In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: K. M.-A. R.-L. and P. S. K., Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1660

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: K. M.-A. R.-L. and P. S. K., Commissioner
of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

Filed June 13, 2022
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-JV-20-3333

Jennifer M. Shabel, Grinde & Dicke Law Firm P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for appellants
T.E. and K.E.)

Mark D. Fiddler, Delmar Flynn, Fiddler Osband, LLC, Edina, Minnesota; and

Steven K. Murakami, Muraka mi Law Firm, LLC, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent
mother K. M.-A. R.-L.)

Mark Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Debra A. Groehle r, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Mi nnesota (for respondent Olmsted County Health, Housing, and
Human Services)

P.S.K., Rochester, Minnesota (pro se respondent father)

Nizhoni Smith, Morton, Minnesota (for respondent Penny Sche ffler, tribal representative
for Lower Sioux Indian Community)

Kim Ruckdaschel-Haley, Best & Flanagan LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
Lower Sioux Indian Community)

C.L. and S.L., Rochester, Minnesota (pro se respondent foster parents)

Karen Haugerud, Preston, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

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Considered and decided by Reilly, Presid ing Judge; Worke, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this juvenile-protection appeal, appellants challenge the district court’s denial of
their motion seeking adoptive pl acement of an Indian child and asserting that the county
was unreasonable in failing to make the reques ted adoptive placement. Appellants argue
that the district court erred by denying their motion without an evidentiary hearing and that,
in reaching its decision, the district court misapplied the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
and the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA) in two ways: (1) by failing to
recognize appellants as relatives of the child and failing to gi ve them preference as the
adoptive placement, and (2) by determining that there was good cause to deviate from the
adoptive placement preferences in ICWA and MIFPA. Becau se we conclude that the
district court did not misapply ICWA or MIFPA, and it did not otherwise abuse its
discretion when it denied appellants’ motion, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondents K.M.-A.R.-L. (mother) and P.S.K. (father) are the biological parents
of A.G.K. (the child), born in March 2019. Mother and father were never married to each
other, and father signed a reco gnition of parentage after the child was born. Mother has
four other children, none of whom reside with her. When the child was born, both mother
and the child tested positive fo r methamphetamine. The child stayed in the neonatal
intensive care unit after her birth because of feeding complications and respiratory distress.
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CHIPS Proceeding and Foster Care Placement
Respondent Olmsted County Health, Housing, and Human Services (the county)
received a report about the drug-test results fo r mother and the child. The county held a
rapid case-planning conference to identify a viable safety plan option that would allow the
child to be discharged from th e hospital into the care of fa mily members. Because the
parents could not identify a placement option that satisfied the county’s safety concerns,
mother signed a voluntary placement agreement, which allowed the child to be placed in
foster care. The child was discharged from the hospital on April 6, 2019, and placed in a
foster-care home.
Shortly afterward, the county learned that mother’s father (who is deceased) was a
member of the Lower Sioux In dian Community (Lower Sioux). Mother did not disclose
this information to the county at first because she did not want the tribe involved. Mother
is not a member of Lower Sioux. Father does not have any Native American heritage and
is not affiliated with a tribe. After learni ng about mother’s connection to Lower Sioux, a
county social worker contacte d the tribe to determine whethe r the child was eligible for
membership in Lower Sioux. The county also directed the parents to sign another
voluntary placement agreement in the presence of a judge to sa tisfy ICWA requirements.
Lower Sioux informed the county that the child was eligible for enrollment in the tribe “as
an adopted member by lineal descent.”
On May 6, 2019, the child was placed in her current foster home with C.L. and S.L.
(foster parents). Foster parents are non-Indian and are not relatives of the child. At the
time, Lower Sioux supported the child’s placement with foster parents. On May 30, 2019,
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the county filed a petition allegi ng that the child was in need of protection or services
(CHIPS). The district court found the parents in default after father failed to appear at a
July 2, 2019 hearing and mother left the co urtroom in the middle of the hearing. The
district court adjudicated the child in need of protection or services. Throughout these
proceedings, the county remained in contact with Lower Sioux and kept the tribe informed
about the child’s health and safety.
Appellants’ Initial Request for Adoptive Placement
While the CHIPS case was pending, the co unty searched for relatives who could
potentially serve as an alternative permanency option if the child could not be returned to
mother or father. In June 2019, the count y notified appellant T.E. that he had been
identified as a relative of the child. T.E. is related to father by marriage: T.E.’s sister was
married to a cousin of father. T.E. and father had known each other from a young age and
had had a close relationship for many years, but T.E. had distanced himself from father in
recent years when father began using drugs re gularly. T.E. is Cambodian, and his wife,
appellant K.E., is a member of Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians. According to
appellants, the concept of family “is more [fl uid] in Cambodian culture, which also holds
true with Native American culture.” The co unty informed T.E. th at, because he was a
relative of the child, he had the right to be considered a temporary foster placement for the
child and a possible permanency option. Ap pellants contacted the county and expressed
interest in being considered a placement.
The county held a family group conference in August 2019 to determine alternative
permanency options for the child. Mother’s family id entified foster parents as their
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preferred permanency option. Lower Sioux disa greed, stating that it preferred appellants
as a permanency option instead.
At a review hearing on September 24, 2019 , Lower Sioux requested that the child
be placed in appellants’ care. Mother objected and requeste d that the child remain with
foster parents. The child’s guardian ad lite m also expressed concer ns about moving the
child to a different placement. The district court directed the county to begin a transition
plan for the child to move in to appellants’ home. But a short time later, mother filed a
motion seeking to prevent the change of placement. Mother argued that ICWA and MIFPA
did not apply and that, even if they did, there wa s good cause to co ntinue the child’s
placement with foster parents based on mother’s preference.
After a hearing on mother’s motion, th e district court issued an order on
November 27, 2019, granting mother’s requested relief. The district court determined that
ICWA and MIFPA applied and that the child is considered an Indian child because she is
eligible for membership in Lower Sioux. Even so, the district court determined that mother
had proven by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to deviate from the
order of placement preferences. In determining that there was good cause, the district court
cited the facts that mother had requested that the court deviate from the order of placement
preferences and that the child had developed a strong bond with foster parents. As a result,
the district court ordered that the child remain with foster parents rather than be placed with
appellants. Foster parents later conveyed their interest in adopting the child.
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Termination of Parental Rights and Appellants’ Motion to Intervene
Seven months later, in June 2020, the county filed a petition to terminate the parental
rights of both mother and father (the TPR petition). The TPR petition sought termination
of mother’s parental rights based on her interest in consenting to adoption by foster parents,
and the petition sought to terminate father’s parental rights based on several grounds for
involuntary termination or voluntary termination with father’s written consent. The county
provided notice to Lower Sioux of the TPR petition.
In July 2020, appellants filed a motion to intervene in the TPR matter and requested
to be considered an adoptiv e placement for the child. Appellants asserted that their
intervention was in the child’s best interests because the child is an Indian child, appellants
are extended family members of the child , and Lower Sioux supported them as the
preferred placement for the child. The motion asked the district court to order the county
to take appropriate action regarding their request for consideration as an adoptive
placement.
In support of their motion, appellants s ubmitted a declaration from a member of
Lower Sioux, who offered a statement as a qualified expert witness under ICWA and
MIFPA. The qualified expert witness reaffirm ed Lower Sioux’s previous statement that
the child is an Indian child and eligible for enrollment in the tribe. The expert stated that,
under the “fluidity an d dynamic character of Indian extended families,” Lower Sioux
considered anyone “related by blood or marriage who maintains some form of significant
contact with the child” to be a family member to an Indian child. The expert opined,
“Given the significance and clos eness of [T.E.’s] relationship with [father] and [father’s]
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family, it is my expert opinion that [T.E.] and, consequently, his wife [K.E.] are relatives
of [the child] under . . . Lower Sioux’s laws and customs.”
The county opposed appellants’ motion to intervene and supported adoptive
placement by foster parents. Foster parents i ndicated that they had established a strong
connection with mother’s side of the family, and they regular ly brought the child to visit
her maternal relatives and half-siblings. Foster parents also stated that they were seeking
to learn about the child’s culture and heritage and that they intended to expose the child to
Lower Sioux’s cultural events, including the tribe’s annual powwow.
On August 28, 2020, mother signed a cons ent to adoption, which was executed in
writing before the district cour t. The consent to adoption st ated that mother wished for
foster parents to adopt the child and that mo ther believed this was in the child’s best
interests. On October 6, 2020, father si gned an affidavit to voluntarily terminate his
parental rights. The district court terminated the parental rights of mother and father in a
January 19, 2021 order. The district court also denied appellants’ motion to intervene. In
the TPR order, the district court noted that it had determined before that there was clear
and convincing evidence of good cause to modify the ICWA order of placement
preferences, and it concluded that “[g]ood ca use continues to exist to deviate from the
ICWA order of placement preference[s].”
After mother’s and father’s parental rights were terminat ed, the child remained in
foster parents’ care while the county continued adoption efforts. Foster parents specified
that they were willing to supp ort an ongoing relationship with father’s side of the family,
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including appellants. The guardian ad litem reported that the child was “thriving” in foster
parents’ care.
Appellants’ Post-Termination Motion for Adoptive Placement
Thirteen months after the county filed the TPR petition, on July 26, 2021, appellants
filed a motion under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subds. 5, 6 (2020), which again requested
permission to intervene in the proceedings and alleged that the county had been
unreasonable both in failing to consider appellants as relativ es of the child, and in not
identifying them as the preferred adoptive placement. The motion asked the district court
to take the following actions: (1) to explain why appellants were not “relatives” of the
child, (2) to explain the reas on for the county’s refusal to defer to Lower Sioux’s
determination about the suitability of appella nts’ home for adoptive placement, (3) to
reconsider the decision to depart from the order of placement preferences provided in
ICWA and MIFPA, and (4) to explain why an adoptive placement with appellants would
not meet the child’s best interests. Alternatively, appellants asked the district court to find
that appellants had made a prima facie showing that the county had been unreasonable by
refusing to consider them as the preferred a doptive placement, and they asked the district
court to set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Lowe r Sioux supported appellants’
motion.
The district court addressed appellants’ motion in a November 22, 2021 order. The
county did not object to appellants having pa rty status, and the district court granted
appellants’ motion to interven e. But the district court denied appellants’ remaining
requests, reaffirming its previous reasons for not granting appellants’ requests for adoptive
9
placement. The district court reasoned that there was good cause to deviate from the ICWA
and MIFPA placement preferences based on “the reasonable request of the mother that her
daughter remain in the care and custody of [foster parents],” as well as “the familial bond
[the child] has established with [foster parents].” In determining that mother’s request was
reasonable, the district court noted that moth er had signed a written voluntary consent to
the child’s adoption by foster parents. Fo r these reasons, the district court denied
appellants’ requests and reaffirmed the decision for adoption proceedings to proceed with
foster parents.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. ICWA and MIFPA govern the adoptive placement proceedings in this case.
Juvenile-protection proceedings are governed by chap ter 260C of the Minnesota
Statutes. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001-.637 (2020). When a juvenile-protection case
involves an “Indian child,” the proceedings are subject to additional requirements of ICWA
under federal law and MIFPA under Minnesota law. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (2018);
Minn. Stat. §§ 260.751-.835 (2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subds. 2(a), 3
(requiring that, in proceedings involving an I ndian child, determinations of the children’s
best interests must comply w ith ICWA). ICWA seeks to pr otect, among other interests,
the best interests of Indian children. 25 U.S.C. § 1902; see also Miss. Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32-37 (1989) (discussing origin and purposes of ICWA).
ICWA creates “a presumption that placement of Indian children within the preferences of
the Act is in the best inte rests of Indian children.” In re Custody of S.E.G. , 521 N.W.2d
10
357, 362 (Minn. 1994). In its November 27, 2019 order, the district court determined that
the child is an Indian child, and the parties do not dispute th at determination on appeal.
See Minn. Stat. § 260.755, subd. 8 (defining “Indian child” for purposes of MIFPA).
ICWA provides the following directive for the adoptiv e placement of an Indian
child:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State
law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause
to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s
extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe;
or (3) other Indian families.

25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). When pl acing an Indian child, the di strict court “must follow the
order of placement preferences required” by ICWA. Minn. Stat. § 260.771, subd. 7(a); see
also Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a) (requi ring the agency to follow the order of
placement preferences in ICWA when placing an Indian child in foster care). The district
court “may place a child outside the order of placement preferences only if the court
determines there is good cause.” Minn. Stat. § 260.771, subd. 7(b).
II. The district court did not err by deny ing appellants’ motion for adoptive
placement without an evidentiary hearing.
Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of their Ju ly 26, 2021 motion
asserting that the county was unreasonable in failing to make the adoptive placement
requested by appellants. Appellants brough t the motion under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607,
subd. 6, and they requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
A relative “who believes the responsible agency has not reasonably considered the
relative’s . . . request to be considered for adoptive placement as required under
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section 260C.212, subdivision 2, and who wants to be considered for adoptive placement,”
may move the district court for that relief. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 5(b). A relative
seeking to be an adoptive pl acement must file a motion and supporting documents that
“make a prima facie showing that the agency has been unreasonable in failing to make the
requested adoptive placement.” Id., subd. 6(a), (b); see also In re Welfare of L.L.P. , 836
N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013). If the motion and supporting documents make a
prima facie showing that the county was unreasonable in fa iling to make the requested
adoptive placement, the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter; if no
prima facie showing is made, the dist rict court must dismiss the motion. 1 Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(c).
“A motion for adoptive placement is analog ous to a motion to modify custody.”
L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570. At the prima-facie- case stage, the district court must accept
the facts in the moving party’s documents as true, disregard contrary allegations, and
consider the nonmoving party’s documents only for explaining or providing context. Id.
In the analogous context of a motion to modify custody, we have stated that “[a]t the prima-
facie-case stage of the procee ding, [the movant] need not establish anything,” but “need
only make allegations which, if true, would allow the district court to grant the relief [the
movant] seeks.” Amarreh v. Amarreh , 918 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn. App. 2018), rev.

1 We understand the reference to a “prima facie showing” in section 260C.607 to be
synonymous with a “prima facie case” as used in caselaw. See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570
(repeatedly using the term “pri ma facie case” in an appeal reviewing a district court’s
dismissal of a motion for adoptive placemen t under Minn. Stat. § 260C.607 without an
evidentiary hearing).
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denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2018); see also Tousignant v. St. Louis County, 615 N.W.2d 53, 59
(Minn. 2000) (stating that a prima facie case is “one that prevails in the absence of evidence
invalidating it” (quotation omitted)); Braylock v. Jesson, 819 N.W.2d 585, 590 n.2 (Minn.
2012) (noting that the term “prima facie case” is a term of art that “does not always carry
the same meaning in every context,” but “m ay vary depending on the nature of the
proceedings, the type of action involved, and the stage of the litigation”).
We review the district court’s determin ation of whether appellants established a
prima facie case of unreasonableness for an abuse of discretion. L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at
570. Generally, a district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that are not
supported by the record, improperly applies the law, or otherwise resolves a discretionary
question in a manner that is contrary to logic or the facts in the record. Bender v. Bernhard,
971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022); see also Dobrin v. Dobrin , 569 N.W.2d 199, 202
(Minn. 1997); In re Adoption of T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010) (applying
this aspect of Dobrin in an adoption appeal). At th e prima-facie-case stage of the
proceedings, the district court does not find facts, and its assessment of whether the
movant’s motion and supporti ng documents make a prima facie case is based on the
movant’s allegations.
Appellants argue that their motion and supporting documents made a prima facie
case that the county was unreasonable in failing to make their requested adoptive
placement. Appellants contend that the district court erred by denying their motion without
an evidentiary hearing because the district court misapp lied ICWA and MIFPA, failed to
accept appellants’ allegations as true, and reach ed a conclusion that is not supported by
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logic or the record. Appellants assert that the district court misapplied the requirements
for ICWA and MIFPA in two wa ys: (1) by failing to recogn ize appellants as “extended
family” of the child where th ey would be the first placement preference, and (2) by
determining that there was good cause to depart from the order of placement preferences.
We address each argument in turn.
A. Appellants have alleged sufficient facts that they are the preferred adoptive
placement because they are extended family of the child.
ICWA provides that the first preferred placement of an Indian child is with “a
member of the Indian child’s extended family.” 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). An “extended family
member” is “defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2);
see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 26b (definin g “relative of an Indian child” as “a
person who is a member of the Indian child ’s family as defined in” ICWA, including
section 1903(2)). Appellants assert that they qualify as “extended family” of the child.2
Appellants’ assertion that they are “extended family” of the child is consistent with
the declaration from Lower Sioux’s qualified expert witness. The expert stated that, under
Lower Sioux’s understandi ng of extended families, anyone who is “relat ed by blood or
marriage who maintains some form of signific ant contact with the child” is considered a
family member to an Indian child. The expert opined that , based on the closeness of the
relationship between father and T.E., both appellants are “relatives” under Lower Sioux’s

2 Appellants argue that the district court erro neously “refused” to recognize appellants as
extended family of the child. We observe that the district court did not expressly make this
ruling. Instead, the district court appears to have assumed without deciding that appellants
were extended family, but it denied appellant s’ requests because it concluded that there
was good cause to deviate from the order of placement preferences.
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laws and customs. At the prima-facie-case stage, the expert declaration is sufficient on this
point.
We recognize that appellants’ relation to father could be seen as attenuated: T.E. is
father’s cousin’s wife’s brother. But ICWA is clear that the tribal law or custom, rather
than non-Indian societal st andards, are determinative of whether someone qualifies as
extended family of an Indian child. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2). Because appellants have
made allegations that, if true, would allow the district court to rule that they are “extended
family” of the child as defined by the la w or custom of Lower Sioux, and because
“extended family” of the child are entitled to a placement preference, appellants have
adequately alleged that they are a preferred adoptive placement under ICWA and MIFPA.
B. The district court did not err in its an alysis of good cause to deviate from
the ICWA and MIFPA order of placem ent preferences, or by determining
that appellants failed to make a pr ima facie case that the county was
unreasonable in failing to make the requested adoptive placement.
When placing an Indian child, the district court “must follow the order of placement
preferences required” by ICWA, unless the distri ct court determines that there is “good
cause” to place the child outside the order of placement preferences. Minn. Stat. § 260.771,
subd. 7(a), (b). MIFPA itemizes factors for the district court to consider in determining
whether there is good cause:
(1) the reasonable request of the Indian child’s parents, if one
or both parents attest that they have reviewed the placement
options that comply with the order of placement
preferences;
(2) the reasonable request of the Indian child if the child is able
to understand and comprehend the decision that is being
made;
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(3) the testimony of a qualified expert designated by the child’s
tribe and, if necessary, test imony from an expert witness
who meets [the] qualifications of [the statute], that supports
placement outside the order of placement preferences due
to extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child
that require highly specialized services; or
(4) the testimony by the local social services agency that a
diligent search has been conduc ted that did not locate any
available, suitable families fo r the child that meet the
placement preference criteria.
Id., subd. 7(b). Good cause to deviate from the order of placement preferences cannot be
based on “[t]estimony of the child’s bonding or attachment to a foster family alone, without
the existence of at least one of the [above-listed] factors.” Id., subd. 7(c).
At the prima-facie-case stage, the district court must accept the facts in the moving
party’s allegations as true and may consider the nonmoving party’s allegations only to
provide context. L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570. Here, the district court accepted appellants’
allegations in their motion and supporting documents. The dist rict court also recognized
the procedural history of the case and the facts that the parties did not dispute—including
mother’s consent to th e child’s adoption by foster parent s, father’s voluntary termination
of his parental rights, foster parents’ wish to adopt the child and their established bond with
the child, appellants’ wish to adopt the child, and the guardian ad litem’s belief that it was
in the child’s best interests to be adopted by foster parents. Considering all these facts, the
district court determined that there was good cause to deviate from the order of placement
preferences, based primarily on two factors: (1) mother’s request that the child remain in
foster parents’ care; and (2) the “familial bond” that the child had established with foster
parents. When reviewing a district court’ s good-cause analysis, we review de novo
16
whether the district court considered improp er factors or improperly weighed certain
factors. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363.
We conclude that the district court ne ither considered improper factors nor
improperly weighed the factors when it determ ined that there was g ood cause to deviate
from the order of placement preferences. It was not improper for the district court to rely
on mother’s request for the child to remain in foster parents’ care. The district court may
find good cause based on “the reasonable request of the Indian child’s parents, if one or
both parents attest that they have reviewed the placement options.” Minn. Stat. § 260.771,
subd. 7(b)(1) (emphasis adde d). Mother signed a consen t to adopt in August 2020
acknowledging her desire that foster parents adopt the child. And the record supports that
mother had strong reasons for wanting the child to remain with foster parents: foster parents
had established strong connections with mother’s biological family and the child spent time
with her half-siblings and other maternal relatives. Th e guardian ad litem also reported
that the child was thriving in foster parents’ care. Under these circumstances, the district
court did not err by determining that mother’s request was reasonable, which is enough to
satisfy the statute.3

3 This position aligns with cases from other states applying ICWA, which have recognized
that good cause may exist to deviate from the order of pl acement preferences when one
parent voluntarily terminates parental rights and expresses a desire for the child to be
placed with a non-Indian family. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Keith M.W. , 79 P.3d 623,
631-32 (Alaska 2003) (holding that the distri ct court’s determination that good cause
existed to deviate from the ICWA order of placement preferences was not erroneous and
that mother’s preference to have the child adopted by the foster parents “was central to its
decision and was an appropriate factor . . . to consider in its finding of good cause,” when
the district court also considered other factors (quotation omitted)); In re Baby Boy Doe ,
902 P.2d 477, 487 (Idaho 1995) (determining that the district court “did not err as a matter
17
We also conclude that the district court did not err in considering the bond between
the child and foster parents. The district court may not rely on “the child’s bonding or
attachment to a foster family alone.” Minn. Stat. § 260.711, subd. 7(c) (emphasis added).
Here, the district court made clear that it was not relying solely on the bond between the
child and the foster family, and instead cited it as just one factor. And nothing in the statute
prohibits the district court from consid ering this factor alongside others. See id., subd. 7;
see also S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363 (recognizing that a need for permanence, much like the
bonding argument the district court considered here, may still be considered to determine
whether good cause exists to deviate from th e order of placement preferences). Because
the district court clearly articulated that the bond between the child and foster parents was
not the sole basis of its good-cause determina tion, the district court did not err in this
respect. For these reasons, the district court did not misapply the law when analyzing the
existence of good cause to deviate from the or der of placement preferences in ICWA and
MIFPA.
Based on these facts, we similarly conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that appellants failed to make a prima facie showing that the
county acted unreason ably. The district court properly accepted the allegations in
appellants’ motion and supporting documents as true. See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570. The
district court also considered the nonmoving parties’ submissions to the extent those added

of law by giving weight to th e mother’s preference to pla ce the child with the adoptive
parents” when concluding that there was good cause to deviate from the ICWA order of
placement preferences).
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context to and did not contra dict appellants’ allegations. The nonmoving parties (the
county and mother) poin ted to the fact that mother had signed a consent to adopt, which
was executed in writing before the district c ourt. This fact is undisputed and legally
significant, so it was appropriate for the district court to consider this fact to give context
to appellants’ allegations. See id. The consent to adopt stated that mother wanted foster
parents to adopt the ch ild and believed that ad option by foster parent s was in the child’s
best interests. The county’s decision not to place the child with appellants and for the child
to remain in foster parents’ care carried out mother’s preference as expressed in the consent
to adopt. Appellants’ submissions in suppo rt of their motion do not make allegations
addressing how, in light of th e consent to adopt, the county’s failure to make appellants’
requested placement was unreasonable.4
We further observe that the parties had extensively litigated the issue of the child’s
adoptive placement. Appellant s’ motion made essentially the same allegations and
arguments in favor of adoptive placement that the district c ourt had previously rejected,
and appellants’ additional allegations in support of their motion do not show that the district
court’s previous decisions were erroneous. For these reasons, we see no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s determination that ap pellants’ allegations, even if true, were not

4 Mother’s brief takes the argument one step further and contends that, because mother
signed the consent to adopt, appellants were legally ineligible to adopt the child and were
thus barred entirely from bringing th eir motion for adoptive placement. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 7 (providing that, when a child’s parent has consented to adoption, “only
the person identified by the parent and agreed to by the agency as the prospective adoptive
parent qualifies for adoptive placement of th e child”). Given our de cision, we need not
address mother’s alternative argument.
19
sufficient to show that the c ounty acted unreasonably by fa iling to place the child with
appellants.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that appellants fa iled to make a prima facie s howing that the county was
unreasonable in failing to make the requested adoptive placement. As a result, the district
court did not err by denying appellants’ motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.