In the Matter of the Children of: S. L. L. and M. J. T., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0015

In the Matter of the Children of: S. L. L. and M. J. T., Parents.

Filed June 13, 2022
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-JV-21-1181

Jason Steck, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant M.J.T.)

Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Jo hn A. Bowen, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Cathleen Gabriel, Annandale, Minnesota (for respondent S.L.L.)

Janell Trocke, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presid ing Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the termination of his parental rights to two children,
arguing that (1) the district court misapplied the standard for rebutting the presumption of
palpable unfitness and erroneously determ ined that appellant had not rebutted the

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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presumption; (2) the district court relied on improper factors when it determined that
termination was in the childre n’s best interests; and (3) judicial bias and attorney
misconduct denied him a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant M.J.T. is the biological father of five children: R.N.T. (born 2004), N.J.T.
(born 2008), S.A.T. (born 2012), K.K.A.T. (born 2019), and S.R.T. (born 2021).
Appellant’s involvement w ith child-protectiv e services began in 2008 when
Arizona authorities received reports of physical abuse regarding R.N.T. and N.J.T. R.N.T.,
who was four at the time, appeared at daycare with a bruised eye, which was her third black
eye in a four-month period. Appellant admitte d to accidentally causing one of the black
eyes. N.J.T. was treated later that year for bruising and swelling on his genitals, various
fractures, and a depressed area on his skull. Appellant explained that N.J.T.’s injuries were
caused by his car seat or by appellant accident ally kicking him or gr abbing him too hard
while changing his diaper. N.J.T. was labeled a “medically fragile” infant and experienced
significant developmental delays.
Arizona authorities continued to receive ch ild abuse and injury reports through 2013
regarding N.J.T. and two other children in appellant’s care, A.A.R. and K.C.W, who were
the biological children of appe llant’s then-partner, S.C. Among other things, the reports
included: that N.J.T. was not getting his asthma medication; that there was a large sore on
N.J.T.’s chest; an emergency-room visit in which A.A.R. was seen for bruising, head
injuries, and a chest wound; and treatment for A.A.R. for a hemorrhage in his eye, bruising,
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a scratched face and buttocks, and a mark on hi s head that appeared to be from being hit
with a belt buckle.
Appellant and S.C. moved to Minnesota in 2013. In May 2013, A.A.R. was brought
to the hospital for injuries that reportedly occurred after A.A.R. fell down the stairs. A.A.R.
had bruises all over his left eye and forehead . In June 2013, Carver County Community
Social Services (CCCSS) received a report that A.A.R. had significant bruising on his face
and a scab on his genitals and that the other children in appellant’s care were hungry.
CCCSS investigated and found that four of the five children had bruising. CCCSS filed a
child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition, alleging that S.A.T., A.A.R.,
K.C.W., N.J.T., and R.N.T. ne eded protection or services. In August 2013, appellant
admitted the allegations of the CHIPS petition.
In September 2013, CCCSS filed a petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights.
Appellant admitted to an involuntary termination of his parental rights to all of his children.
The district court adopted pa ragraph four of CCCSS’s petiti on as the factual basis for
appellant’s involuntary-termination admission. Paragraph four detailed: appellant’s prior
involvement with child protec tion in Arizona; A.A.R.’s ex tensive bruising and injuries;
statements from K.C.W., N.J.T., and R.N.T. that appellant had hit, bit, and choked them;
appellant’s statements to police that he hit the children with a belt; and reports that, after
the children were placed in foster care, their bruises healed and their bodies remained clear
of any new significant bruising. Based on its findings in paragraph four, CCCSS made
maltreatment findings of physical abuse of A.A.R., N.J.T., and K.C.W. and findings of
neglect and mental and emotional harm as to all five children.
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The district court terminated appellant’s pa rental rights to all of his children in
October 2013.1 Shortly after, appellant also pleaded guilty to and was convicted of felony-
level malicious punishment of a child, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.377, subd. 1 (2012).
Appellant met S.L.L. in 2015 and has b een in a relationship with S.L.L. for
approximately four years. Appellant and S.L.L. had a child, K.K.A.T., born in 2019.
K.K.A.T. has been diagnosed with hip dysp lasia, hypothyroidism, and infantile spasms;
she is in the care of specialty doctors and qualifies for special education. In January 2021,
appellant and S.L.L. brought K.K.A.T. to the emergency room because she would not bear
weight on her left leg. An x -ray showed that K.K.A.T. had a broken leg. Later medical
review of the visit stated that K.K.A.T. could have been injured during normal childhood
activities but also stated that it was not possible to determine whether maltreatment
occurred. Respondent Wright County Health and Human Services did not make a finding
of maltreatment for K.K.A.T.’s injuries.
Appellant and S.L.L. had another child, S.R.T., in February 2021. In March 2021,
respondent received a birth-match report for S.R.T., whic h alerted it that appellant had
fathered additional children since his 2013 termination. Because appellant’s parental rights
to other children were previously involuntarily terminated, respondent was required under

1 The district court listed four grounds for appellant’s 2013 termination: (1) he was palpably
unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(4) (2012); (2) following out-of-home place ment, reasonable efforts failed to correct
the conditions leading to th e children’s placement under Mi nn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(5) (2012); (3) a child had experienced egregious harm under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(6) (2012); and (4) the children were neglected and in foster care under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8) (2012).
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Minn. Stat. § 260.503, subd. 2(a)(4) (2020), to immediately file a petition to terminate
appellant’s parental rights to K.K.A.T. an d S.R.T. Respondent filed an expedited
termination petition on March 15, 2021, alleging that, under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
1(b)(4) (2020), appellant is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship.
The district court held a trial on the te rmination petition in Se ptember 2021. The
district court heard testimony from appellant; S.L.L.; two Wright County social workers; a
Carver County social worker; the guardian ad litem (GAL); parenting assessor Dr. Linda
Marshall; and two of appellant ’s mental healthcare provid ers, Dr. Mark Thelen and
Michael Keegan.
At trial, appellant testified that he did not remember details of the 2013 termination
petition and could not recall why he had admitte d to it. Appellant admitted that he hit
A.A.R. with a belt but did not admit to anyt hing else in the 2013 petition. He stated
generally that “I take responsibility for what possibly had happened because I should have
been a better parent,” but when asked if he took responsibility for in juries other than the
belt incident with A.A.R., he said no. However, appellant briefly testified again at the end
of the trial and, in response to the district court asking if he had abused the children before
the 2013 termination, appellant answered, “Back then, yes I di d. But some of the stuff
that’s in the report, I did not do. But the majority of it is true, yes.”
Appellant acknowledged his mental health diagnoses and stated that he now
regularly takes medication for his bipolar disorder. Appellant explained that his medication
made him less depressed and less paranoid. He stated that he had also recently started
therapy sessions with Dr. Thelen. Appellant identified his healthy relationship with S.L.L.,
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a post-2013 anger management class, and regular medication as factors that contributed to
his positive changes since 2013. He did not think that he needed parenting help or further
anger management treatment but stated that he would comply with a case plan and
participate in any recommended services.
S.L.L. testified generally that she and appellant have a “great relationship” with “a
lot of teamwork.” She felt that appellant has changed and that, when she read the 2013
reports, she was “reading about a completely different person, like someone I don’t know,
like it’s a complete 180.” S.L.L. identifi ed “the assessments he did” and anger
management as factors contributing to appellan t’s change. S.L.L. te stified that appellant
was bonded with K.K.A.T. and described him as a kind and patient partner and father.
Dr. Marshall, a licensed psychologist wh o conducted a paren ting assessment on
appellant’s request, testified about her evaluation of appellant. As pa rt of her evaluation,
Dr. Marshall conducted psycholog ical testing of appellant, observed him with K.K.A.T.
and S.R.T., spoke to his ment al healthcare providers, and reviewed records of the 2013
termination. Dr. Marshall noted that she could not get information about appellant’s past
from appellant. She recognized similarities to the 2013 reports that appellant “was not
open about talking about any type of abuse and was in denial about that abuse.” She did
not believe appellant could identify changes he had to make after 2013, noted that appellant
failed to seek necessary individual thera py between 2013 and 2021, and believed that
appellant had not addressed crucial issues. Specifically, she described appellant’s lack of
“insight” into his past beha viors and his failure to acc ept responsibility, which she
characterized as a “r oadblock for change.” Dr. Ma rshall noted that on the Adult-
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Adolescent Parenting Inventory Test, appellant scored in the moderate or higher risk
categories on four of the five scales measur ing parenting strengths and weaknesses. The
rest of appellant’s testing was invalid because appellant’s responses were defensive.
Although she acknowledged appellant’s pers istence in getting the assessment, his
stabilized mood due to his medication, and hi s engagement with his children during her
observation, Dr. Marshall did not recommend reunification. Her report stated that
appellant failed to make sufficient changes to ensure the safety of his children and
continued to believe he did nothing wrong regarding the past abuse allegations.
Psychologist Dr. Mark Thelen disagreed with Dr. Marshall’s recommendation and
testified instead that he believed appellant should be given a “second chance.” Appellant
began seeing Dr. Thelen in May 2021, after respondent filed the termination petition. Dr.
Thelen performed a diag nostic assessment and diagnosed a ppellant with bipolar disorder
and post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr. Thel en noted that appellant initially denied the
allegations about his past behavior but became more truthful and motivated over the course
of their appointments. Dr. Th elen conceded that they had not discussed appellant’s first
three biological children and had not talked “about much of his past,” but Dr. Thelen
nevertheless felt that appellant was a “different person” than he was in 2013. Dr. Thelen
based his recommendation that appellant be given a “sec ond chance” on the fact that
appellant was sincere in his desire to go to therapy, sincere in his desire to be a father to
K.K.A.T. and S.R.T., and committed to being a good father.
Keegan, a nurse practitioner who has seen appellant regularly for 15- to 30-minute
medication-management appointments since 2015, also testified. Keegan testified that
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appellant consistently takes his prescribed medication to manage his bipolar disorder. He
also stated that appellant is more compliant, less angry, happier, sleeping more, and better
at managing his emotions since starting medication treatment in 2015.
The district court heard testimony from social workers involved in appellant’s 2013
and 2021 termination cases. The social worker assigned to appellant’s 2013 case testified
about her investigation into the abuse allegations against appellant in 2013. She described
the 2013 events as “the most egregious physical abuse case” that she had seen in her 15
years as a social worker. She noted that during the 2013 case, appellant did not recognize
his own issues and that he had minimized the problems and blamed others. The two social
workers assigned to appellant’s current case also testified. Both stated that they did not
believe there would be a case plan that would ensure the safety of the children in appellant’s
care; that S.L.L. could not keep the children safe if appellant was in the house; and that
termination of appellant’s parental rights wa s appropriate and in the best interests of
K.K.A.T. and S.R.T. The social workers stated that their recommendations were based on
the severity of appellant’s past abuse, the lack of documented evid ence of change in
appellant’s behaviors and insight, and the need to ensure the safety of the children.
Finally, the GAL assigned to appellant’s case testified last and recommended
termination. To prepare her recommendation, the GAL reviewed the termination petitions;
spoke to appellant, S.L.L., and the social wo rkers; read Dr. Thelen’s and Dr. Marshall’s
assessments; and met with the children. The GAL stated that, based on the seriousness of
the injuries from 2013, appellant’s lack of ongoing relationship with the children, and the
need for safety of the childre n, terminating appellant’s pare ntal rights was in the best
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interests of K.K.A.T. and S.R.T. The GAL did not believe that appellant’s post-2013 anger
management and medication were enough to make appellant a safe parent.
In November 2021, the district court te rminated appellant’s parental rights to
K.K.A.T. and S.R.T. The district court first found that the county was not required to make
reasonable efforts to reunify appellant with the children because appellant’s parental rights
to another child had been terminated involuntarily. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(2) (2020).
The district court then stated that appellant ’s prior termination triggered a presumption
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd . 1(b)(4), that he is palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent and child relationship. The district court determined that appellant failed to rebut
that presumption and that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate appellant’s
parental rights.
In so determining, the district court fou nd appellant’s testimony not credible. The
district court emphasized the severity of the prior child abuse and found that appellant had
not adequately admitted to his past conduct. It stated that appellant’s inability to remember
past events made it difficult to assess his mental health and that the sole change adequately
demonstrated at trial was that appellant now takes medication for his bipolar disorder. The
district court concluded that appellant’s br ief, recent involvement in therapy did not
demonstrate a commitment to change, and “[g]iven the severity of events that occurred in
2013,” was “insufficient to prove a change of circumstances showing that [he] can raise
his children safely.” The district court found that “if [appellant] is reunited with K.K.A.T.
and S.R.T., it is highly likely th at his unresolved mental health issues will endanger their
physical and emotional health.” The district court found S.L.L.’s view of appellant’s
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changes “naïve” and instead credited Dr. Marshall’s recommendation that appellant should
not be reunited with K.K.A.T. and S.R.T. It concluded that appellant “is not presently able
to assume the responsibility of caring for his children” and “this inability will continue for
a prolonged, indeterminate period.”
The district court then found that it is in K.K.A.T. and S. R.T.’s best interests that
appellant’s parental rights be terminated because the children’s need for “stability, proper
care, and safety” outweigh any interest in preserving the parent-child relationship.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in dete rmining that appellant is palpably unfit.

Appellant argues that the district court (1) imposed the wrong standard for rebutting
the statutory presumption of pa lpable unfitness; (2) erred by finding that appellant failed
to rebut the presumption; and (3) abused its discretion in concluding that there was clear
and convincing evidence that appellant is palpably unfit. We address each in turn.
A district court may terminate parental ri ghts if (1) at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convinci ng evidence; (2) the county either made or
was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family; and (3) termination is in
the child's best interests. See In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
2008); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (setting out statutory grounds for termination);
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2020) (establishing when reasonable efforts are required). “[W]e
review the district court’s determinations of whether a statutory gr ound for termination
exists and whether termination is in the child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion.”
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In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn.
2021). We give “considerable deference” to the district court’s decision to terminate
parental rights but “closely inquire” into the sufficiency of the ev idence to determine
whether it was clear and convincing. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
A district court may terminate parental rights if:
a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct
before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the
parent and child relationship either of which are determined by
the court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent
unable, for the reasonably fo reseeable future, to care
appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional
needs of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).
The statute creates a presumption that a parent is palpably unfit if his parental rights
to a different child were previo usly involuntarily terminated. Id. But the presumption is
“easily rebuttable.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014).
To rebut the presumption, the parent need only “introduc[e] evidence that would justify a
finding of fact that [the pare nt] is not palpably unfit.” Id. (quotations omitted). In other
words, the parent bears the burden of producing “only enough evidence to support a finding
that the parent is suitable to be entrus ted with the care of the children.” Id. (quotation
omitted); In re Welfare of Child of J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d 241, 245-46 (Minn. App. 2018).
“[W]hether the evidence satisfies the burden of production is determined on a case-
by-case basis.” R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137. The district court must determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to the parent’s palpable unfitness.
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J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 246. If the parent produces such evidence, the statutory presumption
is rebutted and has no further effect at the tr ial; the district court must instead “find the
existence or nonexistence of the alleged palpab le unfitness upon all the evidence exactly
as if there had never been a presumption at all.” Id. (quotations omitted).
A. The district court did not err by applying the standard set forth
in R.D.L. that, to rebut the presumptio n of palpable unfitness, a
parent need only produce enough evidence to justify a finding that
the parent “is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the
children.”

Appellant first argues that the supreme court in R.D.L. set forth two standards for
rebutting the presumption of pa lpable unfitness by first stati ng that a parent rebuts the
presumption “by introducing evidence that would justify a finding of fact that the parent is
not palpably unfit,” then further explaining that the parent must produce “only enough
evidence to support a finding that the parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the
children.” See R.D.L., 852 N.W.2d at 137. Appellant argues that the two standards are
different and that only the fi rst formulation—that is, that the parent must only produce
evidence justifying a finding that the parent is “not palpably unfit”—is constitutionally
permissible. Appellant argues that the di strict court erred by applying the second
formulation and requiring appellant to produce evidence that he is currently “suitable to be
entrusted with the care of the children.”
We are bound by supreme court precedent. See State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342,
346 (Minn. 2018); State v. Rohan, 834 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. App. 2013) (“[W]hen the
supreme court has already construed a statute, this court is bound by that interpretation.”),
13
rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013). We are also bound by our own precedential opinions.
State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010).
The supreme court addressed a constitutional challenge to the statutory presumption
of unfitness in R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 136-38. In a lengthy discussion of the statute, the
supreme court affirmed our holding that “a pare nt rebuts the presumption by introducing
evidence that would justify a finding of fact that [the parent] is not palpably unfit.” Id. at
137 (quoting In re Welfare of Child of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 445-46 (Minn. App. 2011)).
It then explained that the burden imposed by the presumption is not a heavy one, because
“the parent needs to produce on ly enough evidence to support a finding that the parent is
suitable ‘to be entrusted with the care’ of the children.” Id. (quoting In re Welfare of
Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 1980)). We applied that same standard in J.A.K.,
stating that a parent rebuts the presumption “ by introducing evidence that would justify a
finding of fact that [the parent] is not palpably unfit. In other words, a parent . . . needs to
produce only enough evidence to support a finding that the parent is suitable to be entrusted
with the care of the children.” 907 N.W.2d at 246 (quotations omitted).
R.D.L. and J.A.K. establish that evidence justifying a finding that the parent “is not
palpably unfit” means evidence justifying a finding that the parent “is suitable to be
entrusted with the care of the children.” Ac cording to both supreme court precedent and
our own precedent, the “introducing evidence showing the parent is suitable to be entrusted
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with the care of the children” standard is the correct standard, and the district court did not
err by applying it.2
B. The district court erred when it de termined that appellant failed to rebut
the presumption of palpable unfitness.

Appellant next argues that he produced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption
of palpable unfitness. We agree.
As noted above, the evidence necessary to rebut the presumption of palpable
unfitness need only “create a genuine issue of ma terial fact” as to whether the parent is
palpably unfit. J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 246. In determ ining whether a parent’s evidence
rebuts the presumption, the district court sh ould credit and consider the evidence without
weighing it against contrary evidence. See J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 445- 47 (concluding that
parent’s evidence, “if believed,” would suppor t a finding that she wa s not palpably unfit
and concluding that parent rebutted presumption despite introduction of contrary evidence
by the county); see also Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency , 728 N.W.2d 510, 523
(Minn. 2007) (stating that, generally, “a distri ct court should not engage in a qualitative
evaluation or weighing of the evidence when deciding whether a [party] has produced
sufficient evidence to rebu t [a] statutory presumption”). Extensive credibility
determinations are therefore usually not appr opriate when determining whether a parent

2 We also note that, although appellant argues that the district court’s order rests “entirely”
on whether appellant is immediately suitable to be entrusted with the care of the children,
the district court stated multiple times that appellant’s problems would take significant time
to address and that appellant would be unable to care for his children for a prolonged,
indeterminate period. As we discuss infra section I.C., the district court focused not just
on whether appellant was immediately unsuita ble to care for his children but also on
whether appellant would be unsuitable for the reasonably foreseeable future.
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rebutted the presumption of palpable unfitness, although a district court is not necessarily
prohibited from making any credibility determinations. See Jacobson, 728 N.W.2d at 523
(noting that credibility may be essential “when the [party’s ] only evidence is his own
testimony,” which “no reasonable fact[-]finder would believe”); see also In re Civ.
Commitment of Poole, 921 N.W.2d 62, 68 (Minn. App. 2018) (stating that a party’s own
uncorroborated assertions are insufficient to meet that party’s burden of production), rev.
denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2019). We review de no vo a district court’s determination on
whether a parent has rebutted the statutory presumption of palpable unfitness. J.A.K., 907
N.W.2d at 246.
Here, appellant provided evidence that he has made changes since the 2013
termination that could, if believed, support a finding that appellant is suitable to be
entrusted with the care of the children. Appella nt testified that his current relationship is
healthy, supportive, and free of the stresses he experienced in his prior relationships. He
also testified that he has be en on medication sin ce 2015 for his bipolar disorder and that
the medication has helped him manage his mood s. He stated that he completed anger
management treatment after his 2013 termination, which helped him control his temper.
Appellant also produced other corroborat ing evidence. S.L.L. testified that
appellant has changed significantly sinc e 2013; that his anger management, the
assessments he did, and their healthy relati onship contributed to that change; and that
appellant is now a patient and loving father to K.K.A.T. Keegan corroborated appellant’s
testimony that he has been consistent with his medication and that the medication led to
significant improvement in appellant’s mood, sleep, and emotional control. Dr. Thelen
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noted that appellant had become more truthful and motivated over the short course of their
therapy, had changed since 2013, was committed to being a good father, could control his
anger, would be willing to deal with his pa st, and should be given a second chance to
parent. Finally, although Dr. Marshall did not recommend reunification, she also stated
that, if appellant would be honest and seek therapy, it may be possible to change his
behavior and see progress in two or three months.
The district court’s determination that appellant failed to rebut the presumption
appears to rest on its finding that appellant was not credible and that evidence from other
witnesses based on appellant’s “false statemen ts” was also not credible, as well as its
conclusion that appellant’s evidence was outweighed by other evidence that appellant
remains an unsafe parent. But those credib ility determinations and the weighing of
evidence are generally not appropriate when considering whether the statutory presumption
of palpable unfitness is rebutted. See J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 445-47.
We conclude that appellant produced enough evidence to create a genuine issue of
fact as to whether he is suitable to be entrus ted with the care of th e children, which is all
that he was required to do to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness. The district court
therefore erred when it concluded that appellant failed to rebut the presumption.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
clear and convincing evidence showed that appellant is palpably unfit.

Although the district court erroneously determined that appellant failed to rebut the
presumption of unfitness, it also found that “[f]urther, there is clear and convincing
17
evidence to terminate the parental rights of appellant pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4).”
Once the presumption of palp able unfitness is rebutted, respondent has the burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that appellant “is palpably unfit because of a
consistent pattern of specific conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly
relating to the parent and child relationship, either of which are . . . of a duration or nature
that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future,” to care for the needs
of the child. Minn. Stat. § 2 60C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). “A d ecision to terminate parental
rights must be based on the conditions that exist at the time of te rmination and it must
appear that the conditions giving rise to th e termination will conti nue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period.” J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 446 (quotations and citations omitted).
When reviewing an involuntarily termination of parental rights, we review factual
findings for clear error and, as noted above, we review whether a statutory basis to
involuntarily terminate parental rights exists for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of
Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). A finding is clearly erroneous if it
is manifestly contrary to th e weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
record. Id.; see also In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-23 (Minn. 2021)
(discussing clear-error standard of review); J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601 n.6 (applying Kenney
in a termination-of-parental-rights appeal). Th e district court abuses its discretion if it
improperly applies the law. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 87.
In support of its decision to terminate appe llant’s parental rights, the district court
found that “ample evid ence shows that [appellant] suff ers from severe and significant
18
mental health issues that have caused his ch ildren great harm.” The district court also
found that until the time of the trial, appellant denied the past physical abuse, continued to
minimize or deflect blame for his past conduct, and failed to engage in meaningful therapy
to address his unresolved mental health issues. The district court found that it was likely
that appellant’s “unresolved mental health issues will endanger [K.K.A.T.’s and S.R.T.’s]
physical and emotional health, as [appellant’s] mental health directly affects his ability to
parent and keep the children safe.” The district court also found that appellant’s unresolved
issues would take “significant time” to address, that any improved insight he gained would
not “equate to safety for his children in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and that, given
the longstanding nature of his issues, appellant is “not presently able” to safely care for his
children, and “this inability will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.”
Although appellant argues that the district court misapplied the law by focusing on
appellant’s past, appellant concedes that the district court could consider his history insofar
as it establishes a pattern of conduct or conditi ons that persist to th e present day. While
the district court did consider appellant’s prior behavior and express special concern about
the severity of the abuse that led to the 2013 termination, it also considered and credited
evidence showing appellant’s current lack of insight, his ongoing pa tterns of denial and
deflection, his failure to engage in indi vidual therapy in the time between the 2013
termination and the filing of the current termination petition, and his failure to acknowledge
and address his history of abuse as part of his mental-health treatment. Those findings are
supported by the evidence produced at trial.
19
Given the severity of appella nt’s history of a buse, and the ample evidence in the
record that appellant continues to undermin e meaningful treatment progress by denying,
minimizing, and deflecting blame for the harm he caused to other children in his care, we
agree with the district court that respondent met its burden of showing that patterns and
conditions persist which render appellant unab le to safely care for his children. We
therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that appellant
is palpably unfit under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4).3
II. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by ruling that termination is in
the best interests of the children.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion because it based its
ruling that termination is in the best interests of the children on improper factors.
Even if a statutory basis for termination ex ists, the child’s best interests must be the
“paramount consideration” in any termination proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
7 (2020). When determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests, the district
court balances three factors: (1) the child’ s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship, (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship, and (3) any

3 We note that when, as here, the parent rebuts the presumption of palpable unfitness, the
parent may arguably have a right to reasonabl e efforts to reunify the family, which are
usually required before a district c ourt can terminate parental rights. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2020). Although reasonable effort s to reunify are not required
when “a petition has been filed stating a prima facie case that . . . the parental rights of the
parent to another child have been terminat ed involuntarily,” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(2),
the reasoning in R.D.L. at least suggests that a parent who rebuts the presumption of
unfitness should then be entitle d to the same reasonable effo rts toward reunification to
which other parents are entitled. See R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 136-38. But the district court
here found that reasonable efforts to reunify were not required under section 260.012(a)(2),
and appellant does not challenge that finding, so we do not address that issue.
20
competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing
interests include such things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s
preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992).
We review a district court’s best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion.
In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “Because the best -interests analysis involves credibility
determinations and is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a
record,” we give “considerable deferenc e to the district court’s findings.” J.K.T., 814
N.W.2d at 92 (quotation omitted).
Here, in determining that termination is in the children’s best in terests, the district
court concluded that the children’s need fo r stability, proper care, and safety outweighed
the children’s and appellant’s in terest in preserving the pare nt-child relationship. The
district court also considered appellant’s history of abuse and that the children deserved a
safe environment. It found that appellant was unable to be that safe caregiver based on his
inability to recognize and deal with his history of abuse. It credited the GAL’s testimony
that termination is in the best interests of the children. It acknowledged that the children
have a financial interest in preserving the pa rent-child relationship and that appellant is
genuinely interested in being part of his children’s lives. Bu t the district court ultimately
concluded that appellant’s in terest in reunification, and the children’s interest in
maintaining the parent relationship with appellant, was outweighed by their need for safety.
The record supports the district court’s findings.
21
Appellant argues that the district court re lied primarily on the GAL’s testimony that
appellant’s changes were not significant in light of the severity of the past abuse. We
disagree. Although the district court relied in part on the GAL’s recommendation, it also
relied on its own review of the child-protecti on reports underlying the 2013 termination,
its assessment of appellant’s mental health and treatm ent progress since 2013, and
testimony from county social workers that there was not a case plan that they could provide
that would ensure the children’s safety. Moreover, the district court must consider relevant
factors, including those affecting the children’s interest. Here, the se verity and nature of
appellant’s past abuse and the sufficiency of his efforts to address his past issues were
relevant to determining whether the children would be safe if the parent-child relationship
was maintained.
Appellant also argues that it was unfair for the district court to rely on the fact that
appellant had no ongoing bond with the children, because re spondent severed that bond
when it prohibited appellant from seeing the children starting in May 2021. But while the
district court did acknowledge that appellant does not have an ongo ing relationship with
the children due to the no-contact order, it did not rely solely on this factor in making its
best-interests determination. And, as a ge neral matter, whether the children have a bond
with appellant is a relevant factor to weigh when considering the children’s interest in the
parent-child relationship. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination that termination is in the best interests of the children.
22
III. Appellant was not deprived of a fair trial by attorn ey misconduct or judicial
bias.

Appellant argues that attorney misconduct and judicial bias denied him a fair trial.
Due process affords to every party the right to an impartial tribunal in both civil and
criminal cases. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). Whether a party was
denied its right to a fair trial and whether a judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct are
questions of law that we review de novo. See State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 246, 249
(Minn. 2005). Appellate courts presume that district court judges have discharged their
duties properly. See Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). Adverse rulings
by a judge do not, by themselves, constitute judicial bias. State v. Sailee, 792 N.W.2d 90,
96 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). “The bias must be proved in
light of the record as a whole.” Hannon, 752 N.W.2d at 522.
Appellant first argues that respondent’ s attorney implied that appellant was
responsible for K.K.A.T.’s broken leg. Appellant argues that this implication was without
evidentiary foundation. However, appellant does not appear to have objected to
respondent’s questions at tr ial regarding K.K.A.T.’s brok en leg on these grounds. The
parties stipulated to the exhibits, including K. K.A.T.’s medical records. At trial, both
parties questioned the witnesses about K.K.A.T .’s broken leg. Additionally, the district
court acknowledged both at trial and in its order that there had been no finding of
maltreatment regarding K.K.A.T.’s leg and that the doctor had been unable to determine
whether the injury resulted from abuse. The district court’s acknowledgment is supported
by the record.
23
Appellant appears to essentially challenge the district court’s finding that “the
similarities between the injuries” were “highly relevant in determining whether the children
would be safe in [appellant’s] ca re.” But even if that findi ng was erroneous, the district
court’s consideration of K.K.A. T.’s injury does not establish that the district court was
unfairly biased against appellant. See Peterson v. Knutson, 233 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn.
1975) (stating that even a “fundamentally e rroneous” district court finding “does not
necessarily show [judicial] bias”). Furthermore, although appellant argues that the district
court made K.K.A.T.’s leg injury a “core tenant” of its termination order, the district court’s
order identified its concerns about K.K.A.T .’s injury as only one of numerous other
considerations underlying its decision to terminate appellant’s parental rights.
Appellant next argues that the district court showed bias by engaging in age
discrimination regarding S.L.L. Judges must not “in the performance of judicial duties . . .
manifest bias or prejudice” based on age. Minn. Code Jud. Conduc t Rule 2.3(D). But
judges are not precluded from “making legitimate reference” to age when it is “relevant to
an issue in a proceeding.” Id.
Appellant first points to the district court’ s statement that “[i]t is noteworthy that
[appellant’s] last two partners were also significantly younger than appellant; during both
child-protection matters have also defended appellant and their relationship; and have also
downplayed any concerns regarding [appellant’s] mental health.” In so noting, the district
court was not manifesting bias toward S.L.L. over her age but rather identifying similarities
between appellant’s current relationship and his past relationships, which had contributed
to the unsafe conditions that led to the 2013 termination. Comparing appellant’s current
24
behaviors and circumstances to his past beha vior and circumstances was relevant to the
central issue in this case of whether appella nt had made changes since 2013 such that the
presumption of unfitness no longer applies.
Appellant next points to the district c ourt’s comments on S.L.L.’s age when it found
S.L.L.’s testimony not credible. The district court stated in its findings of fact that
[S.L.L.]’s viewpoint is shaped by a naïve willingness to believe
[appellant]’s version of events, despite significant evidence to
the contrary. Given her young ag e, this is not surprising.
However, the Court finds that [S.L.L.]’s testimony as to
appellant and the children’s safe ty lacks adequate foundation,
given her belief that appellant had been telling the truth when
in fact, he disclosed at trial that he had not been telling the
truth.

The district court’s comment that S.L. L.’s naïveté was unsurprising “given her
young age” may have been unnecessary. However, even when a district court’s comments
are “not always appropriate,” appellate co urts generally do not intervene unless the
comments were prejudicial or deprived a party of its right to a fair trial. See Uselman v.
Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130, 139 (Minn. 1990). Appellant has not shown that the comments
about S.L.L.’s age were so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial, nor has he shown
that the outcome would have been different had the district court not made such comments.
See id. Moreover, while the district court refere nced S.L.L.’s age, it explained that it
primarily found S.L.L.’s testimony not credible because S.L.L. failed to take appellant’s
history seriously and presented an idealized view of appellant. We therefore conclude that
appellant was not denied a fair trial due to either judicial bias or attorney misconduct.
Affirmed.