Joseph Kurian, individually, and as Trustee for Samael Alessandro Ittyerah, deceased, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0022

Joseph Kurian, individually,
and as Trustee for Samael Alessandro Ittyerah, deceased,
Appellant,

vs.

Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc.,
d/b/a Hennepin County Medical Center,
Respondent,

Fairview Health Services,
d/b/a University of Minnesota Medical Center Fairview,
Respondent,

and

University of Minnesota Physicians,
Respondent.

Filed September 6, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-13181

Wayne B. Holstad, Craig J. Beuning, White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Matthew S. Frantzen, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc.)

Kelly A. Putney, Anuradha Chudasama, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent Fairview Health Services, d/b/a University of Minnesota Medical Center
Fairview)

2
Rodger A. Hagen, Julia J. Nierengarten. Meagher & Geer PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent University of Minnesota Physicians)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Cochran ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Joseph Kurian challenges the district court’s dismissal of his wrongful-
death action against respondents Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc., d/b/a Hennepin
County Medical Center (HHS), Fairview Health Services, d/b/a University of Minnesota
Medical Center Fairview (FHS ), and University of Minnesota Physicians (UMP), which
claimed that respondents’ medical negligence injured and caused the death of Kurian’s
premature infant. Kurian argues that the district court erred by dismissing the action
(1) pursuant to Ortiz v. Gavenda, 590 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. 1999), based on Kurian’s
commencement of the wrongful-death action before he was appointed as a trustee for the
next-of-kin and (2) pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 145.682 (2020), based on
Kurian’s failure to comply with the expert-witness-disclosure requirement. Because the
district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action under section 145.682,
subdivision 6, based on Kurian’s insufficient expert-witness disclosures, we affirm.
FACTS
This case involves the death of a premature infant treated by respondents. Kurian,
who brought a wrongful-death action against respondents, is the infant’s father and the
trustee for the infant’s next-of-kin.
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Facts Alleged in Complaint
On May 3, 2017, Samael Alessandro Ittyerah was born at HHS’s facility, Hennepin
County Medical Center. At 25 weeks gestational age, Samael was very premature. He
remained under HHS’s care until September 10, 2017. According to Kurian’s complaint,
Samael’s condition improved throughout the summer of 2017. He gained weight and no
longer needed a ventilator.
The complaint alleges that HHS administered a series of vaccines to Samael in mid-
August. Samael’s health “rapidly and significantly” deteriorated, and he was again placed
on a ventilator. On August 29, 2017, an x -ray revealed that Samael had “numerous
unexplained bone fractures.”
On September 10, 2017, after Samael’s condition had further declined, he was
transferred to FHS. UMP is a physicians group whose physicians provide care at FHS.
After the transfer to FHS, Samael’s weight “more than doubled,” and he was
lethargic, required ventilation, and had numerous broken bones. Samael was also given
intravenous fentanyl and caffeine, a regimen that was started after his birth and was
continued while he was at FHS. During a procedure on September 13, 2017, a physician
punctured Samael’s spleen, requiring surgery. On September 20, 2017, doctors met with
Samael’s family and recommended that life-saving measures be discontinued. The family
disagreed with the recommendation. FHS then used “oxygen bursts” to assist Samael’s
breathing. Samael died later that day.
On September 18, 2020, Kurian served FHS with a summons and complaint, and on
September 21, 2020, he served HHS with an identical summons and complaint. Kurian’s
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complaint identified four claims against HHS and FHS : (1) medical malpractice,
(2) wrongful death, (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and (4) res ipsa loquitur.
Affidavit of Expert Review
Minnesota law mandates a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice to serve an
affidavit of expert review with the summons and complaint. See Minn. Stat. § 145.682,
subd. 2.1 Kurian did not follow this requirement. On September 29, 2020, FHS requested
Kurian’s affidavit of expert review. Shortly thereafter, HHS also demanded an affidavit of
expert review.
Almost two months later, in November 2020, Kurian’s attorney served a purported
“Affidavit of Expert Review.” It stated that no affidavit was served with the summons and
complaint because “no expert could be retained to render an opinion prior to the expiration
of the statute of limitations.”2 Additionally, the affidavit noted that Kurian’s attorney had
personally communicated
with three experts who have been consulted but cannot or will
not formally render an opinion prior to reviewing documents
which the plaintiff was unable to obtain from the defendants
prior to the commencement of this lawsuit. The experts
consulted have a recognized expertise in the areas of

1 In cases where expert review “could not reasonably be obtained before the action was
commenced because of the applicable statute of limitations,” a plaintiff must provide an
affidavit certifying this fact. Minn. Stat. § 145.682, subd. 3(2).

2 Although the statute of limitations for a wrongful-death lawsuit is three years, see Minn.
Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 (2020), the governor issued an executive order extending statutes of
limitation due to the COVID-19 pandemic that affected the limitations period in this case.
Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-01, Declaring a Peacetime Emergency & Coordinating
Minnesota’s Strategy to Protect Minnesotans from COVID- 19 (Mar. 13, 2020); 2020
Minn. Laws ch. 74, art. 1, § 16. The parties agree that the limitations period for this action
expired on April 15, 2021.
5
vaccinations for neonatal infants, pediatrics, and interventional
radiology.

Finally, the affidavit stated that Kurian, who attended some medical school, and his mother,
who “has substantial experience with hospital care and procedures based on many years of
practical experience working in hospitals in India,” were qualified to render opinions.
Appointment of Kurian as Trustee and Amendment of Complaint
When Kurian served the summons and complaint, he had not been appointed trustee
under Minnesota Statutes section 573.02 (2020), which requires wrongful-death actions to
be commenced by a trustee for the next-of-kin. On October 7, 2020, Kurian petitioned for
appointment as trustee. Following Kurian’s petition for appointment as trustee, by
stipulation of the parties and with the district court’s permission, Kurian served and filed
an amended complaint. On January 12, 2021, four months after Kurian served the
summons and complaint, the district court issued an order appointing him as the trustee.
In February 2021, Kurian filed a second amended complaint, which added UMP as
a party.
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
In March 2021, HHS and FHS brought motions for judgment on the pleadings,
seeking dismissal of Kurian’s action on the ground that the complaint failed to properly
plead his claims. Kurian agreed to dismiss his claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. In support of his remaining claims, Kurian’s counsel filed affidavits from Kurian
and Kurian’s mother.
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Affidavits of Kurian and His Mother
Kurian’s affidavit explained that he was in medical school when Samael was born,
but that he later dropped out. It provided background information about Samael’s birth
and medical history. The affidavit discussed Samael’s medical treatment by HHS,
including his surgeries, management of complications, and medications. Kurian noted his
disagreement with the decision to vaccinate Samael and expressed his opinion that the
vaccinations “overloaded” Samael’s immune system, causing Samael to decompensate.
He stated that Samael was diagnosed with “osteopenia of prematurity” once HH S
discovered Samael’s bone fractures. But he surmised that the fractures could have been
caused by abuse. Kurian’s affidavit further described Samael’s treatment at FHS following
the transfer, including an interventional radiologist’s unintentional puncture of Samael’s
spleen during a procedure, an d the complications that occurred thereafter. Finally, the
affidavit described the treatments that Samael received, including “oxygen bursts,” which
Kurian speculated contributed to Samael’s death.
The affidavit of Kurian’s mother stated that she worked as a psychiatrist for the
Missouri Department of Mental Health and the Missouri Department of Corrections. It
also noted her one-year residency in obstetrics and gynecology in India. Kurian’s mother
stated that she visited regularly after Samael’s birth a nd reviewed the notes of his nurses
and doctors. She described Samael’s course of treatment and the complications he
experienced. Her affidavit criticized the providers’ decisions to vaccinate Samael and to
treat him with fentanyl, which can cause intestinal complications. It also expressed her
opinion that an improperly administered “oxygen burst” ultimately caused Samael’s death.
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Motion to Dismiss Kurian’s Remaining Claims
In early June 2021—and before the district court ruled on the motions to dismiss on
the pleadings—respondents collectively moved to dismiss Kurian’s remaining claims on
two grounds. First, t hey argued that , because Kurian had commenced the action before
being appointed trustee for Samael’s next-of-kin, the action was a legal nullity pursuant to
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz, 590 N.W.2d 119. Second, they argued
that dismissal was required because Kurian failed to comply with the statutory
requirements for maintaining a medical-malpractice action. Respondents noted that Kurian
had never served the affidavit of expert review required by section 145.682, subdivisions
2 and 3. Moreover, Kurian had failed to timely serve the expert -witness disclosures
mandated by section 145.682, subdivision 4(a), which requires a plaintiff in a medical-
malpractice action to serve expert-witness disclosures on the defendant within 180 days of
the commencement of discovery.
Order for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
On June 22, 2021, the district court issued an order granting the initial motions of
HHS and FHS for partial judgment on the pleadings. Concluding that Kurian’s complaint
failed to sufficiently plead his medical-malpractice claims against HHS and FHS because
it did not identify the applicable standards of care or the alleged departures from those
standards, the district court dismissed those claims with prejudice. As to the affidavits of
Kurian and his mother , the district court determined that they “do not qualify as expert
testimony, are inadmissible for purposes of this motion, and the court need not analyze
them further.” The district court declined to dismiss the res ipsa loquitur claim against
8
HHS, however—but only as to Samael’s broken bones. Because Kurian did not allege that
these injuries caused Samael’s death, the district court limited the claim as to special
damages. See Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 2 (2020) (“When injury is caused to a person by
the wrongful act or omission . . . and the person thereafter dies from a cause unrelated to
those injuries, the trustee [in a wrongful -death action] may maintain an action for special
damages arising out of such injury . . . .”).
Affidavit of Dr. Jonathan Cohen and Supplemental Affidavits
In response to respondents’ second dispositive motion, which alleged that Kurian
had failed to provide expert-witness disclosures, Kurian filed an affidavit from
Dr. Jonathan Cohen, a neonatologist. Kurian also filed his own supplemental affidavit and
a supplemental affidavit from his mother. He filed these affidavits almost two months after
the 180-day statutory deadline for a plaintiff’s expert-witness disclosures.
Dr. Cohen’s affidavit stated that the “records available . . . regarding the precise
cause of death are too incomplete to reach a conclusion or render an opinion.” It explained
that there was a “temporal relationship” between Samael’s death and the vaccinations, but
that “a causal relationship between the vaccinations and the infant’s decomposition can’t
be established from the data present.” Dr. Cohen also noted that Samael’s “death and poor
outcome were, in part, due to a complication that occurred during the paracentesis. There
is insufficient charting available to determine the level of monitoring that occurred
following the procedure.” Regarding the administration of fentanyl, Dr. Cohen stated that
“fentanyl is commonly used for pain for premature infants and it was not negligent to
prescribe it.” And as to the oxygen bursts, Dr. Cohen stated that this “can be necessary
9
during periods of desaturation or bradycardia, however there is the possibility of lung
damage due to exposure of fragile lung tissue to high levels of oxygen.”
The supplemental affidavits from Kurian and his mother reiterated that they had
scientific and medical knowledge. Their affidavits asserted that they were qualified to
provide opinions about Samael’s medical care.
District Court’s Second Order and Judgment
On October 11, 2021, the district court dismissed Kurian’s remaining claims with
prejudice. The district court agreed with respondents that the action was a legal nullity
under Minnesota law because a wrongful-death action must be brought and maintained by
a trustee, and Kurian had commenced the action before he was appointed as trustee. But
even if the action had been properly commenced, the district court determined that Kurian’s
failure to timely serve the expert-witness disclosures required by section 145.682,
subdivision 4, necessitated dismissal of Kurian’s medical-malpractice claims. The district
court reiterated that the affidavits of Kurian and his mother “do not qualify as expert
testimony” and are “inadmissible for purposes of this motion.” As to Dr. Cohen’s affidavit,
the district court concluded that it failed to “demonstrate a causal link between the breach
of standard of care and the harm suffered” and therefore “does not remotely show
malpractice and/or causation as required by statute.”
Kurian appeals.
DECISION
Kurian challenges the district court’s dismissal of his action on two grounds. First,
he argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that his
10
commencement of the action before he was appointed as trustee rendered it a legal nullity.
Second, he contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims under Minnesota
Statutes section 145.682 because he provided the statutor ily required expert-witness
disclosures. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the action because Kurian did not satisfy the expert-witness-disclosure requirement under
section 145.682, and we do not reach Kurian’s other argument.
Appellate courts review a dismissal of a medical-malpractice action for failure to
comply with section 145.682 under an abuse- of-discretion standard. Haile v. Sutherland,
598 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn. App. 1999). A district court abuses its discretion when its
ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against the facts in the record, or when
it exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner. City of N. Oaks v. Sarpal,
797 N.W.2d 18, 24 (Minn. 2011).
To establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice, a plainti ff must show:
“(1) the standard of care recognized by the medical community as applicable to
the . . . defendant’s conduct; (2) that the defendant departed from that standard; (3) that the
defendant’s departure . . . was a direct cause of the [plaintiff’s] injuries; and (4) damages.”
Tousignant v. St. Louis County, 615 N.W.2d 53, 59 (Minn. 2000). “Expert testimony is
generally required in medical-malpractice cases because they involve complex scientific
or technological issues.” Mercer v. Andersen, 715 N.W.2d 114, 1 22 (Minn. App. 2006).
In a medical-malpractice action where expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima
facie case, Minnesota Statutes section 145.682 imposes two requirements on a plaintiff.
Minn. Stat. § 145.682, subd. 2; Anderson v. Rengachary , 608 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Minn.
11
2000). These statutory requirements were enacted “as a means of readily identifying
meritless lawsuits at an early stage of the litigation.” Broehm v. Mayo Clinic Rochester,
690 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Minn. 2005). First, the complaint must include an affidavit of expert
review by the plaintiff’s attorney stating that the attorney has reviewed the case “with an
expert whose qualifications provide a reasonable expectation that the expert’s opinions
could be admissible at trial and that, in the opinion of this expert, one or more defendants
deviated from the applicable standard of care and by that action caused injury to the
plaintiff.” Minn. Stat. § 145.682, subds. 2, 3(1). Second, within 180 days after
commencement of discovery, a plaintiff must serve on the defendant an affidavit of expert
identification that includes:
[T]he identity of each person whom plaintiff expects to call as
an expert witness at trial to testify with respect to the issues of
malpractice or causation, the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and a
summary of the grounds for each opinion.

Id., at subd. 4(a). To satisfy this second requirement for expert-witness disclosures, the
expert affidavit must articulate specific details of the expert’s testimony, including the
standard of care, the acts or omissions that the plaintiff alleges violated the standard of
care, and an outline of the chain of causation that resulted in the injury. Maudsley v.
Pederson, 676 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Minn. App. 2004). General or conclusory statements
concerning the standard of care, breach, or the causative link between the breach and the
injury will not suffice. See Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 192-
93 (Minn. 1990).
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Although respondents point out that Kurian failed to satisfy either statutory
requirement, the district court ultimately dismissed Kurian’s claims because he did not
comply with the second requirement for expert-witness disclosures. We therefore confine
our analysis to the second requirement.
A. Kurian’s claims required expert testimony.
Initially, Kurian suggests that expert testimony is not required to establish a prima
facie case of malpractice under the circumstances alleged here, and therefore, the expert-
witness-disclosure requirement of section 145.682 does not apply. The affidavit
requirements of section 145.682 only apply to medical-malpractice actions “as to which
expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie case.” Minn. Stat. § 145.682,
subd. 2. If expert testimony is unnecessary to establish a prima fac ie case, the statute is
inapplicable. See Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 191. Thus, as a threshold question, we consider
whether Kurian can establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice without expert
testimony. See Tousignant, 615 N.W.2d at 58.
When a negligence action involves matters “within the general knowledge and
experience of lay persons,” expert testimony may not be required. Atwater Creamery Co.
v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 279 (Minn. 1985). “But expert testimony is
necessary to support all but the most obvious medical malpractice claims.” Haile, 598
N.W.2d at 428. Only “exceptional” and “rare” medical-malpractice cases fall within the
limited exception to the expert-testimony requirement. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 191.
Kurian specifically points to three issues of medical malpractice in his brief:
(1) “Was the failure to monitor the effects of the risky vaccinations malpractice and a
13
contributing factor to the death of the decedent?”; (2) “Was the accidental puncturing of
the spleen during the paracentesis and the failure to monitor the condition of the patient
after the procedure negligent?”; and (3) “Was the respiratory technician responsible for
decedent’s ‘spontaneous pulmonary failure’ after admitting that she gave too many
‘oxygen bursts?’” “The primary purpose of an expert affidavit is to illustrate ‘how’ and
‘why’ the alleged malpractice caused the injury.” Maudsley, 676 N.W.2d at 14. The issues
identified by Kurian are certainly not within the realm of “practical common sense” of
jurors. See Miller v. Raaen, 139 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1966) (summarizing cases where
expert testimony was unnecessary because they “involved situations where there was no
doubt about the cause of the result complained of, and the result would not have followed
in the absence of a breach of duty, the establishment of which did not involve any scientific
knowledge”). A layperson would not be familiar with the medical standards of care for
vaccinating a premature infant, for monitoring a premature infant postvaccination, for
conducting a paracentesis procedure, or for administering oxygen bursts to a premature
infant. Likewise, a layperson would not know what actions would breach the applicable
standards of care or whether those breaches would cause injury or death.
Clearly, this is not the “rare” or “exceptional” medical-malpractice case that does
not require expert testimony. We therefore reject Kurian’s argument that section 145.682
does not apply to his claims.
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B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
Kurian’s affidavits did not satisfy section 145.682, subdivision 4.

Kurian argues that the district court erred by determining that his expert-witness
disclosures were insufficient under section 145.682, subdivision 4, and dismissing his
claims on this basis. He first challenges the district court’s refusal to consider his own
affidavit and his mother’s affidavit as expert -witness disclosures. Kurian contends that
both he and his mother have scientific and medical expertise, and that they were qualified
to render expert opinions about Samael’s care.
In a medical-malpractice case, a plaintiff must identify an expert “whose
qualifications provide a reasonable expectation that the expert’s opinions could be
admissible at trial.” Minn. Stat. § 145.682, subd. 3(1). To qualify as an expert, a witness
in a medical-malpractice case must have both scientific knowledge and practical or
occupational experience in the subject matter at issue. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d
684, 692 (Minn. 1977). In considering the competency of an expert witness, the district
court examines “both the degree of the witness’ scientific knowledge and the extent of the
witness’ practical experience with the matter which is the subject of the offered testimony.”
Reinhardt v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d 88, 93 (Minn. 1983) . Theoretical expertise is not
sufficient. Lundgren v. Eustermann, 370 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1985).
An appellate court applies a “very deferential standard” to a district court’s
determination regarding the qualifications of an expert. Teffeteller v. Univ. of Minn., 645
N.W.2d 420, 427 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted). That determination will only be
reversed “if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.
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Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that neither
Kurian nor his mother had the requisite credentials to qualify as expert witnesses in this
case, involving the complex care of a very premature infant. Kurian, who did not complete
medical school, is not a medical provider. And although his mother is a physician, she is
a psychiatrist with no expertise or occupational experience in neonatology or interventional
radiology. Thus, the district court properly exercised its discretion by deciding that Kurian
and his mother were not qualified to offer opinions about the applicable standards of care,
whether respondents deviated from those standards of care, and whether deviations from
standards of care caused Samael’s death.
Kurian also argues that the district court erred in concluding that the affidavit of
Dr. Cohen did not satisfy the requirements of section 145.682. We disagree. Dr. Cohen’s
affidavit did not identify the applicable standards of care or the acts or omissions allege d
to violate those standards, nor did it assert that deviations from the standard of care caused
any injury. Maudsley, 676 N.W.2d at 13-14. Indeed, the affidavit indicates that providers
did not deviate from the standard of care by vaccinating Samael because his condition at
the time of the vaccination “would lead to an opinion that the vaccinations could be
administered safely.” As the district court observed, the affidavit suggests there were some
communication issues between medical providers and the family. But it does not establish
that any malpractice occurred or that there was any causal link between Samael’s medical
care and his death. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by concluding
that Dr. Cohen’s affidavit did not satisfy the statutory requirement for expert-witness
disclosures.
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C. Because Kurian failed to comply with section 145.682, subdivision 4, the
district court properly dismissed the action.

“Strict compliance” with section 145.682 is required, “[s]o as not to undermine the
legislative aim of expert review and disclosure.” Broehm, 690 N.W.2d at 726; see also
Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572, 577-78 (Minn. 1999) (concluding that
the statutory requirements of section 145.682 are “uncomplicated and unambiguous” and
contemplate strict compliance). Kurian did not subm it sufficient affidavits as required by
section 145.682, subdivision 4. A plaintiff’s failure to comply with subdivision 4 requires
“mandatory dismissal of each action with prejudice as to which expert testimony is
necessary to establish a prima facie case.”3 Minn. Stat. § 145.682, subd. 6(c). The district
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Kurian’s claims on this basis.4

3 Kurian suggests that respondents failed to provide notice of the alleged deficiencies in his
expert-witness disclosures, which he could have cured if given the opportunity. See Minn.
Stat. § 145.682, subd. 6(c) (stating that mandatory dismissal is appropriate if a motion to
dismiss identifies the alleged deficiencies in plaintiff’s affidavit, a hearing on the motion
is scheduled at least 45 days from service of the motion, and the plaintiff does not correct
the deficiencies before the hearing). This argument was not presented below and is
therefore forfeited. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Moreover, we
observe that respondents moved to dismiss Kurian’s claims based on his failure to comply
with the expert-witness disclosure requirement in June 2021. After respondents’ motion
was filed, Kurian served the affidavit of Dr. Cohen and supplemented the affidavits already
provided. Thus, the record does not support Kurian’s claim that he did not receive
sufficient notice of the deficiencies in his expert-witness disclosures.

4 We note that Kurian’s wrongful-death and res ipsa loquitur claims are medical-
malpractice claims subject to the expert-review requirements of section 145.682. The
wrongful-death claim was based entirely on the theory that medical malpractice caused
Samael’s death. And the res ipsa loquitur claim is a claim against a health care provider
“alleging malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort,”
and is thus a medical- malpractice claim governed by section 145.682. See Minn. Stat.
§ 145.682, subd. 2; Tousignant, 615 N.W.2d at 56, n.1 (concluding that a negligence action
against a health care provider alleging failure to exercise care in providing care and
17
Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing
Kurian’s action based on his failure to comply with the statutory expert-witness-disclosure
requirement, we need not address his argument that the district court erred by determining
that the action was a nullity because Kurian brought suit under the wrongful-death statute,
Minnesota Statutes section 573.02, subdivision 3, before he was appointed as the trustee.
Affirmed.

treatment is a medical -malpractice claim subject to Minn. Stat. § 145.682). Because
Kurian did not comply with the statutory expert-witness-disclosure requirement, the
district court was required to dismiss these additional claims. Minn. Stat. § 145.682, subd.
6(c).