State of Minnesota v. Raeleen Kay Johnson, A21-1360, Supreme Court, September 13, 2023

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A21-1360

Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,
vs. Filed: September 13, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
Raeleen Kay Johnson,

Appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, and

Rachel v. Cornelius, Waseca County Attorney, Waseca, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson,
Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defenders, Saint Paul, Minnesota for appellant.

SY LLA BU S

1. Because the “informs” element of the offense of falsely reporting a crime,

Minn. Stat. § 609.505 (2022), is satisfied when a law enforcement officer receives the false

report of a crime, venue for the crime of filing a false report is proper in the place where

the officer receives the false report.

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 2. Because the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

the law enforcement officer received the false report of a crime in Waseca County, the

evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction.

Affirmed.

O PI N I O N

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

This case arises from appellant Raeleen Kay Johnson’s false report to police that the

father of her child had abused their child. Based on this report, a Waseca County jury

found Johnson guilty of falsely reporting a crime to a police officer in violation of Minn.

Stat. § 609.505 (2022). Because she was in Blue Earth County when she made the report,

Johnson alleged on appeal that venue was improper in Waseca County. In the alternative,

Johnson argued that the evidence was not sufficient to support her conviction. The court

of appeals affirmed, and we granted Johnson’s petition for review. Because we conclude

that venue is proper in Waseca County and that the evidence was sufficient, we affirm.

FACTS
Appellant Raeleen Kay Johnson and her son, who was 8 years old at the time of

these events, live in Waseca County. Her son’s father (“Father”) also lives in Waseca

County. Johnson and Father had a parenting agreement governing custody of their son.

The agreement gave Father primary custody and gave Johnson parenting time on

Wednesday evenings and some weekends. In late August 2020, Johnson declined to return

her son to Father’s custody for several days.

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 Father contacted the Waseca Police Department on Thursday, August 27, which was

when Johnson first failed to return her son as required under the parenting agreement. The

Waseca Police Department opened an investigation based on Father’s contact.

The following Tuesday, on September 1, Johnson took her son to a hospital in

Mankato, in Blue Earth County. Detective Brent Brass of the Waseca Police Department

was working the case that day. Brass looked for Johnson at her home, as well as at her

parents’ home, both in Waseca County. He also called Johnson on her cell phone twice.

Johnson initially did not answer the phone, so Brass left voicemail messages both times.

Johnson returned Brass’s calls late that afternoon. The entirety of the approximately

7-minute phone call between Brass and Johnson took place while Johnson was in the

hospital parking lot in Mankato. Johnson stated that she did not want to return her son to

Father because she believed that Father was abusing him and that doctors at the emergency

room confirmed the abuse. During the call, Brass stated several times that Johnson should

come meet him at the Waseca Police Department. Bass testified that he specifically

directed Johnson to “come straight to the Waseca Police Department . . . so that [he] could

see [her son].” Brass waited for Johnson for at least an hour, but Johnson never arrived at

the Waseca Police Department. Later that day, Brass discussed the case with Sergeant

Schroeder, who was coming on duty, and stated that Johnson should be taken into custody

when police found her.

Mankato police officers arrested Johnson at the Mankato hospital that night. The

Waseca County Attorney’s Office charged Johnson with filing a false report based on the

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report Brass received during the September 1 phone call. The case went to trial in Waseca

County, and the jury included only Waseca County residents.

Johnson first raised the issue of venue after the State finished its case. Johnson’s

attorney moved for a judgment of acquittal on the false reporting charge, arguing that the

State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged offense took place in

Waseca County. Defense counsel noted that the pattern jury instruction required the State

to prove that the offense took place in Waseca County, and that unlike some offenses, no

special statutory provision permits a charge in a county where no element of the offense

was committed. The State opposed the motion, arguing that it had proven venue.

The district court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal. The court explained

that the State had presented enough evidence for the jury to conclude that the “informs”

element of the offense—that the “defendant informed a law enforcement officer that a

crime had been committed”—was committed in Waseca County because the evidence

supported a finding that Johnson had called a Waseca police officer.

The venue argument came up again in closing arguments. Johnson’s attorney

emphasized that evidence placed Johnson in Blue Earth County—and not in Waseca

County—during the phone call with Brass, and counsel argued that Johnson therefore

should be acquitted.

The district court instructed the jury that there are four elements of falsely reporting

a crime:

First, the defendant informed a law enforcement officer that a crime had been
committed.
Second, the defendant knew that the report was false.

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 Third, the defendant intended that the law enforcement officer acted in
reliance upon the report.
And fourth, the defendant’s act took place on or about August 27, 2020,
through September 1, 2020, in Waseca County.

(Emphasis added.) The district court also explained that each element must be proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Johnson guilty as charged.

Johnson appealed her conviction. On appeal, Johnson argued that no part of the

crime occurred in Waseca County because she was in Blue Earth County when she

“informed” Brass that a crime had been committed. In the alternative, Johnson argued the

circumstances proved supported a reasonable inference that Brass was not in Waseca

County when he received the false report, and so the evidence was not sufficient to sustain

her conviction.

The court of appeals affirmed Johnson’s conviction of falsely reporting a crime.

State v. Johnson, 979 N.W.2d 483, 489 (Minn. App. 2022). Relying on the venue statute,

Minn. Stat. § 627.01 (2022), the court concluded that venue is proper in a county where

any element of the offense was committed. Johnson, 979 N.W.2d at 498. Next, the court

considered whether the “informs” element of Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 1, requires not

just the making of a false report of a crime, but also the receipt of the false report by a law

enforcement officer. Id. at 499. Relying on a dictionary definition of “to inform,” the court

concluded that “the act of informing under the statute necessarily includes two

components—the making of a false report and the receipt of that false report.” Id.

Consequently, the court held that “the plain language of the statute necessarily provides

that an element of the offense occurs in both the county where the false report was made

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and the county where the false report was received by the police officer.” Id. at 500.

Having clarified the “informs” element of the offense, the court considered whether the

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Brass received the false report in Waseca

County. Id. at 500–01. The court concluded that the “only reasonable hypothesis” that

could be drawn from the circumstances proved, as a whole, was that Brass was in Waseca

County when he received the false report. Id. at 501.

Johnson petitioned for review on the issue of whether the State was required to prove

that she was in Waseca County when she made the false report. We granted her petition.

ANALYSIS

Johnson raises two issues on appeal. She argues that because she was in Blue Earth

County when she made the report at issue, venue for the crime of filing a false report was

not proper in Waseca County. She argues in the alternative that even if the location of the

police officer who received the report can support the venue element of the crime, her

conviction must still be reversed because the State did not prove that Brass was in Waseca

County when he received Johnson’s report. We consider each question in turn.

I.

Johnson argues that the State failed to meet its burden to show venue in Waseca

County because evidence at trial shows that Johnson was in Blue Earth County when she

placed the call to Brass. 1 A venue statute governs the place of criminal trials in Minnesota.

1 The State argues that Johnson forfeited this venue argument under the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to raise it before trial. The State failed to raise its
forfeiture argument to the court of appeals, so the State forfeited its forfeiture argument.

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See Minn. Stat. § 627.01, subd. 1. 2 The statute requires that “every criminal cause shall be

tried in the county where the offense was committed,” with some exceptions that are not

relevant here. Id. And the statute defines “[c]ounty where the offense was committed” as

“any county where any element of the offense was committed.” Id., subd. 2.

For venue to be proper under the statute, the State needed to show that Johnson

committed at least one element of the crime of filing a false report in Waseca County. 3 The

See Steward v. State, 950 N.W.2d 750, 754 n.4 (Minn. 2020) (holding that State forfeited
its argument that the motion should be treated as a post-conviction petition by failing to
raise it to the district court); In re Minnegasco, 565 N.W.2d 706, 713 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to reach issues not raised to the court of appeals).
The State also contends that Johnson forfeited any separate constitutional argument
about venue and vicinage. Because Johnson’s petition for review did not include a
constitutional challenge, Johnson has forfeited the issue. See McGuire v. Bowlin,
932 N.W.2d 819, 829 (Minn. 2019) (“Failing to raise an issue both before
the court of appeals and in a petition for review forfeits the issue.”).

2 In full, the venue statute states:

Subdivision 1. Place of trial. Except as otherwise provided by rule 24 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, every criminal cause shall be tried in the county
where the offense was committed. The defendant shall be entitled to one
change of venue only except in cases involving potential prejudicial publicity
in accordance with rule 25.02, subdivision 5, of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Subd. 2. County where the offense was committed. “County where the
offense was committed” means any county where any element of the offense
was committed or any county where the property involved in an offense is or
has been located or where the services involved in an offense were provided.

3 Because venue is proper in “any county where any element of the offense was
committed,” venue can be proper in more than one county. Minn. Stat. § 627.01; see State
v. Pierce, 792 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. App. 2010) (rejecting argument that venue is proper
only where an illegal e-mail was sent); United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir.
1985) (“It is clear [that when] the acts constituting the crime and the nature of the crime

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crime of false reporting is committed when a person “informs a law enforcement officer

that a crime has been committed . . . knowing that [the report] is false and intending that

the officer shall act in reliance upon [the report].” Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 1. The

court of appeals relied on the “informs” element in concluding that venue was proper in

Waseca County. Specifically, the court of appeals held that a defendant “informs” a law

enforcement officer in both the county where the defendant is and the county where the

officer is, because the word “informs” under the statute includes both the making of the

false report and its receipt. Johnson, 979 N.W.2d at 498–500.

Johnson argues that the court of appeals misinterpreted the language of the false

reporting statute, see Minn. Stat. § 609.505, when it held that the “informs” element of

falsely reporting a crime requires the receipt of the false report by a law-enforcement

officer. In support of her argument, Johnson cites dictionaries that defined “inform” as “to

communicate knowledge to” or “to tell.”

For its part, the State urges us to affirm. The State cites dictionaries that define

“inform” as “give (someone) facts or information.” The State also relies on the

whole-statute canon, which provides that a statute should be read and construed as a whole

so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts. See State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205,

212 (Minn. 2021) (discussing whole-statute canon). According to the State, the court of

appeals’ interpretation of the word “informs” harmonizes the “informs” element with the

charged implicate more than one location, the constitution does not command a single
exclusive venue.”). Accordingly, the fact that venue would have been proper in Blue Earth
County does not necessarily foreclose prosecution in Waseca County.

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third element of the crime, which requires an intent that the officer act in reliance on the

false report.

The parties’ arguments present an issue of statutory interpretation and our review is

de novo. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019) (“A

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim that turns on the meaning of the statute under which a

defendant has been convicted presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review

de novo.”). Our objective in statutory interpretation is to “effectuate the intent of the

legislature.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a phrase in a

statute is undefined, we may look to dictionary definitions “to determine the common and

ordinary meanings of these terms.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn.

2017). In determining which dictionary definitions apply, we consider the statutory

context. Buzzell v. Walz, 974 N.W.2d 256, 263 (Minn. 2022).

Some dictionary definitions of “inform” include another party’s receipt of the

information, see e.g., Inform, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 641 (11th ed.

2014) (defining “inform” as “to give information (as of another’s wrongdoing) to an

authority”), and some definitions involve merely making information available, id. (“to

impart information or knowledge”). See also Inform, Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 1160 (2002) (similar). But the statutory context of the word “informs” resolves

the competing dictionary definitions. See Buzzell, 974 N.W.2d at 263 (considering

statutory context to resolve question of which dictionary definition applies). The language

of the statute makes it a crime to inform “a law enforcement officer” of false information,

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with an intent “that the officer shall act in reliance upon it.” Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 1

(emphasis added).

Because the language of the statute expressly provides that, to commit this crime,

the defendant must inform a specific type of person—a law enforcement officer—it would

be inconsistent with the context of the statute to use a definition of “informs” that does not

involve the officer’s receipt of the information. See Friese, 959 N.W.2d at 212. In other

words, the plain language of the statute reflects a legislative intent to include, as part of the

crime, a police officer’s receipt of the false information. Accordingly, we hold that the

“informs” element of the falsely-reporting-a-crime statute is satisfied when a law

enforcement officer receives the false report of a crime. The State therefore can meet its

burden to show venue for the crime by showing that the law enforcement officer was in the

county of trial when the officer received the false report.

II.

Johnson argues, however, that even if we hold that venue can be satisfied based on

the location of the officer when the officer receives the report, the evidence is not sufficient

to support her conviction. Specifically, she argues that the circumstantial evidence does

not “exclusively show” that Brass received the false report of a crime in Waseca County.

Before we begin our analysis of the circumstantial evidence, we acknowledge the

parties’ dispute regarding the standard of proof required to satisfy the venue requirement.

Consistent with existing court of appeals precedent, Johnson argues the standard is proof

beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Pierce, 792 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Minn. App. 2010)

(stating that the State must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt). The State argues the

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standard is preponderance of the evidence, which is the rule in the federal circuits and a

substantial number of states. See, e.g., United States v. Black Cloud, 590 F.2d 270, 272 n.2

(8th Cir. 1979); State v. Allen, 293 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Iowa 1980); see also Smith v. United

States, 599 U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 1594, 1608–09 (2023) (noting that venue determinations

do not resolve the question of criminal culpability because a venue determination does not

resolve “some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged” (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Although we have never squarely addressed the

standard of proof issue the parties identify, 4 we need not do so here because, as explained

below, the circumstantial evidence presented by the State proves beyond a reasonable

doubt that Brass was in Waseca County when he received the false report of a crime.

The State relied on only circumstantial evidence to show venue at trial. The first

step in our circumstantial evidence review is identifying the circumstances proved. State

v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011). In identifying the circumstance proved,

we “winnow down the evidence presented at trial to a subset of facts that are consistent

with the jury’s verdict and disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict.”

State v. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d 178, 186 (Minn. 2021) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Next, we “independently examine the reasonableness of any inferences

4 In a few cases, we have assumed without deciding that a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard applies. See State v. Heidelberg, 12 N.W.2d 781, 782 (Minn. 1944) (concluding
that the State had proven venue beyond a reasonable doubt); see also State v. Carignan,
272 N.W.2d 748, 749 (Minn. 1978) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to establish
venue); State v. New, 22 Minn. 76, 78–79 (Minn. 1875) (noting that the defendant argued
for a jury instruction that included a “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden for venue and
concluding that the State proved venue).

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that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, as a whole, including an inference

consistent with rational hypotheses other than guilt.” Id. (emphasis added).

Here, the circumstances proved are as follows. Brass is a Waseca police officer.

On September 1, 2020—the date of the phone call—Brass was actively investigating

whether Johnson was depriving Father of his custodial rights. His investigation led him to

Johnson’s apartment in the City of Waseca, and then to her parents’ apartment, which is

also in Waseca County. Brass left Johnson a voicemail message telling her that she needed

to come to the Waseca Police Department by 3:00 p.m. that day. Johnson did not comply.

Rather, at 4:09 p.m., Johnson called Brass from Mankato, which Brass knew was

approximately 30 minutes from the Waseca Police Department. During the recorded call

with Johnson, Brass repeatedly asked Johnson to come to the Waseca Police Department

with her son. More specifically, Bass testified that he told Johnson, to “come straight to

the Waseca Police Department” and to “come straight to us so that I could see [your son].” 5

(Emphasis added.) Radio chatter can be heard in the background of the phone call

recording. Brass waited for Johnson for over an hour, but Johnson and her son never came

to the police department. At that point, Brass left Johnson another voicemail message,

5 Johnson correctly notes that Brass did not say to come straight here to the police
department. But the absence of the word “here” does not change the colloquial meaning
of “come straight to us”; that phrase suggests that Brass was at the Waseca Police
Department during the call. Cf. State v. Cantieny, 24 N.W. 458, 459 (Minn. 1885)
(concluding that witnesses identified the location of the crime sufficiently, “although
somewhat indirectly”).

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pinged her phone and later discussed the case with the next supervisor on duty, Sergeant

Schroeder.

Independently examining the reasonableness of any inferences that can be drawn

from the circumstances proved, we conclude that the only inference that can be reasonably

drawn from the circumstances proved, as a whole, is that Brass was in Waseca County

when he received the false report.

Johnson’s argument to the contrary is unavailing because it fails to consider the

circumstances proved as a whole. 6 Instead, Johnson focuses on only two of the

circumstances proved: (1) Brass knew that Johnson was 30 minutes away from the Waseca

Police Department, and (2) indiscernible police radio chatter can be heard in the

background of the phone call recording. According to Johnson, these two circumstances

support an inference that when Brass told Johnson to bring her son to the Waseca Police

Department so Brass “could see [him],” Brass was also away from the Waseca Police

Department and at a location outside Waseca County. Johnson asserts that the radio

dispatch noises in the background could mean that “Detective Brass was in a car talking

on his cell phone.” In other words, Johnson contends that because Brass knew that Johnson

was 30 minutes away from the police station, one inference we can draw is that when Brass

6 Johnson correctly noted at oral argument that it would have been easier for the State
to ask Brass directly whether he was in Waseca County when he received the call. We
urge prosecutors to establish venue through direct testimony. But we cannot make any
inferences about Brass’s location based on the State’s failure to ask a question, and
“[v]enue may be proved by indirect evidence.” State v. Trezona, 176 N.W.2d 95, 96
(Minn. 1970) (collecting cases).

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told Johnson to meet at the police station, Brass might have been somewhere within a

30-minute drive of the station, including areas outside Waseca County.

We disagree. In light of all of the circumstances proved, the only reasonable

inference is that Brass was in Waseca County when Johnson called him. Specifically,

Brass worked for the Waseca Police Department; Brass was working the case in Waseca

County before the call; during the call, he told Johnson to come straight to the Waseca

Police Department so that he could see her son; then after the call, he waited for Johnson

for over an hour, and when Johnson still had not shown up at the police department after

an hour, Brass involved the next supervisor on duty. Further, while radio dispatch noises

could come from a squad car (as Johnson observes) or they could come from the police

station, one inference we can definitively draw from the radio dispatch noises in the

background of the call is that Brass was working his job as a Waseca police detective at

the time of the call. And the fact that Brass knew that Johnson was 30 minutes away from

the police station—standing alone—does not support a reasonable inference that Brass

himself was outside Waseca County. There is no evidence that Brass left the county during

his investigation. And while Johnson’s alternative explanation is theoretically possible—

perhaps Brass drove his car to another county for some other reason while doing his work

as a Waseca County police officer—we conclude that it is not a reasonable inference to

draw. See State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 860–61 (Minn. 2008) (acknowledging that

defendant’s alternative theory was “theoretically possible” but rejecting the argument and

upholding the conviction because there was “no physical evidence in the record to provide

reasonable support for this hypothesis”).

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 Rather, the only reasonable inference from our consideration of the circumstances

proved as a whole is that Brass was in Waseca County when he spoke to Johnson. It is

simply not reasonable on this record to infer that Brass was anywhere other than Waseca

County when the call took place. See State v. Boldman, 813 N.W.2d 102, 108 (Minn. 2012)

(“[C]ircumstances must be evaluated as a part of the whole evidentiary picture.”).

Accordingly, we hold that the circumstantial evidence presented by the State proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that Brass received the false report of a crime in Waseca

County. 7

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed.

7 See State v. New, 22 Minn. 76, 79 (Minn. 1875) (concluding that the State met its
burden to show venue for embezzlement by showing that embezzled money was received
in the county and an absence of evidence that the defendant moved the money out of the
county); State v. McReady, 191 N.W. 816, 816 (Minn. 1923) (holding that venue was
sufficiently established in Anoka County for crime of taking indecent liberties when the
record shows that the victim lived and studied in Fridley, the crime was committed near
the victim’s home, the defendant and several witnesses lived in Fridley, and the defendant’s
testimony showed that Fridley is in Anoka County); State v. Frost, 200 N.W. 295, 295
(Minn. 1924) (holding that State met its burden to show venue for illegal sale of alcohol
by inference when testimony established that sales were made at defendant’s store and the
defendant testified that the store was in a city that was in the county).

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