In the Matter of the Welfare of: R. K. W., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1684

In the Matter of the Welfare of:
R. K. W., Child.

Filed July 5, 2022
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-JV-21-1035, 27-JV-20-3522

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant R.K.W.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered an d decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant, a juvenile, asserts that the district court erred when it certified him for
prosecution as an adult in two criminal cases. He argues that the district court erred by
combining its evaluation of the second public -safety factor and making a single
certification determination for the two separate proceedings and by failing to find that his
remorse diminished his culpability in the second case. Although the district c ourt erred in
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its analysis of the second public -safety factor, we conclude the district court did not abuse
its discretion in considering appellant’s remorse or in certifying appellant for prosecution
as an adult in both cases. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant R.K.W. challenges the district court’s determination that he should be
certified for prosecution as an adult in two criminal cases. R.K.W. was born in December
2003, and he was 16 years old at the time of the first offense and 17 years old at the time
of the second offense.
The first offense occurred o n September 27, 2020, when R.K.W. and two
accomplices arrived at F.T.’s apartment after communicating with F.T. on Facebook and
agreeing to sell him a cell phone. 1 When the three young men arrived at F.T.’s apartment,
they threatened F.T. and demanded his property, two of them displayed guns, and one shot
him in the foot. F.T. identified R.K.W. as one of the individuals holding a gun and standing
at F.T.’s apartment door but said R.K.W. was not the individual who shot him . During a
traffic stop on October 6, 2020, law enforcement took R.K.W. into custody after finding a
firearm’s magazine and two cell phones in the vehicle . A lay person found a handgun at
the scene of the stop and turned it over to law enforcement. When questioned about the
September 27 incident, R.K.W. admitted to law enforcement that he was at F.T.’s
apartment for the cell -phone sale, and he said that the sale went badly and there was a
struggle.

1 For the purpose of this appeal, we presume the allegations in the complaint are true.
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Respondent S tate of Minnesota charged R.K.W. with one count of first -degree
aggravated robbery and one count of second -degree aiding or abetting assault while
possessing a dangerous weapon. In January 2021, R.K.W. pleaded guilty to count two and
was placed on extended -juvenile-jurisdiction (EJJ) probation. The court ordered R.K.W.
to complete residential programming at Minnesota Correctional Facility (MCF)-Red Wing
and to report to the juvenile detention center within two days , but he did not turn himself
in as directed and did not report to MCF -Red Wing.
The second offense occurred on February 18, 2021, when R.K.W. messaged D.H.
on Facebook Marketplace and agreed to buy three pairs of shoes from him. The two met
and talked, then R.K.W. displayed a black handgun and told D.H., “[E]ither your life or
your shoes.” D.H. gave R.K.W. the shoes , and R.K.W. left. D .H. reported the incident to
law enforcement and identified R.K.W. as the per son who robbed him. R.K.W. contacted
D.H., “expressed remorse for his actions,” and offered to return D.H.’s shoes by dropping
the shoes off near where they initially met. The state charged R.K.W. with first -degree
aggravated robbery.
In May 2021, the state filed motions to certify R.K.W. for adult prosecution in the
second case and to revoke R.K.W.’s EJJ probation and execute his adult sentence in the
first case. R.K.W. moved to withdraw his guilty plea in the first case, and the district court
granted his request based on its finding of a manifest injustice.
The parties appeared for R.K.W.’s adult-certification hearing in both cases, which
took place over three days in October and November 2021. The district court reviewed
R.K.W.’s probation agent’s November 25, 2020 certification study for the first case
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recommending that the case proceed as an EJJ prosecution, her June 11, 2021 certification
study for the second case recommending that the court certify R.K.W. for adult
prosecution, and psychological-evaluation reports from 2020 and 2021 prepared for each
of the two cases. The district court heard testimony from R.K.W.’s witnesses: the clinical
forensic psychologist who prepared R.K.W.’s 2021 psychological evaluation and a
program lieutenant from MCF -Red Wing. The court also heard testimony from the state’s
witnesses, including the psychologist who conducted the 2020 psychological evaluation ,
R.K.W.’s investigating probation officer , a program director from MCF -Lino Lakes, and
three additional probation officers. The district court credited all the witnesses, issued
detailed findings, determined that R.K.W. failed to overcome the presumption of
certification to adult court, and granted the state’s motions for certification in both cases.
R.K.W. appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts “review the juvenile court’s decision to certify a child to adult court
for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of J.H. , 844 N.W.2d 28, 34 (Minn. 2014) . We
review questions of law de novo and findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.
Id. at 34-35. “A district court has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify a
case for adult prosecution.” In re Welfare of D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d 742, 744 (M inn. App.
1997) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998). “In determining whether the
juvenile court’s findings are clearly erroneous, we view the record in the light most
favorable to the juvenile court’s findings.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 35. A district court ’s
“finding is clearly erroneous only if there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding
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or when an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
occurred.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The district court presumes that a child will be certified for adult prosecution if
(1) the child was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the offense, (2) the delinquency petition
alleges that the child committed an offense that would result in a presumptive commitment
to prison under the sentencing guidelines or that the child committed any felony offense
while using a firearm, and (3) the district court determine d that probable cause exists to
believe the child committed the alleged offense . Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 1
(citing Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3) . To rebut the presumption, t he child bears the
burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in
the juvenile court serves public safety. Id. R.K.W. was 16 at the time of the first offense
and 17 at the time of the second. He employed a firearm in both felony offenses. Neither
party argues that the district court erred by determining that R.K.W. was presumed to be
certified for prosecution as an a dult in both cases. Because R.K.W. was presumed to be
certified, he bore the burden of rebutting that presumption.
After the district court determines that a presumption exists, it must review the
following public-safety factors to determine whether to certify the child for ad ult
prosecution:
Subd. 4. Public safety. In determining whether the
public safety is served by certifying the matter, the court shall
consider the following factors:
(1) the seriousness of the all eged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;
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(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child’s participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any
mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;
(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child’s programming history, including the
child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

In considering these factors, the court shall give greater
weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the child’s
prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed in
this subdivision.

Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4 (2020); accord Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 3
(repeating the public-safety factors). “Though each factor must be considered, the district
court is to give ‘greater weight ’ to the first and third factors.” In re Welfare of H.B. ,
956 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Minn. App. 2021) (quoting Minn. R. Juv. P. 18.06, subd. 3) , rev.
granted (Minn. May 26, 2021) . If the district court finds the child failed to rebut the
presumption, “the court shall certify the proceeding.” M inn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3
(2020).
After determining that the presumption of certification applied, t he district court
conducted the public-safety analysis for both cases in a single order. It determined that the
first and third factors weighed in favor of certification in both cases; the second factor
weighed in favor of EJJ designation in the first case and in favor of certification in the
second case and was therefore a neutral factor for both cases; the fourth factor was neutr al
and did not weigh in favor of certification or EJJ designation in both cases; and the fifth
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and sixth factors weighed in favor of EJJ designation in both cases. Thus, the district court
determined whether each factor weighed in favor of or against cert ification for each of the
cases; however, the court combined its findings for the second factor when it conducted its
analysis of the public-safety factors.
R.K.W. argues on appeal that the district court erred by (1) determining that the
second factor w eighed in favor of EJJ designation in the first case and in favor of
certification in the second case and that, therefore, the second factor was neutral for
certification of both cases, and (2) failing to consider R.K.W.’s remorse as a mitigating
factor.2
I. The district court err ed by determining that the second public-safety factor
was neutral, but that error did not result in an abuse of discretion in the first
case.

R.K.W. argues, and the state concedes, that the district court erred by failing to
consider the second public-safety factor separately for each case and instead combining its
analyses of the second factor to find the factor “neutral” for the certification analysis in
both cases. The district court determined that because the second factor weighed in favor
of EJJ designation in the first case and in favor of adult certification in the second case, the
factor was neutral. We agree with the parties that the district court erred by determining
that the second factor was neutral in both cases.

2 The state argues that the district court erred in its factual findings supporting the fourth,
fifth, and sixth factors and that those factors should have been found in favor of certification
or neutral. Because we affirm the district court’s certification of R.K.W. on other grounds,
we need not reach the state’s arguments.
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Both the statute and the rule refer only to a singular “matter,” “offense,” and
“proceeding” when describing the public -safety analysis. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd.
4; Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 3. The plain language of the statute and the rule
supports a conclusion that the analysis of the public -safety factors should be applied
independently to each case. It does not support a conclusion that the district court could
apply the analysis to multiple cases together when the child is facing certification in
separate case s. Having concluded that this was an error, we must consider whether the
error requires reversal of the district court’s certification order.
In In re Welfare of N.J.S., the district court determined that all six factors weighed
in favor of adult certification for prosecution of a juvenile. 753 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn.
2008). The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the district court erred in its analysis
of the third f actor by considering school discipline records in its analysis of the juvenile’s
prior record of delinquency. Id. The supreme court then turned to whether the error
required reversal because appellate courts do “not disturb a finding that public safety would
be served by certification unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. The supreme court stated that
“[a]s the prior record of delinquency is one of six factors, whether the error requires
reversal depends on the weight given to the ina dmissible records and the weight given the
five other factors. ” Id. Based on th ese principles, the supreme court concluded that the
district court’s determination that the five other factors weigh ed in favor of adult
certification was not clearly erroneo us and that it was not an abuse of discretion to certify
N.J.S. for adult prosecution even though the district court erred in its analysis of the third
factor. Id. at 711.
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R.K.W. argues that if the district court had not found the second factor neutral for
the public-safety analysis in both cases , the first case would have had three factor s that
weighed in favor of EJJ designation and only two factors that weighed in favor of
certification for prosecution in adult court, which he argues would have resulted in the first
case remaining in juvenile court . The state argues that the district court weighed all the
considerations in the first case and determined that public safety was served by adult -court
certification.
In R.K.W.’s first case, the district court found that the first and third factors weighed
in favor of adult -court certification, that the fifth and sixth factors weighed in favor of EJJ
designation, and that the second and fourth factors were neutral and did not weigh in favor
of or against certification. If we correct the district court’s error, the second factor weighs
in favor of EJJ designation in the first case. While R.K.W. is correct that this would result
in three factors in favor of EJJ and two factors in favor of certification in the first case, a
district court ’s application of the six statutory factors is “not a rigid, mathematical
equation.” In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation
omitted). The supreme court has repeatedly directed us to weigh the first factor—the
seriousness of the offense—and the third factor—the child’s prior record of delinquency —
the most heavily in the public-safety-factors analysis. See, e.g., N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d at 708.
The district court issued a thorough and thoughtful order certifying R.K.W. for
prosecution as an adult in both cases. The district court determined that the first and third
factors weighed in favor of adult -court certification for each of R.K.W.’s two cases . In
particular, in evaluating the first factor of seriousness of the alleged offense with respect to
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the first case, the district court noted R.K.W.’s possession of a firearm, the harm to the
victim, and the presence of at least one statutory aggravating factor due to the number of
people who actively participated in the crime . In its evaluation of the third factor of the
child’s prior record of delinquency , the district court discussed the nature and number of
adjudications for delinquency in R.K.W.’s record and the “concerning pattern of
increasingly aggressive and violent conduct” in which he has engaged.
Although the district court erred by combining its analysis of the second factor for
both cases to determine that it was neutral for each of the two cases , the district court’s
careful analysis and consideration of all six public-safety factors , including its specific
findings regarding the second factor as to each of the two separate cases, convinces us that
it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to certify R.K.W. for adult prosecution
in the first case. The district court considered all six public -safety factors and properly
weighed the first and third factors as compared with the remaining factors , including the
second factor.
We will “not disturb a finding that public safety would be served by certification
unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. at 710. The di strict court’s determination that the first
and third factors, which receive the greatest weight when considering all six factors,
weighed sufficiently in favor of adult certification to overcome its findings that the second,
fifth, and sixth factors favored EJJ designation in the first case was not clear error. Because
the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in certifying R.K.W. for adult prosecution in the first case.
Thus, the district court’s error on the second factor does not require reversa l.
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II. The district court did not err by determining that R.K.W. was culpable in the
second case notwithstanding his expression of remorse.

R.K.W. argues that the district court erred by not considering his remorse in the
second case as a mitigating factor in its analysis of the second public-safety factor. We
review the district court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at
34. The second factor requires that, in determining the child’s culpability, the district court
consider “the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing
Guidelines.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(2). The Minnesota Sentencing Guideline s
state that an offender being “particularly amenable to probation” is a mitigating factor.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7) (2020). Comment 2.D.303 adds that “[i]n determining
whether a defendant is particularly suitable to individualized treatment in a probationary
setting, for example, a court is permitted to consider the defendant ’s age, prior record,
remorse, cooperation, attitude before the court, and social support.” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines cmt. 2.D.303 (2020) (emphasis added ).
Here, the district court stated, “While it is true that [R.K.W.] contacted the victim
afterwards and expressed remorse, this does not reduce [R.K.W.’s] culpability for
committing the offense.” This statement could be read to mean that the dist rict court
considered the mitigating factor of R.K.W.’s remorse and determined it did not reduce
R.K.W.’s overall culpability or that the district court did not believe that remorse could be
a mitigating factor. This statement does not explicitly misstate the law or establish a clear
error of fact so as to constitute an abuse of discretion . Instead, the statement supports a
determination that the district court sufficiently considered the potentially mitigating factor
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of R.K.W.’s remorse and determined th at it did not reduce his culpability. See State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Minn. 2016) (affirming the district court’s determination
that the defendant’s demonstrated remorse did not make his conduct significantly less
serious than the typical conduct).
The caselaw R.K.W. cites does not support a conclusion that the district court
abused its discretion if it considered evidence of a mitigating factor and determined it did
not reduce the child’s culpability. Therefore, R.K.W. has not met his burden, and t he
district court did not err by determining that the remorse R.K.W. expressed to D.H. was
insufficient to reduce his culpability. The district court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the second factor weighed in favor of certification for
prosecution as an adult in the second case.
Affirmed.