “As a general rule, refusing to abide by an employer’s
reasonable policies and requests amounts to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v.
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FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002). “Even a single incident can be
misconduct if it represents a sufficient enough disregard for the employer’s expectations.”
Blau v. Masters Rest. Assocs., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. App. 1984).
Reviewing de novo, we conclude that Christenson’s conduct was employment
misconduct. It is reasonable that an employer would expect an employee to follow written
employee policies, including a policy requiring an employee to obtain the employer’s
permission before taking the employer’s property. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a).
And even a single incident of employee theft can constitute employment misconduct, even
if the items are of de minimis value. See, e.g., Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 344 (concluding
that employee’s theft of food valued at less than four dollars was employment misconduct
because the employer could no longer trust employee with her job responsibilities).
Christenson argues that his conduct was not intentional, negligent, or indifferent
because he spoke with his manager “about possibly taking the parts home.” As noted,
however, the ULJ specifically rejected Christenson’s testimony that he had received
permission to take the filters.
Christenson also contends that it was “common practice” for RIHM employees to
“help themselves” to materials slated for trash. But “[v]iolation of an employer’s rules by
other employees is not a valid defense to a claim of misconduct.” Dean v. Allied Aviation
Fueling Co., 381 N.W.2d 80, 83 (Minn. App. 1986); see also Sivertson v. Sims Sec., Inc. ,
390 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Minn. App. 1986) (“Whether or not other employees violated [the
employer’s] same rules and were disciplined or discharged is not relevant.”), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 20, 1986).
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Christenson deliberately violated a reasonable employment policy by taking the
employer’s property without permission. His conduct therefore constituted employment
misconduct.
Affirmed.