John Lo, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1650

John Lo,
Relator,

vs.

Pye-Barker Fire & Safety LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 27, 2022
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 46477395-3

John Lo, Isanti, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Pye-Barker Fire & Safety LLC, Alpharetta, GA (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Pro se relator challenges the decision of an unemployment law judge (ULJ) that he
was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he quit his job without good reason
caused by respondent-employer. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Pye -Barker Fire & Safety LLC (Pye -Barker) provides fire and life
safety equipment and services such as fire alarms, fire suppression systems, and fire
extinguishers. Relator John Lo began working for Pye-Barker’s predecessor, Nardini Fire,
as a fire alarm technician, but later moved to the shop where he serviced fire extinguishers
by removing chemical powders from the extinguishers. Pye -Barker provided safety
glasses, dust masks, and gloves to the shop technicians, and required them to be worn in
order to prevent exposure to the chemicals. Pye -Barker also recently remodeled the shop
room to improve ventilation by installing a utility fan.
Lo quit his job at Pye -Barker, claiming that the shop was not properly ventilated,
which resulted in too much exposure to the chemical associated with the fire extinguishers.
Lo subsequently established a benefit account with respondent Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (department), and a department administrative
clerk issued a determination of eligibility, which concluded that Lo quit for a good reason
caused by the employer. Pye -Barker appealed that decision and, following a de novo
hearing, the ULJ determined that the “work conditions were not a reason which would
compel a reasonable employee to quit and become unemployed” because the
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“preponderance of the evidence shows that [Pye -Barker] provided personal protective
equipment to minimize exposure,” and “took steps to improve ventilation.” The ULJ also
found that Lo never complained about the conditions to his employer. Thus, the ULJ
concluded that Lo was not eligible for unemployment benefits.
Lo requested reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed his decision. This certiorari
appeal follows.
DECISION
Lo challenges the ULJ’s decision that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits
because he quit without good reason caused by his employer. “A quit from employment
occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at the time the employment ended,
the employee’s.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (2020) . “An applicant who quit[s]
employment is ineligible for all unemployment benefits” unl ess he or she qualifies under
one of the enumerated exceptions to ineligibility. Id., subd. 1 (2020).
One exception to ineligibility for unemployment benefits is if an applicant quit
employment because of a good reason caused by the employer. Id., subd. 1(1). “What
constitutes good reason caused by the employer is defined exclusively by statute.” Rootes
v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn. App. 2003). A good reason caused
by the employer is “a reason: (1) that is directly related to t he employment and for which
the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker; and (3) that would compel
an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remaining in
the employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2020). “If an applicant was subjected
to adverse working conditions by the employer, the applicant must complain to the
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employer and give the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working
conditions before that may be a good reason caus ed by the employer for quitting. ” Id.,
subd. 3(c) (2020).
“In unemployment benefits cases, we review the ULJ ’s findings of fact in the light
most favorable to the decision and will not disturb those findings as long as there is
evidence in the record that reasonably tends to sustain them.” Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr.,
Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Whether the applicant falls
under an exception to ineligibility for quitting employment is a question of law, which is
reviewed de novo. Peppi v. Phyllis Weatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App.
2000); Rowan v. Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. App. 2012).
Lo argues that the ULJ erred in concluding that he quit his employment without
good reason caused by his employer because he quit his job “due to the excessive amount
of chemical powder lingering in the room [he] worked in.” To support his position, Lo
cites Pahl-Jones v. ASI Sign Sys., in which this court determined that the employee quit her
employment for good reason caused by her employer because “exposure to . . .
polyurethane paint caused her to have chest pain and headaches.” No. C2 -01-1245, 2002
WL 4556, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 2, 2002). But Pahl-Jones is a nonprecedential opinion
that has li mited value in deciding an appeal. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)
(“Nonprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding authority . . . .”). Moreover,
in Pahl-Jones, the employee complained to her employer about the chemical exposure and
the employer would not allow the employee to use recently purchased safety equipment.
Id. at *3. Here, the ULJ found that Lo never complained to his employer about the working
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conditions. This finding is supported by Pye -Barker’s branch manager’s test imony.
Although Lo testified that he complained to his employer about his concern related to the
ventilation, the ULJ specifically found that the branch manager’s testimony “was credible
because it was logical and plausible,” and we defer to this credibil ity determination. See
Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006). Therefore, because
the ULJ found credible the branch manager’s testimony that Lo did not complain to his
employer, we will not disturb the ULJ’s finding that Lo fail ed to give Pye -Barker a
reasonable opportunity to correct any alleged adverse working condition as required by
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c).
There is also no evidence that the conditions of Lo’s employment were so adverse
as to compel an average, reas onable employee to quit. Although the branch manager
acknowledged that “exposure to large amounts” of the chemical powders contained in the
fire-safety equipment can “cause some irritation,” he testified: “that’s why we require our
employees to wear safe ty glasses.” And the branch manager testified that Pye -Barker
provides other safety equipment “like masks and gloves . . . to keep the agent off the skin
and out of the lungs.”
Lo argues that the masks provided by Pye -Barker were inadequate because the y
“were no different than the disposable one -time use COVID mask which is not N95 or
N100, which failed to protect my lungs from the chemical powders.” But the branch
manager testified that they provide “3M . . . masks that are . . ., they’re like dust ma sks.”
The branch manager also testified that the shop was recently “remodeled . . . to make it
larger” and a new utility fan was installed to improve ventilation. And according to the
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branch manager, the shop room met regulatory standards because “OSHA a nd DOT” had
been in the facility “several times” and “nobody’s mentioned anything about the room or
the fan.” Accordingly, we conclude that, because there is no evidence that the conditions
of Lo’s employment were so adverse as to compel an average reasonable employee to quit,
and because there is substantial evidence to support the ULJ’s finding that Lo failed to
inform his employer about his safety concerns, the ULJ did not err in determining that Lo
was not eligible for unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.