Tywan Rulford, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1659

Tywan Rulford, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 18, 2022
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-23182

Tywan Rulford, Faribault, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief. We affirm.
2
FACTS
In 2019, appellant Tywan Rulford filed a direct appeal of his conviction for unlawful
possession of ammunition. See State v. Rulford, No. A19-1483, 2021 WL 21501, at *1
(Minn. App. Jan. 4, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2021). Rulford was represented by
the Office of the Minnesota Appellate Public Defender (OMAPD). His attorney argued
that the district court erred by failing to provide a unanimity jury instruction. Id. Rulford
filed a pro se supplemental brief, claiming that: (1) the search warrant was not supported
by probable cause, (2) his trial attorney was ineffective, and (3) the state violated his rights
under the compulsory process clause. Id. at *3. This court affirmed Rulford’s conviction
but determined that the record was insufficient to resolve Rulford’s ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim. Id. at *3-4. This court stated that Rulford could pursue his ineffective-
assistance claim in a postconviction petition. Id. at *4.
In May 2021, Rulford filed a petition for postconviction relief. Rulford renewed
issues addressed on direct appeal, including: (1) probable cause, (2) the confrontation
clause, (3) due process, (4) failure to disclose evidence, (5) the compulsory process clause,
and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. Along with his petition, Rulford included a
statement from S.C. in which she claimed that the ammunition that Rulford was found
guilty of possessing belonged to her. OMAPD declined to represent Rulford in the
postconviction matter because it had provided representation in his direct appeal.
The district court concluded that all but one of Rulford’s claims were procedurally
barred. The district court granted Rulford an evidentiary hearing on that sole issue—
whether Rulford’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call S.C. as a witness.
3
At the evidentiary hearing, Rulford’s trial counsel testified that he included S.C.’s
name on his potential witness list. Counsel testified that he met with S.C. during the trial,
and she stated that items found during the search may have been her property. Counsel
testified that he was “left with the impression that . . . if called to testify [S.C. would] offer
an admission to certain evidence.” But counsel testified that he did not feel that S.C. “was
an asset” to Rulford’s defense because Rulford made a statement to police that he was
aware of at least one item of contraband that was recovered during the search—a clip with
bullets in it. Counsel believed that Rulford was the only witness who could overcome that
statement. He did not feel that S.C.’s testimony that she possessed items recovered would
be helpful when the jury instructions included joint and constructive possession. Counsel
stated that he believed that Rulford testified credibly at trial regarding his statement to
police and feared that S.C. could have testi fied inconsistently or revealed things not
controlled by the defense, which could have been damaging.
S.C. testified that she would have provided the following testimony at Rulford’s
trial: “I think that was September 2018 I do remember . . . putting casings, 9 millimeter
casings and a clip, a clip to the gun in the room that day. It was maybe like early September
maybe.” She continued: “The clip and the bullets, those are mine. I have a permit to
purchase, a permit to carry for them. I was staying there. That was my address at the time.
No one stayed in that room.” But on cross-examination, S.C. admitted that certain items
found during the search did not belong to her, that the room searched was Rulford’s room,
that she did not have proof that she lived at the home, and that the permit to purchase she
submitted was issued after the trial.
4
The district court denied Rulford’s petition for postconviction relief, concluding that
counsel’s decision to not call S.C. as a witness was a strategic decision. The district court
stated: “[T]here is little reason to believe that the result of the trial would have been
different had [S.C.] testified. It may have been worse.” This appeal followed.
DECISION
This court reviews the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion. Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2010). “A court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
In his postconviction petition, Rulford raised the following: (1) a probable-cause
issue, (2) a confrontation-clause issue, (3) a due-process issue, (4) failure to disclose
evidence, (5) a compulsory-process-clause issue, and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel.
On appeal, Rulford categorizes the probable-cause and due-process issues as “previously
appealed.” Although Rulford does not include the compulsory-process-clause issue in this
category, that issue was also raised on direct appeal. Rulford makes no argument regarding
his confrontation-clause and evidentiary issues, which are issues that could have been
raised on direct appeal. The district court correctly ruled that these issues are procedurally
barred. See State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (stating that petitioner is
not entitled to relief for claims raised on direct appeal or for claims not raised on direct
appeal, but that could have been raised on direct appeal).
Rulford’s remaining issue relates to the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Following
an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Rulford’s attorney was not
5
ineffective. When reviewing a district court’s denial of postconviction relief based on an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, this court considers the district court’s factual
findings that are supported in the record and reviews de novo the “legal implication of
those facts.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503-04 (Minn. 2013).
To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Rulford must establish
that his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Under this
prong, this court will not review conduct that “falls within trial strategy.” Andersen v.
State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2013). Rulford must then show that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. If the ineffective-
assistance claim fails under either prong, we do not need to address the other. Carridine
v. State, 867 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Minn. 2015).
Here, Rulford’s attorney explained his decision for not calling S.C. as a witness at
Rulford’s trial. The district court determined that Rulford’s attorney exercised legitimate
trial strategy. We agree. Counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective standard
of reasonableness because his choice of defense theory and decision on which witnesses to
call fell under trial strategy, which is not reviewed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim. See Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 13 (noting that trial strategy includes which witnesses
to call and extent of investigation into theories). Because Rulford has not shown that his
attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, we do not
need to address prejudice.
6
Rulford also argues an “added” ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim.
Rulford did not raise this claim below; thus, we decline to consider it. See Azure v. State,
700 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. 2005) (stating that petitioner may not raise issue for the first
time on appeal from the denial of postconviction relief).
Rulford lastly argues that his postconviction evidentiary hearing was not fair
because he did not receive notice of the hearing and he was not provided the assistance of
counsel. But Rulford had his two witnesses testify at the hearing. And Rulford was not
afforded counsel because OMAPD declined representation because they represented
Rulford on direct appeal. Rulford fails to show that his hearing was not fair.
Affirmed.