In re the Marriage of: Kimberly Erin Macfarlane, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-1741

In re the Marriage of: Kimberly Erin Macfarlane, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Bruce Travis Adam Macfarlane,
Respondent.

Filed October 10, 2022
Affirmed in part, r eversed in part, and remanded
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-19-8377

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey K. Priest, Priest Hill Law Firm, PLLC, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Timothy D. Lees, Lees Family Law, LTD., Edina, Minnesota; and

Jolene D. Baker Vicchiollo, Alexis N. Rohach, Baker Vicchiollo Law, LL C, Edina,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Reyes , Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
*

*Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this marriage dissolution dispute , appellant-wife argues that the district court
(1) abused its discretion by awarding husband permanent spousal maintenance; (2) erred
by making a finding of fact purportedly ordering the parties to submit possible future
disputes regarding personal property to binding arbitration; and (3) should have s pecified
that the property equalizer be paid from pre -tax retirement funds. W hile we conclude that
the district court failed to make the findings of fact necessary to support its decisions related
to the maintenance award and the property equalization pay ment, w e also conclude that
any error made by including a finding of fact purportedly referring possible future disputes
to binding arbitration is harmless. As a result, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
FACTS
Appellant-wife Kimberly Erin Macfarlane and respondent -husband Bruce Travis
Adam Macfarlane married in 1999. When wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage
in 2019, t hey had three minor children, one of whom is now an adult. In July 2021, the
matter proceeded to a two -day trial to address the disputed issues of physical and legal
custody of the minor children, parenting time, child support, spousal maintenance, and the
division of debts and assets.
The district court made many findings of fact about the parties’ incomes and
expenses, including that, during the marriage, the parties enjoyed a middle -class lifestyle
and did not incur significant debt. After separating, the parties sold the family home for
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$730,000 with the proceeds split equally bet ween husband and wife. At the time of the
trial, the district court found that wife worked full-time and earned a gross monthly income
of $14,730.33. The district court found wife’s reasonable monthly living expense s were
$5,441.54.
The district court also found that husband started working full-time in 2019. Before
taking that job, however, husband spent about 14 years as the homemaker and primary
caretaker of the children. Wife was the primary wage earner during the marriage, and the
district court found that her income increased steadily during the marriage. The district
court found that husband lost employment and earning opportunities by being a
homemaker. At the time of the trial, the district court found that husband earned a gross
monthly income of $6,657.66. The district court found husband ’s reasonable monthly
living expenses were $5,502.
The December 2021 dissolution judgment divided the parties’ marital property and
included a finding of fact stating that any disputes “shall be resolved through binding
arbitration without right of appeal.” The district court also granted husband $2,000 in
permanent monthly maintenance and ordered wife t o pay husband a property equalizer
amount of $55,028.27 within 90 days following the entry of judgment. Wife appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court erred by failing to calculate the parties’ net incomes .
Wife asserts that the district court’s findings do not support awarding husband
permanent spousal maintenance in the amount of $2,000 per month because the findings
show that husband’s reasonable monthly expenses ($5,502) are less than his gross monthly
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income ($6,657.66). Appellate courts review a district court’s decision about spousal
maintenance for an abuse of discretion. Honke v. Honke , 960 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn.
2021). A district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings unsupported by the record,
misapplies the law, or decides the question i n a manner contrary to logic and the facts on
record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022); Bender v. Bernhard, 971
N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022); Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
Spousal maintenance is “an award made in a dissolution or legal separation
proceeding of payments from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support
and maintenance of the other .” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2020) ; see Honke, 960
N.W.2d at 266 (stating that “an award of maintenance depends on a showing of need”)
(citations and quotations omitted). When a party requests spousal maintenance, the district
court must address whether the spouse seeking spousal maintenance established a need for
maintenance under Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2020) . Honke, 960 N.W.2d at 266;
Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 695 (Minn. App. 2019). A party shows a need for
maintenance if, considering the standard of living during the marriage, the party shows that
he or she cannot provide for the payment of his or her reasonable expenses calculated at
the marital standard of living. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (addressing need for
maintenance); Honke, 960 N.W.2d at 266 (same).
If a party shows a need for maintenance, the district court may award spousal
maintenance “in amounts and for periods of time, either temporary or permanent, as the
court deems just, . . . after considering all relevant factors[,]” including those listed in Minn.
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Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2020). Honke, 960 N.W.2d at 267. No single factor is dispositive.
Id.
Wife is correct that the district court’s findings show that husband’s gross monthly
income exceeds his monthly expenses, thereby creating a possibility that husband does not
need part or all of the maintenance that the district court awarded him. But the district
court did not find husband’s after -tax net income. See Schmidt v. Schmidt , 964 N.W.2d
221, 227 (Minn. App. 2021) (noting that, generally, “an employe d person is required by
law to file an income -tax return and pay income taxes, unless the employee’s income is
below the applicable income thresholds”). While the spousal maintenance statute does not
specify whether the district court must consider gross income versus net income, “it usually
is necessary for the district court to consider a spouse’s obligation to pay income taxes
when determining his or her ability to provide adequate self-support through employment.”
Id.; see Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 1982) (affirming a maintenance
award noting that the recipient’s “[reasonable] monthly expenses exceeded her net take-
home salary”) (emphasis added ); Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d at 229 (reversing denial of
maintenance when the denial was based on an analysis which omitted consideration of the
effect of taxes on the potential maintenance recipient’s income); cf. Kostelnik v. Kostelnik,
367 N.W.2d 665, 670 (Minn. App. 1985) (reversing an award of spousal maintenance
because “ to determine [the potential obligor’s] ability to pay, the court must make a
determination of the payor spouse’s net or take -home pay”), rev. denied (Minn. July 26,
1985).
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Here, the district court used neither party’s net income when addressing whether to
award husband maintenance, even though the record contained information addressing
their respective tax burdens. The parties’ tax obligations could affect husband’s ability to
meet expenses and wife ’s ability to pay maintenance, respectively. By omitting
consideration of the tax information in this record, the district court ran afoul of both
(a) the statutory requirement in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2, requiring that, when setting
the amount and duration of a maintenance award, the district court consider “all relevant
factors[;]” and (b) the caselaw specifically identifying taxes as a factor relevant to a
maintenance award. Thus, in making its maintenance award, the district court both
misapplied the law and set maintenance in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts
on this record.
Wife’s arguments to the contrary do not persuade us otherwise. She first contends
that husband never : (1) proposed that the district court use his net mont hly income to
determine maintenance, and (2) challenged the district court’s findings about his income
through a post-trial motion or cross-appeal. But husband’s burden to establish his need for
maintenance does not absolve the district court from making findings on the parties’ net
incomes when the relevant tax information is in the record . Wife also argues that husband
has no need for spousal maintenance, even considering net income . And although both
parties make record-based arguments about what the net income figures should be , “[a]
district court’s determination of income for maintenance purposes is a finding of fact[ .]”
Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App. 2004). “It is not within the province
of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal.” Kucera v. Kucera, 146 N.W.2d
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181, 183 (Minn. 1966). Thus, a remand to determine both parties’ net incomes based on
the tax information in the record is required for the district court to analyze husband’s need
for maintenance.1
II. Any error by referring to binding arbitration in the district court’s findings of
fact is harmless.

Wife next argues that the district court erred by including a finding of fact
purportedly requiring the parties to submit to binding arbitration over the division of
property because the parties did not agree to participate in arbitration.
The district court’s findings of fact about the division of property included a finding
that “[t]he parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the division of household goods
and furnishing. If they have not done so within thirty (30) days of entry of this Judgment
and Decree, any remaining disputes shall be resolved through binding arbitration without
right of appeal.” But in the conclusions of law, the district court again detailed the division
of personal property: “[a]ll unspecified home goods and furnishings will be divided by the
parties by agreement within thirty (30) days of entry of the Judgment and Decree. ” And
the district court ordered that “[i]f future disputes arise relating to matters in this case, the
parties shall participate in mediation.” Nowhere in the conclusions of law does the district
court order the parties to participate in binding arbitration. And nowhere in the findings of
fact does the district court mention mediation.

1 Wife also argues that the district court erred by awarding husband permanent spousal
maintenance instead of temporary spousal maintenance. Without findings of the parties’
net incomes, and thus of husband’s need and wife’s ability to pay, it is premature to address
the duration of any maintenance award that the district court might make on remand. As a
result, we decline to address wife’s argument on this point.
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The parties are correct that the district court lacks authority to order binding
arbitration absent their agreement. But when there is a conflict b etween a finding of fact
and a conclusion of law that has become part of the judgment, “the judgment is binding
and prevails over an inconsistent statement in an underlying finding of fact.” Dailey v.
Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 631 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2006).
Because th e conclusion of law is incorporated into the judgment, its requirement that
disagreements be mediated trumps any statement in the findings of fact purportedly
referring matters to binding arbitration. Thus, any error in the findings of fact is harmless.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 requires courts to ignore harmless error.
III. The district court abused its discretion by failing to specify from which source
of funding the property equalizer must be paid.

Finally, the parties disagree about whether the source of the equalizer payment is
from pre- or post -tax funds. They claim the document is ambiguous leaving a dispute
between the parties. “ Generally, a document is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible
to more than one meaning.” Suleski v. Rupe , 855 N.W.2d 330, 339 (Minn. App. 2014)
(quotation omitted). Whether a document or “provision in a dissolution judgement and
decree is clear or ambiguous is a legal question.” Id. “A district court’s determination of
the meaning of an ambiguous judgment and decree provision is a fact question, which
appellate courts review for clear error.” Id.
Here, the district court’s division of property requires wife to “pay [husband] a
property equalizer amount of $55,028.27 . . . within ninety (90) days of entry of the
Judgment and Decree. ” Wife does not dispute the amount owed but argues that the
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property equalizer should be paid from pre -tax retirement funds that can be transferred
directly to husband. She argues that a post -tax property equalizer would “significantly
affect the property division and render it unequal and inequitable.” Husband contends that
it does not matter which account or source of funding wife pays the property equalizer
amount from, only that wife pays husband $55,028.27 free and clear of any interest. He
argues that if wife is allowed to transfer the amount of the property equalizer from a pre -
tax retirement fund, he will not receive the full property equalizer payment because of the
tax consequences of that payment.
The district court order is not clear about whether the equalizer payment may be
transferred directly to husband from a pre -tax retirement account or must be paid to
husband post -tax. The district court only ordered that wife pay husband the property
equalizer amount within 90 days. Thus, t he district court’s order is ambiguous, and a
remand is required to clarify the ambiguity.
Affirmed in part, r eversed in part and remanded.