In re the Marriage of: Matthew James Beland, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1675

In re the Marriage of: Matthew James Beland, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Heidi Ann Beland,
Respondent,

and

Polk County,
Respondent.

Filed August 22, 2022
Affirmed in part, reversed in part , and remanded; motions denied
Bryan, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-FA-15-340

Sarah M. Kyte, Kyte Law Office, East Grand Forks, Minnesota (for appellant)

Denise A. Sollund, Brink La wyers, P.A., Hallock, Minnesota (for respondent Heidi Ann
Beland)

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Larry Orvik, Assistant County Attorney, Crookston,
Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and dec ided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this child support modification matter, appellant disputes the following three
aspects of the child support magistrate’s (CSM) modification order: (1) the factual findings
regarding respondent’s employment; (2) the amount of deductions for appellant’s two
nonjoint children; and (3) the denial of appellant’s request to provide the joint children’s
dental insurance. We conclude that the CSM did not clearly er r in making findings
regarding respondent’s employment. However, because the record is insufficient to allow
appellate review of the contested amount of the deduction for appellant’s nonjoint children,
we reverse and remand the second issue for further fi ndings. We decline to consider the
third issue because appellant previously litigated and appealed a decision requiring both
parties to maintain dental coverage without reimbursement. Finally, we deny appellant’s
motion to strike respondent’s brief and motion for sanctions.
FACTS
Appellant Matthew James Beland (father) and respondent Heidi Ann Beland, n/k/a
Heidi Ann Rylander (mother), share joint physical custody of their two children born in
May 2010 and May 2012. In November 2015, the district court adopted the parties’
stipulated divorce decree. The divorce decree ordered father to pay mother $703 per
month, which included $251 in basic support. This obligation was based on father’s gross
monthly income of $4,820 and mother’s gross income of $3,164.1 The divorce decree also

1 Before the final divorce decree, the parties stipulated to the court that “[mother] has taken
a voluntary reduction in hours at her job. Her income for child support calculation purposes
3
required father to provide healthcare and vision coverage, and obligated mother to provide
dental coverage . The decree ordered the parties to reimburse one another for these
expenses based on their PICS percentages.2
In 2017, the parties agreed to modify child support due to an increase in childcare
expenses. In 2018, the parties agreed father would reimburse mother $75 each month for
his portion of the joint children’s extracurricular expenses, and in October 2019, the district
court ordered father to pay this amount , reasoning that “there will be many months where
the children’s [extracurricular] expenses will exceed [$150.00].” In April 2020, father
moved to modify child support and to be reimbursed for the costs of providing dental
insurance coverage for the joint children. The district court modified child support, after
determining that father earned a gross monthly income of $5,722 and mother earned
$3,222. The district court ordered father to pay $535 in basic support , found that “[e]ach
of the parties has chosen to maintain dependent dental insurance coverage for the joint
children,” and ordered that “[n]either party shall pay the other party medical support
reimbursement for the cost of dependent health insurance coverage.” Father appealed the
district court’s modification and challenged the decision requiring both parties to provide
dental insurance without reimbursement . This court affirmed the decision , specifically
concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered both parents

will remain the same as the original temporary support order.” The first temporary child
support order calculated mother’s gross income based on 32 hours per week as a certified
medical assistant, and the parties used this amount in their stipulated divorce decree.
2 “PICS” stands for Parental Income for determining Child Support. Minn. Stat. § 518A.26,
subd. 15 (2020). “PICS percentages” refers to a calculation of the parents’ proportionate
share of their combined monthly PICS. Minn. Stat. § 518A.35, subd. 2 (2020).
4
to provide healthcare coverage without adjusting their support obligations . Beland v.
Beland, 2021 WL 1081487 (Minn. App. Mar. 22, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 2021).
In July 2021, Polk County moved to modify basic support, medical support, and
childcare support at father’s request . The request was based on the following
circumstances: both parents’ gross monthly incomes have increased since the last order;
both parents’ childcare expenses have changed since the last order; and father has an
“ordered support obligation” for his nonjoint child, L.B., born April 2021, who “resides in
a household other than [his] .” Beyond providing information about the parties’ income,
expenses, and changed circumstances, the county did not provide the district court with
any proposed calculations or submit a proposed child support worksheet. Father submitted
a responsive affidavit to the county’s motion and generally echoed the county’s statements,
noting that he has a court-ordered child support obligation for L.B. and that he has another
nonjoint child, C.B., whom he cares for. Father also asserted that mother regularly receives
income from providing childcare and from rental properties.
The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing before a CSM on October 7, 2021.
The CSM admitted three exhibits offered by father and received testimony from mother,
father, and K.M. (a human resources manager from mother’s employer). K.M. testified
that her knowledge was limited because she only completed the employment verification
form and had not reviewed mother’s entire employment record. She explained that she did
not know of any scheduling requirements for certified medical assistants and that any
changes to her hours were at the department’s discretion. K.M. also explained that there
were “other hours available within [the] organization” but she could not speak to
5
availability of specific hours for medical assistants. K.M. confirmed that mother had
worked 32 hours a week since 2012.
Mother testified that her employer considered her to be a full-time employee at 32
hours per week. Mother also explained that she could get more hours on a sporadic basis
when other colleagues needed time off, but that it was unlikely her employer would grant
a request for more hours on a more permanent basis . Mother testified that the number of
hours per week has remained constant and that she has never asked for a reduction in hours
or refused to increase her hours.
Father introduced exhibits includ ing one exhibit relating to local job listings for
certified medical assistants, part of the parties’ 2015 stipulated interi m order, and certified
medical assistant reports from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics. Father testified about
his change in childcare expenses and discussed L.B., the nonjoint child he has with Sarah
Kyte.3 Father also mentioned C.B. , a “boy that we’ll hopefully [sic] will adopt here pretty
soon.”4 Father has a stipulated child support order for L.B. requiring father to pay $1,332
a month to Ms. Kyte . Father also requested that the CSM modify the previous order to
require him to provide dental insurance and to require mother to reimburse him based on
the PICS percentages. The CSM clarified that father was not asking the court to preclude
mother from also maintaining insurance and confirmed that mother was currently providing

3 Ms. Kyte is father’s attorney on appeal and also represented father during the evidentiary
hearing before the CSM. Father and Ms. Kyte are not married, but father testified that he
resides with Ms. Kyte, L.B., C.B., and Ms. Kyte’s four children from a previous marriage.
4 There are only two other references to C.B. in the record: on father’s 2020 tax form listing
C.B. with the relationship status redacted and, as noted above, in father’s affidavit asserting
father cares for C.B.
6
both medical and dental coverage. 5 Mother requested to maintain the status quo, arguing
that father’s motion was previously litigated.
On October 12, 2021, the CSM granted the county’s motion to modify child support,
concluding that since the last support order there had been substantial chang es in the
parties’ incomes, childcare expenses, and “number of [nonjoint] children.” The CSM
found that father’s gross monthly income was $5,959 and that mother’s gross monthly
income was $3,319. The CSM found that mother “is a licensed practical nurse, who works
32 hours per week . . . [and she] is not voluntarily underemployed.” The CSM set father’s
new, ongoing basic child support obligation at $482 a month. The CSM ordered father to
maintain dependent medical insurance coverage and designated father’s medical insurance
as the primary medical coverage for the joint children. The CSM denied fath er’s
modification request regarding dental insurance and continued to require both parents to
provide dental insurance at their own expense and without reimbursement. The CSM
designated mother’s dental insurance as the primary coverage for the joint children.
The CSM found that father “ has one [nonjoint] child in his home,” for whom there
is a court-ordered, monthly child support obligation in the amount of $1,332. However,
the CSM found that “this was a stipulated support order between the [father] and [ Ms.
Kyte], and the [nonjoint] child resides in this same household [ with father and Ms. Kyte].”
The CSM concluded that the stipulated child support obligation “has not been added to the

5 To the extent that any portion of father’s brief can be construed as challenging the CSM’s
factual finding that mother is currently providing dental insurance, we conclude that the
finding was not clearly erroneous given mother’s statements at the evidentiary hearing.
7
guideline calculation for the joint children of the parties.” The CSM did not include a child
support worksheet as an attachment and made no mention of C.B. in its order.
Father appeals . Father also made two motions to this court: a motion to strike
portions of mother’s brief and a motion for attorney fees .
DECISION
Father raises three primary challenges to the CSM’s order. First, father argues that
the CSM made an erroneous finding of fact when it determined that mother was not
voluntarily underemployed as part of its calculation of mother’s gross income .6 We
conclude that the CSM did not clearly err because the record supports the finding that
mother was not voluntarily underemployed. Second, father argues that the CSM erred in
determining the applicable adjustment for father’s nonjoint children, L.B. and C.B.
Because the record is insufficient to review the CSM’s decision regarding deductions for
father’s nonjoint children, we remand for further findings . Finally, father argues that the
CSM erred when it ordered both parties to provide dental insurance without
reimbursement. Because this court previously affirmed the decision ordering both parents

6 Father also challenges the CSM ’s income findings because mother’s income did not
include the $75 per month that father is obligated to pay mother for his portion of the joint
children’s extracurricular expenses. Father characterizes the reimbursements as equivalent
to spousal maintenance and argues they should be counted as income for purposes of child
support. We decline to consider this argument because father does not cite to any binding
authority treating one parent’s portion of a joint child’s extracurricular expenses as
equivalent to spousal maintenance. Kaehler v. Kaehler, 18 N.W.2d 312, 537 (Minn. 1945)
(declining to review an argument not supported by legal authorities); see also, e.g., State,
Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to address an issue absent adequate briefing); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d
471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family law appeal).
8
to provide healthcare coverage without reimbursement, we decline to consider the merit s
of this decision a second time.
Appellate courts use the same standard to review a CSM ’s order as they use to
review orders issued by a district court. Hesse v. Hesse , 778 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn. App.
2009); Brazinsky v. Brazinsky , 610 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Minn. App. 2000). We review a
district court’s factual findings for clear error, Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn.
App. 2014), questions of law de novo, Haefele v. Haef ele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn.
2013), and the ultimate decision to modify child support for an abuse of discretion, Gully
v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 820 (Minn. 1999).
I. Challenge to Finding Regarding Mother’s Full-time Employment
Father argues that the CSM clearly erred in finding that mother was not voluntarily
underemployed under Minnesota Statutes section 518A.32, subdivision 1 (2020). Because
the record supports the CSM’s finding, the CSM did not clearly err.
For purposes of c alculating child support, the Minnesota Legislature requires
imputation of a full-time income when a parent is voluntarily underemployed: “ If a parent
is voluntarily unemployed, underemployed, or employed on less than full-time basis, . . .
child support must be calculated based on a determination of potential income . . . . [I]t is
rebuttably presumed that a parent can be gainfully employed on a full-time basis.” Id.
“Full-time means 40 hours of work in a week except in those industries, trades, or
professions in which most employers, due to custom, practice, or agreement, use a normal
work week of more or less than 40 hours in a week.” Id.
9
Reviewing findings regarding income and whether a party is voluntarily
underemployed presents questions of fact that we review for clear error. Schisel v. Schisel,
762 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that appellate courts review district
court’s findings on income for clear error); see also Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2020)
(“gross income” includes “potential income,” if any). “[Appellate courts] will not conclude
that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed .” In re Civil Commitment of Kenney ,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations and citations omitted). Nor should
appellate courts reconcile conflicting evidence or “weigh the evidence as if trying the
matter de novo.” Id. (quotation and emphasis omitted). “When the record reasonably
supports the find ings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide
a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation
omitted).
In this case, the CSM found that mother “is a licensed practical nurse, who works
32 hours per week . . . [and] is not voluntarily underemployed” and stated at the hearing
that it believed mother’s employer considered her a full-time employee. We conclude that
the record supports these findings. 7 First, the record shows that mother has been employed
as a certified medical assistant at 32 hours a week since 2012, three years before the parties
divorced. Mother’s testimony indicates that while her income has changed, the number of
hours she works has not changed. Second, according to mother, her employer considers

7 The CSM incorrectly stated mother’s title, as mother is a certified medical assistant.
Father does not assert any error arising from this discrepancy.
10
her full-time at 32 hours a week and has since 2012. This testimony was generally
corroborated by K.M., the human resources manager for mother ’s employer. Mother also
testified that she is unable to increase her hours on anything more permanent than a shift -
by-shift basis. Given this testimony, the record supports the CSM’s factual finding. 8
II. Challenge to Decision Regarding Income Deduction fo r Nonjoint Children
Next, father argues that the CSM clearly erred when it did not include a deduction
in the amount of father’s court -ordered child support obligation for L.B. and when it did
not include the statutory deduction for C.B. 9 We are unable to review the determinations
made by the CSM regarding L.B. and C.B. and remand the matter for further findings .
When calculating child support, Minnesota Statutes section 518A.33(a) (2020)
requires the district court to include deductions from a parent’s income when that parent is
“legally responsible for a nonjoint child.” The statute contemplates the use of the actual
amount of a court-ordered child support obligation or the use of a standard amount derived
using the basic support guideline table. The testimony at the evidentiary hearing shows
that father owes court-ordered child support for L.B. i n the amount of $1,332 pursuant to

8 We also observe that the parties and the district court have consistently classified mother
as employed full-time at 32 hours per week. Although mother stipulated that she took “a
voluntary reduction in hours at her job” before to the divorce decree in 2015, in every order
since the divorce decree, mother’s income has been calculated using her hourly rate for 32
hours a week. Given our decision regarding the evidentiary support for the CSM’s factual
finding, however, we need not determine whether father has forfeited the argument that
mother is voluntarily underemployed.
9 Father also asserts, in passing, that withholding income to satisfy his child support
obligation violates the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA). See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1673(b)(2)(A) (2021). We need not address this argument because father does not
provide adequate analysis to allow meaningful review. Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480; Kaehler,
18 N.W.2d at 537; Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d at 479.
11
a stipulation that father and Ms. Kyte agreed to. The written order , however, does not
include a child support worksheet and while the CSM noted that the stipulated amount of
$1,332 “has not been added to the guideline calculation,” the order does not specify
whether the CSM used some other amount, such as the standard statutory deduction, when
it calculated father’s child support obligation. In addition, there is no specific mention of
C.B. in the CSM’s written order or analysis regarding possible deductions relating to C.B.
Nor is there any statement regarding the total deduction made, if any, or the total number
of nonjoint children for whom father is legally responsible.
Accordingly, we remand this matter for furt her findings regarding the applicable
deductions. We acknowledge that the record from the evidentiary hearing contains almost
no testimony or evidence regarding C.B. or regarding father’s legal relationship to C.B. at
the time of the evidentiary hearing. Nevertheless, the record on remand shall be limited to
the evidence presented at the October 7, 2021 hearing and neither party is permitted to
reopen the record. If father wishes to present new evidence because circumstances have
changed since the evidentiary hearing (for example, father may now have formally adopted
C.B. or may now have court-ordered child support specifically relating to C.B.), he may
proceed by filing a new motion for modification.
III. Challenge to Decision Regarding Dental Insurance
Father’s final arguments on appeal challenge the CSM’s order requiring both parties
to provide dental insurance coverage without requiring reimbursement. We decline to
consider th is argument in light of our previous opinion affirming the CSM’s earlier
decision to require both parties to provide dental insurance without reimbursement .
12
In his previous appeal, father challenged the CSM’s decision to require both parties
to provide dental insurance at their own expense. Specifically, father argued that the CSM
“should not have ordered both parties to provide medical support without adjusting their
support obligations accordingly.” Beland, 2021 WL 1081487 at *4. Father argued that
Minnesota Statutes section 518A.41, subdivision 3(1) (2020), required the CSM to
“determine which parent’s coverage [was] more comprehensive by considering what other
benefits [were] included in the coverage.” Id. And father argued that section 518A.41,
subdivision 5(b), required the CSM to reduce the carrying party’s support obligation by the
amount of the contributing party’s contribution. Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 5(b) (2020).
This court determined that “the CSM was not obligated to follow subdivisions 3(1), 5(a),
or 5(b)” because “the parties entered into their own agreement reg arding the division of
medical and dental insurance obligations for their children, and because Beland decided to
provide supplemental dental insurance for the children of his own volition.” Id. at *5. In
his present appeal, father asserts the same error as before. Because we already determined
that the CSM did not abuse its discretion in requiring both parties to provide dental
insurance without reimbursement, we decline to consider father’s argument.
10

10 To the extent that any part of father’s brief can be construed as challenging the portion
of the CSM’s decision that designated mother as primarily responsible for dental insurance,
we are not convinced that this decision compels reversal. We previously concluded that
the CSM was not obligated to apply subdivision 3(1) to these parties. Beland, 2021 WL
1081487, at *5. In addition, even assuming there is a significant difference between the
comprehensiveness of the policies, father makes no attempt to explain why it is an abuse
of discretion to designate the less comprehensive policy as primary and the more
comprehensive policy as secondary or supplemental. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d
461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made [ to]
appear affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . . [T]he burden of showing error rests
13
IV. Motion to Strike and for Sanctions
While this appe al was pending, father moved to strike 19 portions of mother’s
responsive submissions to this court and moved for attorney fees. Father argues that
mother’s submissions contained copies of documents not in the record below and that she
submitted them for an impermissible purpose. Father seeks attorney fees under Minnesota
Statutes section 549.211, subdivision 2 (2020), arguing that mother acted in bad faith. We
deny both motions and address each in turn.
Father’s motion to strike mother’s brief included general assertions, inaccurate
characterizations of the record , arguments that were generally not supported by authority,
and arguments regarding issues we have declined to consider. In addition, t o the extent
that mother’s responsive submissions improperly included documents not in the appellate
record, such as the register of actions from another case, we did not rely on any of those
documents in resolving this appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (“The appellate
record is limited to “documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the
proceedings, if any”); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582- 83 (“An appellate court may
not base its decision on matters outside of the re cord on appeal , and may not consider
matters not produced and received in evidence below”). Therefore, we need not consider
father’s arguments to strike those documents .

upon the one who relies upon it”); Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (quoting
this aspect of Waters in a family law appeal); Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 283
(Minn. App. 1999) (applying this aspect of Loth).
14
Turning to father’s motion for sanctions, we find his arguments unavailing.
Minnesota Statutes section 549.211 (2020) permits this court to award reasonable attorney
fees when a party acts in bad faith by asserting frivolous or unfounded claims solely to
harass or to delay proceedings. The assertions made by father do not establish that mother
acted in bad faith, intended to harass father, or cause unnecessary delay, and we deny his
motion for attorney fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded ; motions denied .