Anthony Emerson Howson, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0010

Anthony Emerson Howson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 1, 2022
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-19-32

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Melissa Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Assistant County Attorney,
Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty
plea to second-degree intentional murder. Appellant now challenges the district court’s
order denying his request, arguing that his plea lacked an adequate factual basis. Because
the factual basis provided by appellant at the plea hearing is sufficient to support
appellant’s plea, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Anthony Howson
with three offenses: second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19,
subd. 1(1) (2018), kidnapping in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3) (2018), and
first-degree aggravated robbery in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2018). The
charges were based on allegations that Howson aided and abetted the kidnapping, robbing,
and killing of J.L. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2018) (setting forth criminal liability
for aiding and abetting a crime of another). In February 2019, Howson and the state entered
into a plea agreement. Howson agreed to plead guilty to second-degree intentional murder
and, in exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. At the plea hearing,
Howson entered his guilty plea and provided a factual basis for the plea. The following
summarizes Howson’s testimony at the plea hearing.
On January 5, 2019, Howson was at his apartment with Bailey French. French is
the best friend of Howson’s girlfriend. French asked Howson if she could invite J.L. over
so that she and J.L. could “do[] business, meaning selling drugs, talking about drugs.”
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Howson agreed, and J.L. came to Howson’s apartment. After some time, J.L. left the
apartment.
Later, Deshon Bonnell, a family friend of Howson, came over to the apartment.
French told Howson and Bonnell that J.L. had made a sexual pass at her and had touched
her inappropriately. French, Howson, and Bonnell were angry with J.L. French also told
another individual, D.H., about what J.L. had done. D.H. told French to bring J.L. to his
house so that they could “teach him a lesson” and “pretty much take all his stuff.” French,
Howson, and Bonnell found J.L. at a nearby auto shop and brought him to D.H.’s house.
At D.H.’s house, they “pushed [J.L.] around a little bit . . . [j]ust [to] kind of scare him.”
They also took two phones, $13, and a debit card from J.L. After they “roughed him up,”
D.H. gave the debit card back to J.L. and told J.L. to never make sexual advances towards
French again. D.H. then told the others to drive J.L. somewhere, drop J.L.’s car off
somewhere else, and go home.
Instead of dropping off J.L., Howson, French, and Bonnell then drove J.L. back to
Howson’s apartment. Howson, French, and Bonnell then held J.L. at Howson’s apartment
for several hours. Bonnell showed J.L. a gun and told him that he was not free to leave
because of what he did to French. Bonnell also said to J.L. something to the effect of
“you’re not going to be able to live today.” Howson, French, and Bonnell then came up
with a plan to drive J.L. to a wooded trail in the city of Kerr, have Bonnell and French take
him onto the trail, and shoot and kill him. Meanwhile, Howson, French, and Bonnell
fabricated a story to confuse J.L. about their intentions. They told J.L. that they were going
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to go meet up with the “Mexican Cartel,” sell them marijuana to get money for gas for
J.L.’s car, and then bring J.L. home.
Several hours later, sometime between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. on January 6, Howson
drove French, Bonnell, and J.L. to Kerr. Howson, French, and Bonnell decided to make
the drive at that hour because they believed the police department conducted its shift
change around that time and, as a result, there would be fewer officers on patrol. During
the drive, Howson knew that Bonnell was still in possession of a gun. Upon arriving in
Kerr, Howson parked the car at a dead-end near a trail in a wooded area. French then asked
Howson to switch shoes with her to make it easier for her to walk on the trail because she
was wearing high heels. Howson agreed. The group told J.L. to put a bandana over his
face and scrunch up his hood so that “the Mexican Cartel couldn’t see him.” French and
Bonnell then walked with J.L. down the trail, while Howson stayed in the car. As he
waited, Howson engaged in “wishful thinking” that Bonnell and French would just let J.L.
go. But Howson’s “serious possible thinking was [J.L.] getting shot” because Howson
knew that the plan was to shoot J.L.
Bonnell and French walked J.L. down the trail and shot him. Howson heard two
gunshots from the car. Bonnell or French then called Howson and told him they were done.
Bonnell and French returned to the car , and Howson drove them back to his apartment.
The medical examiner concluded that J.L. died as a result of gunshot wounds. At the plea
hearing, Howson testified that at some point on January 5 or 6 he “was thinking about”
contacting the police or trying to stop J.L.’s murder, “but never did.”
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At the conclusion of the plea hearing, the district court accepted Howson’s guilty
plea. The district court later sentenced Howson to 306 months in prison in accordance with
the plea agreement.
In September 2021, Howson filed a postconviction petition seeking to withdraw his
guilty plea. In a supporting memorandum, Howson argued that his plea was invalid
because he did not admit facts at the plea hearing showing that he intentionally aided in the
commission of J.L.’s murder. In November 2021, the district court issued an order denying
Howson’s postconviction petition.
Howson appeals.
DECISION
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017). But a defendant may withdraw a
guilty plea at any time, even after sentencing, if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs if a plea
is not valid. State v. Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. 2021). “To be constitutionally
valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. Deter mining the
validity of a guilty plea presents a question of law, which we review de novo.
Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 2015). We review a district court’s decision
to deny a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State,
919 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Minn. 2018). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it
has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an
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erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Howson challenges only the accuracy of his plea. For a guilty plea to be accurate,
a proper factual basis must be established for each element of the offense. State v. Jones,
921 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019). “[A] factual
basis is inadequate when the defendant makes statements that negate an essential element
of the charged crime.” Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d at 603 (quotation omitted). The accuracy
standard requires a district court judge considering a guilty plea to “make certain that facts
exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged can be reasonably inferred.”
Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Howson pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree intentional murder.
Under Minnesota’s aiding-and-abetting statute, “[a] person is criminally liable for a crime
committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires
with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1.
A person “intentionally aids” in the commission of a crime if “two important and necessary
principles” are satisfied: (1) “the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going
to commit a crime,” and (2) “the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the
commission of that crime.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted). In other words, to be guilty of aiding and abetting a crime, the defendant must
have played a knowing role in the commission of the crime and taken no steps to thwart its
completion. State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 924 (Minn. 1995).
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The supreme court has “distinguish[ed] between playing a knowing role in the crime
and mere presence at the scene, inaction, knowledge and passive acquiescence.”
State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631, 640 (Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted). But “active
participation in the overt act which constitutes the substantive offense is not required.”
Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d at 924. The necessary state of mind for accomplice liability may be
inferred from “presence at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal
offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances,
and flight from the scene of the crime with the principal offender.” State v. Bahtuoh,
840 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. 2013).
Here, the district court concluded that the factual basis for Howson’s plea was
sufficient to establish that Howson intentionally aided French and Bonnell in the
commission of J.L.’s murder. The district court determined that Howson’s testimony
supported reasonable inferences that Howson knew French and Bonnell were going to kill
J.L. and that Howson intended his presence and actions to aid in the commission of the
murder. In reaching this conclusion, the district court analyzed both “necessary principles”
of the “intentionally aids” element. See Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 805.
Howson contends that the factual basis for his guilty plea was inadequate because
he did not admit facts demonstrating that he intentionally aided in the commission of J.L.’s
murder. He focuses his argument on the second necessary principle—whether the
defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of the crime. Id. He
asserts that the factual basis for his plea failed to establish that he intended his presence
and actions to aid the commission of J.L.’s murder. For the reasons set forth below, we
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conclude that the district court properly analyzed both requirements of the “intentionally
aids” element and that the factual basis was adequate to support Howson’s guilty plea.
First, as Howson appears to concede, he admitted sufficient facts at the plea hearing
to show that he knew his accomplices were going to commit a crime. As the district court
noted, Howson admitted to being intricately involved in helping Bonnell and French plan
J.L.’s murder. Specifically, he stated that he discussed the plan to shoot and kill J.L. with
Bonnell and French while they held J.L. at Howson’s apartment. His testimony also
demonstrated that he was with Bonnell and French continuously from January 5 , when
French told him and Bonnell that J.L. had made a sexual pass at her, until J.L.’s murder
during the early morning hours of January 6. Howson further stated that he saw Bonnell
show a gun to J.L. and heard Bonnell say to J.L., “you’re not going to be able to live today.”
He testified that he knew the plan was to shoot J.L. when he drove the group to Kerr and
when Bonnell and French exited the car to walk J.L. down the trail. And Howson testified
that, during the drive to Kerr, he knew that Bonnell was still in possession of a gun. Based
on Howson’s testimony, the district court reasonably inferred that Howson knew that his
accomplices were going to murder J.L.
Second, the record reflects that Howson admitted sufficient facts to show that he
intended his presence and actions to further the commission of J.L.’s murder. His
testimony established that he was closely associated with Bonnell and French, and that he
actively assisted in planning and carrying out J.L.’s murder. Howson testified that Bonnell
was a family friend, and that French was his girlfriend’s best friend. Furthermore, Howson
acknowledged that he permitted Bonnell and French to hold J.L. at his apartment against
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J.L.’s will for a number of hours preceding the murder. During that time, Howson
discussed with Bonnell and French the plan to drive J.L. to Kerr, take him onto a trail, and
shoot him. Howson also joined Bonnell and French in coming up with a story, intended to
“confuse” J.L., that they were going to sell marijuana to the Mexican cartel and then drive
J.L. home. Howson testified that when they left his apartment, he drove Bonnell, French,
and J.L. to the trail in Kerr. Once they arrived, Howson further aided the commission of
the crime by agreeing to switch shoes with French, making it easier for French to walk on
the trail to the murder site. Howson then waited in the car while Bonnell and French walked
J.L. down the trail and shot him. After the shooting, Howson drove Bonnell and French
back to his apartment. The district court properly concluded that Howson’s testimony at
the plea hearing supports a reasonable inference that Howson intended his presence and
actions to further the commission of J.L.’s murder.
Howson’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise. Howson contends that his
testimony at the plea hearing does not demonstrate that he intended his presence and
actions to aid in the commission of J.L.’s murder because he did not admit to encouraging
Bonnell or French to shoot J.L. and was not present when the shooting occurred. He further
emphasizes his testimony that he engaged in “wishful thinking” that Bonnell and French
would let J.L. go and that he “was thinking about” contacting the police or trying to stop
the murder. Howson argues that he “[a]t most . . . passively acquiesced in Bonnell’s and
French’s actions.”
Howson’s admissions at the plea hearing demonstrate that he did far more than
passively acquiesce to Bonnell and French’s conduct. He discussed with them the plan to
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murder J.L. and participated in at least some of the planning. Then, knowing the details of
that plan, Howson drove Bonnell, French, and J.L. to the scene of the murder, waited for
Bonnell and French while they shot J.L., and then drove Bonnell and French away from
the crime scene. Based on his own testimony, Howson played a knowing role in J.L.’s
murder. Moreover, in light of Howson’s admissions at the plea hearing, his additional
testimony that he had merely “wish[ed]” that Bonnell and French would not kill J.L. and
“was thinking about” attempting to stop the murder does not negate a reasonable inference
that Howson intended his presence and actions to aid in the commission of J.L.’s murder.
As the district court noted, Howson had “numerous opportunities to cease his involvement
in the plan to kill J.L. and thwart the commission of the crime. Yet, despite these
opportunities, [Howson] took no action to thwart the crime and, instead, did the opposite.”
In sum, the district court reasonably inferred from Howson’s testimony at the plea
hearing that Howson knew that his accomplices were going to murder J.L. and intended
his presence and actions to further the commission of that crime. The factual basis
supporting Howson’s guilty plea was therefore sufficient to establish that Howson
intentionally aided in the murder of J.L. Accordingly, we conclude that Howson’s guilty
plea was accurate and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Howson’s postconviction petition seeking to withdraw the plea.
Affirmed.