In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1576

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:

Walter Johann Happel.

Filed May 16, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-PR-20-2924

Jessica Buberl, J. Buberl Law, Osceola, Wisconsin (for appellant)

Pete Orput, Washington Coun ty Attorney, James Zuleger, Assistant Coun ty Attorney,
Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order civilly committing him as a sexually
dangerous person (SDP) and as a sexual psycho pathic personality (SPP). He argues that
the district court erred by determining that he is an SDP and an SP P because the record
does not support either determination. We affirm.
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FACTS
In 2015, at the age of 63, appellant Walter Happel pleaded guilty to and was
convicted of four criminal offenses agains t child victims spanning over a period of more
than 30 years. Happel ente red his pleas pursuant to a pl ea agreement involving three
different court files. His convictions consiste d of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
second- and fourth-degree intrafamilial sexual abuse, and surreptitious interference with
the privacy of a minor. Consistent with the plea agreement, the district court sentenced
Happel to serve 120 months in prison. The district court further specified that the sentence
included a minimum imprisonment term of 80 months (less credit for time served) with the
remaining sentence to be served on supervised release.
In February 2021, in an ticipation of Happel’s rele ase from prison, respondent
Washington County (the county) petitioned to civilly commit Happel to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program as an SDP and/or an SPP. The district court held a three-day hearing on
the matter in July 2021. During the hearing, the county submitted numerous documentary
exhibits, including criminal complaints, pol ice reports, and presen tence-investigation
reports, which detailed Happel’s criminal offenses and other misconduct. The district court
also heard testimony from Happel, two cour t-appointed psychologists, Happel’s adult
foster son, and Happel’s current wife. The following summarizes the testimony and other
evidence presented during the hearing.
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Criminal Offenses
A. Conviction for Interference with Privacy Against a Minor Under 18
Before his incarceration, Happel worked as a custodian in the St. Paul school district
for 30 years. In 2014, police began investig ating Happel after an 11-year-old student
reported that Happel had looked over and under a bathroom stall while the student was
using the toilet. The investigation revealed numerous incidents of misconduct by Happel
against young male students at the school that occurred primarily between 2011 and 2014.
Multiple students reported that Happel rou tinely went into the boys’ bathroom while
students were present, looked at students through gaps in bathroom stalls while they were
using the toilet, and used the urinal next to students while looking at them. One student
disclosed that Happel once stood at a urinal next to the student an d exposed his penis to
the student. Another student reported seeing a man looking at him th rough a vent in the
wall above the toilet. Investigators discovered that Happel had reversed vents in two boys’
bathrooms, which allowed him to secretly watch students use the bathroom. A student also
reported that Happel had leaned against him with an erect pe nis in the school lunchroom
and made it appear as if it were an accident. On a different occasion, Happel slapped the
student on the buttocks. Investigators also learned that Happel had been giving students
candy. The school reprimanded Happel for slapping the student on the buttocks, entering
the boys’ bathroom with students present, and giving students candy.
Investigators also discovered that Happel had a “secret room” in the school to which
he had changed the lock. Happel kept a co t, a children’s blanket, a stuffed animal, a
computer, and a packet of sexual lubrican t inside the room. Happel admitted to
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investigators that he had masturbated in the “secret room” at least once. Based on this
investigation of Happel’s conduc t at the school, Happel was charged with six counts of
surreptitious interference with the privacy of a minor, second- and fourth-degree criminal
sexual conduct, and fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. As part of the plea deal, Happel
entered an Alford plea1 to one count of surreptitious interference with the privacy of a minor
and the other charges were dismissed.
B. Convictions of Second- and Fourth-Degree Intrafamilial Abuse
After the news broke regarding the 2014 investigation, Happel’s adult son from his
first marriage, A.H., contacted police. A.H. reported that Happel had sexually abused him
when he was a minor, and A.H. provided police with the names of other family members
and acquaintances whom Happel had abused. One of those individuals was D.W., Happel’s
nephew. D.W. told po lice that Happel had sexually abused him in the late 1970s to the
early 1980s, when D.W. was eight to 12 years old. He reported several incidents in which
Happel offered D.W. beer or cigarettes, played a pornographic movie, and fondled D.W.’s
genitals over and under his clothing. One or both of Happel’s oldest sons, A.H. and W.H.,
were present during some of these incidents, and Happel would sexually abuse A.H. and
W.H. as well. On one occasion, Happel took numerous photographs of the boys’ genitals.
In another incident, Happel got on top of D.W. while D.W. was naked from the waist down.
Happel then put his penis between D.W.’s th ighs and ejaculated on D.W. Based on his

1 A defendant entering an Alford plea maintains his innocence but admits that the state has
sufficient evidence to convict him . State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007)
(citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970)).
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sexual abuse of D.W., Happel pleaded guilty to second- and fourth -degree intrafamilial
sexual abuse.
C. Conviction of First-Degre e Criminal Sexual Conduct
A.H. also informed police that Happel had abused B.J.S. , a boy who lived in their
neighborhood. B.J.S. told police that Happel sexually abused him between 1986 and 1988,
while B.J.S. was approximately seven to ten years old. He reported that Happel once told
him that they needed to shower together and that Happel repeatedly hit B.J.S. with his penis
while in the shower. On another occasion, while B.J.S. was sleeping over at Happel’s
house, Happel fondled B.J.S.’s penis and took numerous naked photos of B.J.S. Happel
then performed oral sex on B.J.S., got on top of B.J.S., and made B.J.S. put his penis in
Happel’s anus. Based on Happel’s sexual abuse of B.J.S., Happel was charged with
first- and second-degree criminal sexual co nduct. Happel pleade d guilty to and was
convicted of one count of first-degree cr iminal sexual conduct. The second-degree
criminal-sexual-conduct charge was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
Other Evidence of Sexual Abuse
In addition to the above co nvicted offenses, the state presented evidence at the
hearing that Happel sexually abused several other children in the 1970s and 1980s. Happel
has not been criminally charged based on these reports. Happel’s additional victims
included Happel’s two sons from his first marriage (A.H. and W.H.), two nieces, two other
nephews, and a nonrelative boy. They ranged in age from four to 16 years old at the time
of the abuse, and Happel sexually abused a ll but one of them on several occasions. For
instance, A.H. reported that Happel repeated ly sexually abused him from age four to
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14 or 15. These individuals disclosed that Happel’s sexual abuse included the
following: fondling children’s genitals over and under their clothing; digital penetration of
two minor females; attempted vaginal penetration; orchestr ating sexual contact between
minor males; orchestrating sexual contact between a minor male and female;
photographing and videotaping naked minor males and female; and showing naked pictures
and videos of children to other children. A.H. also reported that Happel’s sexual abuse of
him involved “penetration in both directions.”
Happel’s Testimony
During his testimony at the civil-comm itment hearing, Happel denied sexually
assaulting any children or engaging in any other sexual misconduct against children. When
asked on cross-examination abou t his 2015 guilty pleas, he insisted that he had perjured
himself regarding the factual bases for the guilty pleas to receive the benefit of the plea
deal. During cross-examinatio n, the county’s attorney also called Happel’s attention to
several prior statements Happel had made to investigators and others in which he admitted
to sexually abusing children or admitted to certain facts re garding his sexual abuse of
children. In each instance, Happel either denied making the admission or said that he could
not remember. Happel stated that he is not sexually attracted to children and denied ever
telling investigators that he is.
Happel testified that he does not believe th at he needs sex-offender treatment. He
admitted that he had previously refused to do required sex-offender treatment while he was
incarcerated at the Moose Lake correctional facility. He testified that he refused treatment
because he “had not done anyt hing wrong” and preferred the shorte r program at another
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facility. Because he refused to participate in treatment, Happel was required to serve an
additional six months in prison. Happel also testified that he had not applied to or enrolled
in a sex-offender treatment program at the time of the hearing. And he testified that he did
not have a relapse-prevention plan in place if he were to be released because he believed
he does not need one. Happel st ated that if he were to be released, he would reside with
his current wife in the same house in which he lived prior to his incarceration. Happel
testified that, at the time of the hearing, he and his current wife had been married for
26 years.
Expert Reports and Testimony
The district court also received the repor ts and testimony of two court-appointed
psychologists who asse ssed Happel—Dr. Andrea Lovett and Dr. James Alsdurf.
Dr. Alsdurf was appointed at the request of Happel’s counsel.
Both examiners supported the county’s petition to co mmit Happel as an SDP and
SPP. Dr. Lovett diagnosed Happel with pedophilic disorder, antisocial personality
disorder, and other specified paraphilic disorder—hypersexuality and hebephilia.
Dr. Alsdurf diagnosed Happel with pedophilic disorder and specified personality disorder
with antisocial features. Based on their assessment of Happel, both examiners opined that
Happel is “highly likely” to e ngage in future acts of harmful sexual conduct. Both also
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opined that Happel has “an utter lack of po wer to control his sexual impulses” and is
dangerous to others.
District Court’s Order
Following the hearing, the district cour t issued a detailed, 39-page order civilly
committing Happel as an SDP and SPP. The district court determined, based on detailed
factual findings and a thorough analysis of th e law, that the county proved by clear and
convincing evidence that Happel met the statutory re quirements for commitment both as
an SDP and SPP. In reaching its decision, the district court found that Happel’s testimony
“ha[d] no credibility wh atsoever” and accordingly attribut ed “absolutely no weight to
[Happel’s] denials of his past criminal convic tions or his denials of other reported sexual
offenses or misconduct.”
Happel appeals.
DECISION
Happel argues that the district court erred by determining that he meets the criteria
for SDP and SPP commitment. A person may be civilly committed as an SDP or SPP if
the county proves the statutory criteria by clear and convincing evidence. Minn.
Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3 (2020). We review a district court’s factual findings on the
elements of the civil-commitment statutes for clear error. In re Civ. Commitment of Stone,
711 N.W.2d 831, 836 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2006). Following a
review of all the evidence, we will not conc lude that a fact-finder clearly erred unless we
are “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 20 21) (quotation omitted). But
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whether the evidence meets the statutory re quirements for commitment is a question of
law, which we review de novo. In re Civ. Commitment of Crosby , 824 N.W.2d 351, 356
(Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2013).
I. Clear and convincing evid ence supports the district court’s determination that
Happel is an SDP.

A person is sexually dangerous if the person (1) “has engaged in a course of harmful
sexual conduct”; (2) “has manifested a sexual , personality, or other mental disorder or
dysfunction”; and (3) “as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.”
Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16(a) (2020). On appeal, Happel limits his argument to the
district court’s determination of the third statutory criterion: whether he is likely to engage
in acts of harmful sexual conduct. The Mi nnesota Supreme Court has interpreted this
criterion to require a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the person is “highly
likely” to engage in future harmful sexual conduct. In re Civ. Commitment of Ince,
847 N.W.2d 13, 20-22 (Minn. 2014).
To determine whether a person is highly lik ely to reoffend, a district court must
conduct a “multi-factor analysis.” Id. at 23. The multi-factor analysis includes
consideration of six factors, commonly known as the Linehan factors:
(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.); (b) the person’ s history of violent behavior
(paying particular attention to recency, severity, and frequency
of violent acts); (c) the base rate statistics for violent behavior
among individuals of this person’s background ( e.g., data
showing the rate at which rapists recidivate, the correlation
between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.); (d) the sources
of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective factors
which indicate that the person may be predisposed to cope with
stress in a violent or nonviolent manner); (e) the similarity of
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the present or future context to those contexts in which the
person has used violence in the past; and (f) the person’s record
with respect to sex therapy programs.

Id. at 22 (quoting In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994)). The multi-factor
analysis may also include other relevant evidence and information, including
actuarial-assessment evidence. Id. at 23-24. No single factor is determinative. In re Civ.
Commitment of Navratil , 799 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.
Aug. 24, 2011). Rather, “[t]he district court is free to determine the weight to be attributed
to any particular piece of evid ence, including predic tions of future s hort- or long-term
recidivism rates, based on the record in an individual case.” Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 24.
Here, the district court concluded that the state established by clear and convincing
evidence that Happel is highly likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. In a
detailed written analysis, the district court co nsidered the opinions of the examiners and
the other evidence presented at the hearing. The district court’s order includes detailed
findings regarding each Linehan factor and other considerations relevant to Happel’s risk
of reoffending.
On appeal, Happel does not ch allenge any of the district court’s findings of fact
regarding its multi-factor analysis. Instead, he challenges only the district court’s legal
determination that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that he is highly likely
to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. Specifically, Happel asserts that the evidence
is not clear and convincing re garding that statutory require ment because the evidence
demonstrates the following: he is approxi mately 70 years old and is retired from
employment; he has had no recent violent behavior while incarcerated; he is of “average”
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risk to reoffend according to an actuarial tool known as the Static-99R; if released, he
would return to live with his wife of many years; he woul d be willing to do sex-offender
treatment; he would be on supe rvised release until May 2024; and he would have Social
Security and his pension as sources of income. We are not persuaded.
The record amply supports the district c ourt’s determination that Happel is highly
likely to reoffend. The record demonstrates that Happel engaged in frequent sexual abuse
of children in the 1970s and 1980s. Happel al so reportedly engaged in extensive peeping
on young students using the bathroom in his place of employment as recently as 2014 while
he was over 60 years of age. He is untreated and has refused sex-offender treatment even
though his refusal required him to spend more time in prison. And, despite his assertion
on appeal that he is willing to participate in sex-offender tr eatment, he testified at the
civil-commitment hearing that he does not believe he needs treatment and that his risk of
reoffending is “zero.” He also testified that he does not have a relapse-prevention plan in
place because he does not need one.
If Happel were to be released, he would retu rn to an environment similar to that in
which he sexually offended. Happel testified that he plans to return to live with his current
wife, to whom he has been married for over 26 years. While Happel appears to argue that
these circumstances make him less likely to reoffend, the record demonstrates that Happel
lived at the same address with his wife pr ior to his incarceration and offended against
children while living there. The record also shows that Happel sexually abused children
while married to his previous wife.
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The court-appointed examiner s, Dr. Lovett and Dr. Als durf, both expressed their
belief that Happel is highly likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. In reaching
that opinion, both emphasized the extent of Happel’s sexual deviance—which Dr. Alsdurf
described as “persistent and robust”—in add ition to Happel’s refusal to participate in
sex-offender treatment, his apparent lack of remorse and empathy for his victims, and his
history of denying, minimizi ng, and blaming others regard ing his sexual misconduct.
Dr. Lovett reported that indivi duals who sexually offend agai nst children have a lifetime
recidivism rate as high as 52%. Dr. Alsdurf opined that Happel “has no features that would
mitigate base rate predictions.”
Although both examiners recognized that an offender’s advanced age would
normally reduce their risk of reoffending, both agreed that the research showing reduced
rates of recidivism as sex offenders age is not as applicable to male offenders like Happel
who sexually abuse children. Dr. Lovett testif ied that “males who pr efer sexual conduct
with prepubescent boys . . . are the most likely to continue offending into their later years.”
Both examiners further testified that Happel’s risk of reoffe nding is not mitigated by his
age because he offended after age 60. This evidence supports the district court’s
determination that Happel’s “age or demographics do not mitigate his risk to reoffend.”
Happel appears to argue that his score on an actuarial tool known as the Static-99R
undermines the district court’s determination th at he is highly likely to engage in acts of
harmful sexual conduct. Both examiners scored Happel as a +2 on the Static-99R, which
places him in the “average” category in terms of his risk of recidivism. But, as the district
court recognized, both examiners also opined that Happel’s score on the Static-99R is
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artificially low in light of the persiste nce of Happel’s sexual misconduct and sexual
deviance, his large number of victims, and his diverse victim pool. Both examiners
attributed Happel’s lower score to his age, and Dr. Lovett indicated that Happel’s reduced
score was also affected by “the extended period during which [Happel’s] sexual offense
behaviors remained largely undetected by la w enforcement.” Dr. Lovett and Dr. Alsdurf
each noted that if age were not factored into the Static-99R analysis, Happel’s score would
be a +5, which falls into the “above average” risk category. Given this evidence, the district
court did not err by declining to attribute significant weight to Happel’s Static-99R score.
See Ince , 847 N.W.2d at 24 (“The district court is free to determine the weight to be
attributed to any particular piece of evidence, including predictions of future short- or long-
term recidivism rates . . . .”).
Based on our careful review of the record , we conclude that clear and convincing
evidence supports the district court’s determination that Happel is highly likely to engage
in acts of harmful sexual conduct. The di strict court did not err by ordering Happel
committed as an SDP.
II. Clear and convincing evid ence supports the district court’s determination that
Happel meets the criteria for civil commitment as an SPP.

Happel also argues that the district cour t erred when it concluded that clear and
convincing evidence supports his commitment as an SPP. SPP is defined as
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional
instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary
standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the
consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any of these
conditions, which render the person irresponsible for personal
conduct with respect to sexua l matters, if the person has
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evidenced, by a habitual cour se of misconduct in sexual
matters, an utter lack of power to control the person’s sexual
impulses and, as a result, is dangerous to other persons.

Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 15 (2020) (emphasis added). On appeal, Happel challenges
the district court’s conclusions that he has an utter lack of power to control his sexual
impulses and that he is dangerous to other people.
To determine whether a person has an utter lack of power over their sexual impulses,
the district court generally considers the following factors from In re Blodgett:
the nature and frequency of the sexual assaults, the degree of
violence involved, the relationship (or lack thereof) between
the offender and the victims, the offender’s attitude and mood,
the offender’s medical and family history, the results of
psychological and psychiatric testing and evaluation, and such
other factors that bear on the predatory sex impulse and the
lack of power to control it.

510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994). The district court may also consider additional factors
such as the person’s refusal of treatment op portunities, the lack of a relapse-prevention
plan, the person’s belief that a problem does not exist, the presence of grooming behaviors,
and the person’s failure to remove himsel f or herself from similar situations.
See In re Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 30,
1995); In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 375 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. May 16,
1995); In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 27, 1994). In addition, a person is “‘dangerous to others’ and subject to commitment
as a[n] [SPP] when the person’s pattern of sexual misconduct (1) creates a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to others, and (2) is likely to recur because
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of an utter lack of power to control sexual impulses.” In re Kindschy, 634 N.W.2d 723,
732 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2001).
In its evaluation of whether Happel has an utter lack of power to control his sexual
impulses, the district court engaged in a le ngthy discussion of the factors set forth in
Blodgett, along with the additional factors from Pirkl, Irwin, and Bieganowski. In
considering these factors, the district court made the following factual findings: Happel has
four convictions for criminal sexual conduc t occurring during a 30-year span; he has
engaged in and/or has been accused of sexual misconduct against at least 14 children; his
victims and accusers included family member s, acquaintances, an d students from the
school where he was employed; he “used coercion, surprise, manipulation, grooming, and
his position as an authority fi gure to accomplish his sexual offending,” and he attempted
forced vaginal intercourse on one occasion; he categorically denied committing any sexual
crimes even when confronted with evidence of his own previous admissions and has a
substantial history of minimizing, rationaliz ing, and blaming others for his sexual
misconduct; he has a broad victim pool that includes mostly males, but at least one female,
ranging in age from four to 16 years old; he does not have any medical conditions that
would limit his ability to reoffend; he has refused sex-offender treatment; he lacks a
relapse-prevention plan; he insists that he has no risk of reoffending; and he has
continuously failed to remove hi mself from situations that led to his reoffending. All of
these findings are well-supported by the record , and they amount to clear and convincing
evidence that Happel has an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses.
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The district court further determined that Happel is dangerous to others based on its
conclusion that he is highly likely to engage in future harmful sexual conduct. Because the
same analysis applies to the SPP dangerousness prediction as to the SDP requirement that
an offender be highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct, our earlier conclusion
that Happel is highly likely to reoffend indica tes that he is also dangerous to others. See
Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 840.
In challenging the district court’s determ ination that he meets the SPP statutory
requirements, Happel again notes that his risk of recidivism based on certain actuarial tools
is “average” and that “[h]e will be 70 years old this year, is retired, and plans to reside with
his wife of 26 years.” But, as discussed w ith respect to the SDP statutory requirements,
the district court did not err by attributing little weight to Happel’s age and his Static-99R
score or by finding that Happel’s plan to return to live with his wife would place him in the
same environment in which he was previously offending.
We therefore conclude that clear and co nvincing evidence supp orts the district
court’s determination that Happel has an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses
and is dangerous to others, and accordingly meets the SPP statutory requirements. The
district court did not err by ordering Happel civilly committed as an SDP and SPP.
Affirmed.