In the Matter of the Welfare of: M. W. H., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1688

In the Matter of the Welfare of: M. W. H., Child.

Filed June 27, 2022
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-JV-20-154

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant M.W.H.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly M. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Leah A. Stauber, Assistant County
Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order certifying him for adult prosecution.
We affirm.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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FACTS
In October 2020, respondent State of Minnesota filed a juvenile delinquency
petition charging appellant M.W.H. with attempted second -degree murder.1 The petition
alleged the following facts: During the early morning hours of October 8, 2020, appellant,
then 16, stabbed his then 13 -year-old brother 13 times with a kitchen knife while the
brothers were going on a walk in the woods. After stabbing his brother, appellant dragged
him down by the lake and then went home, knowing that his brother would “probably
‘bleed out.’” Approximately 12 hours later, appellant’s brother was found by some hikers
“curled up in the fetal position in a gully,” and the br other was later airlifted to a Duluth
hospital where he underwent surgery for his injuries. Police subsequently searched
appellant’s residence and, in appellant’s bedroom, discovered a “large kitchen style knife”
that appeared to have been recently washed, and “[w]et tennis shoes that appeared to have
blood in the mesh.”
Respondent moved to certify appellant as an adult, and the parties agreed that, under
Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.06, subd. 1, the presumption was in respondent’s favor. A
contested certification hearing was held at which several witnesses testified, including two
psychologists, a probation officer, a corrections lieutenant at a juvenile corrections facility,
a program director at a juvenile corrections and treatment center, a social wor ker, and
appellant’s father. This testimony, along with other evidence presented at the hearing,

1 For the purposes of certification determinations, the charges and factual allegations laid
out in the juvenile delinquency petition are presumed to be true. In re Welfare of J.H., 844
N.W.2d 28, 38 (Minn. 2014).
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established that appellant thought about calling 911 after the attack, but decided against it.
Moreover, appellant’s brother told law enforcement that appell ant returned to the scene
several hours after the attack and “said ‘still alive huh,’ and walked off.” And according
to appellant’s brother, when he asked appellant what led to the attack, appellant replied that
he wanted to see a dead body.
The district court determined that appellant was subject to presumptive certification
because he “was 16 years old and the alleged offense carries a presumptive prison
sentence.” The district court then considered the factors set forth in Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.125, subd . 4 (2020), and, after “giving greater weight to the seriousness of the
alleged offense and [appellant’s] delinquency history,” determined that five of the six
statutory factors did not rebut the presumption of certification. The district court concluded
that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances . . . the record does not support a
conclusion, by clear and convincing evidence, that public safety would be served by
designating the proceeding as an extended juvenile jurisdiction [(EJJ)] prosecution.” The
district court, therefore, granted respondent’s motion to certify appellant as an adult. This
appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s order certifying him for adult prosecution.
We review such an order for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 34 . “A district
court has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify a case for adult prosecution.
Its decision will not be reversed unless the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous so
as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfa re of D.T.H. , 572 N.W.2d 742, 744
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(Minn. App. 1997) (citation and quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998).
“In determining whether the juvenile court ’s findings are clearly erroneous, we view the
record in the light most favorable to the ju venile court’s findings.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at
35. A district court’s “finding is clearly erroneous only if there is no reasonable evidence
to support the finding or when an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake occurred.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In presumptive-certification proceedings, the state bears the burden of showing that
(1) the juvenile was 16 or 17 years old, and (2) the alleged offense carries a presumptive
prison sentence or is a felony offense involvi ng a firearm. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd.
3 (2020); see also In re Welfare of P.C.T. , 823 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 2012) , rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). If the district court finds that probable cause exists to believe
the child committed the al leged offense, the child shoulders the burden of rebutting the
“presumption [of certification] by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that
retaining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public safety.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.125, subd. 3 . If the district court finds the child failed to rebut the presumption,
“the court shall certify the proceeding.” Id.
If the district court determines that a presumption to certify exists, it must review
the following factors to determine “whether the public safety is served” by certifying the
child as an adult:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;

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(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child’s participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any
mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines;

(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;

(4) the child’s programming history, including the
child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming;

(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and

(6) the dispositional options available for the child.

Id., subd. 4. Although each factor must be considered, the district court is to give “greater
weight” to the first and third factors. Id.
The statutory factors are designed to “assess whether a juvenile presents a risk to
public safety and . . . to predict whether a juvenile is likely to offend in the future.” In re
H.S.H., 609 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Minn. App. 2000). “[P]ublic safety is the touchstone of the
analysis.” P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 685. “For purposes of certification, the juvenile is
presumed guilty of the alleged offenses.” In re Welfare of U.S. , 612 N.W.2d 192, 195
(Minn. App. 2000).
Here, th e district court determined that certification was presumed and that the
“presumption of certification is rebutted” by the child’s lack of prior delinquency. But the
district court found that none of the other five factors rebutted the presumption of
certification. Appellant challenges the district court’s decision with respect to factors two,
four, five, and six.

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A. Culpability of the child
The second factor requires the district court to examine the child ’s culpability in
committing the alleged offense. Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(2). In considering the
child’s culpability, courts should “examine the alleged offenses.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 38.
The district court here examined the alleged offense and found that appellant “acted
on his own in carrying out the assault.” Appellant agrees that the district court’s finding
that he acted alone is supported by the record. But he contends that the “dis trict court
erroneously refused to consider mitigating factors,” and that upon proper consideration, his
“level of culpability is reduced by his mental impairment.” We disagree.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines include mental impairment as a mitigating
factor: “The offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial
capacity for judgment when the offense was committed.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.D.3.1(3) (20 20). But only “extreme” mental impairment that deprives a juvenile of
control over his actions justifies sentence mitigation. State v. McLaughlin , 725 N.W.2d
703, 716 (Minn. 2007).
Here, the district court recognized the mitigating factor under the sen tencing
guidelines and found that there “is information in the file that [appellant] may suffer from
Schizoaffective Disorder.” But the district court noted that “[t]his is not a diagnosis
[appellant] had prior to the incident.” And the district court fo und that “[e]xpert opinions
differ on whether the diagnosis is appropriate, and what, if any , impact it has in reducing
[appellant’s] culpability.” Although the district court acknowledged that appellant
“experienced a significant amount of trauma throughout his life,” and that “[h]e may have
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a [r]ule 20.02 defense” to the alleged offense, the district court concluded that the “level of
sophisticated planning before, during, and after the assault” demonstrates appellant’s
culpability in the commission of t he alleged offense. The district court’s findings are
supported by the record and demonstrate that the district court appropriately weighed any
potential mitigating factors. Thus, appellant is unable to show that the district court clearly
erred in determining that the second factor did not rebut the presumption of certification.
B. Programming history
Under the fourth factor, the district court must consider the “[c]hild’s programming
history, including the child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in available
programming.” Minn. Stat. § 260B. 125, subd. 4(4). In general, “programming” refers to
“a specialized system of services, opportunities, or projects designed to meet a relevant
behavioral or social need of the child.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 38. Programming may either
be through either the juvenile justice system or a non-juvenile justice system setting that is
designed to address a relevant behavioral or social need of the child. Id. at 39.
Appellant argues that the district court clearly erred in concluding that this factor
did not rebut the presumption because he “has not had the opportunity for a long-term out
of home placement programming,” and “[h]is limited history does not suggest he would be
unwilling to engage with and succeed in future programming.” We disagree. As the
district court found, “it is unclear whether [appellant] will openly work with any potential
providers.” The record reflects that appellant was provided extensive support services from
a county public health and human services department for approximately ten years, that he
received counseling services through a range mental health facility beginning in 2016, and
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that he spent a week at a mental health center in 2019. But despite receiving some social
and mental-health services prior to this offense, appellant was described as having a “flat
affect.” And a psychologist’s report stated that appellant acknowledged being “irritated by
previous psychologists and did not take the testing seriously.” In fact, the report noted that
appellant “strongly resisted discussing the specifics of the actual assault,” has a history of
resistance to taking psychiatric medications, and did not agree with the previous
determination that he was incompetent to stand trial. Finally, appellant fails to show how
his participation in programming would serve the interests of public safety. See Matter of
Welfare of H.B., 956 N.W.2d 7, 14 -15 (Minn. App. 2021) (stating that the disputed issue
with the fourth factor is not whether the child “might benefit from programming were he
to actually take part and complete it”; rather the issue is “whether programming as part of
EJJ serves public-safety interests rather than adult certification”), rev. granted (Minn. May
26, 2021). Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in finding that this factor failed
to rebut the presumption of adult certification.
C. Adequacy of punishment or programming available in the juvenile justice
system and the dispositional options available for the child

The fifth and sixth factors consider “the adequacy of the punishment or
programming available in the juvenile just ice system” and the “dispositional options
available for the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(5) , (6). These two factors are
frequently considered together. See, e.g., D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d at 745. In addressing the
adequacy of juvenile justice punishment, it is appropriate to consider the length of potential
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sentences of the dispositional options and whether those sentences “sufficiently address the
seriousness of the offense or ensure public safety.” J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 39.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in finding that the fifth and sixth factors
weigh in favor of certification because its determination that “public safety on this factor
is served by certifying [appellant] to stand trial as an adult is refuted by its . . . finding that
there are suitable juvenile disposition options.” “But the mere availability of juvenile
programming does not necessarily favor maintaining juvenile jurisdiction.” In re Welfare
of R.D.M., III, 825 N.W.2d 394, 401 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2013).
Moreover, this court has recognized that “[i]n some cases, a strong need for treatment that
. . . would require more time to complete than that remaining under juvenile jurisdiction
may weigh in favor of certification.” H.S.H., 609 N. W.2d at 263. And the certification
statute emphasizes public safety rather than treatment options. State v. Mitchell , 577
N.W.2d 481, 489 (Minn. 1998).
Here, the district court considered appellant’s mental -health issues along with the
treatment options available to address those issues. But the district court also considered
that it was unclear whether there was sufficient time to complete treatment and whether
appellant was even open to participating in treatment. The district court then noted the
severity of the offense and the lengthy presumptive prison sentence associated with the
offense. The district court determined that the interests of public safety favored
certification, particularly in light of the disparity between the presumptive prison sentence
and the amount of time the court would have jurisdiction over appellant in the EJJ system.
The district court’s findings on these factors are well reasoned and supported by the record.
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Therefore, under these circumstances, appellant cannot show that the district court erred in
determining that the fifth and sixth factors weigh in favor of certification.
D. Weighing of the factors
The ultimate question here is whether the district court clearly erred by finding that
public safety was best served by certifying this case to adult court. See J.H., 844 N.W.2d
at 35. After making extensi ve findings, the district court determined that five of the six
public-safety factors failed to rebut the presumption of certification. One of these factors
was the seriousness of the offense, which is one of the two factors that must be given the
greatest weight. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4. The district court thoroughly
analyzed each factor and, as discussed above, the record supports the district court’s
findings and analysis of each factor. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that public safety is best served by certifying appellant for adult
prosecution.
Affirmed.