The holding in the court’s own words
We conclude that the ULJ correctly interpreted and applied the statutory provisions cited above.
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Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0038
David Rupprecht,
Relator,
vs.
Qwest Corporation,
Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.
Filed September 19, 2022
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 47089275-6
David Rupprecht, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Qwest Corporation, Garden City, New York (respondent employer)
Anne Froelich, Keri A. Phillips, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
David Rupprecht was laid off from his job and was given a lump-sum severance
payment equal to 30 weeks of pay. An unemployment-law judge concluded that he was
ineligible for unemployment benefits for a period of 30 weeks. We affirm.
FACTS
Rupprecht was employed by Qwest Corporation from 2017 to 2020. At the
conclusion of his employment, he was a full-time credit consultant earning a weekly salary
of $786.50 and receiving approximately $90 per month in bonuses.
In 2020, Qwest closed the office where Rupprecht worked. Qwest offered
Rupprecht a separation agreement that provided him with a lump-sum severance payment
equal to 30 weeks of his pay. Rupprecht accepted the offer, and his last day of employment
was July 15, 2020.
Rupprecht applied for unemployment benefits with the department of employment
and economic development. He stated in his application that he was “not sure” whether he
would receive severance pay. As a consequence, the department initially determined that
Rupprecht was eligible for unemployment benefits and began paying him weekly benefits
of $488.
On July 31, 2020, Rupprecht received a lump-sum payment of $24,213.75.
Rupprecht did not report his receipt of the payment to the department. Approximately one
year later, Rupprecht re-applied for unemployment benefits and stated on his application
that he had received severance pay . The department made a new determination that
3
Rupprecht was ineligible for unemployment benefits for 30 weeks, beginning the week of
July 15, 2020, and that there had been an overpayment of $14,945.
Rupprecht filed an administrative appeal. An unemployment-law judge (ULJ)
upheld the ineligibility determination without an evidentiary hearing. Rupprecht requested
reconsideration. The ULJ set aside the prior decision and held an evidentiary hearing. The
ULJ thereafter issued a written decision uph olding the determination of ineligibility but
reducing the amount of the overpayment to $14,633 based on a re-calculation of
Rupprecht’s bonuses. Rupprecht again requested reconsideration. The ULJ affirmed the
prior ruling. Rupprecht appeals by way of a writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Rupprecht argues that the ULJ erred by concluding that he was ineligible for
unemployment benefits for a period of 30 weeks. He contends that he should have been
ineligible for only a single week.
In general, t his court reviews a ULJ’s decision regarding eligibility for
unemployment benefits to determine whether the findings, inferences, conclusion, or
decision are affected by an error of law, are unsupported by substantial evidence in view
of the entire record, or are arbitrary or capricious. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)
(2020). “If the relevant facts are not in dispute, we apply a de novo standard of review to
the ULJ’s interpretation of the unemployment statutes and to the ultimate question whether
an applicant is eligible to receive unemployment benefits.” Menyweather v. Fedtech, Inc.,
872 N.W.2d 543, 545 (Minn. App. 2015).
4
The department pays unemployment benefits to applicants who meet the statutory
requirements. Minn. Stat. § 268.069, subd. 1 (2020). “An applicant is not eligible to
receive unemployment benefits for any week the applicant is receiving, has received, or
will receive separation pay, severance pay, bonus pay, or any other payments paid by an
employer because of, upon, or after separation from employment,” Minn. Stat. § 268.085,
subd. 3b(a) (2020), so long as the weekly amount of severance pay is equal to or greater
than the weekly unemployment benefit amount, id., subd. 3b(e). The receipt of severance
pay makes an applicant ineligible for “all the weeks of payment.” Id., subd. 3b(d). The
number of “weeks of payment” is determined as follows: “if the payment is made in a lump
sum, that sum is divided by the applicant’s last level of regular weekly pay from the
employer.” Id., subd. 3(c)(2); see also id., subd. 3b(d).
In this case, the ULJ found that Rupprecht knew on or before July 15, 2020, that he
would receive severance pay. Accordingly, the ULJ found that Rupprecht was ineligible
for unemployment benefits beginning July 16, 2020. Because Rupprecht received his
severance pay in a lump sum, the ULJ divided Rupprecht’s severance payment by his
weekly pay and concluded that Rupprecht was ineligible for 30 weeks.
On appeal, Rupprecht does not challenge the ULJ’s factual findings. He asserts that
he believed that his receipt of severance pay would make him ineligible only for a single
week. He notes that the unemployment statute makes an applicant ineligible for benefits
only when the applicant “is receiving, has received, or will receive ” severance pay. See
Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 3b(a). He contends that he should be deemed ineligible for
only a single week in July 2020.
5
Rupprecht’s argument fails to account for statutory provisions other than section
268.085, subdivision 3b(a). Another paragraph of subdivision 3b provides that a lump-
sum severance payment may be allocated to multiple time periods. See id., subd. 3b(d)
(incorporating id., subd. 3(c)). Specifically, if a lump-sum payment is greater than the
applicant’s weekly pay, the lump-sum payment must be allocated to a number of weeks
that is determined by dividing the amount of the lump-sum payment by the applicant’s
weekly pay. Id., subd. 3(c)(2).
The ULJ applied these statutory provisions by dividing Rupprecht’s lump-sum
severance payment ($24,213.75) by his weekly pay ($807.27) and by concluding that
Rupprecht was ineligible for 30 weeks. Because Rupprecht’s brief does not mention
subdivisions 3(c) and 3b(d), he does not argue that the ULJ misapplied those statutory
provisions. We conclude that the ULJ correctly interpreted and applied the statutory
provisions cited above.
Thus, the ULJ did not err by concluding that Rupprecht was ineligible for
unemployment benefits for a period of 30 weeks.
Affirmed.