State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1565

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daryl Wayne Moran, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed November 7, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Becker County District Court
File Nos. 03-CR-18-2475, 03-CR-21-1625

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin , Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his presentencing request to
withdraw his guilty plea to felony impaired driving and that plea withdrawal is required
2
under the manifest -injustice standard because his plea was not intelligent. Because we
agree that appellant’s plea was not intelligently entered, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
In November 2018, a Minnesota State Patrol Trooper stopped appellant Daryl
Wayne Moran Jr.’s vehicle. The officer saw Moran’s vehicle fail to signal its turn, cross
over a fog line, and travel at a speed of 60 miles per hour in a 30- mile-per-hour zone. The
officer believed that Moran was under the influence of a controlled substance. The officer
noticed that Moran was fidgeting and smelled of an alcoholic beverage. The officer also
noticed that there was a “bag with multiple needles” jus t outside the vehicle. The officer
found two baggies with white residue in the passenger’s purse and additional needles inside
the vehicle. The officer requested that Moran undergo field sobriety testing, but Moran
refused. The officer obtained a search warrant to draw a sample of Moran’s blood. The
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension analyzed Moran’s blood sample and noted
the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Moran with two counts of felony driving
while intoxicated, one count of gross misdemeanor driving after cancellation, and one
count of misdemeanor fleeing police.
Before trial, Moran moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer
unlawfully stopped his vehicle and seized him and that the results of the blood test were
“the fruits of an unlawful search and an expired blood test kit .” Following a contested
omnibus hearing, the district court denied Moran’s motion to suppress. The district court
determined that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Moran’s vehicle
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and that the charges were supported by probable cause. As for Moran’s contention that the
blood test kit had expired, the district court determined that the expiration date listed in the
officer’s report was a typographical error and that the kit had not expired.
Moran pleaded guilty to one count of fel ony impaired driving. The state agreed to
dismiss the remaining three counts in exchange for Moran’s plea. The district court
accepted Moran’s plea. Moran later appeared before the district court for sentencing. At
the beginning of the hearing, Moran s aid that he wanted to move to withdraw his guilty
plea. The district court continued the sentencing hearing to permit Moran to file his motion.
The parties returned about a month later for sentencing. Moran stated that he wished to
withdraw his guilty plea because he believed the officer used an expired blood test kit and
that the state was hiding information about the expiration date. The district court denied
Moran’s motion. The district court then sentenced Moran to 65 months in prison for the
impaired-driving offense .
This appeal follows.
1
DECISION
Moran challenges the district court’s denial of his presentence motion to withdraw
his guilty plea to the impaired -driving offense . “A defendant has no absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea after ent ering it.” Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn.
2016) (quotation omitted). Plea withdrawal is permitted under two circumstances. State

1 The state did not file a brief and we ordered the matter to proceed under Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 142.03 (directing that when a respondent fails to file a brief the matter is to be
decided on the merits).
4
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). First, a district court must allow a defendant
to withdraw a guilty plea “[a]t any time” if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Second, a district court may allow a defendant
to “withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to do so.” Id., subd. 2.
The decision to permit the withdraw al of a guilty plea prior to sentencing under the fair
and just standard is left to the sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed
only in the “rare case” that the district court abuses its discretion. Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d
263, 266 (Minn. 1989). Moran challenges the district court’s decision under both the
manifest-injustice standard and the fair -and-just standard.
We determine that Moran has a right to withdraw his guilty plea under the manifest-
injustice standard. 2 Under this standard, a district court must allow a defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea “upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
“A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686,
691 (Minn. 2015). “To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”
Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 823. The distr ict court must allow the defendant to withdraw a
guilty plea if the defendant proves that the plea was not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
See Barrow, 862 N.W.2d at 689-91 (placing the burden of proof on defendant).

2 Based on this determination we do not consider Moran’s argument that he is entitled to
withdraw his plea under the fair -and-just standard, which is “a less demanding standard
than the manifest -injustice standard .” State v. Townsend, 872 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn.
App. 2015) (quotation omitted).
5
Moran does not contest the accuracy or voluntariness of his plea. But he claims that
his plea was unintelligent. The intelligence requirement ensures that the defendant
understands the state’s charges, the rights being waived, and the consequences of the plea.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. The defendant must understand the ple a’s “direct
consequences.” Id. “[D]irect consequences are those which flow definitely, immediately,
and automatically from the guilty plea .” State v. Crump, 826 N.W.2d 838, 841- 42 (Minn.
App. 2013) (citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. May 21, 2013).
Moran claims his plea was unintelligent because he did not understand the rights he
was waiving by pleading guilty. Moran argues that no one advised him that, by pleading
guilty, he would be unable to appeal the district court’s suppression order. Moran argues
that his plea was unintelligent because he believed he could enter a guilty plea and still
preserve his right to challenge the state’s evidence on appeal.
We agree. Generally , “[a] guilty plea by a counseled defendant has traditionally
operated . . . as a waiver of all non -jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the
plea.” State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). Th ese defects include the right
to challenge the admissibility of the state’s evidence. See Korman v. State , 262 N.W.2d
161, 161 (Minn. 1977) (holding that issues relating to the admissibility of petitioner ’s
confession were waived by his “voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered guilty
plea”). Moran did not sign a plea petition. During the waiver portion of his plea, counsel
advised Moran about the rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea. Moran
acknowledged that he understood the charge he was pleading to, that he understood the
maximum penalty associated with the charge, and that he was pleading guilty of his own
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free will. Moran agreed that he had enough time to speak with counsel. Moran understood
that he had the right to a trial, that the state bore the burden of proof, and that he was entitled
to a jury of his peers.
But counsel did not advise Moran that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right
to appeal the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. At the sentencing hearing,
Moran’s counsel reiterated that Moran wanted to withdraw his guilty plea . The district
court inquired, “With the Court ruling on that, would that also be an appellate issue that
you could raise, do you know?” Counsel responded, “The Court did rule on [ the
suppression issue] at the Omnibus hearing . . . and those issues were addressed, and . . .
that would probably be an appellate issue.” In its order denying Moran’s motion to
withdraw his plea, the district court noted that it had heard Moran’s arguments during the
omnibus hearing and did not find that suppression was warranted. The district court found
that “Because the Court has already heard [Moran’s] arguments and ruled on the matter,
this issue is a matter for the Court of Appeals.”
Both counsel and the district court suggested that Moran could challenge his
suppression issue on appeal , and there is no indication in the record that Moran was ever
informed otherwise. But by pleading guilty, Moran waived his right to do so. The record
shows that Moran failed to comprehend “ the nature, purpose, and consequences of his
plea.” State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. App. 2003) , rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 19, 2003). Moran’s guilty plea was therefore unintelligent, and its withdrawal is
7
necessary to correct a manifest injustice . As a result, we reverse and remand with
instructions to permit Moran to withdraw his guilty plea. 3
Reversed and remanded.

3 Moran further argues that he is entitled to resentencing. Based on our decision that Moran
has a right to withdraw his plea, we do not reach this issue.