State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1629

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David Lee Williams, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed September 12, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-CR-19-1416

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Philip K. Miller, Benton County Attorney, Kathleen L. Reuter, Assistant County Attorney,
Foley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for second-degree unintentional
murder, appellant challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an upward departure that unfairly exaggerates the criminality of his
2
conduct. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward
departure, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant David Lee Williams
Jr. with second -degree intentional murder and second -degree unintentional murder. The
complaint stated that on July 27 at around 2:55 a.m., the Sauk Rapids Police Department
responded to 911 for a medical emergency. At the scene, the officers found Williams next
to an unconscious female who was not breathing. The officers identified the female as
Williams’ partner, 30 -year-old C.B. The officers knelt near C.B. and observed that the
floor was wet. The officers also saw multiple large bruises on C.B., red and purple marks
on her entire body, two black eyes that were swollen shut, and blood around her nose. The
officers found red marks on the wall which appeared to be dried blood. The officers
reported that C.B. was cold to the touch and believed her to be i n a “state of rigor” when
they arrived. The officers attempted life -saving measures, but could not revive C.B.
Williams later admitted that the assault occurred hours earlier, but that he did not
immediately call for medical assistance.
The state filed a notice of intent to seek an aggravated sentence because the victim
was particularly vulnerable and Williams treated the victim with particular cruelty. The
state later withdrew its notice of intent to seek an aggravated sentence based on
vulnerability but moved forward asserting that Williams treated the victim with particular
cruelty. The parties reached a plea agreement; Williams waived his right to a jury trial and
pleaded guilty to second-degree unintentional felony murder. The presumptive sentencing
3
guidelines range for the offense was 128 to 180 months. Williams also waived his rights
under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and agreed to admit facts showing he
treated the victim with particular cruelty to support an aggravated upward departure. The
parties agreed to cap the amount of executed time at 270 months. At the plea hearing,
Williams testified that he caused the injuries to victim C.B., that he “hit her with gratuitous
violence inflicting pain,” and that he did not render aid immediately.
The Department of Corrections prepared and submitted a presentence investigation
report before the sentencing hearing. The report revealed that Williams ha d a criminal
history score of zero and therefore fell within the sentencing guidelines range of 128 to 180
months. But the report recommended that Williams be committed to the Commissioner of
Corrections for 270 months.
At the sente ncing hearing, the state argued that “substantial and compelling
circumstances . . . exist to support a sentencing outside of the range of the grid” including
the nature of the injuries sustained by the victim and Williams’ failure to promptly seek
medical attention. The state urged the district court to sentence Williams to 270 months,
arguing that Williams’ actions and the injuries to the victim were “egregiously cruel.” The
defense asked for a sentence of 180 months, arguing that Williams was “remorsef ul and
wants to make amends.”
Following arguments, the district court granted the motion for an upward departure
and sentenced Williams to the Commissioner of Corrections for 270 months. The district
court believed Williams to be remorseful but stated tha t the victim “was treated with very
unusual cruelty by [Williams].” This appeal follows.
4
DECISION
Williams argues that the 270 -month sentence imposed on him is excessive and
exaggerates the criminality of his conduct . He contends that we must reverse his sentence
and direct the district court to impose a sentence within the sentencing guidelines range of
128 to 180 months . Generally, a district court must impose a sentence within the
presumptive sentencing guidelines range unless there are “identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances” to warrant a departure from the guidelines. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2020). We “will not interfere with a district court’s discretion in
sentencing unless the s entence is disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates
the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 264 (Minn.
2014). “Substantial and compelling circumstances are those showing that the defendant ’s
conduct was significantly more . . . serious than that typically involved in the commission
of the offense in question.” State v. Edwards , 774 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2009) . We
review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Solberg,
882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). “A district court abuses its discretion when its reasons
for departure are legally impermissible and insufficient evidence in the record justifies the
departure.” Id.
Williams pleaded guilty to second -degree unintentional murder and admitted facts
that showed he treated the victim with particular cruelty to support an aggravated upward
departure. “[P]articular cruelty involves the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty of a
kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense in question.” Tucker v.
State, 799 N.W.2d 583, 586 (Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted) . Williams does not
5
challenge the district court’s finding that the victim was treated with particular cruelty, nor
does he deny that the district court was allowed to grant an upward departure under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines . Instead, he argues that his 270- month sentence is
excessive when compared to other second -degree murder convictions in Minne sota. He
also argues that the general lack of upward departures in second -degree murder cases
shows that offenders rarely receive sentences above those in the presumptive guideline
ranges.
Williams is correct that o ur review of sentencing decisions is “guided by past
sentences imposed on other offenders.” State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 715 (Minn.
2007) (quotation omitted). And we have the discretion to modify a sentence in the interests
of fairness and uniformity. State v. Vazquez, 330 N.W.2d 110, 112 (Minn. 1983).
But our review of the cases relied on by the parties 1 and other relevant caselaw
establishes that Williams’ sentence is not excessive or disproportionate to his offense . For
example, in State v. Trevino appellant killed his partner, hid her body, and filed a false
missing-person report. No. A14- 0252, 2015 WL 1401464, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 30,
2015), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 2015). The autopsy report showed evidence that the
victim had been smothere d. Id. After a nine-day jury trial, appellant was found guilty of
second-degree felony murder. Id. at *3. The state sought an upward departure from the
presumptive sentencing range of 128 to 180 months based on particular cruelty. Id. The

1 The parties cite both precedential and nonprecedential cases to support their arguments.
We recognize that nonprecedential cases are not binding authority, but that we may use
nonprecedential cases as persuasive authority in analyzing this case. Minn. R . Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
6
district co urt found that appellant treated the victim with particular cruelty because he
concealed the victim’s body and sentenced him to 330 months of imprisonment, an upward
departure of 150 months . Id. We concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the aggravated sentence because appellant acted with particular
cruelty. Id. at *9.
In State v. Traylor, appellant was convicted for an assault charge. 641 N.W.2d 335,
338 (Minn. App. 2002), rev.’d on other grounds , 656 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2003). T he
district court found that appellant exhibited particular cruelty when he stabbed the victim
and refused to allow her to seek medical attention for several hours. Id. at 342. The
presumptive term of imprisonment for the offense was 51 months, but the district court
imposed a sentence of 102 months, twice the guidelines sentence, based on the aggravating
circumstances. Id. We affirmed the upward departure, concluding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in imposing a double durational departure. Id.
In State v. Weaver, appellant was convicted of second -degree unintentional felony
murder. 796 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Minn. App. 2011) , rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011) .
Appellant had an argument with his wife and pushed her to the floor after becoming angry.
Id. Appellant’s wife appeared unresponsive and appellant could not find her pulse, so he
tried to burn down the house. Id. The presumptive sentence for second -degree
unintentional murder was 128 to 180 months . Id. at 566. The state requested an upward -
durational departure, and the district court granted the request, sentencing appellant to 225
months in prison. Id. We concluded that app ellant’s conduct was “significantly more
7
serious than that typically involved in a felony murder,” and thus determined that the
upward departure was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 576.
These cases, although highly fact specific, show that Williams’ 270-month sentence
is not an outlier. Williams pleaded guilty to second -degree unintentional murder and
agreed that he treated the victim with particular cruelty. Williams admitted that after
striking the victim many times, he did not render aid, and he waited about four hours before
calling for help. The district court found that the victim “was treated with very unusual
cruelty” and that “[e]ach injury on her body represents a separate blow or a separate assault
that [Williams] committed upon her, and her body is riddled with injury from head to toe.”
Although the presumptive sentencing range for his conviction is 128 to 180 months, the
district court granted an upward departure on the aggravating factor of particular cruelty.
This departure was legally permissible under the parties’ plea agreement and sufficient
evidence justifies the departure. The sentence is not an outlier compared to similar second-
degree murder cases with an aggravating factor of particular cruelty . T hus, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Williams to 270 months in prison.
Affirmed.