In re Petition for Reinstatement of Michelle MacDonald, a Minnesota Attorney,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-1636

Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam
Took no part, Chutich, Thissen, JJ.

In re Petition for Reinstatement of
Michelle MacDonald, a Minnesota Attorney, Filed: July 26, 2023
Registration No. 0182370. Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Michelle L. MacDonald, West Saint Paul, Minnesota, pro se.

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Binh T. Tuong, Deputy Director, Office of Lawyers
Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

Based on our independent review of the record, the panel’s conclusion that
petitioner has not undergone the requisite moral change for reinstatement to the practice of
law was not clearly erroneous.
Petition denied.

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O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.
On June 30, 2021, we issued an opinion indefinitely suspending petitioner Michelle
MacDonald from the practice of law in Minnesota. In December 2021, MacDonald filed
a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law. After a hearing, a panel of the Lawyers
Professional Responsibility Board unanimously recommended against reinstatement,
concluding that MacDonald failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she had
undergone the requisite moral change. The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional
Responsibility (Director) agrees with the panel. MacDonald contests the panel’s findings,
conclusions, and recommendation, and asserts that she should be reinstated.
Based on our independent review of the record, we hold that the findings and
conclusions of the panel are not clearly erroneous. Because MacDonald has failed to show
by clear and convincing evidence that she has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement
to the practice of law in Minnesota, we deny her petition for reinstatement.
FACTS
MacDonald was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 1987. She has a history
of discipline. MacDonald was admonished in 2012 for trust-account violations and failing
to cooperate with the Director’s investigation. In January 2018, we suspended MacDonald
for 60 days for violating several ethics rules in two matters, the most significant of which
involved her representation of a family law client, S.G. In re MacDonald (MacDonald I),
906 N.W.2d 238, 240 –43 (Minn. 2018). In MacDonald I, we determined MacDonald
failed to competently represent a client; made false statements about the integrity of a judge
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(the judge in the S.G. matter) with reckless disregard for the truth; improperly used
subpoenas; knowingly disobeyed a court rule and failed to follow a scheduling order; and
engaged in disruptive courtroom conduct in the S.G. matter , including behavior resulting
in her arrest. 906 N.W.2d at 239– 43. We also concluded that MacDonald’s legal
experience was an aggravating factor as well as her “lack of remorse, lack of insight, and
blaming of others.” Id. at 248–49. In March 2018, we reinstated MacDonald and placed
her on probation for 2 years.
In June 2021, we suspended MacDonald for a second time. In re MacDonald
(MacDonald II), 962 N.W.2d 451, 470 (Minn. 2021). This suspension was based, in part,
on an October 3, 2018, radio interview about MacDonald ’s candidacy for the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which MacDonald gave while she was on probation. Id. at 458. During
the interview, MacDonald discussed S.G.’s case and made statements about the judge
overseeing that dispute. Id. at 458–59. We determined that MacDonald violated Minn. R.
Prof. Conduct 8.2(a) and 8.4(d) for “knowingly making false statements about the integrity
of a judge” during her interview, and we also found that MacDonald, in another matter
during her probation, failed to comply with the requirements of a fee-sharing
representation, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(e)(2). MacDonald II,
962 N.W.2d at 460– 61, 466. We agreed with the referee that MacDonald’s disciplinary
history, probation status, and legal experience were aggravating factors. Id. at 467–68.
Because “the record unequivocally establishe[d] that MacDonald ha[d] not expressed
remorse and ha[d] sought only to justify her conduct,” we concluded that MacDonald’s
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lack of remorse was also an aggravating factor. Id. at 468. We indefinitely suspended
MacDonald, with no right to petition for reinstatement for 4 months. Id. at 470.
During MacDonald’s 2021 suspension, and after she filed her current petition for
reinstatement, the Director admonished MacDonald for violating Minn. R. Prof. Conduct
3.1, 4.4(a), and 8.4(a). MacDonald’s misconduct surrounding the admonishment stemmed
from a family law matter in which MacDonald, during her probation, assisted one of the
parents in creating and serving notices that had no substantial purpose other than to harass,
intimidate, and burden the parties to whom the notices were served. MacDonald did not
contest the admonition.
MacDonald filed her petition for reinstatement in December 2021. The panel
conducted a 3-day hearing. At the hearing, MacDonald presented the testimony of seven
witnesses and testified on her own behalf. Testimony from MacDonald and her witnesses
included descriptions of an encounter between MacDonald and the judge in the S.G. matter,
in November 2018, that resulted in their participation in a prayer circle. The Director called
the judge to testify, who also described the prayer circle.
In October 2022, the panel issued its findings, conclusions, and recommendation.
The panel concluded MacDonald “failed to demonstrate through her actions or testimony,
or through the testimony of others, the requisite moral change” and thus recommended
denial of MacDonald’s petition. MacDonald ordered a hearing transcript and now asks us
to reinstate her.

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ANALYSIS
We have the sole responsibility for determining whether an attorney should be
reinstated to the practice of law in Minnesota. In re Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d 868, 870
(Minn. 1999). In evaluating whether to reinstate an attorney, we “conduct an independent
review of the entire record; although we consider a panel’s recommendation, we are not
bound by it.” In re Tigue, 960 N.W.2d 694, 699 (Minn. 2021 ). If the attorney orders a
transcript, as MacDonald did here, we will uphold the panel’s factual findings if the
findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. In re Stockman ,
896 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 2017). Factual findings are clearly erroneous if we are left
with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Tigue, 960 N.W.2d
at 699 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To be reinstated, the attorney must prove: “(1) compliance with the conditions of
suspension, (2) compliance with the requirements of Rule 18, RLPR, and
(3) demonstration of a moral change.”
1 Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 856 (citations omitted).
We also recently held that an attorney must prove intellectual competence to practice law

1 In addition to reinstatement requirements, we weigh other factors in considering
whether to reinstate a lawyer, including the attorney’s recognition that the conduct was
wrong, the seriousness of the misconduct, any physical or mental pressures susceptible to
correction, and the length of time since the misconduct and suspension. Stockman,
896 N.W.2d at 856. Because moral change is dispositive here, we need not address these
other factors.
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to be reinstated. In re Mose, __ N.W.2d __, 2023 WL 4479642, at *7 (Minn. July 12,
2023). Here, only the requirement to demonstrate moral change is at issue.
“Showing a moral change is the most important factor in the determination of
whether to reinstate an attorney.” Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 857. An attorney must prove
“by clear and convincing evidence that [she] has ‘undergone such a moral change as now
to render [her] a fit person to enjoy the public confidence and trust once forfeited.’ ” In re
Swanson, 343 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. 1984) (quoting In re Smith, 19 N.W.2d 324, 326
(Minn. 1945)). To establish a moral change, “a lawyer must show remorse and acceptance
of responsibility for the misconduct, a change in the lawyer’s conduct and state of mind
that corrects the underlying misconduct that led to the suspension, and a renewed
commitment to the ethical practice of law.” In re Mose, 843 N.W.2d 570, 575
(Minn. 2014). “Evidence of moral change must come from an observed record of
appropriate conduct and the petitioner’s state of mind and values.” In re Lieber,
834 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Minn. 2013).
Here, the panel made numerous determinations in evaluating MacDonald’s alleged
remorse and acceptance of responsibility for her misconduct, her change in conduct and
state of mind, and her renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law. Although
MacDonald testified that she was remorseful and sorry for her misconduct , the panel
ultimately found that MacDonald failed to demonstrate the requisite remorse . The panel
determined that MacDonald minimized the seriousness of her misconduct, neglected to
acknowledge her misconduct, and was unable to show—through her own words or through
the testimony of others—any recognition of the harm she caused by her misconduct. The
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panel found that MacDonald “was unable to describe her understanding of the root cause
of the misconduct, other than to place blame on the circumstances she was in when the
misconduct occurred.” Likewise, although MacDonald presented testimony from seven
other people, the panel found that “none of petitioner’s witnesses were able to point to any
specific examples of petitioner’s show of remorse outside of the prayer circle, other than
her general statements to them that she felt remorse.” Ultimately, the panel concluded that
MacDonald did not meet her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she
has undergone the requisite moral change to render her fit to resume the practice of law.
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MacDonald primarily emphasizes the specific details of, and inferences from, the
testimony of her and her witnesses before the panel. The panel did not find MacDonald or
her witnesses’ testimony on remorse credible, and “[w]e generally defer to the panel’s
findings that the petitioner’s testimony regarding moral change was not credible.” Tigue,
960 N.W.2d at 701. Here, the record supports the panel’s finding s that MacDonald and

2 MacDonald argues the panel misstated the factors and applied the wrong burden of
proof by requiring her to prove by clear and convincing evidence each of the three factors
considered when evaluating moral change. We reject MacDonald ’s interpretation of the
panel’s decision; the panel appropriately considered the three factors relevant to a moral
change analysis and ultimately concluded she failed to meet her burden of proof. And we
need not decide if the clear and convincing burden of proof applies to each of the three
factors or applies only to the overarching issue of whether an attorney has proven moral
change. Even if the panel misapplied the burden of proof to a particular factor, our
independent review assures us that MacDonald failed to prove “by clear and convincing
evidence that [she] has ‘undergone such a moral change as now to render [her] a fit person
to enjoy the public confidence and trust once forfeited.’ ” Swanson, 343 N.W.2d at 664
(quoting Smith, 19 N.W.2d at 326).

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her witnesses lacked credibility on the issue of remorse.3 We therefore defer to the panel’s
credibility determinations and its findings. In re Mose, 754 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2008)
(deferring to the panel’s credibility determination); In re Griffith, 883 N.W.2d 798, 802
(Minn. 2016) (same).
To demonstrate her remorse, MacDonald primarily relied on her interaction with
the judge from the S.G. matter in November 2018—over 2 years before her 2021
suspension. The encounter occurred at a Rotary event when MacDonald and her friend
approached the judge and asked him if he would pray with them. The panel found that
“[n]one of the witnesses recalled what was specifically stated in the prayer circle, but a
general request for forgiveness was made and accepted by both parties.”
The record supports the panel’s finding that evidence of the prayer circle did not
demonstrate MacDonald’s remorse for her misconduct during the 2018 radio interview.
MacDonald’s friend testified that MacDonald “didn’t state any details at that time of, like,
what was the apology for,” but she apologized “basically for the past.” The judge
acknowledged the interaction but testified that MacDonald did not mention the harm she
caused the judge or the public, nor did she mention the 2018 radio interview. Moreover,
because MacDonald testified that she did not recognize that her radio interview was

3 MacDonald argues the panel adopted its findings verbatim from the Director’s
proposed findings of f act, conclusions of law , and recommendations and thus we should
apply “strict scrutiny” to the findings of the panel. According to MacDonald, adopting the
Director’s proposal verbatim “indicates that the panel did not review and analyze the facts
independently.” But MacDonald concedes that the panel added two findings to its decision
that were not included in the Director’s proposal. Thus, we need not address whether a
more rigorous review is required as the panel did not adopt verbatim the Director’s entire
proposal.
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improper until our decision in 2021, any conduct that predated this awareness, such as the
prayer circle, does not demonstrate remorse for the radio interview misconduct. Based on
our independent review of the record, we conclude that the panel’s finding that MacDonald
did not show remorse and acceptance of responsibility for her misconduct is not clearly
erroneous.
Without the prayer circle, MacDonald has little evidence of specific examples
showing her moral change. See In re Sand, 951 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 2020) (stating
that “evidence of this moral change must come . . . from an observed record of appropriate
conduct” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) ); Griffith, 883 N.W.2d at
802 (holding that the panel did not clearly err by giving “little or no weight” to the
testimony of a petitioner’s witnesses when the witnesses did not provide “specific
examples” of how the petitioner had demonstrated moral change). The panel also made
numerous findings about whether MacDonald has changed her conduct and state of mind
to correct the underlying misconduct that led to her suspension, and whether she has
demonstrated a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law. Again, the panel found
the testimony of MacDonald and her witnesses to be unpersuasive, and there is no reason
to depart from the panel’s findings, which are supported by the record.
4 We are also
particularly concerned about MacDonald’s renewed commitment to the ethical practice of

4 We do not consider the professional status of MacDonald’s law firm, or any alleged
misconduct in its operations or annual report submissions, in our decision here. Although
the panel noted concern regarding potential additional misconduct since her suspension,
we do not need to decide whether the panel clearly erred in making those determinations
because we do not rely on that evidence in reaching the conclusion that MacDonald has
not demonstrated the requisite moral change.
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law given that she was admonished after filing her petition for reinstatement for assisting
an individual in serving frivolous notices upon third parties and she was previously
suspended for similar misconduct. See In re Singer, 735 N.W.2d 698, 705 (Minn. 2007)
(concluding that the lawyer’s conduct after filing his petition for reinstatement, which
demonstrated a pattern of mismanagement of his personal finances when the lawyer was
suspended for financial misconduct and failure to keep trust account books and records,
“hinder[ed] his ability” to prove that he was “morally fit for the practice of law”).
In summary, b ased on our independent review of the record, we hold that
MacDonald has not met her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she
has undergone a moral change. Accordingly, we deny her petition for reinstatement.
Petition denied.
CHUTICH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
THISSEN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.