State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0003

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Frank Joseph Tregoning,
Appellant.

Filed November 28, 2022
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-20-638

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, David Classen, Assistant County Attorney, Center
City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of felony driving while impaired (DWI),
arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of his
intoxication because law enforcement impermissibly expanded the traffic stop. We affirm.
FACTS
Around 7:40 p.m. on September 5, 2020, a sheriff’s deputy was patrolling in a
marked squad car on U.S. Highway 8 when he saw a motorcycle driving toward him at a
high rate of speed. At a curve in the road, the motorcycle veered into oncoming traffic and
continued on the left shoulder. The deputy activated his emergency lights to alert nearby
traffic, and the motorcycle crashed in front of his vehicle. The deputy reported the crash
and called for an ambulance; dispatch contacted the Minnesota State Patrol, which is the
law-enforcement agency responsible for investigating crashes that occur on highways.
The deputy then exited his vehicle and identified the motorcycle driver as appellant
Frank Tregoning. As they waited for the ambulance and a state trooper, the deputy noticed
that Tregoning had a cut on his head and “road rash” on one arm. The deputy did not
observe any odor of alcohol coming from Tregoning or bloodshot or watery eyes, but he
noted that Tregoning was acting “jittery.” The deputy asked Tregoning how much he had
to drink, but he denied drinking. The deputy checked Tregoning’s driver’s license and
learned that he lacked a motorcycle endorsement; Tregoning acknowledged as much.
Tregoning asked to retrieve his phone, and the deputy instructed him to wait until the state
trooper arrived.
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Upon their arrival, the emergency medical technicians (EMTs) brought Tregoning
into the ambulance to examine him. While Tregoning was with the EMTs, a state trooper
arrived to investigate the crash. He began by asking the deputy what he observed and
watching the deputy’s squad-car recording of Tregoning’s driving and the crash. The
trooper asked the deputy and one of the EMTs whether they smelled alcohol on Tregoning;
both said they had not but noted that Tregoning was acting “weird.” The EMT noted that
Tregoning gave inconsistent information about his address.
Once the EMTs finished with Tregoning, t he trooper spoke with him about the
crash. The trooper stood downwind so he would be able to detect any odors coming off of
Tregoning. As they spoke, the trooper had to repeat himself and ask Tregoning for his full
attention. He also noticed an odor of alcohol from Tregoning and observed that his eyes
were bloodshot and watery. Based on these observations, the trooper asked Tregoning how
much he had to drink that day. Tregoning denied drinking. The trooper asked him to
perform field sobriety tests. Tregoning agreed to do so and confirmed that his head felt
fine and he had no physical limitations that would affect his ability to perform the tests.
The trooper conducted three tests, all of which revealed signs of impairment. And after a
preliminary breath test (PBT) indicated an alcohol concentration above the legal limit, the
trooper arrested Tregoning for DWI. Subsequent breath testing indicated an alcohol
concentration of 0.12.
Tregoning was charged with felony DWI (enhanced because of a prior conviction)
and driving without a motorcycle endorsement. He moved to suppress evidence of his
intoxication “obtained as a result of an unlawful expansion of the traffic stop.” After an
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evidentiary hearing at which the deputy and the trooper testified, the district court denied
the motion. A jury found Tregoning guilty of both offenses, and the district court sentenced
him to 57 months’ imprisonment. Tregoning appeals.
DECISION
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo. State v.
Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). Where, as here, the facts are not in dispute,
“the issue is purely a legal determination on given facts,” which we review de novo. State
v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
Law enforcement may detain a motorist if (1) the stop is justified at its inception by
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause; and (2) the actions
of the police during the stop are reasonably related to and justified by the original legitimate
purpose or independent probable cause or reasonable suspicion. State v. Askerooth, 681
N.W.2d 353, 363, 365 (Minn. 2004). A traffic stop has “no rigid limit” to its duration but
may continue as long as reasonable suspicion remains, “provided that police act diligently
and reasonably.” Stat e v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605, 611 (Minn. App. 2014) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014).
Tregoning does not dispute that law enforcement had reasonable, articulable
suspicion to detain him to investigate his erratic driving conduct and the crash. But he
contends that the trooper impermissibly expanded the investigation by assessing
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Tregoning’s possible intoxication because any reasonable suspicion of intoxication lapsed
when the deputy and the EMT failed to observe signs of impairment. We disagree. The
trooper detained Tregoning to investigate the crash, as he was called to the scene to do.
Tregoning does not dispute that the trooper’s conduct during their initial interactions was
reasonably tied to his duties in addressing the crash—he explained what would happen
with the motorcycle, asked Tregnoning to describe the crash, obtained Tregoning’s contact
information, and confirmed that Tregoning lacked a motorcycle endorsement. While doing
so, the trooper personally observed well-known indicia of intoxication that generally
support an expansion of detention to further assess a driver’s impairment. See Mesenburg
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 969 N.W.2d 642, 648-49 (Minn. App. 2021) (stating that “a
traffic violation coupled with indicia of intoxication can provide reasonable suspicion” to
justify field sobriety testing and PBT), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2022).
Tregoning cites no authority for the proposition that the trooper could not follow up
on the signs of possible impairment simply because the deputy and EMT did not observe
them. We have found no such authority. And we are persuaded that the failure of others
to observe the signs the trooper personally observed while lawfully investigating the crash
did not eliminate any suspicion of intoxication, particularly in light of Tregoning’s driving
conduct and “jittery,” confused behavior despite being medically cleared . Cf. id. at 649
(concluding that successful completion of field sobriety tests “may have diminished the
suspicion that [driver] was impaired” but “did not completely remove that suspicion”).
In sum, the undisputed facts establish that the trooper reasonably detained
Tregoning for the purpose of investigating the cause of the crash, including but not limited
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to the role intoxication may have played. The trooper’s observation of numerous indicia
of intoxication justified further detention to investigate possible intoxication through field
sobriety testing and a PBT.
Affirmed.