State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1643

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Adrian Dominque Bell,
Appellant.

Filed September 12, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Kirk, Judge*

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-20-2652

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant
County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for first-degree assault,
appellant argues that he must be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because the record
does not establish that the plea was voluntary and intelligent. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
This matter involves appellant Adrian Dominique Bell’s plea of guilty to one count
of first-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 2(a) (2018). According to the
criminal complaint—in June 2020—while Bell was an inmate at the Minnesota
Correctional Facility in Stillwater serving a sentence for attempted first-degree murder,
Bell stabbed a correctional officer (CO) with a self-made weapon (referred to as a “shank”
or “shiv”) in the lower right torso and also struck the CO multiple times. Bell was
subsequently charged with first-degree assault. Because Bell committed the assault against
a “correctional employee,” this offense carried a minimum sentence of at least ten years.
Id., subd. 2(b) (2018).
A hearing originally scheduled as a pretrial hearing was held electronically via
Zoom in May 2021. At the hearing, Bell indicated his desire to plead guilty. Bell’s attorney
explained that he “went through [Bell’s] rights” with him and stated Bell was pleading
guilty “despite [his] advice” to the contrary. Bell’s attorney indicated that he had advised
Bell that (1) the sentence would be presumptively consecutive to his existing attempted-
murder sentence, and (2) there would be a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months.
Bell’s attorney noted that he therefore advised Bell that the only “viable option” for getting
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a lower sentence would be “for him to have a trial where [he] would make a motion for a
lesser-included offense.” The district court added, “Mr. Bell, I’m not going to talk you out
of it, but, you know, [your attorney] has given you very good advice here . . . . [T]he only
way you could mitigate your outcomes here is to have a trial and convince a jury of that.
But that’s up to you.” Despite this advice, Bell indicated that he wanted to plead guilty,
and he did so.
The district court then asked Bell’s attorney to “go over [Bell’s] constitutional
rights.” Bell’s attorney inquired into the following facts and issues:
• “I read to you that you [would] be committed to the prison for
not less than ten years but not more than 20” by pleading guilty;
• “I told you under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines grid
and under the statute, you would not be facing a mandatory
minimum of 120 months, if we were successful at trial in
getting a jury to find you guilty of either Assault II or Assault
III, but not Assault I”;
• “I advised you not to plead guilty today”;
• “The only mechanism that I legally saw viable for us to get you
out from under that 120-month mandatory minimum was a jury
trial, or a court trial, with a lesser included”;
• “Your scheduled release date had been extended because of
this offense”; and
• “I’ve now shown you a couple of times surveillance video from
the prison . . . . You raised some concern, or you said out of the
video that you received that you didn’t believe that was you [in
the video] . . . . But you also indicated that you did, in fact,
admit that you had a shiv, or a self-made weapon, and you did,
in fact, attack a prison guard.”

Bell acknowledged and agreed to all these statements. He also indicated that he had agreed
to allow his attorney to electronically sign a plea petition for him and that he had decided
to plead guilty “freely and voluntarily” despite his attorney’s advice to the contrary. These
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were all of the rights inquired into during Be ll’s plea colloquy. Bell’s attorney indicated
that he would file a written plea petition after the hearing, but no such petition was ever
submitted.
Bell then provided a factual basis for the plea, agreeing that in June 2020 he had
assaulted with a shiv a CO who was performing his duties as a CO. He acknowledged that
a reasonable person would have understood that doing so would create “a substantial risk
of death or great bodily harm.” The court accepted this factual basis, deferred acceptance
of Bell’s guilty plea, ordered a pre-sentence investigation, and scheduled a sentencing
hearing. Bell was ultimately convicted and sentenced to the mandatory ten-year minimum
sentence. This appeal follows.
DECISION
On appeal, Bell argues that the record fails to establish that his guilty plea was
intelligent and voluntary and that he must therefore be permitted to withdraw his plea. A
defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing. State v. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But withdrawal must be permitted if “necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” Id. at 94 (quotation omitted). “A manifest injustice exists if a
guilty plea is not valid. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Id. “The
intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges against him, the
rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Id. at 96.
In support of his argument, Bell relies on Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, which sets forth
rights which must be inquired into prior to acceptance of a guilty plea. Specifically, rule
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15.01 states that “[b]efore the judge accepts a guilty plea, the defendant must be sworn and
questioned by the judge with the assistance of counsel as to [certain rights].” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1. Citing this requirement, Bell points to the district court’s failure to
inquire into (1) whether Bell “was satisfied that defense counsel was fully informed of the
case or that defense counsel was representing his interests ,” see id., subd. 1(4)(b);
(2) whether Bell “was being threatened by another person or given promises to induce a
guilty plea,” see id., subd. 1(4)(c); (3) whether Bell “was under the influence of drugs or
intoxicating liquor, whether he suffers from a mental disability, or whether he is
undergoing medical or psychiatric treatm ent.” See id., subd. 1(5); and (4) whether Bell
understood his various trial rights, such as the right to a jury trial, presumption of
innocence, the beyond -a-reasonable-doubt requirement, and the right to question and
present witnesses, see id., subd. 1(6). Looking at the transcript of Bell’s plea, it is clear that
none of these rights were mentioned during Bell’s colloquy, even in passing.
Bell acknowledges that “failure to interrogate a defendant as set forth in rule 15.01
or to fully inform him of all constitutional rights does not invalidate a guilty plea.” State v.
Doughman, 340 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. App. 1983), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1984).
Rather, “[w]hat is important is not the order or the wording of the questions, but whether
the record is adequate to establish that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily given.” Id.
For example, in Doughman, we determined that the plea colloquy was “substantial, if not
precisely that prescribed by [rule] 15.01,” where the state explicitly questioned the
defendant regarding the trial rights Bell identifies here, including the right to a jury trial,
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the right to call and examine witnesses, and the presumption of innocence. Id. Thus, the
failure to “precisely” follow rule 15.01 was not fatal. Id. at 351-53.
Conversely, there was no such questioning here. Although Bell’s attorney placed
special emphasis on Bell’s decision to plead guilty despite the mandatory minimum
sentence and against his counsel’s advice, he was still required to undergo the usual rule
15.01 inquiry into the intelligence of the plea itself. Such an inquiry simply did not happen,
as evidenced by the transcript of Bell’s colloquy.
The state correctly notes that a defendant’s prior criminal history, including a history
of prior guilty pleas, can supplement the record on this issue. See id. at 353 (“[A]ppellant’s
criminal history makes it unlikely that he was unaware of the consequences of a guilty
plea.”); see also State v. Wiley, 420 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Minn. App. 1988) (“[W]ith five
criminal history points, [the defendant] has had extensive exposure to the criminal justice
system, a factor which may be considered in determining whether a guilty plea is knowing
and intelligent.”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 1988). However, as in Doughman, in Wiley
there was substantial other information in the record which supported a finding of
intelligence. 420 N.W.2d at 237-38. In Wiley, in addition to the defendant’s prior criminal
history, the defendant submitted numerous “pre-plea submissions to the court” which were
found to “reveal a knowledge of many of the rights subject to rule 15.01.” Id. at 237. In
Doughman, as noted above, the defendant was asked “substantial” questions regarding his
various constitutional rights which largely tracked the requirements of rule 15.01. 340
N.W.2d at 351.
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The record here is comparatively bereft of information relating to Bell’s
understanding of his constitutional rights. While it is true that Bell affirmed that he went
over a plea petition with his attorney, it is unknown what that petition contained and
whether it actually informed Bell of the relevant rights or whether it was—like his plea
colloquy— deficient. And while it is true that Bell has a prior criminal history, the state
cites to no caselaw indicating that prior criminal history alone is sufficient to create a
presumption that the defendant understands his constitutional rights. See id.; Wiley, 420
N.W.2d at 235. Here, the only evidence in the record suggesting that Bell understood the
rights contained in rule 15.01 are (1) his prior criminal history and (2) the plea petition he
went over with his attorney, the contents of which are unknown. The amount of relevant
evidence in both Doughman and Wiley was far more substantial, and the state cites to no
case in which a plea was found to be intelligent with this little evidence. The state is correct
in arguing that, “had the petition been filed, as counsel said it would be, the record would
be clearer,” but the petition was not filed.
In sum, despite the state’s arguments to the contrary, the record, including Bell’s
clearly deficient plea colloquy, fails to establish that Bell understood the rights he was
waiving as a result of his guilty plea.
1 Therefore, withdrawal of Bell’s guilty plea is
necessary to avoid a manifest injustice, Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 , and we reverse and
remand to the district court for Bell to be allowed to do so. Should Bell persist in his desire
to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court will not be limited by the ten-year sentence

1 Because we reverse and remand on this ground, we need not reach Bell’s argument that
his guilty plea was not voluntary.
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imposed in 2021. If he is eventually convicted of assault in the first degree, he will face a
presumptive consecutive sentence of ten to 20 years’ confinement.
Reversed and remanded.