A21-1598

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1597
A21-1598

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
M. H., Parent.

Filed May 2, 2022
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-JV-20-151

John J. Leunig, Justin J. Duffy, The Law Office of John J. Leunig, Bloomington, Minnesota
(for appellant M.H.)

Lucas J.M. Dawson, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent
N.H.)

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Erin A. Johnson, Assistant County Attorney,
Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent Washington County Community Services)

Connie Kranz, Ramsey, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A father killed his five-month-old son by in tentionally forcing the infant’s head to
drop against the floor on two occasions becaus e the father was frustr ated by the child’s
crying. Washington County successfully petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights
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to two younger children born during the pendency of the re sulting homicide case that
resulted in the father’s guilty pl ea to manslaughter. The distri ct court terminated father’s
rights and concurrently denied the mother’s alternative petition to transfer sole legal and
physical custody of the younger children to her. Both the father and mother argue on appeal
that termination is not in the best interests of the children and that the district court should
have instead issued an order transferring custody to the mother. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination serves the children’s best
interests, we affirm.
FACTS
M.H. (Father) and N.H. (Mother) have been married since 2017 and had three sons.
In the interest of privacy and to avoid confusion, we will call the first son Adam, the second
Ben, and the third Cam. Adam was born in 2018. Adam was admitted to the hospital when
he was five months old because he suddenly stopped breathing. He died five days later. An
autopsy revealed that Adam died from blunt-force head trauma and that the force occurred
twice—about two weeks before his death and within one week before his death.
Officials suspected abuse and investigated. Both parents first denied harming Adam,
saying that they were unaware of any occasi on when he fell or was otherwise injured.
Father eventually confessed to twice mistreating Adam shortly before he died. He admitted
that he “bonked” the infant’s head agains t the floor and later dropped him to the floor
headfirst from about chest level. Father cited his frustration w ith the child’s crying as his
reason. The state charged Father with sec ond-degree murder, and he ultimately pleaded
guilty to first-degree manslaughter. The district court sentenced him to prison.
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In the period after Father killed Adam a nd before he pleaded guilty, Mother gave
birth to Ben and Cam. On Be n’s birth, Washington County immediately petitioned to
terminate Father’s parental rights to Ben. The district court promptly found that Father had
egregiously harmed Adam, which relieved th e county of any duty to make reasonable
efforts to reunify Father and Ben. The distri ct court allowed Ben to remain in Mother’s
care and ordered Father to have no contact with him except, eventually, short video calls
between Father and child. By the time of Father’s trial on the county’s petition to terminate
his parental rights, he had spent a total of about ten hours on thes e video calls. Cam was
born 19 months after the county had filed the petition, wh ich the county then amended to
also seek to terminate Father’s parental rights to Cam. At the time of the trial, Father had
never met Cam, even by video interaction.
Mother filed a competing petition to transfer sole legal and physical custody of Ben
(and later Cam) to herself, seek ing to ensure that Father would have the opportunity to
parent the children (and, as acknowledged during this appeal, to rema in jointly obligated
to meet their financial needs) during and after his incarceration. The parties stipulated that
clear and convincing evidence met two statutory bases to terminate Father’s rights—that a
child has experienced egregious harm in Father’s care of a nature “that indicates a lack of
regard for the child’s well-bei ng, such that a reasonable pers on would believe it contrary
to the best interest of the child or of any child to be in the parent’s care” under Minnesota
Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(6) (2020), and that Father was convicted of a
specifically listed crime justifying termination under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(9)
(2020). The parents maintained that the only issue remainin g for trial was whether the
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children’s interests were better served by terminating Father’s rights or by maintaining his
rights while transferring custody to Mother.
After a two-day trial, the district court found that termination was in the children’s
best interests, and it ordered Father’s right s terminated. Father and Mother separately
appealed. We now resolve the consolidated appeals.
DECISION
Our only question in this na rrow appeal is whether the di strict court appropriately
found that terminating Father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Ordinarily,
we review the district court’s conclusion that termination is in the children’s best interests
for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.H ., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn.
App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). But reviewing the conclusion in this case
seems somewhat, if not entirely, to be an ac ademic exercise given Mother and Father’s
pretrial stipulation. They stipulated that cl ear and convincing evidence proved that Adam
“experienced egregious harm in [Father’s] care . . . such that a reasonable person would
believe it contrary to the best interest of the child or of any child to be in the parent’s care.
Minn. Stat. 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6) (emphasis added). Mother and Father stipulated that a
reasonable person would find it contrary to any child’s best interests to be in Father’s care.
Because that stipulation is not challenged on appeal, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion by making its best-interests decision. Although the district court must
conduct a separate analysis to determine whether termination is in the best interests of the
child after it finds that a statutory ground to terminate exists, the legislature crafted
subdivision 1(b)(6) uniquely among the enumerated statutory bases for terminating rights.
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It did so by including a built-in best-interests premise. But the county did not raise this as
a basis to affirm, and, for the following reasons , our analysis leads us easily to conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion even apart from the integral nature of the
best-interests feature of subdivision 1(b)(6).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that terminating Father’s
rights is in Ben’s and Cam’s best interests. The district court cons idered and applied the
juvenile-protection rule’s crit eria when addressing the best-i nterests question, which are
the children’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship, Father’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship, an d any competing interests of the children. See
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895,
905 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). The district court’s findings on
the three challenged factors find support in the record.
As for the first best-interests factor, the district court acknowledged but gave limited
weight to Father’s assertion that he had deve loped a bond with Ben. It credited the social
worker’s observation that a genuine father-c hild bond unlikely deve loped through video
contact—the only contact Ben ever experi enced with Father. And Cam had never
encountered Father by video or otherwise. Additionally, Mother’s separate argument that
the district court ignored the effect that te rminating Father’s right s would have on the
children’s relationship with extended family misstates the record. The district court
addressed the issue, citing Ben’s paternal grandfather’s testimony that Ben would “still
have [him]” regardless of termination.
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As for the second factor, the dist rict court found that it cut against terminating
Father’s rights. Mother and Father’s arguments on this factor add nothing to our review.
As for the final factor, Moth er and Father’s arguments fa il. Father unpersuasively
argues that the district cour t focused only on the children’s physical safety. Given the
nature of the specific safety risk Father poses in light of his killing of Ben and Cam’s infant
brother, we cannot say that the district court’s best-interests consideration overemphasized
the children’s safety risk. Bu t even assuming the argument otherwise has merit, it is
factually unsupported because the district cour t terminated Father’s rights out of concern
that the children be protect ed from a “safety risk in any form.” (Emphasis added.) The
district court also did not ignore Father’s testim ony that he intends to seek help in prison
or that no evidence of a pattern of abuse exists. It conclude d that causing the death of a
child is so serious that mitig ation efforts are “nearly impossi ble.” It credited the social
worker’s and guardian ad litem’s testimony, which supported this finding. Mother’s
arguments fail for the same reason. Mother disa grees with the district court’s conclusion
that the children’s emotional health and stability would be best served by terminating
Father’s rights, but that conclusion is grounded in the social worker’s and the guardian ad
litem’s testimony.
Because the district court’s analysis found the children’s interest in preserving the
relationship with Father and the children’s co mpeting interests favor termination of his
parental rights, and because its reasoning is su pported by the record, the district court did
not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.