Bradley D. Fordyce,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-1619

Court of Appeals Moore, III, J.

Bradley D. Fordyce,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: September 6, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.
________________________

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Travis J. Smith, William C. Lundy, Special
Assistant County Attorneys, Slayton, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. Willful and lewd exposure occurs “in any place where others are present”
under the indecent-exposure statute, Minnesota Statutes section 617.23, subd ivision 1
(2022), if the exposure is reasonably capable of being viewed by others.
2. The State presented sufficient evidence that appellant exposed himself “in
any place where others are present” under the indecent-exposure statute, Minnesota
2
Statutes section 617.23, subdivision 1, where appellant was in a partially-enclosed
backyard in clear view from the back porch of another residential property located directly
across a public alley from appellant’s location.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N

MOORE, III, Justice.
This case presents the question of whether an individual who willfully and lewdly
exposes himself in the privately owned, partially enclosed backyard of his home has done
so in a “public place, or in any place where others are present” within the meaning of the
indecent-exposure statute, Minnesota Statutes section 617.23, subdivision 1 (2022). A jury
found appellant Bradley D. Fordyce guilty of gross-misdemeanor indecent exposure, and
Fordyce later filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the State failed to
produce evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction. The district court denied Fordyce’s
petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. Fordyce v. State, No. A21-1619, 2022 WL
3711483, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 29, 2022). Because we conclude that a reasonable jury
could have found that Fordyce’s exposure occurred in a “place where others are present”
within the meaning of the indecent-exposure statute, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 1, 2019, at approximately 9:00 a.m., B.T. was at her home in the City of
Crosby in Crow Wing County , where she was in her enclosed back porch about to go
outside to tend to her flowers. With the door to the back porch open but without stepping
out from her porch, B.T. testified that she saw Fordyce standing alone in the backyard of
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his home across the alley. Fordyce was “not doing anything,” only “standing there” without
any clothes on, according to B.T. 1 Fordyce was initially standing sideways before facing
toward her and then turning to the wall of his house, and from that angle, B.T. could see
his buttocks. From the back, B.T. saw no indication that Fordyce was wearing “a pair of
underwear or thong underwear or anything.” B.T. testified that she was “really scared” by
Fordyce’s behavior because she was alone. She stepped out onto her deck, took two
photographs of Fordyce with her cell phone, and drove directly to the police station to
report what she had seen.
Respondent State of Minnesota initially cited Fordyce for misdemeanor indecent
exposure in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 617.23, subdivision 1(1). Because of
a prior indecent-exposure conviction, however, the State later charged Fordyce with gross-
misdemeanor indecent exposure in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 617.23,
subdivision 2(2) (2022).
The evidence at trial showed that B.T.’s porch door opens toward a paved public
alley, and across the alley is Fordyce’s backyard. Both properties sit just north of Highway
210, which is a main thoroughfare through Crosby. A police officer testified that the
neighborhood was mostly residential with small city lots. The officer took photographs
and estimated the distance between where B.T. and Fordyce were standing to be
approximately 79 feet. A fence runs along at least one other side of Fordyce’s property,
but there is an unobstructed view from B.T.’s deck to Fordyce’s back door. In addition,

1 According to the testimony of a Crosby police lieutenant, B.T. told police that
Fordyce “was not only just standing outside the door but was dancing.”
4
anyone in the public alley between the two properties would have a clear view into
Fordyce’s backyard.
The jury found Fordyce guilty of gross-misdemeanor indecent exposure. Fordyce
did not file a direct appeal.
In a petition for postconviction relief filed in June 2021, Fordyce argued, in part,
that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not prove
the “place” element of the offense. Specifically, Fordyce argued that the State failed to
prove that he was in a public place at the time of the alleged offense. See Minn. Stat.
§ 617.23, subd. 1. The district court denied the petition, concluding that Fordyce’s actions
occurred in a public place because his “conduct was so likely to be observed, either by a
neighbor or a passerby in the alley, that it must be reasonably presumed that [his] conduct
was intended to be witnessed.” Even though Fordyce was on his own property, the district
court reasoned that “it is less important what level of privacy an individual believes he
should have, rather it is the likelihood of the conduct being witnessed that is more
significant.”
The court of appeals affirmed. Fordyce, 2022 WL 3711483, at *1. In examining
the place element of the indecent-exposure statute, the court of appeals concluded that “the
jury reasonably could have concluded that [Fordyce] was either in a public place or in a
place where others were present” based on the visibility of Fordyce’s conduct. Id. at *5.
Specifically, the court of appeals reasoned that Fordyce was in a public place because he
“was in a place that was open to view from the alley behind his home and where he was
easily visible to anyone passing through the alley .” Id. The court of appeals similarly
5
reasoned that “Fordyce was in ‘a place where others are present’ in the sense that he was
within view of the neighbor, despite her being on her own property.” Id.
We granted review to determine whether the privately owned, partially enclosed
backyard of a home satisfies the “place” element of the indecent-exposure statute,
Minnesota Statutes section 617.23, subdivision 1.
ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is whether the State presented suf ficient evidence of the place
element of the indecent-exposure statute to sustain Fordyce’s conviction. To satisfy this
element, the State must prove the defendant committed the prohibited act “in any public
place, or in any place where others are present.” Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1. “When a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of the statute under which a
defendant has been convicted, we are presented with a question of statutory interpretation
that we review de novo.” State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2018).
I.
The object of all statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention
of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). To do so, we must first “determine
whether the statute is ambiguous on its face.” In re Dakota Cnty., 866 N.W.2d 9 05, 909
(Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a statute is
unambiguous, we must “follow that plain meaning.” State v. McReynolds, 973 N.W.2d 314,
318 (Minn. 2022). But if “a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, then the statute is ambiguous and we may consider the canons of statutory
construction.” State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2013).
6
A.
We begin by considering whether the relevant language in the indecent-exposure
statute is ambiguous. “To determine whether a statute is ambiguous, we first construe
words and phrases in the statute ‘according to rules of grammar and according to their
common and approved usage.’ ” McReynolds, 973 N.W.2d at 318 (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 645.08(1) (2020)). When a statute does not define terms, we may “look to the dictionary
definitions of those words and apply them in the context of the statute” to determine
whether the phrase has a plain and unambiguous meaning. State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d
485, 488 (Minn. 2016). We examine the statute as a whole, considering the entire statute,
not merely the specific phrase at issue, State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn.
2019), and each section of the statute should be reviewed in light of the surrounding
sections to avoid conflicting interpretations, Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn.
2020).
With the principles of statutory interpretation in mind, we turn to the statute at issue.
The indecent-exposure statute prohibits the willful and lewd exposure of one’s body or
private parts “in any public place, or in any place where others are present.” Minn. Stat.
§ 617.23, subd. 1. By use of the disjunctive “or” in the place element of the statute, the
State need only prove one of two alternatives: that Fordyce was either “in any public place”
or “in any place where others are present.” Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1; see also State v.
Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 2000) (“We have long held that in the absence of some
ambiguity surrounding the legislature’s use of the word ‘or,’ we will read it in the
disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order
7
for the statute to be satisfied.”). 2 Because the State need only show that Fordyce was “in
any place where others are present” to satisfy the place element of the indecent-exposure
statute, and because we conclude that Fordyce was in a place where others are present at
the time of the incident at issue, we resolve the case on that basis, and for that reason need
not reach the issue of whether Fordyce was in a “public place” within the meaning of
Minnesota Statutes section 617.23, subdivision 1.
3
Fordyce argues that the phrase “in any place where others are present” in section
617.23, subdivision 1, means a shared physical location between the defendant and other
person, which would not include Fordyce’s backyard because B.T. was in her own home.
The State, on the other hand, argues that “in any place where others are present” means any
place that another person’s lewd conduct might be seen. The crux of the parties’ dispute
hinges on the definition of the word “present” in the phrase “in any place where others are

2 The State argues that Fordyce forfeited consideration of whether the State proved
he was “in any place where others are present” by raising this issue for the first time before
us. Because the jury could have concluded that Fordyce was guilty based on this allegedly
forfeited issue, the State urges us to dismiss this appeal as improvidently granted.
But the State misstates the record. The State did not file a brief in the court of
appeals, participate in oral argument before it, or respond to Fordyce’s petition for review
of the decision of the court of appeals. At oral argument in the court of appeals, Fordyce
presented an uncontested argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove he was “in
any place where others are present.” Oral Argument at 02:33, Fordyce, 2022 WL 3711483,
https://www.mncourts.gov/CourtOfAppeals/OralArgumentRecordings/ArgumentDetail.as
px?rec=2045. Therefore, because Fordyce raised the issue before the court of appeals, and
the court of appeals addressed the merits of the issue in its opinion, this issue was not
forfeited, and we proceed to the merits of his appeal.

3 We therefore express no opinion on the court of appeals’ resolution of the question
of whether Fordyce was “in any public place” at the time of the incident involved in this
case.

8
present.” Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1. The statute does not define either the phrase “in
any place where others are present” or the word “present.” Id.
We have previously considered the meaning of the word “presence” in another
subdivision of the indecent-exposure statute. See State v. Decker, 916 N.W.2d 385, 387
(Minn. 2018) (reviewing a defendant’s conviction of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct
and indecent exposure for sending a picture of his genitals to a minor via social media). 4
In Decker, we explained that dictionaries offer a variety of definitions of the derivative
word “presence,” including, “alternately . . . ‘the state of being in front of or in the same
place as someone or something’ and ‘the condition of being within sight or call.’ ” Id. at
387 n.2 (emphasis in original) (quoting Webster’ s Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language Unabridged 1793 (2002)). We concluded that these alternative
definitions were reasonable in the context of the indecent-exposure statute, so the presence
requirement was ambiguous. Id.
Following this line of reasoning, we also hold that “present” in subdivision 1 of the
indecent-exposure statute is ambiguous. Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1. Based on the
various definitions of “present,” including “at hand” or “[i]n attendance; not elsewhere,”
Present, Black’ s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), and “being in one place and not
elsewhere : being within reach, sight, or call or within contemplated limits : being in view
or at hand,” Webster’ s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language

4 Decker was convicted of gross-misdemeanor indecent exposure because the
“exposure occur[red] ‘in the presence of a minor under the age of 16.’ ” Decker,
916 N.W.2d at 387 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1(2) (2016)).
9
Unabridged 1793 (2002), there are several reasonable definitions of the word “present” in
the context of the indecent-exposure statute. It is reasonable in the context of the indecent-
exposure statute that the Legislature sought to criminalize lewd exposure in a particular
spatial or geographical area, but it is likewise reasonable that the Legislature intended to
criminalize such conduct when it is within sight. Consequently, the language of the statute
is ambiguous.
B.
When a statute is ambiguous, we may consider additional canons of construction to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (explaining that “[w]hen
the words of a law are not explicit,” the Legislature’s intention “may be ascertained by
considering” several nonexclusive canons of statutory construction). As relevant in this
case, the parties examine three particular canons: “the mischief to be remedied,” “the
object to be attained,” and “the consequences of a particular interpretation.” Id. We
consider each of the arguments the parties make in reference to these canons in turn.
1.
We first turn to the mischief to be remedied by section 617.23. Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16(3). In Decker, we considered the mischief to be remedied by the statute’s
prohibition of lewd exposure “in the presence of a minor” in section 617.23, subdivision
2(1). See 916 N.W.2d at 387–88. In that case, the defendant had engaged in “simultaneous
electronic communications with a minor” in which he exposed his genitals. Id. at 386. We
were tasked with determining whether this conduct was “in the presence of a minor under
the age of 16,” which would elevate the crime to a gross misdemeanor. Id. at 387 (internal
10
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 2(1)). We explained that
the mischief to be remedied was “adults lewdly exposing themselves to children.” Id. at
388. Fordyce, however, argues that the mischief targeted by subdivision 1, which does not
mention minors, is “far less weighty” and therefore does not warrant a broad interpretation.
We disagree.
Although subdivision 2(1) of the indecent-exposure statute was specifically devised
to protect children from being exposed to lewd conduct, the statute’s prohibition in
subdivision 1 of lewd conduct in any public place or place where others are present clearly
protects adults from being exposed to the same conduct. Thus, both provisions seek to
remedy the same general type of mischief—the difference is only that subdivision 2(1)
aims to protect children specifically. See Decker , 916 N.W.2d at 387–88; Minn. Stat.
§ 617.23, subd. 2(1) (providing that a person commits a gross misdemeanor when “the
person violates subdivision 1 in the presence of a minor under the age of 16” (emphasis
added)). The fact that subdivision 2(1) makes the act a gross misdemeanor—a more serious
offense—if the offense is committed in the presence of a child does not affect the mischief
the Legislature sought to remedy in subdivision 1.
The purpose of the indecent-exposure statute is apparent from the statute’s face. See
Decker, 916 N.W.2d at 387–88 (determining the mischief to be remedied from the face of
the statute); State v. Serbus, 957 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn. 2021) (concluding that in an
ambiguous criminal statute, the mischief to be remedied was nonetheless “plain from the
face of the statute”). The Legislature sought to remedy the mischief of people lewdly
exposing themselves to others, that is, to curb the offense or annoyance or even fear others
11
may experience when they view lewd conduct, which makes the possibility of being viewed
the touchstone of determining whether indecency occurs in a place where others are present.
See, e.g., Decker, 916 N.W.2d at 387 n.2 (declining the “invitation to require the minor and
the adult to be in the same physical space”).5 Other jurisdictions have recognized a similar
purpose in their indecent-exposure statutes. See State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa
1983) (“The legislative purpose of [the statute], then, is to render indecent exposure
essentially a visual assault crime. It is only exposure with a sexual motivation, inflicted
upon an unwilling viewer, which will constitute the offense.” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Townsend v. State, 750 N.E.2d 416, 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(“[The purpose of the statute is] to protect the non-consenting viewer who might find such
a spectacle repugnant.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); People v. Legel, 321 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill. Ct. App. 1974) (“The purpose of [the
public-indecency statute] is to protect the public from shocking and embarrassing displays
of sexual activities.”). Given the statute’s purpose of remedying the mischief of people
lewdly exposing themselves to others, limiting a definition of “present” to a shared
geographical location would undermine the statute’s ability to protect a non-consenting

5 This purpose is also apparent from another post-ambiguity canon, which allows
consideration of the history of Minnesota’s indecent-exposure statute. See Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16(5) (explaining that legislative intent may be ascertained by considering the former
law on the same or similar subjects). That history reveals that since the inception of
Minnesota law prohibiting indecent exposure, the statute’s aim has been to curtail offense
or annoyance caused by viewing lewd conduct. See Act of Feb. 17, 1881, ch. 33, § 28,
1881 Minn. Laws 51, 51 (making it a crime for a person to “willfully make[] any indecent
exposure of his or her person, in any public place, or in any place where there are other
persons to be offended or annoyed”).

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viewer from being exposed to vulgar, sexual conduct. As the facts here show, a person
may be easily subjected to another’s lewd conduct even if they are in different physical
locations.
Consequently, the mischief to be remedied by Minnesota’s indecent-exposure
statute weighs in favor of interpreting the statute broadly enough to encompass conduct
that is reasonably capable of being viewed by unwilling observers who may suffer
annoyance or offense from the sight of the lewd exposure of another.
2.
We next consider a closely related canon—the object to be attained by the statute.
Minn. Stat. § 645.16(4). Here, the object of the indecent-exposure statute is to prevent the
offense or annoyance one may experience from being exposed to the lewd conduct of others.
According to Fordyce, defining a place where others are present based on geography
in relation to others rather than visibility to others would better serve the legislative purpose
of the statute based on the Legislature’s use of the word “place” in the phrase “place where
others are present” in section 617.23, subdivision 1. Because the language of subdivision 1
focuses on the population of the physical location where the lewd conduct takes place
rather than on what others necessarily view, Fordyce argues that the Legislature’s intent in
passing the statute was to prevent lewd conduct in certain places. But in context, a statute
that seeks to remedy annoyance or offense caused by exposure to lewd conduct—that is,
by sight—must necessarily seek to reduce the risk that unwilling observers would
experience offense from viewing such lewd conduct. We think it more reasonable to
conclude that a statute seeking to remedy the negative impact of viewing lewd conduct also
13
has the object of reducing the risk that such conduct would be viewed, rather than reducing
the risk that lewd conduct will occur only in certain geographic locations. And Fordyce
offers no compelling reason to conclude that the geographic scope the Legislature
contemplated necessarily stops at the boundary of one’s private property. Under Fordyce’s
reading of the statute, because no other individual was physically in his backyard when he
engaged in lewd conduct, he was not in a place where others were present. This
interpretation is unreasonable when his yard was fully visible from the public alley abutting
his property and anyone present in the general vicinity could have viewed his conduct. We
decline to ascribe to the Legislature an intent to draw so arbitrary a line in construing a
statute that aims to protect those subjected to the lewd conduct of others from being
offended, annoyed, or fearful.
Consequently, the object to be attained by section 617.23, subdivision 1, weighs in
favor of interpreting the statute to encompass conduct that is reasonably capable of being
viewed.
3.
Next, we turn to the consequences of the parties’ interpretations. Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16(6). Fordyce argues that a broad interpretation of a place where others are present
would impermissibly expand the statute’s scope. In particular, because indecent exposure
is a general-intent crime rather than a specific-intent crime, Fordyce argues that defining a
place where others are present based on visibility would encompass lewd conduct in private
spaces, including the interior of homes, so long as someone happens to view the behavior,
even accidentally.
14
Fordyce’s fears are not likely to come to fruition. It is true that in State v. Jama, we
held that the offense of indecent exposure, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
617.23, subdivision 1(3), is a general-intent crime, not a specific-intent crime. 923 N.W.2d
632, 637 (Minn. 2019). Section 617.23, subdivision 1(3), however, does not require that
the defendant’s exposure occur “willfully and lewdly,” as required under subdivision 1(1),
the provision Fordyce was accused of violating. But even so, in Jama, we made clear that
the statute nonetheless “requires the State to prove that the openly lewd exposure was
volitional, as opposed to accidental.” 923 N.W.2d at 636. We also noted that factors related
to the “certainty of the observation,” such as “the nature and location of the exposure,”
were relevant to the determination of whether the conduct was volitional. Id. (emphasis
removed). As a result, an accidental exposure in one’s own home —or anywhere else—
would be insufficient to support a conviction for indecent exposure under Minnesota law.
Compare State v. Peery, 28 N.W.2d 851, 853–55 (Minn. 1947) (involving a naked
defendant who accidentally forgot to pull the shades to his dormitory window and reversing
his conviction for indecent exposure), and State v. Stevenson , 656 N.W.2d 235, 241 n.5
(Minn. 2003) (explaining that a person who swims nude in the Boundary Waters Canoe
Area would not be guilty of indecent exposure because the likelihood that the conduct
would be witnessed is small), with State v. Prince, 206 N.W.2d 660, 660 (Minn. 1973)
(affirming a conviction for indecent exposure when the defendant “stood completely naked
in the doorway of his home and attracted the attention of three passing high school girls by
saying, ‘Hi, girls’ ”).
15
To the contrary, defining “in any place where others are present” in section 617.23,
subdivision 1, based on strict geographical boundaries, as Fordyce encourages, would
allow volitional, openly visible lewd conduct under the indecent-exposure statute as long
as the conduct takes place within one’s own property lines, even if it causes annoyance and
offense to a great many passersby. We decline to construe the indecent-exposure statute’s
“place” requirement in a manner that would so thwart the clear legislative intent behind the
statute. Instead, the canons of statutory construction support a determination that, in
criminalizing willful, lewd conduct “in any place where others are present,” the Legislature
intended to prohibit lewd conduct that is reasonably capable of being viewed by others.
Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1.
We further note that this definition is consistent with our past construction of the
word “presence.” In Stevenson, we were tasked with determining the meaning of “in the
presence of a minor” under the statute for fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minnesota
Statutes section 609.3451, subdivision 1 (2000). 656 N.W.2d at 238. We concluded that
the phrase at issue meant “reasonably capable of being viewed by a minor ,” without
requiring physical proximity. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d at 239 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In Decker , we reached the same conclusion when considering whether the
defendant’s simultaneous online transmission of a nude photograph to a minor constituted
the willful and lewd exposure of his private parts “in the presence of a minor” under another
provision of the indecent-exposure statute, Minnesota Statutes section 617.23, subdivision
2(1). Decker , 916 N.W.2d at 387 & n.2 (concluding that the “presence” requirement is
ambiguous and that the phrase means “reasonably capable of being viewed”).
16
Additionally, the fact that the word “presence,” used as a noun in subdivision 2 of
the indecent-exposure statute, is merely a different syntactical form of the word “present”
at issue here, used as an adjective in subdivision 1, suggests that the same meaning should
apply to the two words. See State v. Schmid, 859 N.W.2d 816, 820–21 (Minn. 2015)
(declining to provide two different definitions for “take” and “taking” when “the difference
is not definitional, but syntactical”); Wilbur v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 892 N.W.2d
521, 524 (Minn. 2017) (holding that the same word used in different subdivisions of the
same statute must be given the same meaning). 6 Bolstering our conclusion is the fact that
the relevant dictionary definitions of “presence” are almost identical to those given for
“present.” See Webster’ s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
Unabridged 1793 (2002) (defining “presence” as “the state of being in front of or in the
same place as someone or something” or “the condition of being within sight or call” and
“present” as “being before, beside, with, or in the same place as someone or something,”

6 Fordyce argues that the logic of Schmid does not apply because “present” and
“presence” are not different tenses of the same verb as were the words at issue in Schmid,
and the overall phrasing of the two subdivisions of the indecent-exposure statute is different.
Compare Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1 (“in any place where others are present”), with Minn.
Stat. § 617.23, subd. 2(1) (“in the presence of a minor”). We decline to read Schmid so
narrowly. Schmid does not require that words derive from the same verb or that they be
different forms of the same verb to be given the same meaning. See 859 N.W.2d at 821. If
a word differs in syntactical form, the phrasing incorporating that word must necessarily
be different, as that word then takes on a different grammatical role in the sentence or
clause. Consequently, it does not necessarily offend the logic of Schmid to ascribe the same
definition to two different forms of the same word when the sentences are phrased
differently because the different grammatical role of each word naturally requires some
difference in phrasing.

17
“being within reach, sight, or call or within contemplated limits,” or “being in view or at
hand”).
* * *
In sum, we hold that the meaning of “in any place where others are present” in
section 617.23, subdivision 1, is ambiguous. Applying the relevant canons of statutory
construction, we conclude that in criminalizing certain lewd conduct “in any place where
others are present,” the Legislature intended to prohibit lewd behavior that is reasonably
capable of being viewed by others, in light of the totality of the circumstances.7
II.
Next, we apply the meaning of section 617.23, subdivision 1, to the facts here to
determine whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Fordyce’s conviction
for indecent exposure. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to convict in a
given case, we must “determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from
them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We view the evidence “in the light most favorable to

7 Although we reject Fordyce’s argument that the phrase “in any place where others
are present” in section 617.23, subdivision 1, is defined by geographic scope, we do not
hold that any location in which one might be viewed by others is sufficient under the statute.
Rather, a case-by-case anal ysis of the totality of the circumstances is required of
considerations such as distance from populated locations, whether observation itself would
require some invasion of privacy (such as peering into someone’s window or looking over
a fence), and other facts that would assist a jury in determining whether a person’s lewd
conduct was reasonably capable of being viewed by others.

18
the verdict,” and “[t]he verdict will not be overturned if the fact-finder . . . could reasonably
have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
The sole issue here is whether the State proved that Fordyce engaged in willful,
lewd conduct “in any place where others are present” because he was reasonably capable
of being viewed by others. The evidence presented at trial supports a conclusion that
Fordyce exposed his private parts in a place where he was reasonably capable of being
viewed by others. 8 The trial evidence further showed that Fordyce’s backyard was not
completely enclosed; rather, the evidence showed that Fordyce’s neighborhood consisted
of small, residential lots, and Fordyce’s backyard faced a public alley with houses on the
other side such that there is a clear view from at least one of those houses into Fordyce’s
backyard, unobstructed by a fence or other barrier . According to the testimony and
photographic evidence produced at trial, one of Fordyce’s neighbors, B.T., was in fact able
to see Fordyce standing naked from her enclosed porch. Consequently, we hold that, under
the totality of the circumstances here, the evidence supports the conclusion that Fordyce’s
exposure occurred in a “place where others are present” because he was reasonably capable
of being viewed—and was in fact viewed —at that location by others.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.

8 It should be noted that Fordyce did not seek review on the question of whether the
evidence was sufficient to conclude that he willfully and lewdly exposed his private parts,
and we therefore do not review the sufficiency of the evidence as to that prong of the
indecent-exposure statute.