In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M. L. S., C. V. R., and P. H., Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1680

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
M. L. S., C. V. R., and P. H.,
Commissioner of Human Services, Legal Custodian.

Filed May 23, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-JV-19-6526

Brooke Beskau Warg, Natalie Netzel, Mallor y Stoll, Child Protec tion Clinic, Mitchell
Hamline School of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant-aunt B.R.-H.)

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted Coun ty Attorney, Debra A. Groe hler, Sr. Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Mi nnesota (for respondent Olmsted County Health, Housing, and
Human Services)

Rachel L. Osband, Mark D. Fiddler, Fiddler Osband, Edina, Minnesota (for respondents-
foster parents T.S., F.S., N.M., and S.M.)

Vicki Duncan, Rochester, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant B.R.-H. (aunt)—the paternal aunt of X, an eight-year-old child under the
guardianship of the commissioner of human services—challenges the district court’s
dismissal of her motions for adoptive placement and visitation. Because we conclude that
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the district court erred in dismissing the motion for adoptive placement without holding an
evidentiary hearing, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing and for the district
court to readdress aunt’s visitation motion.
FACTS
In July 2019, respondent Olmsted County Health, Hous ing, and Human Services
(the county) filed a petition alleging that X and her half-siblings (the twins) were in need
of protection or services (CHIPS). The petition alleged that the children, while in the sole
care of their mother, had been exposed to ep isodes of physical abuse, domestic violence,
and controlled-substance use, and that their mo ther had been consistently unable to meet
their basic and mental-health needs. X’s fath er, C.R., is a registered predatory offender
who was convicted of sexually assaulting a three-year-old relative.
The children were subsequently removed fr om their mother’s care. Though X and
the twins have different fathers, they were in itially placed together with the twins’ then-
presumed father, P.H., and P.H.’s mother. However, a county social worker became
concerned with the children’s safety in this placement, and they were subsequently moved.
Following five different fost er-family placements and a si bling-separation order, X was
ultimately placed with her current foster family in October 2019. X had previously spent
time with this foster family in 2017 when they provided care and assistance to X and her
mother through a volunteer organization.
Aunt is the sister of C.R. but asserts th at she is estranged from him. According to
aunt, she attempted to contact the county multiple times beginning in October 2019 to
express her interest in fostering or adopting X. On December 6, 2019, the county held a
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family group conference, which aunt attended . X’s foster family , the guardian ad litem
(GAL), X’s social worker, the county adoption worker, another relative, and other county
workers also attended. During the family group conference, aunt advised that she was
interested in fostering and adopting X. The county social worker told aunt that the county
was not interested in moving X at that time because X had been placed in multiple foster
homes since the beginning of the child-protection proceedings. But aunt was assured that
she would be considered as an adoptive placement in the event of a termination of parental
rights (TPR).
According to aunt, she requested vis itation with X during the family group
conference. Aunt contends th at the social worker said sh e would speak to X’s therapist
about visitation, but she heard nothing from the social worker for months.
On February 6, 2020, the social worker contacted aunt to inquire about her interest
in adopting X. Aunt confirmed her continue d interest, and a meeting was scheduled for
March 13, 2020. At that mee ting, which was held in aunt’s home, aunt was assured that
she and her husband would be considered as a placement option. One month later,
however, aunt was informed th at the child-protection procee dings had been “shut down”
because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In April 2020, the county updated its out-o f-home placement plan for X. It stated
that the family conference had occurred, “a family option was identified for [X],” and the
county “is making progress on this decision.”
Apparently unbeknownst to aunt, the district court presided over a termination trial
in June 2020. The district court issued a le ngthy order on June 26, 2020, terminating the
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parental rights of X’s parents. In its order, the district court stated that the county was
“relieved of further relative search efforts as relatives were not and should not be with the
children. There have been no relatives that have provided support to the children or
family.” The district court further stated that the county had attempted to identify relatives
as possible placement options, “but there are no options at this time.”
According to aunt, the coun ty never notified her that the district court had
terminated parental rights to X. Aunt later learned of the TPR from C.R.
In September 2020, the county adoption wo rker notified the district court by letter
that the county had been in touch with a paternal aunt who had “expressed some interest in
adopting [X].” But the letter stated that moving X from her placement with the foster
family “would be detrimental” and noted a c oncern that aunt may “not fully understand[]
the implications of her brother being a sex o ffender and how to mon itor that situation.”
Additionally, the letter stated that X felt the foster family was her “forever family.”
On October 19, 2020, aunt wrote a letter to the county detailing her prior contacts
with county employees about her interest in adopting X and the county’s lack of
responsiveness. Aunt’s letter asked the county to reconsider her as an adoptive placement.
Nine days later, the county social worker filed a letter in the district court asking the
court to rule out aunt as a permanency option because “it is in [X’s] best interest to be
adopted by her current foster parents.” On November 2, 2020, the county filed aunt’s
October 19 letter in the district court.
Aunt filed a motion for permissive interv ention in the adoption phase of the child-
protection proceedings on November 6, 2020. Several days later, the district court issued
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a notice of judicial determination stating, “[ X] shall remain in he r current placement and
this shall be the permanency option, not [aunt].”
At the hearing on aunt’s motion to intervene on December 3, 2020, the district court
noted that aunt’s family seemed like “wonderful people,” but stated that it was not in X’s
best interest “to have her pla cement disrupted or her life disr upted any further than it is.”
With the district court’s permission, aunt addr essed the district court, explaining that the
county had never given her an opportunity to see X, had failed to notify her of the
termination proceedings, and had delayed referring her for a home study. Aunt assured the
district court that she was no longer in contact with C.R.
On December 15, 2020, in a written order, the district court denied aunt’s motion
for permissive intervention. The district cour t determined that the county “has not been
unreasonable in declining to consider [aunt and her husband] as a permanency option” and
ordered aunt and her husband not to contact the foster family.
Aunt appealed to this court, and we reversed the district court’s denial of aunt’s
motion to intervene. See In re Welfare of Children of M.L.S., 964 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. App.
2021). We noted that we were “genuinely disturbed by what [the] record suggests was the
county’s apparent failure to communicate with the district court about the county’s ongoing
contacts with aunt and her interest in adopting X.” Id. at 456. For example, we noted that
the GAL told the district court at the De cember 3, 2020 hearing on intervention—which
was held a year after the family group conference where aunt officially declared her interest
in adopting X to county employees and the GAL—that she “wish[ed] we would have
known about [aunt] at the beginning.” Id. And we observed that the district court’s June
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2020 termination order stated that no relative placement options existed even though aunt
had made it known to the coun ty months earlier that she wish ed to be considered as an
adoptive placement. Id. We instructed the district c ourt to allow aunt to intervene on
remand. Id. at 459. And we concluded that the di strict court had abused its discretion by
failing to consider X’s best interests in the motion to intervene, “ruling out aunt as a
placement option for X, determining that the county was not unreasonable in failing to
place X with aunt, and relieving the county of relative-search efforts.” Id. On remand, we
urged “the district court and the parties to fo llow the express direction of the legislature:
when making permanent-placement decisions, the county sha ll place a child in a home
selected by first considering placement with relatives and then considering placement with
important friends, such as X’s current foster family.” Id. at 458.
On remand, the district court granted aunt ’s motion to intervene. Aunt then moved
for visitation with X and for adoptive placemen t, seeking an evidentiary hearing on her
adoptive-placement motion. In support of the adoptive-placeme nt motion, aunt filed an
affidavit. According to aunt’s affidavit:
 She is married to her partner of 11 year s, and they have a daughter who is X’s
age.
 She has a master’s degree in mental h ealth psychology and works as a mental
health practitioner.
 She has over 12 years of experience wo rking with challenging behaviors and
individuals with mental health concerns.
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 She and her husband lived in the same home for seven years, and then moved to
a bigger home in 2020 because they wanted to adopt X.
 She went through a lengthy process to get a foster-care lic ense in Hennepin
County, where she resides, in order to foster X.
 She has participated in an adoption home study.
 As a Black woman, she can help X, who is also Black, understand her cultural
identity.
 She has long wanted to adopt X, and ev en suggested to X’s mother before the
termination that she was willing to adopt X.
 She contacted the county multiple times in October 2019, after learning that X
was in out-of-home placement, to express her interest in fostering or adopting
X.
 She again declared her in terest in fostering or adopting X at the family
conference on December 6, 20 19. X’s social worker to ld her that they did not
want to move X again given the many di sruptions X had experienced. But the
social worker assured aunt that she would be considered as an adoptive
placement if the parents’ rights were terminated.
 She asked to visit with X, and the social worker said she would look into it but
did not follow up.
 She reiterated her interest in adopting during a February 6, 2020 phone call with
the social worker and a March 13, 2020 meeting at her home.
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 She received a text from the social worker in April 2020 assuring her that she
was still considered to be a placement option.
 She was told by the county that the courts were closed due to the pandemic, but
she was never notified that the courts ha d reopened or that the termination trial
had occurred.
 She learned about the termination in mid-July 2020 from C.R.
 She made numerous phone calls to the c ounty after learning of the termination
but received no response.
 She received a text from X’s social work er on August 10, 2020, which stated
that X was doing well, that the parents’ rights had been terminated, and that X
was placed in a home that the county supported.
 She received a phone call from the social worker informing her that she should
communicate with X’s adoption worker going forward.
 She left numerous messages for the social worker’s supervisor, to no avail.
 She independently researched adoption, learned that a home study was required,
and discovered that she needed a referral from the county, which then took weeks
to obtain.
 She met with individuals from the county on October 15, 2020. They told her
that she would receive a placement letter 30 days before X’s adoption hearing.
She received no such letter.
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 She hired a lawyer to assist her in in tervening in X’s adoption matter. In mid-
November 2020, she learned from her lawyer that X had already had a placement
hearing.1
In response to aunt’s mo tion for visitation and for adoptive placement, X’s ongoing
social worker, two other county social workers, and the GAL—all of whom opposed aunt’s
motions—filed affidavits. Additionally, the foster family f iled a motion to intervene and
an affidavit explaining their concerns abou t disrupting X’s placement with them. The
foster family’s affidavit emphasized how we ll X was doing in their care, including the
dramatic improvements they have observed in her mental health and development.
The district court held a nonevidentiary hearing on aunt’s motions. Following the
arguments of counsel, the district court issued an oral ruling on aunt’s motion for visitation,
stating:
[A]s I consider this little girl and her fragility, that anything
kind of new in her life, if not carefully monitored, particularly
the introduction of people that, as far as I can tell, she doesn’t
-- she has no familiarity with, and that’s [aunt and her
husband], and I’m not saying that that’s something of their
doing but, I mean, that’s just the reality of it, I’m deeply
concerned about anything that may cause a trigger to result in
[X] regressing to behaviors that this Court has rarely heard
testimony about in eight years or nine years doing this kind of
work. And I’m not suggesting that anything would be done
intentionally. I don’t think that’s the case.

It’s clear that [aunt a nd her husband], you know, care
about this little girl. But I’m just not going to allow contact at
this time because I don’t think it’s in this little girl’s best
interest. And I realize that that’s, you know, difficult for

1 Aunt’s motion also included two exhibits—a copy of text messages exchanged with X’s
social worker and aunt’s October 2020 letter to the county.
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people to understand, who are family members, biological
family members, but I don’t know that there’s any other way
to deliver it. I just -- this is -- this little girl doesn’t need any --
anything that may be disruptive in her life.

The district court subsequently issued a written order addressing aunt’s motion for
adoptive placement. In the order, the district court focused on X’s best interests, including
how X’s interests were being served by her current placement. The district court
concluded:
The gravamen of [aunt’s] position is that they were essentially
not kept apprised and “in the loop” during the course of the
CHIPS/TPR foster care/permanent placement proceedings as
they related to [X]. The Court accepts this, as it is required to
do so, as true. While [aunt’s] affidavits outline how she is
suited to meet [X]’s needs, it does not allege facts showing that
[the county’s] decision to place the child for adoption with the
[foster parents] was unreasonable, irrational, or capricious. [X]
has been in the [foster parents’] exclusive care for over two (2)
years and during that time has developed a strong attachment
to the family, as delineated supra. Removing her from the
foster parents’ care woul d unnecessarily hinder [X]’s
development and cause additional trauma.

[X]’s delicate and turbulent life required a familiar and
consistent environment that the [foster parents] have
unhesitatingly provided. [The county] was not unreasonable
in their assessment. When considering the course of [X]’s life
and the paramount consideration of her health, safety and best
interests – including the importance of permanency – [the
county] was not unreasonable in not considering [aunt and her
husband] for adoptive placement . What would have been
unreasonable, patently unreasona ble, would have been to
transition this fragile soul at any stage of these proceedings to
a family unfamiliar to her.

The district court denied and dismissed, without an evidentiary hearing, aunt’s motion for
adoptive placement.
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Aunt appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court erred in dismissing , without an evidentiary hearing, aunt’s
motion for adoptive placement of X.

Aunt challenges the district court’s dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of her
motion for adoptive placement of X.
When a child is under the guardianship of the commissioner of human services after
the termination of the biological parents’ parental rights, an agency acting on behalf of the
commissioner must make “reasonable efforts” to finalize an adoption. Minn. Stat.
§§ 260C.601, subd. 2 (2020), .6 05, subd. 1 (Supp. 2021). Reasonable efforts include
identifying an appropriate prospective adoptiv e parent in accord w ith the child’s best
interests, see Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2 (S upp. 2021), performing an up-to-date
relative search, and ultimately finalizing the child’s adoption, Minn. Stat. § 260C.605,
subd. 1(d)(3)(i), (10).
A relative or foster parent seeking to adopt the child who is not the placement
selected by the county may, w ithin the statutory period, mo ve for adoptive placement of
the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6( a) (Supp. 2021). “A motion for adoptive
placement is analogous to a mo tion to modify custody.” In re Welfare of L.L.P. , 836
N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2013). The procedure for a motion to modify custody, and
hence the procedure for a motion for adoptive placement, is di vided into several stages.
See id. at 570-72 (discussing the process for modifying custody and applying that process
to a motion for an adoptive placement).
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At the outset, “[t]he motion and suppor ting documents must make a prima facie
showing that the agency has been unreasonab le in failing to make the requested adoptive
placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(b) (Supp. 2021).2 “At the prima-facie-case
stage of the proceeding, [the movant] need not establish anything. [The movant] need only
make allegations which, if tr ue, would allow the district c ourt to grant the relief [the
movant] seeks.” Amarreh v. Amarreh , 918 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn. App. 2018), rev.
denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2018); see Tousignant v. St. Louis County , 615 N.W.2d 53, 59
(Minn. 2000) (stating that a prima facie case is “one that prevails in the absence of evidence
invalidating it” (quotati on omitted)). If the district court concludes that the movant has
failed to make a prima facie case, “the co urt shall dismiss the motion.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(c) (Supp. 2021). But if the district court concludes that “a prima facie
basis is made,” then “the court shall set the matter for evid entiary hearing.” Id. Thus,
whether the movant’s motion and supporting doc uments make a prima facie case that the
agency acted unreasonably in failing to make the adoptive placement requested by the
movant is dispositive of whethe r the district court must set an evidentiary hearing on the
movant’s motion. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (202 0) (stating that “‘[s]hall’ is
mandatory”).

2 We understand section 260C .607’s reference to a “pri ma facie showing” to be
synonymous with what caselaw calls a “prima facie case.” See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570
(repeatedly referencing a “prima facie case” in an appeal reviewing a district court’s
dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of a motion for an adoptive placement of a child
under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.607 (2012)).
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If there is an evidentiary hearing on the movant’s motion, the county presents
evidence to support its decision not to make an adoptive placement with the movant. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 6(d) (Supp. 2021). Th ereafter, “[t]he moving party . . . has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the [county] has been
unreasonable in failing to make the adop tive placement” sought by the movant. Id. The
district court “may” order the county to make an adoptive placement of the child with the
movant if, at the conclusion of the hearing, the district c ourt “finds” both that (a) “the
[county] has been unreasonable in failing to make the adoptive placement” sought by the
movant and (b) the movant provides “the most suitable adoptive home to meet the child’s
needs using the factors in section 260C.212, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).” Id., subd. 6(e)
(Supp. 2021) (emphasis added); see Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd . 15 (2020) (stating that
“‘[m]ay’ is permissive”).
Here, the district court dismissed, withou t an evidentiary hearing, aunt’s motion for
adoptive placement of X, concluding that aunt had “fail[ed] to make a prima facie showing
that [the county] has been unreasonable in failing to make her the adoptive placement.” A
district court’s dismissal of an adoptive-placement motion is an appealable order. L.L.P.,
836 N.W.2d at 568-69. We review in three parts the dismissal, w ithout an evidentiary
hearing, of an adoptive placement motion. See id. at 570. First, we review de novo whether
the district court “treated” the parties’ supporting documents “properly.” Id. (citing Boland
v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Mi nn. App. 2011)). Second, we consider whether the
district court abused its discretion in determ ining that the movant failed to make a prima
facie showing. Id. And third, we apply de novo review in considering the district court’s
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denial of an evidentiary hearing. Id. (noting that the failure to make a prima facie showing
is dispositive of the need for an evidentiary hearing).
A. The district court erred in its treatment of aunt’s motion and supporting
documents.

We first review de novo whether the di strict court “treated” aunt’s motion and
supporting documents “properly.” Id. When addressing whether a movant made a prima
facie showing that the county acted unreasonably in failing to make the movant’s requested
adoptive placement, “[t]he distri ct court must accept facts in [the movant’s] supporting
documents as true, disregard contrary alle gations, and consider the non-moving party’s
supporting documents only to the extent th at they explain or provide context.” Id. The
district court is not allowed to weigh the alle gations of the moving party against those of
the nonmoving party or agency; the moving party’ s allegations must be accepted as true.
Id. at 570-71. Here, for at least three reasons, we conclude that the district court did not
treat aunt’s motion and supporting documents properly.
First, rather than accepting aunt’s alle gations as true, the district court largely
ignored them. Aunt alleged that she made pe rsistent efforts to foster or adopt X and
repeated attempts to contact and communicate with the county, but th e county failed to
respond. Additionally, aunt asserted that she moved into a larger home so that she could
be a placement for X, participated in an adoption home study, has a long-term relationship
with her husband, has her master’s degree in mental health psychology, and is a suitable
adoptive placement for X because, among other th ings, she shares X’s race. The district
court’s order, however, addresses aunt’s factua l assertions about her dealings with the
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county in just one sentence: “The gravamen of [aunt’s] position is that they were
essentially not kept apprised and ‘in the loop’ during the course of the CHIPS/TPR foster
care/permanent placement proceedings as they related to [X].” And this sentence is not
entirely accurate. Aunt’s allegations were not simply that the county failed to communicate
with her. The real gravamen of the assertions is that the county never genuinely considered
her as a placement for X despite what she asserts were her timely, repeated, and otherwise
(allegedly) well-supported requests. Because the district court did not acknowledge and
accept aunt’s allegations as true, it did not treat her submissions properly.
Second, to the extent that the district court did acknowledge aunt’s allegations, it
weighed those allegations against the reason ableness of X’s current placement with the
foster family. The district court devoted several pages of its order to the responsive
allegations of the foster parents, social workers, and the GAL, which explained how X
would be best served by remaining with the foster family. Then, the district court weighed
what it perceived to be “[t]he gravamen of [aunt]’s position” against (1) the reasonableness
of X’s current placement, (2) the bond betw een X and the foster family, and (3) the
potential dangers of moving X from her current placement. Although a district court may
refer to a nonmoving party’s allegations for context, it must not weigh competing
allegations when addressing whether a movant has made the required prima facie showing
that the county acted unreasonably in declin ing to place the child with the movant. See
L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570-71 (ru ling that the district cour t erred when it denied an
evidentiary hearing on a movant’s motion for adoptive placement under section 260C.607
based, in part, on the district court’s wei ghing of the county’s allegations against the
16
movant’s allegations). Thus, the district court erred as a matter of law by weighing aunt’s
allegations against the county’s counter-allegations.3
Third, to the extent the district court’ s analysis suggests that , at the prima-facie-
showing stage of the proceeding, aunt had to show, demonstrate, esta blish, or otherwise
prove—or that the district court had to find as a matter of fact—that the placement of X in
the foster home was unreasonable, the distri ct court’s analysis is incorrect. In Amarreh,
the district court denied, with out an evidentiary hearing, a father’s motion to modify
custody based on its determina tion that “[f]ather ha[d] not established the four elements
required to establish a prima facie case [to modify custody.]” 918 N.W.2d at 231 (emphasis
added). We rejected that analysis, stating, among other things, that “[a]t the prima-facie-
case stage of the proceed ing, father need not establish anything. Father need only make
allegations which, if true, wo uld allow the district court to grant the relief he seeks.” Id.
Thus, at the prima-facie-showing stage of th e proceeding, the movant need not prove, or
disprove, anything; the district court’s inquiry is limited to evaluating whether the movant

3 Relatedly, the district court’s order states that “[w]hile [aunt’s] affidavits outline how she
is suited to meet [X]’s needs, it does not alle ge facts showing that [the county’s] decision
to place the child for ad option with the [foster parents] was unreasonable, irrational, or
capricious. [X] has been in the [foster parents’] exclusive care for over two (2) years and
during that time has developed a strong attachment to the family, as delineated supra.” At
the prima-facie-showing stage of the proceeding, however, the district court does not weigh
the propriety of child’s actual placement agai nst the propriety of the movant’s requested
placement. L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570-71. Rather, at the prima-facie-showing stage of the
proceeding, the question before the district court is limited to whether the movant made
allegations which, if true, woul d allow the district court to ru le that the department acted
unreasonably in not making the pl acement requested by the movant. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(b), (c). Thus, at the prima-facie-showing stage of the proceeding, any
focus on whether the coun ty acted reasonably in placing, or retaining a placement of, X
with the foster family was improper.
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made allegations which, if true, would allow the district court to rule that the county acted
unreasonably in declining to make the placement requested by the movant.
B. The district court abused its discret ion by concluding that aunt failed to
make a prima facie showing of unreasonableness.

We next consider whether the district c ourt abused its discretion by concluding that
aunt’s allegations, properly treated, failed to make a prima facie showing that the county
acted unreasonably in the requested placement. See L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570. Generally,
a district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that are unsupported by the
record, it improperly applies the law, or it otherwise resolves the discretionary question in
a manner that is contrary to logic and facts on the record. Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d
257, 262 (Minn. 2022); Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997); see In re
Adoption of T.A.M. , 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2010) (appl ying this aspect of
Dobrin in an adoption appeal). When addressing whether a movant makes a prima facie
case, however, the district court accepts the m ovant’s assertions as true and disregards
contrary assertions of the nonmoving party. L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d 570-71. Therefore, at the
prima-facie-case stage of the proceedings, the di strict court does not find facts, and the
district court’s assessment of whether th e movant’s motion and supporting documents
make a prima facie case is based on the movant’s allegations. Additionally, as emphasized
in our prior decision in this case, Minnesota law clearly requires a county to prioritize
relatives when making placement decisions. M.L.S., 964 N.W.2d at 449-50; see Minn.
Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(a) (requiring c onsideration of relative placement before
consideration of other important fri ends, such as foster families); see also Minn. Stat.
18
§ 260C.221(a) (2020) (stating that a county “s hall” consider placement with a relative
without delay when a child is removed from a parent). Further, a court must notify relatives
who have expressed a willingness to adopt of any review hear ings concerning adoption.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 2(5) (Supp. 2021).
Here, the district court abused its discreti on when it ruled that aunt failed to make a
prima facie showing that the county acted un reasonably in not making aunt’s requested
placement of X. Specifically, aunt’s moti on for adoptive placemen t alleges that she
repeatedly expressed her desire to foster and adopt X beginning in October 2019—around
the same time that the county placed X with the foster fam ily. According to aunt, the
county initially assured her that she would be considered as an adoptive placement. Aunt
also alleges, however, that th e county never responde d to her requests for visitation with
X, failed to contact her after the June 2020 TPR, proceeded with a plan to place X for
adoption with the foster family, ignored her communications, and moved to rule her out as
an adoptive placement in Octobe r 2020. Aunt also alleges that she obtained an adoption
home study and is otherwise a suitable placement for X.
On this record, and assuming aunt’s allega tions to be true, ruling that aunt did not
make a prima facie showing that the county was unreasonable in failing to place X with
her for adoption would both misapply the la w by failing to give aunt the statutory
preference accorded relatives, and be contrary to logic and facts in the record. Accordingly,
the district court’s determination that aunt failed to make a prima face case was an abuse
of discretion.
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C. Because aunt made a prima fa cie showing that the county was
unreasonable in failing to make her requested adoptive placement, she
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

As noted, whether a movant makes a pr ima facie case that the county acted
unreasonably in not making the requested adoptive placement is dispositive of whether the
movant gets an evidentiary hearing on a mo tion for an adoptive plac ement. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.607, subd. 6(c); L.L.P., 836 N.W.2d at 570. Here, the district court’s denial of an
evidentiary hearing was consistent with its determination that aunt did not make the
required prima facie showing. But because we conclude that aunt made a prima facie case,
aunt was, necessarily, entitled to an eviden tiary hearing on her motion. We therefore
reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on aunt’s motion for adoptive placement.
In conducting the evidentiary hearing and deciding aunt’s motion, the district court
should follow the process set forth by Minnesota Statutes section 260C.607, subdivision
6(d). But we express no opinion about how the district court should resolve the merits of
aunt’s motion following the evidentiary hearing.
II. On remand, the district court should readdress aunt’s motion for visitation.

Aunt argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for visitation with X.
The district court orally denied the visita tion motion before ruli ng on aunt’s motion for
adoptive placement, stating that X “doesn’t need any -- anything that may be disruptive in
her life.”
A district court’s duty to review a count y’s progress in facilitating an adoption
requires the district court to consider wh ether the child’s out-of-home placement plan
includes the services and supports necessary to, among other things, meet the child’s needs
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for visitation with relatives. Minn. Stat. § 260C.607, subd. 4 (a)(2)(iii) (2020). While the
district court was admirably c oncerned with X’s need for stability in her life, we have
concluded that aunt is entitled to an ev identiary hearing on he r motion for adoptive
placement. Because it is conceivable that, afte r the evidentiary hearing, the district court
may award aunt the placement she seeks, the di strict court’s rationale for denying aunt’s
motion for visitation is now stale. Therefore, on remand, the district court shall readdress
the propriety of awarding aunt visitation pending resolution of her motion for an adoptive
placement. And after resolving aunt’s motion for an adoptive placement, the district court
shall, given its resolution of that motion, ma ke any additional change s in visitation that
may be appropriate. We express no opinion regarding how the district court should resolve
the remanded visitation questions.
Reversed and remanded.