In re the Custody of: T.L.H. DOB 12/05/2014,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1671

In re the Custody of:
T.L.H.
DOB 12/05/2014,

Beth A. Hastings, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Brittany L. Tuinder,
Respondent,

and

Raey M. Hastings, V,
Appellant.

Filed August 29, 2022
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-FA-20-667

Dean K. Adams, Morgan E. Carlson, Adams, Rizzi & Sween, P.A., Austin, Minnesota (for
respondent Hastings)

Brittany L. Tuinder, Austin, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Jocylyn Poehler, Law Offices of Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc.,
Winona, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Heather Kjos Schmit, Assistant County
Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent intervenor Mower County Health and Human
Services)
2
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
In this third-party custody proceeding, appellant-father argues that the district court
should have applied the presumption in Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g) (2020), that
would grant him at least 25% of the parenting time. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-father Raey M. Hastings, V and respondent-mother Brittany L. Tuinder 1
are the biological parents of T.L.H. born in 2014. The parents were never married and
signed a recognition of parentage identifying themselves as the child’s biological parents.
Respondent-paternal grandmother Beth A. Hastings has cared for the child for most of the
child’s life. In September 2019, the child began living primarily with grandmother. In
March 2020, grandmother petitioned the district court for third-party custody , asserting
that she is the child’s de facto custodian under Minnesota Statutes Chapter 257C.
In September 2020, all parties created a temporary parenting-time agreement under
which father would have parenting time every first weekend of the month beginning at
2:30 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, and on Wednesdays from 2:30 p.m. until
7:00 p.m. The district court adopted this agreement.

1 Mother, a party in the third-party custody proceeding, raised no issues in this appeal.
3
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court named grandmother the child’s
de facto custodian and awarded each parent reasonable parenting time. The district court
awarded father less than 25% of the parenting time and did so without affording father the
benefit of the presumption in Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g), that a parent should receive
at least 25% of the parenting time. Father moved the district court for a new trial or to
amend its findings based in part on the district court’s failure to apply the parenting-time
presumption.
The district court denied father’s motion for a new trial and granted in part and
denied in part his motion for amended findings. The district court determined that the
parenting-time presumption was “not operable” in this third -party custody proceeding.
This appeal followed.
DECISION
De facto custody and third-party proceedings are governed by Minnesota Statutes
Chapter 257C. Minn. Stat. §§ 257C.01-.08 (2020). Under Chapter 257C, the district court,
in addition to addressing custody, “must make any additional order it considers just and
proper concerning . . . the quality and duration of parenting time.” Minn. Stat. § 257C.05,
subd. 1(3). Unless Chapter 257C “specifie[s]” otherwise, Chapter 518 applies to de facto
custody proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 257C.02( a). For purposes of this appeal, we assume
that Chapter 257C does not “specif[y]” that section 518.175, subdivision 1(g), does not
apply to de facto custody proceedings. See id.; cf. Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 5(a) (stating
that, at emergency or temporary hearings, Minn. Stat. §§ 518.17- .175, “must” guide the
district court regarding “custody and parenting time”).
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Under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g), absent “other evidence, there is a rebuttable
presumption that a parent is entitled to receive a minimum of 25 percent of the parenting
time for the child.” Here, the sole issue on appeal is whether the district court should have
given father the benefit of the rebuttable presumption created by subdivision 1(g).
Generally, “a district court has broad discretion in determining . . . parenting time.”
Christensen v. Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. 2018); In re Custody of A.L.R., 830
N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating that third- party custody determinations are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion). “A district court abuses its discretion by making
findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a
decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” See Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d
502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Here, even if we assume that section 518.175,
subdivision 1(g), applies to a third-party proceeding under Chapter 257C, affirming the
district court’s award of less than 25% of the parenting time to father is still appropriate.
In denying father’s posttrial motion, the district court stated that “Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 1(g) is not operable” in proceedings under Chapter 257C, and that
applying the presumption created by that statute “would be counterintuitive” because of
the “extraordinary circumstances to give a third party custody of a child over the
[presumption that custody of a child is best p laced with the child’s parent].” Thus, while
the district court ruled that Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g), did not apply to this
proceeding, it also ruled that, if the statute did apply, the rebuttable presumption therein
was rebutted.
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While Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g), does not identify the findings a district
court must make to rebut the parenting-time presumption, the supreme court has long held
that the “paramount” question for courts in establishing a child’s familial relationships is
the child’s best interests. See, e.g., Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 1995)
(considering child’s best interests in grandparent-visitation matter); State ex rel. Flint v.
Flint, 65 N.W. 272, 272 (Minn. 1895) (considering in a custody dispute “the cardinal
principle is to regard the benefit” of the child rather than which parent is more
blameworthy). Here, we conclude that the relevant findings by the district court are not
clearly erroneous and rebut the parenting-time presumption.
The district court issued a thorough and detailed order containing ten singled-spaced
pages of findings of fact. A district court’s findings of fact are not set aside unless they are
clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279,
284 (Minn. 2008) (applying rule 52.01 in a family-law appeal). The clear error standard
of review “is a review of the record to confirm that evidence exists to support the decision.”
In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021). “When the record
reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might
also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. at 223
(quotation omitted). When applying the clear error standard of review, appellate courts
(1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings; (2) do not reweigh the
evidence; (3) do not find their own facts; and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id.
at 221-22. Thus,
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an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s ‘duty is fully performed’ after it has fairly considered
all the evidence and has determined that the evidence
reasonably supports the decision.

Id. at 222 (quotations omitted); see Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn.
App. 2000) (discussing clear error standard of review).
In its de facto custody analysis, the district court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that (1) the child has lived primarily with grandmother since September 2019;
(2) grandmother is the person primarily responsible for the child’s medical and educational
care; and (3) father’s involvement with the child was “inconsistent.”
Regarding whether it was in the child’s best interests for grandmother to be named
the child’s de facto custodian, the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that (1) grandmother had been the child’s primary caretaker “for a significant portion of
the young child’s life”; (2) grandmother fostered the child’s relationships with the child’s
extended family, but father did not promote the child’s relationships with extended family
or with grandmother; (3) father entered no evidence regarding his willingness to continue
or discontinue the child’s education and religious studies; (4) there were “concerns” about
whether father’s house provided “satisfactory and safe housing for [the child]”; (5) father
testified that he previously “would smoke marijuana while parenting [the child],” but
outside the child’s presence; (6) father’s live-in significant other knew that father smoked
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but did not know that he smoked marijuana; and (7) the “lack of supervision and awareness
of what happens at [father’s] residence by the adults residing in the home is of concern.”
These findings of fact are not challenged in this appeal and are not clearly erroneous.
See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (noting that, when reviewing a district court’s findings of
fact, an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to show
that the district court’s findings are correct); Cook v. Arimitsu, 907 N.W.2d 233, 240 n.3
(Minn. App. 2018) (applying this idea in a family-law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17,
2018). Thus, father’s involvement with the child has been inconsistent, and the district
court has concerns about father’s use of illegal drugs while parenting the child and whether
father’s home is a safe environment for the child. The district court also expressed concerns
about father’s willingness to promote the child’s relationships with grandmother and the
child’s extended family, and father’s willingness to advance the child’s educational and
religious studies.
Even if father’s is arguing that the district court’s findings are inadequate to support
a rejection of the parenting-time presumption, we reject that argument. As described
above, we believe the findings are sufficient for this purpose. On this record, we are
convinced that if we remanded for additional findings of fact regarding father’s parenting
time, the result would not change.2 Therefore, any lack of findings specifically addressing

2 See Grein v. Grein, 364 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 1985) (refusing to remand child-custody
case when “on remand, the [district] court would undoubtedly make findings that comport
with the statutory language” and reach the s ame result); Tarlan v. Sorensen, 702 N.W.2d
915, 920 n.1 (Minn. App. 2005) (refusing to remand issue of custodial parent moving
children to another state when doing so “would be futile”); see also Katz v. Katz, 408
N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987) (stating that appellate courts “will not reverse a correct
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the point is harmless, and we decline to remand. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring
harmless error to be ignored); Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 285 (applying rule 61 in a family-
law appeal). Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion by deeming any presumption that father should receive at least 25% of the
parenting time to be rebutted.
Affirmed.

decision simply because it is based on incorrect reasons”); Sinda v. Sinda , 949 N.W.2d
170, 176 (Minn. App. 2020) (applying Katz).