In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: P. A. T., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0012

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
P. A. T., Parent.

Filed June 20, 2022
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-JV-21-80

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant P.A.T.)

Joseph M. Sanow, Nobles County Attorney, Worthington, Minnesota (for respondent
Nobles County Community Services Agency)

Angie Kopplow, Worthington, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Cochran , Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appealing the district court’s termination of her parental rights, appellant -mother
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded tha t: (1) statutory
grounds justified termination; (2) the county exercised reasonable efforts to reunify the

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
family; and (3) the best interests of the child favored termination of mother’s parental
rights. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant P.A.T. (mother) has been addicted to methamphetamine for six years.
She has multiple convictions for drug use, assault and domestic assault, and other crimes.1
Respondent Nobles County Community Services Agency (the county) provided mother
with access to numerous chemical-dependency treatment programs but mother never
successfully completed any program. 2 Instead, mother has a “rather chaotic” history of
entering treatment program s and briefly abstaining from illegal drugs , only to relapse
shortly thereafter. Mother’s history of drug abuse coincided with the termination of her
parental rights to four children prior to this case.
In summer 2020, mother became pregnant with B.C.S. (the child). During her
pregnancy, mother continued to use methamphetamine and other drugs. On March 28,
2021, mother gave birth to the child. Shortly after the birth, the county spoke with mother
about her plan to care for the child; mother indicated that she did not have any plan to care
for the child. On March 29, based on mother’s lack of a plan to care for the child, mother’s
drug use while pregnant, and other concerns for the child’s safety, the county placed the
child in non-relative foster care.

1 In 2018, mother committed credit-card fraud and was sentenced to probation. She was
on probation for this fraud offense during the relevant period underlying this appeal.

2 The county’s probation agent testified at trial that mother w as confrontational with the
staff at treatment centers and repeatedly postponed her treatment dates, doing this so often
that multiple treatment centers rescinded her admission to their treatment programs.
3
On March 31, 2021, the county filed a child in need of protection or services
(CHIPS) petition. The following day, the district court held an emergency protective-care
hearing. The district court found that the county established a prima facie showing that
that the child’s health and safety would be endangered if the child was released to mother’s
care and ordered that the child remain in foster care. The district court instructed mother
to work with the county to develop a case plan and follow the case-plan recommendations.
Instead of working with the county, m other actively avoided the county. Mother
had no contact with the county for three months, did not visit the child, did not answer the
county’s weekly phone calls, and did not answer the door when county agents attempted
to physically locate her at possible residences. Mother continued to use methamphetamine
and other d rugs during this time. In May 2021, b ecause mother refused to meet or
cooperate with the county, the county developed and submitted a case plan without her
participation. The case plan recommended that mother obtain stable housing, complete
chemical-dependency and mental-health diagnostic assessments, and follow the
recommendations of both assessments. Mother did not complete any case -plan
recommendation.
On May 19, 2021, the district court held a pretrial hearing on the CHIPS petition.
Mother did not attend this hearing. In June 2021, the district court held an adjudication
hearing on the CHIPS petition. Mother did not attend this hearing either. The district court
granted the county’s request to proceed with the hearing in mother’s absence and
adjudicated the child CHIPS. O n July 22, 2021, the county filed a petition to terminate
mother’s parental rights to the child pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 (2020).
4
Specifically, the county alleged that mother abandoned the child, refused or neglected t o
comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent-child relationship, and was palpably
unfit to parent the child. See id., subd. 1(b)(1), (2), (4) (2020).
On July 23, the day after the termination -of-parental-rights filing, mother was
arrested and booked into jail where she again tested positive for methamphetamine.
Although “communication with [mother] was kind of hard while she was . . . in jail,” the
county social worker spoke with mother twice during the five days she was in jail. At a
hearing shortly thereafter, m other admitted to violating her probation and requested
execution of her probationary sentence. Mother was sentenced to a 21-month prison term.
The social worker spoke with mother once more during her prison incarceration. The social
worker also spoke with mother’s prison case manager about her progress “on a few
occasions.”
On August 25, 2021, the district court held a review hearing on the CHIPS petition.3
The district court stated: “The [county] should continue trying to work a case plan with
mom. I would appreciate it if the social worker would, ah, meet with mom [in prison] . . .
and see if they can re-work her case plan to take advantage of some of the services that are
available at the . . . women’s prison as there are quite a few.” In its order following th e
hearing, the district court stated that “[the county] has made reasonable efforts to prevent
the initial out-of-home placement and to reunify the child with the mother. The mother has

3 The district court also held an admit/deny hearing on the termination -of-parental-rights
petition. Mother was in quarantine at the prison and unable to attend the hearing. Her
attorney entered a denial on her behalf.
5
not cooperated since. [The county] will re-initiate reasonable efforts with the mother.” On
September 29, the district court held a pretrial hearing on the termination case, wherein the
county informed the district court that “I don’t have anything substantial” to report and
noted that the county social worker “is attempting to coordinate video calls between
[mother] and [the child].” Mother informed the district court that she was participating in
programming, to which the district court replied, “Fantastic.”
On October 15, 2021, the district court held the first day of a two-day trial regarding
whether to terminate mother’s parental rights. The district court received testimony from
the county probation agent and county social worker assigned to mother . The probation
agent testified that mother frequently tested positive for illegal drugs and repeatedly failed
to follow through with chemical -dependency treatments. The agent test ified that the
county “had exhausted all the different treatment facilities” and “ we just didn’t have
anything else to offer.” The agent testified that mother had shown no signs of being able
to capably parent the child; instead, the agent testified that mother has not even “been able
to safely care for herself.” The agent recommended termination of mother’s parental rights.
The county social worker similarly testified that mother was not fit to parent the
child. The social worker testified that mothe r’s myriad issues—chemical dependency,
mental health, lack of stable housing , and repeated criminal behavior—raised concerns
about her ability to parent. Moreover, the social worker testified that mother made no effort
to visit the child, comply with her case plan, or abstain from illegal drugs . The social
worker testified that the county only successfully located mother once she was
incarcerated. The social worker testified that mother stated that “she had been using drugs
6
the entire case.” T he social worker concluded that mother was not capable of parenting
the child and recommended terminating her parental rights. Following the social worker’s
testimony, mother requested a continuance so that she could provide testimony on a
diagnostic assessment scheduled for the following week. The district court approved the
continuance request.
On November 4, 2021, the county filed an updated case plan. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.212, subd. 1a(b) (2020) (requiring the county to submit an updated case plan within
180 days of the child’s out -of-home placement). The updated case plan stated that
reunification was not an appropriate permanency goal. The case plan indicated that the
county had contacted mother to discuss the updated case plan and the services that mother
was receiving while incarcerated. Mother had not signed the updated case plan.
The following day, November 5, 2021, the district court reconvened trial. Mother
testified that she “ha[s] been addicted to meth . . . for six years,” “used drug s . . . while
pregnant,” and the county gave her multiple opportunities to rehabilitate herself but she
was noncompliant with the county and her case plan.
4 Mother testified that she would be
starting a chemical -dependency treatment the following week, was working with a
therapist “on mental health, [and] anger management,” was participating in a prison
parenting program, and had been sober since her commitment to prison . Mother
acknowledged that her treatment would be a “long road,” described her tentative plans to
achieve sobriety, and estimated that she could care for the child “within a year or two.”

4 Mother’s testimony indicated that she had not completed the diagnostic assessment for
which she requested the continuance.
7
On December 17, 2021, the district court filed an order and memorandum
terminating mother’s parental rights . The district court found that “Mother’s chemical
dependency and mental health issues are long -term and significant,” “Mother’s proposed
long-term plan is appropriately hopeful but does not have a reasonably grounded positive
outcome,” and “[a]nother 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 years for the Mother to hopefully provide stability
for the child is not within a reasonably foreseeable future.” The district court found that
“[the county] made reasonable efforts in offering services to correct the problems
preventing Mother from parenting the child.” The district court determined that the county
proved each of the alleged statutory theories for termination by clear and convincing
evidence— that mother abandoned the child, reasonable efforts to correct the conditions
leading to the child’s out-of-home placement had failed, and mother is palpably unfit to be
a party to the parent-child relationship. The district court noted that although mother has
“recently taken responsibility,” “the Child has immediate needs for permanent, consistent,
emotionally stable caregivers NOW that makes it impossible to delay meeting that need
for the unforeseeable length of time it would take for mother to be released from prison
and find housing.” The district court opined that “returning the Child [to mother] would
[not] be safe as . . . there [is] clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s history of drug
use and homelessness, paired with her current incarceration[,] makes her unfit to parent.”
The district court also found that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best
interests of the child. Mother appeals.
5

5 On February 17, 2022, at the county’s request, the district court issued an amended order
terminating mother’s parental rights, newly stating that “[g]uardianship of the child is
8
DECISION
Parental rights may only be terminated for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). Whether to terminate parenta l
rights is discretionary with the district court. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d
127, 136 (Minn. 2014). Although we “give considerable deference to the district court’s
decision to terminate parental rights,” “we closely inquire into the s ufficiency of the
evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.” In re Welfare of Child. of
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) . To terminate mother’s parental rights, the
district court must determine that clear and convincing evidence established: (1) at least
one statutory basis for termination ; (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family; and (3) termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child. of T.A.A.,
702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005).
We conduct a two-step analysis to review a termination decision. First, we “review
the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error.” In re Welfare
of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6,
2012). Findings are clearly erroneous “when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of
the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); see also

ordered to the Commissioner of Human Services.” See In re Welfare of Child of P.A.T.,
No. A22-0240, slip op. at 1 -2 (Minn. App. Mar. 15, 2022) (ord.). Mother appealed this
order as well. See id. We dismissed this appeal, concluding tha t the district court’s
December order was the proper appellate vehicle because the February order did not affect
mother’s substantial rights. Id. at 3. Our March 15, 2022, order does not affect this appeal.
9
In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying
Kenney to a termination appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). Second, we review the
district court’s determination “of whether a particular . . . basis for involuntarily
terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at
901. Evidence supporting termination of parental rights must relate to the conditions as
they existed at the time of trial and which are likely to continue for a “prolonged and
indeterminate” period. Ramsey Cnty. Welfare Dept. v. Beck (In re Welfare of Chosa), 290
N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980). A district court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the
law, makes findings unsupported by the record, or resolves discretionary questions in a
manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record. Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d
257, 262 (Minn. 2022).
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that:
(1) a statutory basis for termination existed; (2) the county made reasonable efforts to
reunite the family; and (3) termination was in the best interests of the child. We address
each argument in turn.
I. The district court did no t abuse its discretion by concluding that statutory
grounds justified terminating mother’s parental rights.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it held that there
were statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. Mother specifically argues that the
district court abused its discretion by concluding that she abandoned the child . Mother
concedes that she did abandon the child after birth but argues that the record does not
10
support the district court’s determination that she intended to abandon the child at the time
of trial. We disagree.
The existence of a statutory condition permitting the termination of parental rights
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1 (2020);
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a). The county bears the burden of proving the
grounds for termination. See In re Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 870
(Minn. 2021).
A district court may terminate parental rights if “the parent has abandoned the
child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1). Abandonment occurs when “the parent has
actually deserted the child and has an intention to forsake the duties of parenthood.” In re
Welfare of Child. of R .W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). “ [A]
separation of child and parent due to misfortune and misconduct alone, such as
incarceration of the parent, does not constitute intentional abandonment.” Hennepin Cnty.
Welfare Bd. v. Staat (In re Staat), 178 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Minn. 1970). However, “the fact
of imprisonment may combine with other factors, such as parental neglect and withholding
of parental affection, so as to lend support to a finding that the pare nt has relinquished all
parental claims to [her] child.” Id.; see also id. (“[I]f a parental relationship existed prior
to a [parent’s] imprisonment and [s]he continued this relationship to the best of [her] ability
during incarceration . . . [her] parental rights would be preserved.”).
On this record, we conclude that t he district court acted within its discretion by
ruling that mother abandoned the child and by terminating mother’s parental rights because
she abandoned the child. Based on mother’s complete lack of a relationship with the child,
11
the district court ruled that the statutory basis of parental abandonment for terminating
parental rights was present because mother both deserted the child and intended to forsake
the duties of the parent-child relationship.6 While the record indicates that mother, once
incarcerated, stated for the first time that she intended to parent the child, other evidence
supports the district court’s determination that mother’s alleged intention was neither
credible or realistic, given the context.
First, the record supports the district court ’s finding that “there [was] no evidence
of a parental relationship [between mother and the child] before her incarceration” and thus
“[t]here was no parental relationship to continue after Mother was incarcerated.” See id.
(indicating that parental rights will not be preserved whe n the parent does not have a
relationship with the child prior to incarceration); see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl ,
570 U.S. 637, 651- 52 (2013) ( concluding in a plurality opinion that when the parent
abandons a child prior to birth in an Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA ) case, there is no
“relationship” to later be “broken up” or “discontinued”). Here, the record supports the
district court’s finding that mother had no preexisting relationship with the child at the time
of her incarceration, and that mother never even met the child following birth.
Second, the record supports the district court’s finding that mother’s historical
approach to treatment has been cyclical: mother proclaims that she will rehabilitate herself,

6 The district court also found that abandonment was presumed because mother had “no
contact with the child on a regular basis and [had] not demonstrated consistent interest in
the child’s well-being for six months.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020).
We need not address this presumption of abandonment because we conclude that the
evidence supports the district court’s determination that mother actually abandoned the
child.
12
enters treatment, and the n fails to successfully complete treatment. T his same pattern
appears to have pl ayed out with respect to the termination of mother’s parental rights to
her older children. Here, the district court found that “Mother’s demonstrated avoidance
behaviors in t his case are consistent with her past conduct” and “[h]er engagement in
services in the controlled environment of prison is not predictive of her future engagement
and follow -through with services upon release.” The district court also found that
“Mother’s proposed long-term plan is appropriately hopeful but does not have a reasonably
guaranteed positive outcome.” The district court thus implied that mother was not
credible—or was at least overly optimistic —with respect to her ability to remain sober and
complete treatment following her release from prison. The district court’s order appeared
to be similarly skeptical of mother’s ability to sustain her alleged intent to parent the child
following her release from prison when mother had not demonstrated such follow through
with any of her older children or past chemical-dependency treatments.
We do not mean to disparage mother. Rather, we commend her embarking upon
the path to recovery . But as the district court found, the child needs stability , consistent
caretakers, and the absence of proximate drug use . We cannot conclude that the district
court clearly erred by finding that mother intend ed to abandon the child . Nor can we
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by determining that mother abandoned
the child. Therefore, the district court acted within its discretion when it determined that
13
mother’s conduct met the statutory basis of abandonment and terminated her parental rights
to the child.7
II. The district court did not abu se its discretion by determining that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunite the family and, in the alternative, any error
made by the district court was harmless.

Admitting that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family prior to her
incarceration, mother next argues that the county failed to provide reasonable efforts to
reunite the family once she was incarcerated.
In proceedings to terminate parental rights, the district court must address whether
“reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were
made.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2020); see Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2020)
(“Reasonable efforts . . . [for] reunification are always required.”).8 “Reasonable efforts
. . . are services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine
assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). Such efforts depend on the facts
and circumstances of the case. In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 663
(Minn. App. 2018) (citing In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996)). A
parent’s incarceration does not excuse the county from making reasonable efforts to reunify

7 We need not to consider the district court’s other statutory -termination determinations
because “we need only one properly supported statutory ground in order to affirm a
termination order.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012).

8 Alternatively, the county can petition the district court to find that reasonable efforts
would be futile. Minn. Stat. § 260C.012 (a)(7) (2020). The county did not request such a
finding of futility here.
14
the family. In re Welfare of Child. of A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d 894, 899 (Minn. App. 2018).
However, incarceration “might change what qualifies as ‘reasonable’ under the county’s
duty to make ‘reasonable efforts.’” Id. Determining whether efforts were reasonable also
requires “consideration of the length of the time the county was involved and the quality
of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 53 2 (Minn. App. 1990) , rev.
denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). “The county’s efforts must assist in alleviating the conditions
that gave rise to” the out-of-home placement.
9 Id.
We review the district court’s determination of whether a county’s reunification
efforts were reasonable for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child. of A.D.B., 970
N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. App. 2022). However, even if we conclude that the district court
abused its discretion, we will not reverse if the error was harmless. Id. at 730-31. An error
is harmless “[w]hen there is no reasonable possibility that it substantially influenced the
[fact-finder’s] decision.” State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 810 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). The party asserting error has the burden to demonstrate that the error was
prejudicial. In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997).
Even assuming that the county could have made some additional e fforts to reunify
mother and the child once mother was incarcerated and assuming that the district court
could have conducted a more -thorough analysis of the county’s reasonable efforts

9 When evaluating whether the county made reasonable efforts, the district court must
consider whether services to the child and family were: “(1) relevant to the safety and
protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally
appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under
the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020).
15
following mother’s incarceration, we still cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by holding that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. On this
record, the efforts that the county made to reunite mother with the child, while not
comprehensive, were reasonable under the circumstance s. T he COVID- 19 pandemic
severely hindered the county’s ability to communicate and meet with mother and the record
indicates that there was little more that the county could have offered mother given these
circumstances.
Moreover, the reasonableness of the county’s efforts is informed by context,
including its past efforts and mother’s past behavior. See A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 663. The
district court found that “[t]he [county] has offered Mother a variety of services aimed at
correcting the issues” and “[t]he goals of these services have been completely frustrated by
Mother’s actions.” (Emphasis added.) It found that mother “actively avoid[ed] probation,”
used drugs during her pregnancy and following the birth of the child , and “Mother’s
chemical dependency and mental health issues are long-term and significant.” The record
supports that there is little more that the county could have done for mother to correct the
conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement. The county provided mother with
access to numerous chemical -dependency treatment programs, which mother repeatedly
failed or refused to complete. The probation agent testified that “there had been so many
attempts [at treatment] without successful completions” that “we had exhausted all the
different treatment facilities.” Between the context of mother’s historical noncompliance
with the county, repeated failure to successfully complete treatment, and the COVID -19
16
pandemic, we cannot say that the d istrict court abused its discretion by ruling that the
county’s efforts at reunification were reasonable, given the circumstances.10
Alternatively, even if the district court abused its discretion by holding that the
county made sufficiently reasonable efforts to reunite the family, such error was harmless.
Had the county made additional efforts at reunification, as mother argues it should have
done, such efforts would not have corrected the conditions leading to the out-of-home
placement in the reasonab ly foreseeable future. T he record evidence demonstrates that
mother is addicted to methamphetamine and has repeatedly attempted treatment without
success. Moreover, as the district court found, mother’s attempts at treatment in prison are
“not predictive of her future engagement and follow -through with such services upon
release,” mother’s plan “does not have a reasonably guaranteed positive outcome,” and the
“length of time it would take for mother to be released from prison and find housing” is
“unforeseeable.” Although mother predicted that she would be able to resume parenting
the child “within a year or two,” the district court concluded that mother’s timeframe to be
reunited with the child was “not within a reasonably foreseeable future.”11

10 We also question the extent to which the county’s reasonable efforts were required here.
The statute requires that the county must provide services for the purpose of reunification.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.012(a). However, mother abandoned her child immediately after birth.
As noted herein, mother never even met the child. Thus, is it questionab le whether there
was any family to “reunify” here. Cf. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. at 651 -52. (concluding in a
plurality opinion in the context of an ICWA appeal that the active-efforts requirement to
“prevent the breakup” of a family prior to the adoption of an Indian child does not apply
when “there is no ‘relationship’ that would be ‘discontinued’” because the “‘breakup of the
. . . family’ has long since occurred” (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012))).

11 Mother also argues that the county failed to provide reasonable efforts because it did not
prepare her a case plan. But the county did prepare a case plan for mother while she refused
17
We also note that the county filed its petition to terminate parental rights prior to
mother’s incarceration. Under the unique facts of this case, we conclude that nothing
would have changed had the county pursued additional efforts at reunification. Again, we
wish mother the best of luck on her path to recovery . But we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the county provided reasonable efforts to
reunite the family and, in the alternative, that even had the county made additional efforts
to reunify, such efforts would not have foreseeably reunited the family . Thus, we must
conclude that any failure by the county to make additional efforts here was harmless.12
III. The district court’s application of the incorrect best-interest factors was
harmless.

Lastly, mother argues that the district court committed reversible error by applying
the incorrect legal standard to the requisite best-interest analysis. The county concedes that
the district court erred but contends that the district court’s error was harmless. We agree
that such error was harmless.

to work with the county. Even so, we are troubled by the county’s failure to promptly
provide mother with an updated case plan after she was incarcerated. We have emphasized
the importance of providing case plans to incarcerated parents. See A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at
900. On this record , however, we still cannot conclude that the county’s failure
demonstrated a lack of reasonable effort or that any error was not harmless.

12 Mother relies heavily on A.D.B. , which stands for the proposition that a district court
cannot make a posttrial finding of futility. 970 N.W.2d at 726. However, mother does not
argue that the district court made such a posttrial futility finding here. Mother also relies
on In re Welfare of Child. of A.L.H., a recent nonprecedential decisio n. No. A21 -0966,
2022 WL 519228 (Minn. App. Feb. 18, 2022). But nonprecedential cases are nonbinding
and have only persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
18
The child’s best interests must be the paramount consideration in any termination
proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020). When determining whether a
termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest, the district court must balance
three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship, (2) the
parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, and (3) any competing interests
of the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii). We review a district court’s best -interests determination for an abuse of
discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. “Because the best -interests analysis involves
credibility determinations and is generally not susceptible to an appellate court's global
review of a record, this court gives considerable deference to the district court's findings.”
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court primarily applied the best- interests factors set forth in
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212, subd. 2(b) (2020), relating to child -custody
determinations, when it concluded that the best interests of the child were served by
terminating mother’s parental rights. These are not the best-interest factors that a district
court is required to evaluate when addressing whether to terminate parental rights. See
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (listing factors to be considered by the district court
when addressing whether to terminate parental rights to a child who is not an Indian child);
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (same); see also In re Welfare of Child. of M.L.S., 964 N.W.2d
441, 452 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (noting that the factors a district court must consider when
addressing a child’s best interest s depends on the purpose for which the child’s best
interests are being a ssessed). However, in its memorandu m attached to the termination
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order, the district court also expressly listed and analyzed the correct termination
best-interest factors, albeit briefly. The district court’s inclusion of the proper best-interest
factors in its memorandum incorporate d those factors by reference into its order and
demonstrates that the district court did consider the proper factors.
Moreover, e ven if we agree with the parties that the district court erred by
considering the incorrect factors, such error was harmless. Had the district court conducted
a more thorough balancing test, this record is clear that it would undoubtedly still have
ruled that termination was in the best interests of the child. As discussed herein, there was
no parent -child relationship to be “preserv[ed]” because mother abandoned the child
immediately after birth. And the district court found that child’s foster mother has the
“ability to meet the Child’s needs,” “[t]he Child appears comfortable with her foster
mother,” and “[t]he Child has not had any contact with Mother since being discharged from
the hospital into foster care.” (Emphasis added.) As it stands, the district court concluded
in its memorandum that: “It is absolutely not in the best interests of the children to continue
to experiment with their young lives so that their parents can exhaust every possible
unrealistic alternative to termination of parental rights.” (quoting In re Welfare of A.V.,
593 N.W.2d 720, 721 (Minn. App. 1999)).
To the extent tha t the district court erred by primarily analyzing the custody
best-interest factors, this record demonstrates that such error was harmless both because
the district court did in fact address the correct factors, and because those factors favored
termination of mother’s parental rights to the child.
Affirmed.