State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1734

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Derrick George Rocha,
Appellant.

Filed December 12, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-17-2384

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, First Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal from his conviction of second- degree sale of a controlled substance
in a prohibited zone, appellant argues that his conviction must be reversed because the state
failed to prove that he constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in his vehicle
2
and that he intended to sell it. Alternatively, appellant seeks a new trial on the ground that
the district court committed prejudicial error by admitting evidence of appellant’s other
drug-possession offenses. We affirm.
FACTS
Following an attempted traffic stop, respondent State of Minnesota charged
appellant Derrick Rocha by amended complaint with seven counts: first-degree sale of a
controlled substance (count one); second-degree sale of a controlled substance in a
prohibited zone (count two); third-degree possession of a controlled substance (count
three); failure to affix a tax stamp (count four); third-degree driving while impaired (counts
five and six); and misdemeanor fleeing a peace officer (count seven). The following facts
were established at Rocha’s jury trial.
On the morning of November 12, 2017, a state trooper on a routine patrol saw a
vehicle turn left in front of him at an intersection in Crookston. The trooper saw the
driver—later identified as Rocha— wave at him. Because neither Rocha nor the passenger
in the front seat was wearing a seatbelt, the trooper activated his emergency lights. Rocha
then accelerated and pulled the car into a driveway where Rocha and the passenger got out
of the car and ran away on foot, leaving the car running. They abandoned the car
approximately 210 feet from a public school building. Law-enforcement officers first
found the passenger hiding behind a nearby house and later found Rocha hiding under a
vehicle within a few blocks of where they fled on foot. Law-enforcement officers arrested
both men.
3
Before Rocha was located, the trooper who initiated the stop searched the
abandoned car for some type of identification to help identify the driver of the car. The
trooper found a glasses case on the center console next to the gear shift. The glasses case
was large enough to contain a driver’s license. Inside the glasses case, the trooper found
two plastic baggies containing a substance that the trooper suspected was
methamphetamine. The glasses case also contained a spoon and a glass pipe. The trooper
testified at trial that the glasses case was located “equal distance” between Rocha and the
passenger riding in the car. Testing later confirmed that the two plastic baggies contained
methamphetamine, which weighed a total of 18.6 grams. The trooper also found a
backpack in the back seat of the car that contained a lockbox holding 156 small unused
plastic baggies, a hypodermic syringe, pills, and a calibration weight for a scale. A second
lockbox located behind the driver’s seat contained more drug paraphernalia.
Rocha showed signs of impairment at the time of his arrest. Though he refused field
sobriety tests, he admitted to having “used” hours earlier and a blood sample obtained by
a search warrant tested positive for “a very high amount” of methamphetamine. A
toxicologist testified at trial that the amount of methamphetamine in Rocha’s blood sample
indicated that Rocha was not a “naïve” or first-time user.
Before trial, the state filed notice of its intent to present “evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant, pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).” The state
identified five such acts: two convictions of fifth-degree possession of a controlled
substance for offenses involving methamphetamine that Rocha committed in 2014, and
three other charges from 2018 —failure to appear in court, third -degree possession of a
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controlled substance in a prohibited zone, and gross-misdemeanor burglary. The 2018
charges stemmed from Rocha’s failure to appear in court for this case and a subsequent
incident in which Rocha attempted to evade officers executing a resulting arrest warrant
by rolling out of a car later found to contain methamphetamine, fleeing on foot, and hiding
in a nearby garage. In a supporting memorandum, the state argued that evidence of these
acts was relevant and admissible at trial to prove Rocha’s “consciousness of guilt, state of
mind (intent and/or knowledge), and identity.” Rocha opposed the state’s motion.
The district court granted the state’s motion for three of the five acts the state had
identified: the two 2014 offenses resulting in fifth-degree possession convictions, and the
third-degree possession charge from 2018. T he district court determined that these three
acts were relevant to prove Rocha’s intent, knowledge, lack of mistake, and modus
operandi. The district court denied the state’s motion with respect to the failure-to-appear
and burglary charges from 2018.
In July 2021, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury heard testimony from
numerous witnesses, including: the prior owner of the car that Rocha was driving on the
day of the traffic stop; the trooper who attempted the traffic stop; the investigator who
handled the evidence collected from Rocha’s car; the forensic toxicologists who analyzed
Rocha’s blood sample and the methamphetamine found in the car; and the law-enforcement
officers and toxicologists familiar with the circumstances of the 2014 and 2018
drug-possession incidents.
5
The prior owner of the car testified that she sold the car to Rocha several weeks
before the 2017 incident for $800 in cash. Rocha stipulated before trial that he was
unemployed during 2017.
The investigator who handled the evidence recovered from Rocha’s vehicle testified
to the nature of the evidence found. He testified that, based on his years of experience
investigating drug offenses, the amount of methamphetamine recovered in an investigation
can indicate whether it was intended for personal use or sale. He testified that a typical
user may have one to two grams of methamphetamine on their person, while possession of
18 grams of methamphetamine would amount to “70 or so usages” and would therefore
suggest an intent to sell. He testified that one gram of methamphetamine cost about $100
in 2017, so 18 grams would have been worth about $1,800 at that time. And he testified
that a person who intends to sell or distribute methamphetamine would use a spoon and a
scale, along with a calibration weight, to divide the drug into smaller amounts for resale
and repackage it in small “designer” plastic baggies. The officer could think of no reason
why a person using methamphetamine but not selling it would have more than 100 clean
“designer” baggies in their possession. And he testified that because methamphetamine is
expensive, most people who use the drug also sell it to support their habit.
The jury acquitted Rocha of first-degree sale of a controlled substance (count one)
and found him guilty of the remaining counts: second-degree sale of a controlled substance
in a prohibited zone (count two), third-degree possession of a controlled substance (count
three), failure to affix a tax stamp (count four), third-degree driving while impaired (counts
five and six), and fleeing a peace officer (count seven). The district court accepted the
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jury’s verdict on all counts but entered convictions for counts two, five, and seven only,
because the remaining counts were lesser-included offenses. The district court sentenced
Rocha to consecutive sentences on counts two, five, and seven for an aggregate sentence
of 128 months in prison.
Rocha appeals.
DECISION
Rocha challenges his conviction of second-degree sale of a controlled substance in
a prohibited zone (count two) on two grounds. First, Rocha argues that the evidence is
insufficient to prove that he possessed the methamphetamine found in his vehicle and that
he intended to sell it.1 Second, in the alternative, Rocha argues that this court should order
a new trial because the district court committed reversible error by admitting “irrelevant
and prejudicial Spreigl evidence” at trial.2 We address each argument in turn.
I. The state presented sufficient evidence to support Rocha’s conviction of
second-degree sale of a controlled substance in a prohibited zone.

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts
generally will not overturn a guilty verdict if the jury, applying the presumption of

1 Rocha also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdicts
on counts three and four, given that they are lesser-included offenses of count two. Because
we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to support R ocha’s conviction on
count two, we need not address this argument. See State v. Moua, 678 N.W.2d 29, 42 n.10
(Minn. 2004) (declining to review unadjudicated counts for sufficiency of the evidence
when affirming a conviction of a greater offense).
2 In Minnesota, we commonly refer to evidence of other crimes , wrongs, or acts admitted
under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) as “Spreigl evidence” in reference to the supreme court’s
decision in State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965). State v. Kennedy,
585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998).
7
innocence and the state’s burden to prove an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, “could
reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” State v. Griffin,
887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). To make this determination, we undertake “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient” to support the conviction.
State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). This standard of review applies when
direct evidence alone is sufficient to support a jury verdict. Loving v. State,
891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). But when the state relies on circumstantial evidence
to prove an element of an offense, we apply a heightened standard of review.3 Id.
Under the heightened standard of review, we conduct a two-step analysis.
State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). As a first step, we identify the
circumstances proved by the state. Id. In doing so, we defer to the jury’s acceptance of
the state’s evidence of these circumstances and rejection of any evidence that conflicted
with the circumstances proved by the s tate. Id. at 598-99. “As with direct evidence, we
construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the
jury believed the S tate’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Id. at 599
(quotation omitted). As a second step, we “determine whether the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any [other] rational hypothesis.” Id.

3 Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the [fact-finder] can infer whether the
facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). “In contrast, direct evidence is evidence that is based on
personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” Id. (quotation omitted).
8
(quotation omitted). To make this determination, we view the circumstances proved as a
whole and independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn
rather than deferring to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id.
To convict Rocha of second-degree sale of a controlled substance in a prohibited
zone, the state had to prove that Rocha unlawfully possessed methamphetamine in a school
zone and intended to sell it. See Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(7)(ii) (2016); Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a(1), (3) (2016) (explaining that “sell” means “to sell, give away,
barter, deliver, exchange, distribute or dispose of to another” or “to possess with intent to
perform” such an act). A “school zone” is “any property owned, leased, or controlled by a
school district ,” including the area up to 300 feet beyond the school property. Minn.
Stat. § 152.01, subd. 14a(1)-(2) (2016). Rocha does not dispute that law-enforcement
officers recovered methamphetamine from his car and that the car was located in a school
zone, but he argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove the elements of
possession and intent to sell.
The record reflects that the state offered circumstantial evidence at trial to prove
both elements. Accordingly, we apply the heightened standard to Rocha’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. See Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
Proof of Possession and Intent
Before turning to the specific circumstances proved in this case, we begin our
analysis by discussing the legal standard that the state must meet to prove the challenged
elements— possession and intent. Possession of a controlled substance may be proved by
evidence of actual or constructive possession. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. Constructive
9
possession exists “where the inference is strong that the defendant at one time physically
possessed the item and . . . continued to exercise dominion and control over it up to the
time of the arrest.” State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015) (quoting
State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975)). The state may therefore prove
constructive possession in one of two ways: (1) by showing that law enforcement officers
“found the item in a place under the defendant’s exclusive control to which other people
normally did not have access” or (2) if law enforcement officers found the item in a place
accessible to others, by showing that a strong probability exists, inferable from other
evidence, that the defendant consciously or knowingly exercised dominion and control
over the item. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
Notably, “[a] defendant may possess an item jointly with another person.” Id.; see
also State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 834 (Minn. App. 2015) (explaining that constructive
possession may be shared). To prove joint possession, the state must demonstrate that the
defendant exercised dominion and control over the item itself and not merely the place
where it was found. State v. Hunter, 857 N.W.2d 537, 542-43 (Minn. App. 2014).
“Proximity is an important factor in establishing constructive possession.” State v. Porte,
832 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). But “mere proximity” is
insufficient by itself to prove the knowing exercise of dominion and control over an item.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
Intent to sell or distribute a controlled substance is typically proved by
circumstantial evidence as well. State v. White, 33 2 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Minn. 1983).
“Evidence tending to show an intent to sell or distribute includes evidence as to the large
10
quantity of drugs possessed, evidence as to the manner of packaging, and other evidence.”
State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
To assess the sufficiency of the evidence to support Rocha’s conviction of
second-degree possession of a controlled substance, we first identify the circumstances
proved by the state and then consider whether those circumstances are consistent with guilt
as to each of the disputed elements of the crime: possession and intent to sell.
Circumstances Proved
The record reflects that the state proved the following circumstances at Rocha’s
trial: (1) on the morning of November 12, 2017, a state trooper attempted to make a traffic
stop after observing Rocha driving a car through an intersection without wearing a seatbelt;
(2) a second person was riding in the passenger seat; (3) Rocha owned the car he was
driving; (4) after the trooper activated his emergency lights, Rocha drove the car into a
nearby driveway and parked it; (5) Rocha and the passenger got out of the car and fled on
foot, leaving the car running; (6) in searching the abandoned car, law enforcement officers
found 18.6 grams of methamphetamine, a glass pipe, and a spoon in a glasses case located
on the center console of the car next to the gear shift, an “equal distance” between the
driver’s seat and the front passenger’s seat; (7) police also found a syringe, pills, a
calibrating weight, and 156 unused “designer” plastic baggies in the back seat of the car;
(8) law enforcement officers eventually found Rocha and the passenger hiding nearby and
arrested them; (9) after his arrest, Rocha showed signs of impairment and admitted to
having “used” hours earlier; (10) Rocha’s blood sample tested positive for a high amount
of methamphetamine, indicating that he was an experienced user; (11) a typical
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methamphetamine user possesses only one to two grams for personal use; ( 12) one gram
of methamphetamine sold for about $100 in 2017, making the methamphetamine recovered
from Rocha’s car worth about $1,800; (13) Rocha was unemployed at the time of the traffic
stop; and (14 ) drug dealers often use scales to weigh quantities of methamphetamine for
resale, use weights to calibrate their scales, and use spoons and plastic baggies to repackage
methamphetamine for resale.
Reasonable Inferences
Taken as a whole, t he circumstances proved are consistent with the rational
inference that Rocha possessed the 18.6 grams of methamphetamine found in his car with
the intent to sell. Rocha does not dispute that this is a rational inference from the
circumstances proved. Rather, Rocha argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support
his conviction because the circumstances proved also support rational inferences consistent
with innocence.
Rocha first argues that the circumstances proved support a rational inference that
“the passenger alone” possessed the methamphetamine. We disagree. Viewed as a whole,
the only rational inference from the circumstances proved is that Rocha consciously
exercised dominion and control over the methamphetamine found in his car and therefore
constructively possessed it, either jointly with the passenger or by himself. Rocha had been
driving the car in which law-enforcement officers found the methamphetamine, he owned
the car, he was in close proximity to the methamphetamine located in the car, he fled on
foot when the trooper attempted to make a traffic stop, he was under the influence when
law-enforcement officers apprehended him, and his use of methamphetamine gave him a
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motive to possess and sell it. See Minn. Stat. § 152.028, subd. 2 (2016) (providing that the
presence of a controlled substance in a car permits the jury “to infer knowing possession
of the controlled substance by the driver or person in control of the [car ] when the
controlled substance was in [it]”); Porte, 832 N.W.2d at 308 (noting that “[p]roximity is
an important factor in establishing constructive possession” (quotation omitted) );
State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 22 (Minn. 2015) (explaining that a jury may consider flight
before apprehension as suggestive of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt); State v. Hill,
287 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Minn. 1979) (concluding that defendant’s acknowledgment of an
expensive drug habit along with his unemployment was “strong evidence of motive” for
robbery). Considering these circumstances proved as a whole, the only reasonable
inference is that Rocha consciously exercised dominion and control over the
methamphetamine found in his car and therefore constructively possessed it. See Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 601.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Rocha’s argument that this case is analogous to
Sam, in which the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction for possession of methamphetamine. 859 N.W.2d at 828. In Sam, the appellant
was driving a borrowed car, accompanied by a passenger in the front seat. Id. at 834. After
a traffic stop, a trooper searched the car and found a small bag of methamphetamine in the
glove compartment of the car. Id. at 829. This court reversed the ap pellant’s conviction
after determining that the circumstances proved in Sam were “insufficient to eliminate all
reasonable inferences inconsistent with [his] guilt.” Id. at 835-36. We held that there were
two alternative inferences inconsistent with guilt: (1) the methamphetamine may have been
13
there when appellant borrowed the car, and (2) the methamphetamine may have belonged
to the passenger alone. Id. at 835.
The circumstances of Sam are distinguishable from this case for several reasons.
First, in Sam, the appellant did not own the vehicle he was driving. Id. at 834. Second, in
Sam, law-enforcement officers recovered methamphetamine from the glove compartment
directly in front of the passenger. Id. at 829. The passenger in Sam was therefore sitting
in closer proximity to the methamphetamine than the driver. And third, additional evidence
in Sam—a small amount of methamphetamine discovered in the passenger’s wallet—could
have led to a reasonable inference that the passenger alone possessed the
methamphetamine. Id. at 835. Here, no such evidence connects the passenger in Rocha’s
car to the methamphetamine recovered from it, and Rocha and the passenger were sitting
an equal distance from the methamphetamine located in the glasses case on the center
console. Finally, Rocha owned the car where the methamphetamine was found. Though
a jury could have reasonably inferred that Rocha and the passenger exercised joint
dominion and control over the methamphetamine and therefore constructively possessed it
together, we disagree with Rocha’s assertion that the state failed to eliminate “the other
rational inference” that the passenger exercised exclusive dominion and control over the
methamphetamine.
Rocha next argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove that he
intended to sell the methamphetamine located in his car. According to Rocha, even
assuming that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the
methamphetamine, the circumstances proved “create a reasonable inference inconsistent
14
with guilt [of intent to sell]—that is, possession for personal use.” Again, we are not
persuaded.
Viewed as a whole, the only reasonable inference from the circumstances proved is
that Rocha intended to sell at least some of the methamphetamine found in his car.
Evidence of the significant amount of methamphetamine in Rocha’s possession and the
other drug paraphernalia found in his car —most significantly, a scale calibration weight
and 156 unused “designer” baggies—strongly supports the inference that Rocha intended
to divide up at least some of the methamphetamine and repackage it for resale. The trial
testimony of the investigator who took custody of the evidence after the traffic stop
supports this conclusion: he could think of no reason that a person who possessed
methamphetamine solely for personal use without intending to sell any of it would possess
the quantity of methamphetamine found in Rocha’s car— 18.6 grams—and more than 100
clean “designer” baggies. Rocha’s possession of these items is inconsistent with any
rational inference other than that he intended to sell or distribute at least some of the
methamphetamine. See Hanson, 800 N.W.2d at 623 (concluding that “the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from [appellant’s] possession of the approximately 100 small,
unused plastic bags of a type used for the packaging of methamphetamine for distribution
and sale is that [appellant] possessed methamphetamine with an intent to sell”).
In sum, we conclude that the circumstances proved by the state are consistent with
the inference that Rocha constructively possessed and intended to sell the
methamphetamine found in his car. Further, the circumstances proved are inconsistent
with any other rational hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude that the state presented
15
sufficient evidence to sustain Rocha’s conviction of second-degree sale of a controlled
substance in a prohibited zone.
II. Any error by the district court in admitting Spreigl evidence at trial was
harmless and does not warrant reversal.

In the alternative, Rocha challenges the district court’s admission of Spreigl
evidence. We review a district court’s decision to admit Spreigl evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 261. “A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. 2019). A defendant who claims that
the district court erred in admitting Spreigl evidence bears the burden of showing (1) that
the error occurred and (2) that the erroneous admission resulted in prejudice. Griffin,
887 N.W.2d at 261. “If an appellate court determines that the district court erroneously
admitted Spreigl evidence, the court must then determine whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id. at
262.
Spreigl evidence, or “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act,” cannot be
admitted “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257, 266 (Minn. 2019)
(stating that “[g]enerally, other-crimes evidence is not admissible to demonstrate that the
defendant (a) has a propensity to commit crimes and (b) acted in accord with that
propensity”). But Spreigl evidence may be admitted for other limited purposes, such as to
16
prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).
A district court may admit Spreigl evidence if: (1) the state gave notice of its intent
to admit the evidence; (2) the state clearly indicated what the evidence was being offered
to prove; (3) there was clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the
prior act; (4) the evidence is relevant and material; and (5) the potential prejudice to the
defendant does not outweigh the probative value of the evidence. State v. Ness ,
707 N.W.2d 676, 685-86 (Minn. 2006).
Here, the district court allowed the state to present evidence of three other acts at
Rocha’s jury trial: two incidents in 2014 that each resulted in Rocha pleading guilty to
fifth-degree possession of methamphetamine, and the 2018 incident that resulted in a
third-degree possession charge that was pending at the time of trial in this case. In a pretrial
order, the district court explained that these three acts were relevant to prove Rocha’s
intent, knowledge, lack of mistake, and modus operandi. At trial, the district court admitted
testimony related to these incidents over Rocha’s objection.
Rocha argues that the district court did not conduct the proper analysis before
admitting the Spreigl evidence and erred by concluding that the evidence was admissible.
He contends that “[t]he Spreigl evidence was not relevant to any proper purpose and invited
unfair prejudice that far outweighed any de minimis probative value.” And he asserts that
the district court erred by evaluating only the probative value of the evidence without
addressing its prejudicial effect. Rocha further argues that the admission of the Spreigl
17
evidence significantly affected the verdict and therefore warrants reversal and remand for
a new trial.
In this case, we need not determine whether the district court abused its discretion
by allowing the state to introduce the Spreigl evidence because we conclude that there is
no reasonable possibility that the allegedly inadmissible evidence significantly affected the
jury’s verdicts. See State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Minn. 2016). “To warrant a new
trial, the erroneous admission of Spreigl evidence must create a reasonable possibility that
the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Fardan,
773 N.W.2d 303, 320 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also Thao, 875 N.W.2d at 839.
In assessing this possibility, we consider whether the district court issued a cautionary jury
instruction, whether the state “dwelled on the evidence in closing argument, and whether
the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.” Thao, 875 N.W.2d at 839.
To support his argument that the Spreigl evidence may have impacted the jury’s
verdicts, Rocha emphasizes the “lack of evidence directly linking Rocha to the contraband
to establish possession,” the “frankly overwhelming amount of Spreigl evidence,” and the
state’s reliance on that evidence in its opening and closing arguments. By contrast, the
state emphasizes that the district court issued a cautionary jury instruction and asserts both
that the prosecution’s use of the Spreigl evidence was minimal and that the evidence
against Rocha was significant. The state also notes that the jury acquitted Rocha of the
most serious charge against him, which suggests that the jury was not “unduly swayed” by
the prosecutor’s comments. See State v. DeWald, 463 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn. 1990).
18
We agree with the state and conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the
admission of the Spreigl evidence significantly affected the jury’s verdicts. First, the
district court issued a cautionary instruction to the jury just before the jury heard each piece
of Spreigl evidence, explaining its “limited purpose.” “We presume a jury follows a court’s
cautionary instruction.” State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009). Second,
although the prosecutor did mention the Spreigl evidence in opening and closing
arguments, he did not “dwell” on the evidence and he cautioned in closing argument that
the evidence was introduced only “for the very limited purpose of” showing Rocha’s
“knowing possession of methamphetamine” and helping “to identify him as the possessor.”
Finally, the state presented significant evidence of Rocha’s guilt that was sufficient by itself
to support Rocha’s convictions. As discussed above, the evidence at trial established that
Rocha purchased the car that he was driving a few weeks before the incident; he fled when
the trooper attempted to make a traffic stop; law enforcement officers found 18.6 grams of
methamphetamine in a glasses case on the center console of the car along with a calibration
weight and more than 100 “designer” baggies typically used for drug distribution in the
back seat ; and Rocha tested positive for methamphetamine after he was located and
arrested near his vehicle. Given the district court’s cautionary instruction, the prosecutor’s
minimal focus on the Spreigl evidence in closing argument, and the strength of the
evidence, we conclude, based on the entire record, that the allegedly erroneous admission
of the Spreigl evidence was harmless and does not warrant a new trial.
19
Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that the circumstantial evidence proved by the state is sufficient
to support Rocha’s conviction of second-degree sale of a controlled substance in a
prohibited zone. We further conclude that any error by the district court in admitting
Spreigl evidence at trial was harmless and therefore does not warrant reversal.
Affirmed.