James Zika, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1710

James Zika,
Appellant,

vs.

Elder Care of Minnesota, Inc., et al.,
Defendants,

Naree Weaver,
Respondent.

Filed August 22, 2022
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CV-19-240

Suzanne M. Scheller, Scheller Legal Solutions LLC, Champlin, Minnesota; and

Kennel L. LaBore, Guardian Legal Serices LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant)

John E. Valen, Valen Law Office, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jennifer E. Olson, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Patrick Stoneking, Jeff Anderson & Associates P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for amicus curiae
Minnesota Association for Justice)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
2
SYLLABUS
Under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(2) (2020), a private guardian
is immune from liability for damages for negligently performing the guardian’s duty to
provide for the care, comfort, and maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship.
OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant James Zika is the next of kin and personal representative of the estate of
his sister, the late Jean Krause. After Jean’s1 death, Zika brought this action against
respondent Naree Weaver , who was Jean’s private guardian, claiming that Weaver
negligently performed her duties as Jean’s guardian and seeking general damages. After a
bench trial, the district court dismissed the negligence claims against Weaver, concluding
that, under Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(2)—a provision of Minnesota’s guardianship act,
Minn. Stat. §§ 524.5- 101 to .5-502 (2020)––Weaver is immune from liability for Zika’s
claims. In a prior ruling on a motion for partial summary judgment, the district court also
determined that Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 2 (2020)—a statute permitting only special
damages for injuries unrelated to a decedent’s death—barred an award of general damages,
rejecting Zika’s argument that the statute is unconstitutional as applied.
Zika challenges the district court’s decision that Weaver is immune from liability
under section 524.5-313(c)(2), arguing that the provision precludes liability only for a
guardian’s failure to apply for government benefits or services on behalf of the person

1 To avoid confusion, we use first names when referring to Jean Krause and her son, Robert
Krause.
3
subject to guardianship. Zika also challenges the district court’s decision regarding the
limitation on damages on behalf of a decedent, arguing that section 573.02 as applied to
the class of elderly and disabled persons violates the Minnesota Constitution.
We hold that that plain language of section 524.5-313(c)(2) grants a guardian
immunity from liability for negligence in the performance of the guardian’s duty to provide
for the care, comfort, and maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship. We
further hold that the district court did not err when it applied that immunity to the
negligence claims against Weaver. Because the negligence claims are barred by immunity,
we need not reach the second issue on appeal ––whether the limitation of damages under
section 573.02, subdivision 2, is unconstitutional as applied. We affirm.
FACTS
Jean was a 77-year-old retired nurse. Later in her life, she suffered from advanced
Alzheimer’s disease. Jean became a resident at Heritage House of Pequot Lakes on
December 28, 2012, after her son, Robert Krause, who had previously been living with and
caring for Jean, was injured and could no longer care for her. Weaver, a long-time friend
and neighbor of Jean, was appointed as Jean’s emergency guardian and conservator on
December 13, 2012; Robert agreed with this temporary appointment, but he wanted to be
informed about his mother’s care.
On March 4, 2013, Weaver was appointed as Jean’s guardian and conservator.
According to the March 4 order, Weaver, as guardian, had the power and duty to
“[e]xercise all of the rights and powers on behalf of [Jean] under M.S . § 524.5-313
4
subd. (c) paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 . . . and to exercise all other powers, duties and
responsibilities conferred on the Guardian under applicable law.”
Throughout Jean’s residency at Heritage House, Zika and Robert had a difficult time
obtaining Jean’s health information from both Weaver and Heritage House. In October
2013, Jane Brink of the Office of Ombudsman for Long-Term Care in the Minnesota Board
on Aging became involved in Jean’s case; Brink remained involved until Jean’s death .
Brink helped Robert and Zika negotiate an agreement with Heritage House to provide
information about Jean’s health directly to Robert or Zika. Robert received information
from Heritage House until 2016, after which the staff no longer kept Robert or Zika
informed of Jean’s condition.
In 2015, Zika and Robert petitioned to have Weaver removed as guardian and
conservator. The court appointed Zika as conservator but continued the appointment of
Weaver as Jean’s guardian. The court also ordered Zika to release $6,000 of Jean’s funds
to Robert for the purchase of a vehicle. After Robert purchased a vehicle, he was able to
visit Jean about every other day. In 2016, he moved to Pequot Lakes and visited Jean almost
every day.
On May 8, 2016, Jean was sexuall y assaulted in her room by an employee of
Heritage House. After another staff member came into the room and apparently interrupted
the assault, Jean was immediately taken to the hospital, where a sexual assault was
confirmed. The perpetrator was later convicted of the crime. The day after the assault, Jean
was released from the hospital and returned to Heritage House. She lived there for another
four months, until she died on September 18, 2016, of causes unrelated to the assault.
5
Jean’s guardian, Weaver, was immediately informed of the sexual assault when it
happened, but Weaver did not inform Jean’s family members. Brink also did not inform
Zika or Robert about the sexual assault because she assumed that someone else would tell
them. Jean’s family members did not learn of the assault until July 2017, ten months after
Jean’s death and 14 months after the assault, when the Crow Wing County Attorney’s
Office informed Robert of the sexual assault.
In the four months between the assault and her death, Jean never received services
for trauma related to the sexual assault. Weaver never sought trauma treatment for Jean.
Robert believed the sexual assault coincided with his mother’s decline in health. He stated
that, had he known of the assault, he would have removed Jean from Heritage House,
sought trauma treatment for her, and petitioned for removal of Weaver as guardian.
In January 2019, Zika brought a negligence claim against Weaver, alleging that
Weaver breached her duties as Jean’s guardian by (1) not monitoring her care after she was
sexually assaulted; (2) failing to provide care, comfort, and rehabilitation care and services
to Jean after the sexual assault; (3) failing to inform Zika and Robert of the sexual assault;
and (4) withholding Jean’s health information from Robert and Zika.
2
Zika moved for partial summary judgment, asking the district court to determine
that general damages were available for his claims, arguing that Minn. Stat. § 573.02,
subd. 2— which allows for a personal-injury action on behalf of a decedent whose death

2 Zika also sued Elder Care of Minnesota, Inc., Minnesota Heritage House, Inc., and
Heritage House of Pequot Lakes, as well as James Birchem, the administrator of Heritage
House. The claims involving those defendants settled, and this appeal involves only the
claims against Weaver.
6
was unrelated to the injury but limits damages to special damages–– is unconstitutional as
applied. The district court denied that motion. After a bench trial in July 2021, the district
court dismissed the negligence claims against Weaver.
Zika appeals.
ISSUES
Is Weaver immune from liability for negligence in the performance of her duties as
Jean’s guardian under Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(2)?3
ANALYSIS
Whether Weaver has immunity from the negligence claims against her depends on
the interpretation of a provision of a section of Minnesota’s guardianship act. We review
the interpretation of a statute de novo. See Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624
(Minn. 2016); In re Guardianship of Tschumy, 853 N.W.2d 728, 742 (Minn. 2014)
(applying de novo review in a guardianship context).
The purpose of statutory interpretation is “to ascertain and effectuate the intention
of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). When the meaning of the statute is
unambiguous, the plain language of the statute controls. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d
914, 920 (Minn. 2019). To determine the meaning of a statute, we construe words

3 Zika does not claim any special damages; he claims only general damages. Under section
573.02, subdivision 2, general damages are unavailable for personal-injury claims brought
on behalf of decedents when the decedent’s cause of death was unrelated to the injury. Zika
challenges that statute as unconstitutional as applied to the class of elderly persons with
disabilities receiving healthcare services as residents of long-term care facilities. Because
we conclude that, under section 524.5-313(c)(2), Weaver may not be held liable for Zika’s
negligence claims against her, we need not address Zika’s challenge to the constitutionality
of the limitation on damages in section 573.02, subdivision 2.
7
according to rules of grammar and to their common and ordinary meaning. Id. We do not
examine the disputed statutory language in isolation but rather read and interpret the
provisions of the statute as a whole. Id. If the plain language of the statute is subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation, then the statute is ambiguous. Id. In that case, we
may use the canons of construction to resolve ambiguity. Id. For example, we may consider
the legislative history of the statute. Minn. Stat. § 645.16.
A. The Plain Language of Section 524.5-313(c)(2)
The statutory language in dispute here is found in section 524.5-313(c). That section
states, in relevant part:
The duties and powers of a guardian or those which the court
may grant to a guardian include, but are not limited to:

. . . .

(2) the duty to provide for the care, comfort, and
maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship,
including food, clothing, shelter, health care, social and
recreational requirements, and, whenever appropriate, training,
education, and habilitation or rehabilitation. The guardian has
no duty to pay for these requirements out of personal funds.
Whenever possible and appropriate, the guardian should meet
these requirements through governmental benefits or services
to which the person subject to guardianship is entitled, rather
than from the estate of the person subject to guardianship.
Failure to satisfy the needs and requirements of this clause
shall be grounds for removal of a private guardian, but the
guardian shall have no personal or monetary liability[.]

(Emphasis added.)
The district court concluded, and Weaver argues on appeal, that all of Zika’s
negligence claims against Weaver in her capacity as guardian are barred by the plain
8
language of the last sentence of this clause. Weaver argues that the phrase “needs and
requirements of this clause” covers all the duties listed in the clause. Zika, on the other
hand, contends that the last sentence precludes liability only for the guardian’s failure to
apply for government benefits for the care of the person subject to guardianship.
We begin with the language of section 524.5 -313(c)(2). The final sentence of that
provision states, “Failure to satisfy the needs and requirements of this clause shall be
grounds for removal of a private guardian, but the guardian shall have no personal or
monetary liability.” The word “but” is used to indicate a contrast or an exception. See
American Heritage Dictionary 253 (5th ed. 2018) (defining “but” as, among other things,
“[o]n the contrary,” “[c]ontrary to expectation,” or “except that”). Thus, the two clauses in
the sentence relate to and contrast with each other. With that understanding, the sentence
logically means that, although failure to satisfy the needs and requirements of the clause
shall be grounds for removal, that failure is not grounds for personal or monetary liability.
The question then becomes what “[f]ailure to satisfy the needs and requirements of
this clause” means. Zika argues that the sentence prevents liability only for the guardian’s
failure to obtain government benefits. But the sentence refers to the “[f]ailure to satisfy the
needs and requirements of this clause.” And the terms “needs” and “requirements” are used
throughout the clause and before any reference to the guardian’s obligation to seek
available governmental benefits. The clause begins with “the duty to provide for the care,
comfort, and maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship, including food,
clothing, shelter, health care, social and recreational requirements.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-
313(c)(2) (emphasis added). The clause continues that a guardian has no duty to “pay for
9
these requirements” out of personal funds. Id. (emphasis added). Instead, the clause states,
the guardian “should meet these requirements through governmental benefits or services
to which the person subject to guardianship is entitled.” Id. (emphasis added). The final
sentence then provides that a guardian shall have no liability for failure to satisfy the “needs
and requirements of this clause.” Id. It is plain that the final sentence is referring to the
needs and requirements identified throughout the entire text of section 524.5-313(c)(2), not
just to the guardian’s obligation to secure available government benefits.4
Zika argues, though, that broad immunity under section 524.5-313(c)(2) is not
logical when read within the context of the larger guardianship statute. Specifically, Zika
points to section 524.5-315, which is titled “Rights and Immunities of Guardian ;
Limitations” and reads:
A guardian is not liable to a third person for acts of the person
subject to guardianship solely by reason of the relationship. A
guardian who exercises reasonable care in choosing a third
person providing medical or other care, treatment, or service
for the person subject to guardianship is not liable for injury to
the person subject to guardianship resulting from the wrongful
conduct of the third person.

Minn. Stat. § 524.5-315(b). Zika asserts that, if the legislature had intended to provide
immunity for the guardian’s own negligent acts, it would have included that immunity in
this provision.

4At oral argument to this court, Zika argued that “this clause” unambiguously refers to only
the second-to -last sentence of section 524.5-313(c)(2), which discusses government
benefits. But a clause is not a sentence. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a clause as “[a]
distinct section or provision of a legal document or instrument.” Black’s Law Dictionary
315 (11th ed. 2019). In section 524.4-313(c)(2), “this clause” unambiguously refers to the
entire provision (c)(2).
10
But the legislature unambiguously included immunity from liability for the specific
duties listed under section 524.5-313(c)(2). And that immunity, when read and interpreted
within the statute as a whole, still plainly exempts a guardian from “ personal or monetary
liability” for the failure to fulfill those specific duties —namely, “to provide for the care,
comfort, and maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship.” Minn. Stat.
§ 524.5-313(c)(2). Section 524.5-315 does not state that the immunities listed there are a
guardian’s only immunities; section 524.5-315 provides additional, specific immunities for
guardians. These immunities are independent of the immunity granted to guardians in
section 524.5-313(c)(2).5
Zika further argues that, because this court has not interpreted the conservatorship
statute––which contains the same language regarding liability as the guardianship statute—
as granting blanket immunity to conservators, we should not interpret the guardianship
statute as granting immunity to guardians. See Minn. Stat. § 524.5-417(c)(1) (2020)
(“Failure to satisfy the needs and requirements of this section shall be grounds for removal,
but the conservator shall have no personal or monetary liability.”). Zika cites to In re
Conservatorship of Moore, 409 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. App. 1987), to support this proposition.
But in Moore, after we determined that a conservator improperly used the conservatees’
funds, we ordered the removal of the conservator, the forfeiture of his bond, and attorney

5 We note that Minn. Stat. § 524.5-112(a) (2020) provides that termination of a guardian
or conservator “does not affect the liability of either for previous acts.” This provision also
does not contradict section 524.5-313(c)(2). The immunity granted to guardians in section
524.5-313(c)(2) is not immunity for every possible act by a guardian; just for acts under
the duties listed in that clause.
11
fees; liability was not at issue. 409 N.W.2d at 17. Thus, Moore does not support Zika’s
contention that the conservatorship statute has been interpreted to not grant conservators
similar immunity as is at issue here.
In sum, we conclude that, under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(2),
read within the context of the statute as a whole, a private guardian is immune from liability
for negligence in the performance of a guardian’s duty “to provide for the care, comfort,
and maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship.”6
B. The Legislative History of Section 524.5-313(c)(2)
Zika argues that section 524.5-313(c)(2) is ambiguous as to the scope of immunity
granted to the guardian and we thus must look to the legislative history, which, according
to Zika, is “instructive and clear.” Because we conclude that the statute is unambiguous,
we need not consult the legislative history. But, even if we determined that the statute were
ambiguous, we would not be persuaded that the legislative history supports Zika’s
interpretation.

6 Zika also argues that our reading of the immunity provision of section 524.5-313(c)(2)
would be absurd and that it runs afoul of the purpose of the guardianship statutes—to
protect the person subject to guardianship. But the language of the statute is clear. And,
because it is clear, we will not speculate about or evaluate the policy reasons that the
legislature may have considered when determining the scope of this immunity provision.
See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (“When the words of a law in their application to an existing
situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”); Leifur v. Leifur, 820 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. App.
2012) (noting a party’s “meritorious policy arguments” supporting his proposed reading of
a statute, but rejecting that proposed reading of the statute because “this court may not
disregard unambiguous statutory language”).
12
Zika’s argument relies on amendments made to the guardianship statute in 1981 and
2003.7 In 1981, the legislature made amendments to the guardianship statute, including the
addition of the sentence that is at issue in this case. See 1981 Minn. Laws ch. 313, § 9, at
1455 (“Failure to satisfy the needs and requirements of this clause shall be grounds for
removal, but the guardian or conservator shall have no personal or monetary liability.”).
The 1981 amendments began as a senate bill, S.F. 574, 1981 Reg. Sess., and a house bill,
H.F. 626, 1981 Reg. Sess. S.F. 574 originally included the sentence at issue at the end of
the entire subdivision regarding the duties and powers of the guardian or conservator of the
person, in a separate paragraph that followed the entire list of duties and powers. S.F. 574,
1981 Reg. Sess., § 9, subd. 3(7). In other words, the immunity provision applied not just to
the clause regarding the duty to provide for the care, comfort, and maintenance needs of
the person subject to guardianship but more broadly to all the duties listed in other clauses
in the subdivision. A March 26, 1981 subcommittee report on S.F. 574 by the law-revision
subcommittee of the senate judiciary committee recommended moving that sentence to its
current place in the statute. S. 72-SCS0574A- 1, Reg. Sess., at 3-4 (Minn. Mar. 26, 1981).
The original placement of the immunity provision at the end of all of the clauses listing a
guardian’s duties and its movement to the end of one clause listing the duties to provide
for the care, comfort, and maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship does

7 In the modern statute, a “guardian” is the equivalent of a “guardian or conservator of the
person.” A “conservator” is the equivalent of a “guardian or conservator of the estate.”
These changes were made in 2003. Compare Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313 (2004), and Minn.
Stat. § 524.5-417 (2004), with Minn. Stat. § 525.56 (2002). If not specified, when we use
“guardian” in this opinion, we mean a guardian or conservator of the person. When we use
“conservator,” we mean a guardian or conservator of the estate.
13
not suggest a legislative intent to limit a guardian’s immunity to only the failure to apply
for government benefits, which is discussed in just a single sentence within that clause.
To support his argument, Zika points to a summary of the 1981 proposed
amendments to the guardianship statute from the Legal Services Advocacy Project, a n
advocacy group, that is attached to the March 26, 1981 senate subcommittee report. This
summary states that the section of the bill covering the duties and powers of the guardian
or conservator of the person “[c]larifies that failure to obtain governmental benefits to
which the ward or conservatee is entitled whenever possible and appropriate is grounds for
removal but does not subject the conservator or guardian to personal or monetary liability.”
S. 72-SCS0574A-1, Reg. Sess., Legal Services Advocacy Project Summary of Proposed
Amendments, at 3 (Minn. Mar. 26, 1981). But this is just a summary of the proposed
amendment, not the actual language of the statute. Further, while it identifies one specific
type of immunity, it does not rule out broader immunity. If the legislature had wanted to
provide immunity for guardians solely for their failure to obtain government benefits, it
could have said so; it did not.
Additionally, a house- research-department report on the house bill, H.F. 626,
summarized the relevant bill section as “to provide that failure to satisfy duties by guardian
of the person is grounds for removal, but not grounds for personal or monetary liability.”
Minn. H.R. Rsch. Dep’t, Bill Summary of H.F. 626 and S.F. 574, at 2 (Minn. Apr. 16,
1981). Another house-research-department report summarized the relevant section of the
bill as: “A guardian/conservator who does not fulfill requirements of this section can be
removed but has no other personal or financial liability.” Minn. H.R. Rsch. Dep’t, Bill
14
Summary of H.F. 626, at 2 (Minn. Apr. 14, 1981). That bill section included all the duties
and powers of a guardian. Neither of these reports suggests that the immunity in the clause
at issue does not apply to all the duties listed in the clause.
Zika next relies on r evisions made to the guardianship statute in 2003. 8 See
generally 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 12, art. 1. These revisions adopted much of the Uniform
Guardianship and Protection Proceedings Act (1997) (UGPPA). Id. Specifically, Zika
directs us to the addition of Minn. Stat. § 524.5-315, which immunizes a guardian from
liability to third persons who are injured by the person subject to guardianship as well as
from liability to the person subject to guardianship for harm by third persons reasonably
selected to provide care to the person. 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 12, art. 1, § 38 , at 140. As
discussed above, the immunities covered in section 524.5-315 do not contradict the
immunity found in section 524.5 -313(c)(2). Further, the legislat ure did not adopt the
section of the UGPPA related to duties of a guardian, instead retaining the pre-2003
language in section 524.5-313. Compare 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 12, art. 1, § 37, at 138, with
Minn. Stat. § 525.56, subd. 3 (2002). If the legislature had wanted to limit immunity to the
immunities in section 524.5-315, it could have done so.
Ultimately, we are not persuaded that, even if the statute were ambiguous, the
legislative history supports Zika’s narrow interpretation of section 524.5-313(c)(2).

8 The 2003 revisions also changed the numbering of the statute. See generally 2003 Minn.
Laws ch. 12, art. 1.

15
C. Weaver’s Liability
Having concluded that section 524.5-313(c)(2) provides immunity to a guardian for
liability for negligence related to performance of the guardian’s duty to provide for the
care, comfort, and maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship, we turn to
whether the district court erred by determining that that immunity applies to Zika’s claims
against Weaver.
Zika argues that, even if Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(2) grants broad immunity for a
guardian’s negligence in performing their statutory duties, that immunity does not apply to
Zika’s claims because those claims are also based on the common law. He asserts that a
guardian’s duties may be found in either statute or common law and that, while a statute
may establish the standard by which a common-law negligence claim is measured, the
claim remains a common-law claim. He contends that his claims here include common-
law claims that are unaffected by the immunity granted by section 524.313(c)(2).
Weaver, on the other hand, argues that Zika has stated no viable claims against her
because all of the negligence claims are founded on Weaver’s statutory duties and the
statute does not expressly or impliedly create a civil cause of action. Weaver asserts that,
though the district court did not address this argument in its ruling, we should conclude
that Zika has failed to state a claim against her.
Because the district court ruled on the basis of immunity, we begin with that issue.
In the immunity context, we review the district court’s application of the law de novo. See
Rehn v. Fischley, 557 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1997). We assume for purposes of argument
that a cause of action exists at common law for negligence in the performance of a
16
guardian’s duty to provide for the care, comfort, and maintenance needs of the person
subject to guardianship. With that assumption, we must analyze whether section 524.5-
313(c)(2) modifies the common law to preclude liability for negligence in performing that
duty. We conclude that it does.
While statutes are presumed to be consistent with the common law, the legislature
may abrogate or modify a rule of the common law by express wording or by necessary
implication. See Jepsen as Tr. for Dean v. County of Pope, 966 N.W.2d 472, 484 (Minn.
2021). Section 524.5-313(c)(2) establishes “the duty to provide for the care, comfort, and
maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship,” which includes “health care,
social and recreational requirements . . . and habilitation or rehabilitation.” The clause then
states, “Failure to satisfy the needs and requirements of this clause shall be grounds for
removal of a private guardian, but the guardian shall have no personal or monetary
liability.” As we explained above, this sentence plainly affords immunity to the guardian
for negligence in the performance of the duties in that clause. By listing the specific duties
and providing immunity for failure to satisfy those duties, the legislature by its express
wording abrogated or modified the common law by providing immunity from any
negligence claims that are based on those duties. Therefore, even if a complaint alleges that
a guardian breached their common-law duty to provide for the care, comfort, or
maintenance of a person subject to guardianship, the immunity afforded by section 524.5-
313(c)(2) applies to the claim.
We next determine whether Zika’s specific claims against Weaver fit under a
guardian’s duties of providing care, comfort, and maintenance. In the complaint and at trial,
17
Zika alleged that Weaver breached her duties as Jean’s guardian by (1) not monitoring her
care after she was sexually assaulted, (2) failing to provide care, comfort, and rehabilitation
care and services to Jean after the sexual assault, (3) failing to inform Zika and Robert of
the sexual assault, and (4) withholding Jean’s health information from Robert and Zika.
We conclude, as did the district court, that Zika’s claims directly implicate Weaver’s
duty, under section 524.5-313(c)(2), to provi de for the care, comfort, and maintenance
needs of the person subject to guardianship. Any claims related to Jean’s care or Weaver’s
failure to give or arrange for proper care for Jean are covered by the explicit “care” duty.
As for the duty to communicate with known interested persons, that duty was not added to
the guardianship statute until 2020, four years after Jean’s death. See 2020 Minn. Laws.
ch. 86, art. 1, § 23. But even before 2020, notifying family members would have fallen
within the guardian’s duty in section 524.5-313(c)(2) to provide for the care, comfort, and
maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship. Jean’s son testified that, had he
known of the assault, the family would have sought trauma treatment for Jean and would
have found her a different residential care facility—actions that would have been directed
at serving Jean’s care, comfort, and maintenance needs. Zika cites to the Minnesota
Association for Guardianship and Conservatorship (MAGiC) standards of practice as a
source for identifying the guardian’s duties . MAGiC, a non-profit organization that
promotes best practices in the guardian and conservator contexts, develops its standards of
practice as a resource for guardians and conservators. Those standards, while not legal
authority, include communication with family members, including about medical
conditions, under the section about “Care, Comfort, and Maintenance,” which includes a
18
citation to Minn. Stat. § 524-313(c)(2). In sum, the actions on which the negligence claims
against Weaver are founded all relate to her duties under section 524.5-313(c)(2). The
immunity provision of that clause therefore applies to those claims.
This conclusion is consistent with our decision in Jackson ex rel. Sorenson v.
Options Residential, Inc., 896 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. App. 2017)—a case cited by the district
court that Zika contends actually supports his argument. In Jackson, we concluded that the
immunity provided in the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act (CTA) did not apply
to the common-law negligence claim asserted in that case. 896 N.W.2d at 556-57. There,
a resident in a group home sued the group home for negligence in connection with injuries
inflicted upon him by another resident who was under commitment pursuant to the CTA.
Id. at 551. The group home argued that it had immunity from the claims based on an
immunity provision in the CTA. Id. at 553. That provision states that “[a]ll persons acting
in good faith . . . who act pursuant to any provision of this chapter or who procedurally or
physically assist in the commitment of any individual, pursuant to this chapter, are not
subject to any civil or criminal liability under this chapter.” See id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 253B.23, subd. 4 (2016)). In rejecting the group home’s argument,
we held that the immunity afforded by that provision applies only to a person’s liability in
connection with performing the duties associated with the civil commitment of persons
under that chapter. Id. at 555. Because the negligence claim at issue did not implicate any
“of the duties or rights established by the [CTA]” but instead was founded on “acts or
omissions entirely unrelated to any provision of the CTA,” we concluded that the immunity
provision did not apply. Id. at 556. Here, in contrast, Zika’s negligence claims do implicate
19
the “duties or rights” established by section 524.5-313(c)(2). The immunity in that clause
therefore applies.
In sum, because Weaver is immune from Zika’s negligence claims under section
524.5-313(c)(2), the district court did not err by dismissing them.
DECISION
The plain meaning of Minn. Stat. § 524.5-313(c)(2) (2020) is that a private guardian
is immune from liability for negligence related to the guardian’s duty to provide for the
care, comfort, and maintenance needs of the person subject to guardianship. This immunity
precludes liability for the negligence claims made here against Weaver. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Zika’s negligence claims against Weaver.
Affirmed.