A21-1683

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1617
A21-1683

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: D. M. P. and J. T. P., Parents.

Filed May 31, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Bryan, Judge

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-JV-21-1082

Timothy H. Dodd, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant J. T. P.)

Elizabeth A. Walker, Elizabet h A. Walker Law, PLLC, De troit Lakes, Minnesota (for
appellant D. M. P.)

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Lisa M. Tufts, Assistant County Attorney,
Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Monica Felt, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellants mother and father ch allenge the decision
of the district court to terminate their parental rights. Both appellants argue that the district
court erred in ruling that they failed to rebut the presumption that they are palpably unfit
parents. Because the district court’s an alysis regarding the rebuttable presumption
2
misapplies applicable law, we reverse the dist rict court’s order and remand the matter for
further proceedings.
FACTS
Appellants D.M.P. and J.T.P. are the parents of S.M.L.P. (the child). In June 2021,
respondent Becker County Human Services (the county) filed a petition for an involuntarily
termination of parental rights (TPR) of D.M.P. and J.T.P. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
section 260C.301, subdivisio n 1(b)(4) (2020), the termination petition alleged that the
parents were palpably unfit to be parties to the parent-child relationship because their
parental rights had previously been terminated involuntarily. The case proceeded to trial.
At trial, the district court admitted several exhibits and heard testimony from various
witnesses, including father, mother, the child’s paternal grandmother, a guardian ad litem
(GAL), and a county social worker (social worker), among others. Much of this evidence
concerned the parents’ previous terminations and experience with domestic violence,
including the circumstances of father’s conv iction for domestic vi olence in 2019. The
district court also received evidence relating to the best interests factors.
Mother and father both testified that they have made changes in their lives since
their previous terminations and asserted th at their parenting ab ilities had improved such
that they were suitable to be entrusted with the care of a ch ild. Both parents have stable
housing and are employed full-time. Father testified that he completed inpatient drug and
alcohol dependency programming as well as completed anger management programming.
Father further explained that he had participated in domestic violence programming as part
of his previous convictions. Mother testified that she took domestic violence information
3
classes from 2018 to 2020, is no longer with the boyfriend she was with during the previous
termination proceedings, and he r current relationship with fa ther has been healthy and
positive. Mother also testified that she lear ned from her past relati onship and should her
relationship with father become unhealthy or unsafe, she would leave. In addition, mother
stated that she previously attended counseling and would be willing to resume therapy.
The child’s paternal grandmother testified that in her opinion , the parents are fit and able
to care for the child. She also testified that she has seen growth in father’s communication
and parenting skills over the years.
The GAL testified regard ing the parents’ abilities and recommended that the
parents’ parental rights be terminated becaus e of the history of domestic violence in the
parents’ respective backgrounds. The GAL ac knowledged that there was no evidence of
domestic abuse between the pare nts and attested to the parent s’ current parenting skills.
For instance, the GAL explained her observati ons that the parents suitably cared for the
child during visits: “I have no doubt [mother] loves her child and I have no doubt [father]
loves his child. During visitation you could see wonderful interaction. They’re engaging
with the baby. They’re, you kn ow, meeting his needs, making sure he’s fed, and making
sure he’s diapered.” The GAL also testified that the parents identified a broken car seat
while the child was not in their care, which was fixed.
On direct examination and again on cross-examination, the social worker stated that
she did not have any current chemical depende ncy concerns for either parent. She also
agreed that chemical depende ncy was not the primary con cern and that there was no
domestic violence involved in the relationshi p between mother and father. Further, the
4
social worker acknowledged that the parents had appropriate housing, were both employed,
and have “lots of great parenting skills.” She stated that she had no concerns about their
ability to provide the day-to-day care for the child and would describe them as nurturing
parents. More specifically, the social worker explained that the parents provide a diaper
bag with all the essentials that a baby woul d need, engage with the child often, ask
developmentally appropriate questions of th e child, comfort the ch ild when needed, and
are able to demonstrate safe parenting. Neve rtheless, the social worker concluded that in
her opinion, termination would be in the child’s best interests.
The district court issued an order terminating the parents’ parental rights. The
district court first determined that the pare nts did not rebut the presumption of palpable
unfitness and, therefore, the county did not be ar the burden of proof on its TPR petition.
The district court granted the TPR petition on this basis alone, concluding that the parents
did not establish their fitness to be a parent. Mother and father filed separate appeals, and
this court consolidated them.
DECISION
Mother and father argue that they pr esented sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of palpable unfitness and that the district court applied an incorrect burden of
proof. We believe that the district court did not properly analyze whether the parents
satisfied the burden of production that shifts the burden of proof to the county.
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court may terminate parental
rights when at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and
5
convincing evidence and the cour t determines that terminatio n is in the children’s best
interests. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014). Generally,
the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground exists
for terminating parental rights. In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996).
However, when a person’s parental rights to a child have previously been terminated
involuntarily, courts must apply a presumption of palpable unfitness, and unless the parent
rebuts this presumption, the county does not bear the ultimate burden to prove the elements
of a termination petition. Minn. Stat. § 260C.3 01, subd. 1(b)(4) (stating that a parent is
presumed to be palpably unfit “upon a showing that the parent’s parental rights to one or
more other children were involuntarily terminated”).
The presumption imposed by the statute is “easily rebuttable” if the parent
introduces evidence that could support a finding that the parent is able to care for the child:
The statutory presumption also is consistent with a parent’s
constitutional rights because it is narrowly tailored to serve the
compelling government interest. The statutory presumption is
narrowly tailored in part because it is easily rebuttable. The
statutory presumpti on imposes only a burden of production,
which means that a parent may rebut the statutory presumption
merely by introducing evidence that would justify a finding of
fact that [the parent] is not palp ably unfit. In other words, a
parent seeking to rebut the st atutory presumption needs to
produce only enough evidence to support a finding that the
parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the [child].

In re Welfare of Child of J.A.K. , 907 N.W.2d 241, 245-46 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 135-38 (Minn. 2014) and In re Welfare of
Child of J.W. , 807 N.W.2d 441, 445-47 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6,
2012)) (quotation marks and other citation omitte d). In determining whether a parent’s
6
evidence rebuts the presumption that the parent is palpably unfit, a court should credit and
consider the evidence without weighing it against any contrary evidence. See J.W., 807
N.W.2d at 445-47 (concluding that the parent ’s evidence, “if believ ed,” would support a
finding that the parent was not palpably unfit, and that the evidence was therefore sufficient
to rebut the statutory presumption).
Mother and father attempted to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness through
presentation of the following ev idence. They both testified th at they have made changes
in their lives since their previo us terminations and that they have stable housing and full-
time employment. Father testified that he completed treatment and programming, and
mother explained that she has also undergone counseling and completed domestic violence
information classes. The testimony from the child’s pate rnal grandmother, as well as
testimony provided during cross examination of the county’s witnesses, relates to whether
the parents can be entrusted with the care of the ch ild. For instance, th e child’s paternal
grandmother testified that the parents are fit and able to care for the child. In addition, both
the GAL and the social worker acknowledged that there was no evidence of domestic abuse
between the parties, and both gave a list of concrete examples of the parents’ current
parenting skills. The social wo rker stated that the parents have “lots of great parenting
skills” and that she had no issues with their ability to provide the necessary day-to-day care
for the child. If believed, this evidence may be sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption.
In making the determination that the parents failed to rebut their burden, the district
court did not accurately articulate the statutory presumption. While the district court noted
that the presumption could be rebutted wh en a parent affirmatively and actively
7
demonstrates the parent’s ability to successfully care for a ch ild, the district court did not
discuss the “easily rebuttable” nature of the statutory presumption. Moreover, the district
court did not accept the evidence presented by the parents as true and instead weighed the
parents’ evidence against eviden ce to the contrary. We c onclude that this analysis
misapplies the holdings of R.D.L., J.A.K. and J.W. We reverse the district court’s order
and remand the matter to the district court to determine whether the parents have rebutted
the statutory presumption under the correct standard and to apply the resulting burdens of
proof regarding the statutory bases for termination. The district court retains the discretion
to decide whether to reopen the record after remand.
Reversed and remanded.