State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0019

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Samuel Dwight Simmons,
Appellant.

Filed December 5, 2022
Affirmed in part and remanded
Ross, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-21-160

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Connolly ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Samuel Simmons entered the bedroom of a sleeping teenage girl, propositioned her
for sex, and groped her buttocks through the blanket covering her. On appeal challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction after being charged with fourth-
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and fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, Simmons argues that groping is not a crime if
effected by touching through a blanket. Because our well -settled precedent defeats the
argument, we affirm in part. Although the state concedes that the district court erroneously
entered a conviction on both criminal-sexual-conduct charges and accurately concedes that
the lesser-included offense should not have resulted in a conviction, neither the sentencing
transcript nor the sentencing order indicates certainly that count two resulted in a
conviction or that it did not. We therefore remand for the district court to amend the
sentencing order to indicate clearly that the fifth-degree offense resulted only in a finding
of guilt but not a conviction.
FACTS
South St. Paul police went to a home responding to a reported overnight incident in
January 2021. The officers met a thirteen-year -old girl (whom we will call Debra to
maintain her privacy), the girl’s mother, and appellant Samuel Simmons, who was dating
the girl’s mother. Debra accused Simmons of touching her inappropriately. The state
charged Simmons with one count of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct and the district
court held a bench trial.
Debra’s testimony was the state’s primary trial evidence. She testified that, at about
2:00 a.m., Simmons entered her bedroom while she slept under a blanket. He approached
her bed, woke her, and asked, “Do you want to do this now or later ?” Simmons reached
toward Debra and touched her over her blanket, groping her buttocks for several seconds.
The state amended the complaint at the close of trial to add one count of fifth-degree
criminal sexual conduct. The district court found that Simmons touched Debra’s buttocks
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through her pajamas and a blanket. It found him guilty on both counts. The record is unclear
as to whether the district court entered a judgment of conviction on both counts.
Simmons appeals.
DECISION
Simmons challenges his conviction by maintaining that the evidence was
insufficient to establish his guilt. Evidence- sufficiency appeals that rest on statutory
meaning call for our de novo review. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn.
2019). Simmons argues alternatively that the district court improperly entered convictions
on two counts rather than only one. Only his second argument is persuasive.
Simmons argues that he cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct because he did
not make “sexu al contact ” with Debra by touching her blanket rather than either her
intimate parts or her garments immediately covering those parts. See Minn. Stat. § 609.345,
subd. 1(b) (2020) (criminalizing any sexual contact with a victim aged 13 to 16 if the
perpetrator is more than 48 months older than the victim); Minn. Stat. § 609.3451,
subd. 1(1) (2020) (criminalizing nonconsensual sexual contact); Minn. Stat. § 609.341,
subd. 11(a)(iv) (2020) (defining “sexual contact” as “the touching of the clothing covering
the immediate area of the intimate parts”). The argument fails under our caselaw.
This case closely resembles State v. Lockhart, 376 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. App. 1985),
rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 30, 1985). The Lockhart defendant mounted and began thrusting
against a sleeping woman who was lying under a bedsheet, blanket, quilt, and bedspread.
376 N.W.2d at 251. Like Simmons, Lockhart argued that he did not make “sexual contact”
with the victim because he touched her intimate parts through bed coverings while the
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statute instead criminalizes touching through “clothing.” Id. at 252. We rejected the
argument, holding that “clothing” as used in the criminal-sexual-conduct statutes included
bed coverings. Id. at 253. We reasoned that, had the legislature intended a narrow definition
of “clothing” that excluded bed coverings, it would have used a term like “wearing apparel”
or “garments.” Id. at 252. We presume “that the legislature acts with full knowledge of
previous statutes and existing caselaw,” Pecinovsky v. AMCO Ins. Co., 613 N.W.2d 804 ,
809 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000), and the Lockhart holding has
stood undisturbed by the legislature for 37 years.
Simmons does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of
criminal sexual conduct under Lockhart, staking his appeal entirely on his plea that we
overrule Lockhart. We will not consider overruling precedent—a substantially disfavored
turn—unless a challenger presents a compelling reason, establishing that the prior decision
is “clearly and manifestly erroneous.” State v. Noor, 964 N.W.2d 424, 435 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted); see also State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Minn. 2017). Simmons
argues only that Lockhart improperly interpreted the statute. He does not contend, let alone
establish, that the holding is manifestly erroneous. Lockhart stands.
Simmons also argues, and the state concedes, that the district court erred by entering
convictions of both fourth- and fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct. The parties are correct
that, if the district court entered convictions on both counts, it erred. The district court may
enter a conviction “of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2020). An included offense for our purposes is a “lesser degree of
the same crime.” Id., subd. 1(1). Fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct is a lesser-included
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offense of fourth- degree criminal sexual conduct and should not have resulted in a
conviction. But we look to the record to determine from the “official judgment of
conviction” whether a finding of guilt has in fact been adjudicated as a conviction. See
Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). Typically that
official judgment is embodied in the “sentencing order” (or “warrant of commitment”).
The sentencing order in this case does not, but must, clarify the disposition of the fifth-
degree offense.1 We therefore remand for the district court to amend the sentencing order
to clarify expressly that the charge of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct has not resulted
in a conviction.
Affirmed in part and remanded.

1 The “Case Charges” portion of the sentencing order indicates “convicted” for counts one
and two, which is how a sentencing order generally records a finding of guilt or a guilty
plea. But in the section designated “Terms of Disposition,” the order does not state that the
district court entered a conviction for count two. It does not include a reference such as “no
adjudication – lesser included,” to establish that count two was not adjudicated. Nor does
it include the kind of notation that typically informs us that count two was adjudicated. The
order simply lacks the signals that typically inform us clearly whether or not the district
court has entered a judgment of conviction on the lesser-included offense.