State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1567

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David NMN Alonzo,
Appellant.

Filed May 8, 2023
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-19-343

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna M. Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, William C. Lundy, Special Assistant County Attorneys, Slayton ,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Barry S. Edwards, Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant was convicted of three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
following a jury trial. He challenges his convictions and sentence, arguing that (1) the
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prosecutor committed unobjected-to misconduct; (2) the district court plainly erred by not
sua sponte dismissing a juror for cause; (3) the district court plainly erred by permitting a
police chief to offer expert testimony; (4) the district court abused its discretion by allowing
relationship evidence without cautioning the jury on its use each time it was offered; (5) the
district court erred by not sua sponte granting him a durational sentencing departure; and
(6) the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition for postconviction relief
without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2018, 17-year-old C.A. was admitted to the hospital after attempting
suicide. At the hospital, C.A. reported that, when he was in eighth grade, his father,
appellant David Alonzo, struck him on the butt with a belt for “making fun of somebody”
in school. In a subsequent forensic interview, C.A. disclosed that Alonzo sexually abused
him starting when he was six years old and ending when he was 12. During this period of
time, Alonzo regularly grabbed C.A.’s “groin” over and under his clothes.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Alonzo with three counts of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct. Before trial, the state moved to admit relationship evidence of
Alonzo’s domestic conduct against other family or household members. The evidence
included several instances of domestic assault by Alonzo against his ex-wife (C.A.’s
mother) and two of C.A.’s siblings. Over Alonzo’s objection, the district court allowed the
state to offer four instances of this relationship evidence. The district court advised the
prosecutor to request a cautionary instruction each time they introduced this evidence.
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During voir dire, the district court asked prospective juror T.Q., who was the mayor
of Redwood Falls, if anything about his relationship with state witnesses from the Redwood
Falls Police Department would make it difficult to evaluate their testimony. T.Q.
responded that he would evaluate the testimony of both the police chief and assistant police
chief “[t]o the best of [his] ability.” He explained that he was not responsible for hiring
them and that he did not feel that his participation on the jury would impact future
negotiations with the police department. At the end of voir dire, defense counsel passed
on challenging any juror for cause, including T.Q.
C.A., his sister M.A., his brother D.A., and the police chief testified for the state.
C.A. testified that Alonzo “shoved a shampoo bottle up our, up my butt” but that the bottle
did not penetrate him. He testified that Alonzo hit him multiple times, including on his
bare butt. He also testified that Alonzo once told him “mine’s bigger than yours,” and
made him expose his penis to “measure [it] basically.” M.A. testified that she once saw
Alonzo “flick” C.A.’s penis while C.A. was naked. The police chief testified about things
that “trigger” memories of sexual abuse, and how they are different with each victim.
The jury found Alonzo guilty as charged. Alonzo moved for a downward
dispositional sentencing departure, asserting that he was particularly amenable to
probation. The district court denied the motion and imposed a 234-month guidelines
sentence and 10 years of conditional release.
Alonzo appealed. At his request, this court stayed the appeal to permit him to seek
postconviction relief. Alonzo’s postconviction petition asserted that he received
4
ineffective assistance of counsel and was denied the right to an impartial jury. After the
district court denied the petition, we reinstated the appeal.
DECISION
I. Alonzo is not entitled to relief based on plain error.

Alonzo makes three arguments on appeal that he did not raise in the district court.
Because he did not object to the alleged errors at trial, we review his arguments for plain
error. See State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016). Generally, “to meet the
plain error standard, a criminal defendant must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the
error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. An error
is plain if it contravenes caselaw or a rule. State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn.
2010). Even if the first three requirements are met, “an appellate court may correct the
error only when it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022).
A. The prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct.

Prosecutors commit misconduct when they “violate[] clear or established standards
of conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this state’s
case law.” State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). One
of these rules is the prohibition against appealing to the passions of the jury. State v.
Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 786-87 (Minn. 2006). If credibility is a central issue in a case,
an appellate court “pays special attention to statements that may inflame or prejudice the
jury.” Id. at 787.
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Alonzo contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by appealing to the
passions of the jury during voir dire, direct examination, and closing argument. He
concedes that his trial counsel did not object to any of the alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
Accordingly, we apply the modified plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d
294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under this standard, if the defendant establishes error that is plain,
the burden shifts to the state to prove that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence
of the misconduct would have significantly affected the jury’s verdict. Id. To determine
whether misconduct significantly impacted a jury verdict, we consider “the pervasiveness
of improper suggestions and the strength of evidence against the defendant.” State v.
Parker, 901 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
1. Voir Dire
A criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amends. VI,
XIV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6; State v. Greer , 635 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Minn. 2001). “The
purpose of voir dire is to probe the jury for bias or partiality to enable counsel to exercise
informed peremptory challenges and challenges for cause.” State v. Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d
289, 295 (Minn. App. 2006) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 4(1)), rev. denied
(Minn. May 16, 2006) . A prosecutor’s questioning that goes beyond this purpose may
constitute misconduct. State v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531 , 543 (Minn. 2004) (expressing
concern about questions implicitly asking jurors to “identify with the victim”).
Alonzo challenges a series of the prosecutor’s voir dire questions, including
questions about “mean drunks,” whether the jurors “think a child needs to say no to being
sexually touched,” whether a child’s failure to say no “make[s] the sexual touching okay,”
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and whether any of the jurors had been through a traumatic event. He cites Bolstad, where
the jury returned a guilty verdict based on evidence that Bolstad had offered a friend money
to kill his father. Id. at 536, 538. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked potential jurors
whether they had ever paid someone to have their parents killed and immediately followed
up with questions regarding the jurors’ relationship with their parents. Id. at 543. The
supreme court noted that “this type of blunt questioning could inflame the passions of
jurors” but concluded that, based on the record as a whole, the questioning was not unduly
prejudicial. Id.
We are not convinced that the challenged voir dire questions here impermissibly
influenced the jury. Like in Bolstad, the prosecutor’s questions were based on evidence
the jurors would encounter during the trial. There was evidence that Alonzo was often
drunk and abusive and that he had physically and sexually abused C.A. and others while
drunk. Voir dire questions that reveal jurors’ ability to hear and impartially weigh such
evidence are critical. See Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d at 295 (stating a “defendant’s right to an
impartial jury is guaranteed, in part, by an adequate voir dire that permits the identification
of unqualified jurors”); State v. Anderson, 603 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn. App. 1999) (stating
that “[c]rime victim status is not one of the proper causes for challenge”) , rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 14, 2000). The challenged statements elicited potential bias and were in line
with the purposes of voir dire. See Gillespie, 710 N.W.2d at 295 (“The purpose of voir
dire is to probe the jury for bias or partiality . . . .”). Alonzo has not demonstrated
misconduct based on the prosecutor’s voir dire questions.

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2. Direct Examination
Alonzo next contends that the prosecutor’s references to “the sexual abuse” and “the
abuse” during direct examination of its witnesses, including C.A., assumed guilt,
“subvert[ed] the presumption of innocence,” “inflame[ed] the passions of the jury,” misled
the jury by presupposing abuse, presented a legal question to witnesses, and improperly
led the witness. These contentions are unavailing.
Alonzo cites no Minnesota caselaw that supports his argument that a prosecutor
must refrain from using the terms “abuse” or “sexual abuse.” Rather, he points to State v.
Patzold, where the district court told counsel to instruct witnesses to avoid using words the
defendant identified as derogatory. 917 N.W.2d 798, 806 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied
(Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). This court concluded that the prosecutor’s use of the term “rape”
was not misconduct, emphasizing that the victim used that term during their testimony. Id.
at 806-07.
As in Patzold, the prosecutor used the same terms that C.A. used. C.A. described
Alonzo’s conduct as “abuse” and “sexual abuse.” Only after C.A. did so did the prosecutor
use the terms in follow-up questioning. We see no misconduct under these circumstances.
3. Closing Argument
Prosecutors have “considerable latitude” during closing arguments and need not
“make a colorless argument.” State v. Williams, 586 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1998). But
the argument “must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences
from that evidence.” Patzold, 917 N.W.2d at 808 (quoting State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d
359, 363 (Minn. 1995)). In considering the propriety of a prosecutor’s argument, we “look
8
to the closing argument as a whole, rather than to selected phrases and remarks.” State v.
Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 308 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
Alonzo contends that the following argument improperly appealed to and inflamed
the passions of the jury:
During storms in a child’s heart are calmed by the loving waves
in the sea of a father’s love. Unless your father is David
Alonzo. If your father is [ Alonzo], he is the cause of the
greatest storms you are forced to bear, there is no calm, there
is no sea of love, the sea is vicious, the sea is turbulent and
you’re forced to swim in David Alonzo’s sea without a life vest
and you’re trapped on a sho ddy raft, alone, with no land in
sight.

He also cites the prosecutor’s statement that “all [C.A.] knew was a manipulative,
controlling, abusive drunk.”1
Alonzo likens these statements to those in Porter, where the prosecutor argued that
“[t]here is no salve you can put on your conscience” and “I got time share in Santa Claus’s
condo at the north pole, and I will sell you some. You are not that big of suckers, and you
know that,” and repeatedly referred to a fictitious “James Porter School of Sex Education.”
526 N.W.2d at 363. Our supreme court concluded that the prosecutor committed

1 The state argues that Alonzo waived this argument because defense counsel affirmatively
told the district court that Alonzo had no objection to the prosecutor’s closing. The state
cites State v. Schill, where we stated that “under the United States Supreme Court’s
development of plain- error review, when a party has instead voluntarily waived a right,
there is no ‘error’ to be reviewed, plain or otherwise.” No. A18-1872, 2019 WL 6698075,
at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 9, 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2020). But in Schill, we
considered the argument because our supreme court “continues to allow for review of
seemingly waived, invited errors under the plain-error standard.” Id. (citing State v.
Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 2012)). Accordingly, we consider Alonzo’s
challenge to the prosecutor’s argument.
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misconduct because the statements went beyond mere colorful language and that the school
references were not based on the evidence produced at trial. Id. at 363-64.
We are not convinced that the prosecutor’s challenged statements implicate the
concerns that were present in Porter. Unlike the prosecutor’s references in that case to a
school that did not exist, the prosecutor’s characterization of Alonzo as manipulative and
a drunk reflects the evidence adduced at trial. C.A. testified that Alonzo was drunk “[t]he
majority of the time” and multiple witnesses testified that he abused his family while drunk.
And while the prosecutor’s reference to storms in C.A.’s heart may have been a bad
metaphor, we are not persuaded that it was misconduct or impinged on the jurors ’
independence. The prosecutor’s language did not suggest that the jurors would be
“suckers” if they acquitted Alonzo or so out of touch with reality that they may believe
Santa exists. See id. In short, the prosecutor’s statements did not improperly appeal to the
passions and prejudices of the jurors.
Even if portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument did cross the line and
improperly appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, the state has shown that any
misconduct did not substantially affect the outcome of his case or implicate the fairness
and integrity of the proceedings. The challenged statements comprise one paragraph of a
19-page closing argument. Indeed, the prosecutor made the statements at the beginning of
the argument and did not repeat or reference them again. Moreover, the evidence against
Alonzo was strong. C.A. testified consistent with his prior statements. While damaging
to the defense, the challenged statements did not misstate the evidence in anyway. The
state met its burden to establish that there was no prejudicial misconduct.
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B. Alonzo waived his challenge to juror T.Q.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.
To prevail on a claim of juror bias on appeal, a party must show that “the challenged juror
was subject to challenge for cause, that actual prejudice resulted from the failure to dismiss,
and that appropriate objection was made by appellant.” State v. Stufflebean, 329 N.W.2d
314, 317 (Minn. 1983). The party challenging a juror “has the burden of proving that the
juror expressed a state of mind demonstrating actual bias towards the case or either party.”
State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 577 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted).
We review the denial of a for-cause challenge for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 576.
But a district court does not have a duty to dismiss a juror for cause sua sponte. Gillespie,
710 N.W.2d at 29 6. This is because it is possible that a defendant may make a strategic
decision not to object. Id.
Alonzo contends that the district court plainly erred by permitting juror T.Q. to serve
because he was the mayor of Redwood Falls. The state urges us to conclude that Alonzo
waived this argument, citing State v. Geleneau, 873 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. App. 2015), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2016). In Geleneau, the defense counsel did not challenge two
jurors for cause and, at the conclusion of voir dire, stated, “That’s all the questions I have
this afternoon. I pass for cause.” 873 N.W.2d at 381. We declined to consider whether
the district court abused its discretion by allowing the jurors to serve because the “trial
counsel’s statement relieved the district court of any obligation to dismiss any juror for
cause sua sponte.” Id.
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As in Geleneau, it is undisputed that Alonzo’s trial counsel did not challenge juror
T.Q. and passed the panel for cause at the conclusion of voir dire. Alonzo does not explain
why we should depart from Geleneau, and we see no reason to do so.2 Simply put, Alonzo
waived his right to challenge prospective juror T.Q. for cause.
C. The district court did not plainly err by permitting the police chief to
testify as an expert.

Expert testimony is “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” that will
“assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Minn.
R. Evid. 702. Expert testimony is admissible if: (1) the witness is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the opinion has foundational
reliability; (3) the testimony helps the jury; and (4) it satisfies the Frye-Mack test if it
involves a “novel scientific theory.” State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 2011);
Minn. R. Evid. 702. To determine whether expert testimony is foundationally reliable, the
district court must examine whether the expert reliably applied the underlying theories and
methodologies in a particular case. State v. Garland, 942 N.W.2d 732, 742 (Minn. 2020).
Because defense counsel did not object to the police chief’s testimony, we review its
admission for plain error. See Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 804.
The police chief testified that it is common in sexual abuse cases for a victim to
suppress memories of the abuse until they are “triggered.” He described that a trigger

2 To the extent Alonzo argues that juror T.Q. was impliedly biased, that argument fails.
See State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 623 (Minn. 2015) (concluding that Minn. R. Civ.
P. 26.02 provides the “exclusive grounds to challenge a prospective juror for implied
bias”).
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“typically means . . . a stimulus a sight, a sound, a smell . . . , maybe an object that a victim
would see or, or take in and it would cause repressed memories to come into their conscious
thought that maybe they’ve been pushing back.” And he explained that triggers may be
completely different from victim to victim. Alonzo contends that the police chief was not
qualified as an expert and that his opinions lacked foundational reliability. We disagree.
As noted above, a witness may be qualified as an expert based on their training and
experience. In May v. Strecker, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by permitting a police officer with 21 years of experience who had taken classes in accident
investigation to opine that intoxication played a role in a motor-vehicle accident. 453
N.W.2d 549, 555 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 1990). Like the
experience and education that qualified the police officer as an expert in May, the police
chief testified that he was trained to investigate sex crimes and had investigated
approximately 30 sexual-abuse cases. Because admission of the police chief’s challenged
testimony did not contravene caselaw or the rules of evidence, we discern no plain error.
See Cao, 788 N.W.2d at 715.
But even if admission of the police chief’s testimony about triggers was plain error,
it did not affect Alonzo’s substantial rights. See Myhre, 875 N.W.2d at 804. Alonzo does
not articulate how any plain error affected his rights apart from the b ald assertion that the
challenged testimony prejudiced him “because the jury heard allegedly expert testimony
from a witness who had no qualifications to provide such testim ony.” The record defeats
this argument. Indeed, before the police chief testified, another witness—whose expert
status was not contested—offered similar testimony about triggers:
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Q: And in your training and your capacity when trigger’s, the
word, “trigger,” is used in this situation, what does that mean
to you?
A: It’s an event that can bring back memories that have been
suppressed, forgotten about, um, completely random.
. . . .
Q: And in your training and experience is every child’s trigger
the same?
A: No.

In other words, the police chief’s testimony was cumulative. State v. McDonald-
Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that erroneously admitted evidence
is harmless when it is cumulative) . Both witnesses testified about what a trigger is, that
triggers are common in sexual-abuse cases, and that triggers can differ from victim to
victim. Under these circumstances, Alonzo has neither demonstrated an error that affects
his substantial rights nor error that seriously affected “the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings,” and it is not clear how such testimony would do so.
Pulczinski, 972 N.W.2d at 356. We see no plain error.
II. Alonzo was not prejudiced by the district court’s failure to give a cautionary
instruction every time the prosecutor introduced relationship evidence.

Evidence of domestic conduct, including sexual and physical abuse, by a defendant
against the victim or other family or household members “is admissible unless the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issue, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2022). Admission
of this “relationship ev idence” over a defendant’s objection requires the district court to
“sua sponte instruct the jurors on the proper use of such evidence, unless the defendant
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objects to the instruction by the court.” State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d 272, 278-79 (Minn.
2019).
Alonzo does not challenge the admission of the relationship evidence. Rather, he
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by not properly instructing the jury. First,
he contends that the district court should have given a cautionary instruction every time a
witness or the prosecutor uttered the words “sexual abuse” or “domestic violence.” He
specifically points to the neuropsychologist ’s testimony that C.A.’s mother told her “that
[C.A.] had . . . witnessed domestic violence, that he had experience[d] verbal/physical
abuse, and that he had recently . . . reported experiencing sexual abuse” and that her
“pregnancy was notable for a few things including . . . domestic violence.” We are not
persuaded. None of th is testimony constitutes relationship evidence because it does not
describe any specific acts of “domestic conduct” as identified in Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Second, Alonzo argues that “virtually all of [M.A.’s] testimony was [section] 634.20
evidence.” But even if that were true, we see no error by the district court. The record
demonstrates that the district court gave a cautionary instruction before M.A. testified
about the instances of relationship evidence.
Finally, Alonzo asserts that the district court should have given a cautionary
instruction before the state offered D.A.’ s recorded statement to the police chief during
which D.A. revealed that Alonzo (1) threw his mother down to the ground by the stairway
at their home, (2) made comments to M.A. about her breasts, and (3) choked and hit D.A.
after an argument about doing the dishes. The state did not request, and the district court
did not provide, a cautionary instruction before playing the recording.
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But even if this was error, it was harmless. “Under the harmless error standard, a
defendant who alleges an error that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove
there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly
affected the verdict.” State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. 2011) (quotations
omitted). It is undisputed that the d istrict court instructed the jury on the proper use of
relationship evidence more than ten times, including before D.A. testified in accord with
the above-referenced recorded statement and in the final instructions . On this record, we
conclude that the district court’s failure to read the cautionary instruction immediately prior
to the introduction of D.A.’s statement did not significantly affect the verdict.3
III. Alonzo forfeited his sentencing argument.

For the first time on appeal, Alonzo argues that he is entitled to a downward
durational departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence. A district court may depart
from a presumptive sentence if there are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” State v. Musse, 981 N.W.2d 216, 219-20 (Minn.
App. 2022) (quoting Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020)), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 28,
2022). A downward durational departure is premised on the defendant’s conduct being
“significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”
Id. at 220. In contrast, a dispositional departure is based on characteristics of the defendant

3 Alonzo contends that his trial contained “so much unfairness that it is impossible to
definitively untangle what would be left if the jury had only heard proper and admissible
evidence.” “An appellant is entitled to a new trial if . . . errors, when taken cumulatively,
had the effect of denying appellant a fair trial.” State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 698
(Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). Alonzo is not entitled to a new trial on this basis because
we discern no prejudicial error at trial.
16
that warrant placing them “in a different setting than that called for by the presumptive
guidelines sentence.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016).
District courts have broad sentencing discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
307-08 (Minn. 2014). Generally, we will not disturb a district court’s imposition of a
sentence that falls “within the presumptive guidelines range.” State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d
426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010).
Prior to sentencing, Alonzo moved for a dispositional departure to probation. He
did not request a durational departure. He cites no authority to support his argument that a
district court abuses its discretion when it does not— on its own accord—depart from the
presumptive sentence. Nor does he persuade us that his conduct was significantly less
serious than is typical of second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a child. Indeed,
Alonzo’s effort to convince us otherwise is confined to the following : “The Court has the
allegations in this case (see Statement of Facts). Assuming the jury believed the allegations
. . . . Those are odd behaviors. Those are, even, criminal behaviors. It is impossible to
imagine, however, how they justify almost 20 years in prison.” This challenge seems better
addressed to the legislature.
More importantly, Alonzo forfeited his sentencing argument by failing to raise it in
the district court. See State v. Busse, 644 N.W.2d 79, 89 (Minn. 2002) (stating that an
appellate court generally “will not decide issues that were not raised before the district
court”). And even if we overlooked that failure, because he did not obtain a transcript of
the sentencing hearing , we cannot review the district court’s sentencing decision. See
Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn. App. 1995) ( stating “[a]n
17
appellant has the burden to provide an adequate record” on appeal). On this record,
Alonzo’s sentencing challenge fails.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Alonzo’s
postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.

We review a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief without an
evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion . Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d 766, 770
(Minn. 2014). In doing so, we review the postconviction court’s factual findings for clear
error and its legal conclusions de novo. Martin v. State, 825 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Minn.
2013). A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless “the petition and the files
and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022); see Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012)
(discussing purpose of evidentiary hearing).
Alonzo moved for postconviction relief based on claimed ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.4 A criminal defendant has a right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. To establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant “must show that (1) counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Minn. 2016). If a defendant does not satisfy one
of these prongs, we need not consider both to determine whether the claim fails. Id.

4 Alonzo also sought postconviction relief based on prosecutorial misconduct, juror bias,
improper relationship evidence, and improper expert testimony but does not challenge the
postconviction court’s decision on these arguments on appeal.
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Alonzo contends his trial counsel was ineffective because they did not object to the
prosecutor’s misconduct, the introduction of improper relationship evidence, and the police
chief’s expert testimony, and did not cross- examine M.A. about inconsistencies in her
testimony. He argues that these deficiencies prejudiced him because they “set the bar
impossibly high for an appeal.” We are not persuaded for two reasons.
First, we are not convinced that trial counsel was ineffective. We presume that an
attorney is competent and that their performance was reasonable. Leake v. State, 767
N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009). And we generally do not review matters of trial strategy or
tactics. State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 358 (Minn. 2012). Decisions concerning
what witnesses to call, what objections to make, and how to cross-examine opposing
witnesses are matters of trial strategy left to the trial counsel’s discretion. See State v. Vick,
632 N.W.2d 676, 689 (Minn. 2001) (declining to review for competency trial counsel’s
claimed failures to vigorously cross-examine a witness and to object to Spreigl testimony);
see also State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009) (stating that whether to object
is part of trial counsel’s strategy and “will generally not be reviewed later for
competence”).
Second, Alonzo cites no authority to support his contention that he established
prejudice because trial counsel’s deficient performance resulted in him confronting the
more stringent plain- error standard of review. The impact of claimed ineffectiveness on
the appellate standard of review is not the standard by which prejudice is measured. To
the contrary, the prejudice prong is measured by whether “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
19
Swaney, 882 N.W.2d at 217. Alonzo has neither argued nor demonstrated that the outcome
of his trial would have been different absent his attorney’s claimed deficiencies. We
discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Alonzo’s ineffective-
assistance claim without an evidentiary hearing.
In sum, Alonzo is not entitled to a new trial or resentencing based on prosecutorial
misconduct or plain error by the district court. And the district court did not abuse its
discretion in its evidentiary rulings or by denying his petition for postconviction relief
without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.