In the Matter of the Short Call Substitute Teaching License Application of Jeronimo Yanez.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0049

In the Matter of the Short Call Substitute Teaching License
Application of Jeronimo Yanez.

Filed November 28, 2022
Reversed and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge

Minnesota Professional Educator Licensing and Standards Board

Robert J. Fowler, Fowler Law, L.L.C., Little Canada, Minnesota (for relator Jeronimo
Yanez)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, David Cullen, Nicholas Lienesch, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Professional Educator Licensing
and Standards Board)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
SYLLABUS
To avoid constitutional infirmity, “immoral character or conduct” that is grounds
for denial of an application for a teaching license under Minn. Stat. § 122A.20,
subd. 1(a)(1) (2020), must relate to professional morals in the occupation of teaching and
indicate that the individual is unfit to teach.
OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator Jeronimo Yanez challenges a decision by respondent
Minnesota Professional Educator Licensing and Standards Board (the board) denying his
application for a short-call substitute teaching license. While working as a police officer,
2
Yanez fatally shot Philando Castile, a St. Paul school district employee, in 2016. The board
denied the license on the grounds that the fatal shooting, and the traffic stop that preceded
it, evidenced “immoral character or conduct” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 122A.20,
subd. 1(a)(1).
Yanez asserts three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the board erred by
placing the burden of proof on him. Second, he argues that the statutory standard allowing
denial of a teaching license for “immoral character or conduct” is unconstitutionally vague.
Third, he maintains that the board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence , is
arbitrary and capricious, and is affected by other legal errors. We reject Yanez’s arguments
regarding the burden of proof and other legal errors but agree that the “immoral character
or conduct” standard is impermissibly vague. We conclude, however, that this defect can
be cured by a narrowing construction, and we reverse and remand for reconsideration of
Yanez’s application in light of the narrowing construction.
FACTS
In February 2020, Yanez applied to the board for a three-year short-call substitute
teaching license. At the time he submitted the application, Yanez had a part-time position
teaching Spanish at a parochial school. One of the questions on the license application
asked: “Have you ever been acquitted or found not guilty of a criminal offense involving
sexual conduct, homicide, assault or any other crime involving violence?” Yanez answered
yes and indicated that he “was involved in a Deadly Use of Force Situation” when he was
on patrol as a peace officer with the City of St. Anthony in July 2016, that he was criminally
charged as a result, and that he was acquitted of those charges in July 2017. Yanez also
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answered yes to a question about whether he had “ever voluntarily surrendered an
education or other occupational license” and indicated that he had voluntarily surrendered
his peace officer’s license.
The board referred Yanez’s application to its disciplinary committee for
investigation. The committee asked Yanez for additional information about the criminal
case. In his reply, Yanez stated that he had been “wrongly accused of a crime while on
duty as a St. Anthony Police Officer . . . and was acquitted.” Yanez further stated that he
“decided to retire from police work” after the criminal trial, that “[s]econd chances are
important in education and life,” and that “[w]orking as a substitute teacher certainly would
be for [him].”
The committee sent Yanez a letter several months later informing him that “[t]he
Committee intends to recommend denial [of the application] because it believes that
[Yanez’s] involvement in the shooting and death of Philando Castile is misconduct which
is a ground for the Board to refuse to issue a teaching license.” T he letter also informed
Yanez that he had the right to administratively appeal the decision.
Yanez appealed, and an administrative-law judge (ALJ) held a contested-case
hearing in July 2021. At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from six witnesses,
including expert witnesses. The board submitted a report and testimony by Joseph
Gothard, Ed.D., the superintendent of the St. Paul Public Schools, as an expert “in the
educational field and in the ethics of the educational profession.” Yanez submitted expert
testimony from an experienced, retired police sergeant, Gary Cayo, as a “police morality
4
expert.” The board also submitted the transcript and exhibits from Yanez’s criminal trial,
along with several television and print media stories.
The evidence and testimony at the contested-case hearing reflect that Yanez stopped
Castile’s car because Yanez thought Castile, a Black man, looked like a suspect in an armed
robbery of a convenience store that had occurred in the area a few days earlier. Yanez
radioed right before the stop that “the two occupants . . . just look like the . . . people that
were involved in our robbery” and then specified that “[t]he driver looks more like one of
our suspects, just [be]cause of the wide set nose.”
Yanez ran the vehicle’s license plate and discovered that the car was registered to
Castile, it had not been reported stolen, and there were no warrants for Castile. The vehicle,
however, had an inoperable brake light. Yanez initiated a traffic stop, and Castile pulled
over. Castile, his girlfriend D.R., and D.R.’s four-year -old daughter were in the vehicle.
Yanez informed Castile that he pulled the vehicle over because of the inoperable brake
light. After Yanez asked Castile for his license and insurance, Castile responded, “Sir, I
have to tell you I do have a . . . firearm on me.” The following exchange then occurred:
Yanez: Don’t reach for it then.
Castile: I’m, I, I was reaching for—
Yanez: Don’t pull it out.
Castile: I’m not pulling it out.
D.R.: He’s not—
Yanez: Don’t pull it out.

At that point, Yanez fired his weapon seven times. Five of the shots hit Castile and caused
his death. The two other shots lodged in the car , including one that passed through the
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back seat. The spot where the bullet hit the back seat was only 16 or 17 inches from where
the four-year-old child was sitting in her car seat.
D.R. used her cellphone to broadcast on Facebook part of the incident shortly after
Castile was shot. The video shows Castile covered in blood, struggling to breathe. Yanez
can be seen with his firearm still aimed at Castile, while D.R. provides a narrative of the
traffic stop and shooting. The video was widely viewed online.
The fatal shooting of Castile caused a strong public reaction and received extensive
media coverage. Multiple protests occurred in response to the shooting, including one in
which protesters shut down Interstate 94. The shooting and subsequent protests were
covered in both local and national news, and Governor Mark Dayton and President Barack
Obama made statements regarding the shooting.
In November 2016, Yanez was charged with one count of second-degree
manslaughter and two counts of intentional discharge of a firearm that endangered safety.
At trial, expert witnesses offered opposing views on whether Yanez’s shooting of Castile
was reasonable and justified. The jury acquitted Yanez on all charges. Shortly after the
trial, the City of St. Anthony reached a civil settlement with Castile’s family. Yanez
entered into a voluntary separation agreement with the City of St. Anthony and left his
employment with the police department.
At the contested-case hearing before the ALJ, the board’s expert, Gothard, testified
that he
believe[d] that [Yanez’s] actions were hurtful and offensive to
the community on three fronts. One, on the prejudgment that
was made by [Yanez] in pulling Mr. Castile over and the
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subsequent descriptions; two, on the hurt that was caused to the
community that continues to be reverberated today; and,
finally, the fact that no safety plan or procedures would
adequately fulfill the duty of licensed educators in the state of
Minnesota to keep [the] school community, students, staff and
the community at large safe.

He further opined that, as a result, he did not “believe [Yanez] should be granted a
substitute teacher’s license.”
Gothard also provided a written report that was admitted into evidence. In that
report, he noted that “Castile was a beloved employee of the Saint Paul Public Schools,”
and that the pain of Castile’s death remained. He opined that Yanez “took a life that he
should not have taken,” “endangered the lives of others when he shot and killed Philando
Castile,” and that “[n]o school-aged child should have a licensed educator who took the
life of a Black man in the way [Yanez] did when he killed Mr. Castile.” Gothard
acknowledged on cross-examination that he is not an expert in law-enforcement matters.
Yanez’s expert, Cayo, testified at the hearing that the stop of Castile by Yanez,
based on an inoperable brake light, was lawful, and that Yanez had a sufficient basis to
suspect that Castile may have been involved in the recent armed robbery. He noted that
Yanez had seen a video image of the suspects and that Yanez had thought Castile looked
like one of the robbers. Cayo further testified that he agreed with the opinion of Yanez’s
use-of-force expert from Yanez’s criminal trial, that Yanez’s use of deadly force was
reasonable. Finally, he acknowledged that he has no expertise in the field of education.
The principal of the parochial school where Yanez was employed part-time as a
Spanish teacher testified in support of Yanez’s application for the teaching license. He
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noted that there were no incidents between Yanez and students or staff members relating
to the shooting of Castile. The principal relayed that Yanez received an excellent
performance rating for the school year and had strengthened the Spanish program. The
principal testified that he rarely gave out top ratings to new teachers, but he gave one to
Yanez based on his job performance and hoped that Yanez would be able to continue to
teach at the school. On cross-examination, the principal acknowledged that 75-80% of the
student body at the school was White.
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
recommendation that the board deny Yanez’s application. The ALJ found that Yanez “took
a life that he should not have taken, and endangered the lives of others, when he shot and
killed Mr. Castile.” The ALJ further found that the “act was based upon [Yanez’s]
prejudging of Mr. Castile as a robbery suspect” because Castile had a “wide set nose,” a
“‘deer in headlights expression’ on his face, and allegedly had an odor of marijuana in the
car,”1 and that Yanez’s “prejudgments of Mr. Castile are indicative of racial bias,
microaggressions, and negativity bias that are detrimental to students, especially students
of color.” The ALJ concluded that Yanez “failed to establish that his use of deadly force
against Mr. Castile was objectively reasonable and necessary” under Minn. Stat. § 609.066,
subd. 2 (2014),
2 that Yanez’s “pretextual stop, racial profiling, and killing of Mr. Castile

1 Marijuana was found in the car.

2 That statute governs the use of deadly force by peace officers in the line of duty. The
statute has been amended, but at the time of Castile’s death, it provided as relevant here
that “the use of deadly force by a peace officer in the line of duty is justified only when
8
constitute immoral conduct [that was] morally wrong, and deeply hurtful and offensive to
the community ,” and that Yanez had “failed to establish that his application should be
granted.” The ALJ consequently recommended that the board affirm the committee’s
denial of Yanez’s application.
Yanez submitted written exceptions to the ALJ’s recommendation. The board
convened to consider the matter and, in December 2021, issued a decision that adopted the
ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the application. The decision
states that the board “agrees and concurs with the Committee’s decision, and the ALJ’s
recommendation, that [Yanez’s] application be denied for immoral conduct pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes section 122A.20, subdivision 1(a)(1).” Yanez petitioned for judicial
review by writ of certiorari.
ISSUES
I. Which party bears the burden of proof?
II. Is the phrase “immoral character or conduct” in Minn. Stat. § 122A.20,
subd. 1(a)(1), unconstitutionally vague and, if so, can it be cured by a narrowing
construction?

III. Is Yanez entitled to a reversal of the denial and an instruction to the board to issue
him a teaching license?

ANALYSIS
The statutes governing teacher licensure authorize the board to deny an application
for a teaching license on the ground of “immoral character or conduct.” Minn. Stat.

necessary . . . to protect the peace officer or another from apparent death or great bodily
harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.066, subd. 2.
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§ 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1). An applicant who has been denied a license has the right to
appeal, and the board must then initiate, as occurred here, a contested-case proceeding
under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 14.001 -.69
(2020 & Supp. 2021). The scope of judicial review of an agency decision following a
contested-case proceeding is limited to determining whether the agency decision is:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious.

Minn. Stat. § 14.69.

We divide our analysis into three sections. First, we address Yanez’s claim that the
burden of proof should have been placed on the board. Second, we address Yanez’s
vagueness challenge. Third, we address the balance of Yanez’s arguments in light of our
analysis of the vagueness challenge.
I. The burden is on Yanez to demonstrate that the board should grant his
application.

Yanez argues that the board improperly assigned him the burden of proving that his
application should be granted. “Identification of the applicable burden and standard of
proof presents questions of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.” C.O. v. Doe,
757 N.W.2d 343, 352 (Minn. 2008).
The administrative rules governing contested -case hearings under MAPA provide
that “[t]he party proposing that certain action be taken must prove the facts at issue by a
10
preponderance of the evidence, unless the substantive law provides a different burden or
standard.” Minn. R. 1400.7300, subp. 5 (2021). Yanez contends that, under this rule, the
board should be treated as the “party proposing that certain action be taken” because it is
the board that proposed to deny his application on a permissive ground —that Yanez
engaged in immoral conduct. He argues that the burden of proof should therefore have
been placed on the board to establish that his application should be denied on that ground.
We disagree. Minnesota courts have consistently held that an applicant bears the
burden of proof to show that an application should be granted. See In re License
Application of Rochester Ambulance Servs., 500 N.W.2d 495, 498-99 (Minn. App. 1993)
(citing Minn. R. 1400.7300, subp. 5, and stating that the applicant “bears the burden of
proof in this case to show that the Commissioner should have granted the license”); accord
N. Mem’l Med. Ctr. v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, 423 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Minn. App. 1988).
Yanez cites In re Teaching License of Issa, an administrative decision, as support
for his assertion . 2021 WL 784614 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 5, 2021). Such
decisions are not binding on this court and, regardless, Issa is distinguishable. Issa
involved a situation where the board sought to revoke a teacher’s license. Id. at *1. It was
the board in Issa that was seeking to change the status quo—to revoke a license—and it
was thereby the board that was “proposing that certain action be taken.” The board thus
rightly had the burden of proof in Issa.
By contrast here, it is Yanez who is seeking to change the status quo by asking the
board to grant him a license and, under Minn. R. 1400.7300, subp. 5, Yanez is therefore
the “party proposing that certain action be taken.” Minn. R. 1400.7300, subp. 5.
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Consequently, the board did not err in determining that Yanez had the burden of proof to
establish that he satisfied the statutory criteria to be granted a license.
II. The phrase “immoral character or conduct” is unconstitutionally vague, but
the infirmity can be cured by applying a narrowing construction.

Yanez contends that Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1), is unconstitutionally
vague. The statute provides that the board may “refuse to issue, refuse to renew, suspend,
or revoke a teacher’s license to teach for . . . immoral character or conduct.” Minn. Stat.
§ 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1). The phrase “immoral character or conduct” is not defined by
statute. The ALJ defined the phrase to mean “conduct which offends the morals of the
community in which it occurred.”3 Yanez argues that the standard is “impermissibly vague
and nearly impossible to quantify or delineate.”
Statutes that are impermissibly vague run afoul of constitutional due-process
protections. State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1985); see also City of Edina
v. Dreher, 454 N.W.2d 621, 622 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 1990).
“A statute is void due to vagueness if it defines an act in a manner that encourages arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement, or the law is so indefinite that people must guess at its
meaning.” Hard Times Cafe, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 625 N.W.2d 165, 171 (Minn.
App. 2001) (quotation omitted); see also In re Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res. Special Permit No.

3 This wording is derived from a Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Falgren v. State
Board of Teaching, that involved the revocation of a teacher’s license for engaging in
immoral conduct based on nonconsensual sexual contact with a minor student. 545
N.W.2d 901, 908 (Minn. 1996). The constitutionality and meaning of the phrase “immoral
character or conduct” was not, however, at issue in the case. The supreme court
commented that the meaning of the phrase was “nebulous,” but did not otherwise address
the issues asserted in this case. Id.
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16868, 867 N.W.2d 522, 532-33 (Minn. App. 2015) (stating that “a party may bring a void-
for-vagueness challenge if the statute at issue encompasses constitutionally protected
conduct or if there is a potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”), rev. denied
(Minn. Oct. 20, 2015).
In State v. Hensel, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained there are “two
possibilities” when addressing a constitutionally infirm statute. 901 N.W.2d 166, 175
(Minn. 2017). “First, if the statute is readily susceptible to a narrowing construction, [a
court] could adopt such a construction if it remedies the statute’s constitutional defects. If
no reasonable narrowing construction remedies the statute’s overbreadth problem, then the
remaining option is to invalidate the statute.” Id. (quotation omitted).
No Minnesota caselaw has addressed the question of whether the phrase “immoral
character or conduct” in Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1), is unconstitutionally vague.
But courts in other jurisdictions have addressed vagueness challenges to similar provisions,
as we discuss below.
The California Supreme Court’s opinion in Morrison v. State Board of Education is
a seminal decision on this issue. 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969). In Morrison, a teacher’s
credentials were revoked on the grounds of “immoral and unprofessional conduct and acts
involving moral turpitude,” as set out in the California statutes. Id. at 377. Morrison had
worked as a teacher in the California schools for many years, but his credentials were
revoked after it was discovered that he had engaged in a physical relationship with another
male teacher. Id. at 377-78. The court reversed the revocation, holding that the terms
“immoral conduct” and “moral turpitude” must be given a narrowing construction so that
13
the objectionable conduct “indicated an unfitness to teach.” Id. at 382-83, 387-89. The
court reasoned that “[w]ithout such a reasonable interpretation the terms would be
susceptible to so broad an application as possibly to subject to discipline virtually every
teacher in the state.” Id. at 382-83.
Numerous other courts have followed suit. 4 Alford v. Ingram is particularly
instructive. 931 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1996). In that case, a federal district court cited
Morrison with approval and reached the same conclusion in interpreting a statute which
provided that a certificate to teach may be revoked “when the holder has been guilty of
immoral conduct or indecent behavior.” Id. at 769. In Alford, the court observed that
“[w]hile these words may have had certain concrete meanings in simpler times, this court

4 See, e.g., Thompson v. Sw. Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp. 1170, 1181 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (limiting
“immoral conduct” to mean conduct “rendering [a teacher ] unfit to teach”); Keene v. Bd.
of Acct., 894 P.2d 582, 587 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (determining that the challenged statute
“prohibits conduct indicating unfitness to practice the particular profession”); Hainline v.
Bond, 824 P.2d 959, 967 (Kan. 1992) (interpreting “immorality” to mean “such conduct
that by common judgment reflects on a teacher’s fitness to engage in his or her
profession”); Cochran v. Bd. of Educ. of Mex. Sch. Dist. No. 59, 815 S.W.2d 55, 64 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1991) (requiring “that there be some nexus between the immoral conduct shown
in the evidence and fitness to teach”); Haley v. Med. Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1074
(Wash. 1991) (interpreting statute prohibiting conduct involving “moral turpitude” as
“prohibiting conduct indicating unfitness to practice the profession”); Ross v. Robb, 662
S.W.2d 257, 259 (Mo. 1983) (determining that the phrase “immoral conduct” is not
unconstitutionally vague when interpreted as meaning “conduct rendering plaintiff unfit to
teach” (quotation omitted)); Clarke v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 338 N.W.2d
272, 276 (Neb. 1983) (stating “in order for a teacher’s conduct to be immoral within [the
statute] such conduct must be directly related to a teacher’s ability to teach, and indicate
an unfitness to do so”); Golden v. Bd. of Educ. of Harrison Cnty., 285 S.E.2d 665, 668 (W.
Va. 1981) (stating that to be disciplined for “immoral conduct” the “conduct in question
must indicate unfitness to teach”); Weissman v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist.
No. R —1, 547 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Colo. 1976) (stating that “actions cannot constitute
immorality within the meaning of the statute unless these actions indicate [an] unfitness to
teach”).
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has serious doubts as to whether these terms currently provide fair warning of the
proscribed conduct or sufficient guidance to persons who are required to apply those terms
and make important decisions about teachers’ futures.” Id. at 771.
A federal district court expressed a similar sentiment in Burton v. Cascade School
District Union High School No. 5, which declared impermissibly vague an Oregon statute
that allowed teachers to be dismissed for “immorality.” 353 F. Supp. 254, 255 (D. Or.
1973). The court aptly observed that “[i]mmorality means different things to different
people,” the statute “fails to give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited,” and “permits
erratic and prejudiced exercises of authority.” Id.
We too are concerned that the phrase “immoral character or conduct” in Minn. Stat.
§ 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1), fails to “give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited” and
“permits . . . prejudiced exercises of authority.” Id. The meaning of the phrase is, at a
minimum, “nebulous” as observed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Falgren, 545
N.W.2d at 908, and is vulnerable to the caprice of ever-changing public opinion and the
potential for arbitrary, biased enforcement. We therefore conclude that the phrase is
impermissibly vague.5

5 The board argues that we cannot reach this issue because Yanez has no vested property
interest in being granted an occupational license. See, e.g., Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr.,
811 N.W.2d 643, 658 (Minn. 2012) (stating that “[h]istorically, we have limited the
property rights that are entitled to due process to real property rights, final judgments, and
certain vested statutory rights”). Applicants for an initial license may not have the same
level or type of due- process rights as license holders facing revocation, but applicants do
have a due-process right to pursue employment in the public sector without interference
from arbitrary or vague statutes. See, e.g., Obara v. Minn. Dep’t of Health, 758 N.W.2d
873, 878-89 (Minn. 2008) (holding that individuals have a protected property interest in
pursuing a career in a job in the public sector and that constitutional interest “demands that
15
While we conclude that the “immoral character or conduct” provision of the
licensing statute is impermissibly vague, we also hold, like other courts, that the statute
may avoid constitutional infirmity through a narrowing construction. In Alford, the court
reasoned that numerous courts have held that similar statutes are constitutional with a
narrowing construction, and “[i]n all of these cases, the courts have interpreted the words
in the statutes to imply an unfitness to teach.” 931 F. Supp. at 773. We are persuaded by
this analysis and agree that, to be constitutional, the grounds for the refusal to issue a
teaching license under Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1), based on “immoral character
or conduct,” must indicate an unfitness to teach.6

a statute not be an unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious interference” with a person’s right
to not be disqualified from the opportunity for such employment (quotation omitted)); cf.
BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., LLC v. Bishop, 927 N.W.2d 314, 325 (Minn. App. 2019) (stating
that “[t]he general purpose of the void-for- vagueness doctrine is to assure that ordinary
people are put on notice of what conduct is prohibited and to discourage arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. June 26, 2019);
In re Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 867 N.W.2d at 532-33 (stating that “a party may bring a
void-for-vagueness challenge if the statute at issue encompasses constitutionally protected
conduct or if there is a potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” (emphasis
added)).

6 The board argues that this court has declined to apply the holding in Morrison and related
cases that a narrowing construction is appropriate. The board cites, as its authority for this
proposition, Fisher v. Independent School District No. 622, 357 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn.
App. 1984). Fisher cannot be read so broadly. In Fisher, this court rejected a school
principal’s argument that his discharge for sexually abusing a student was improper
because the abuse had occurred over ten years earlier and was therefore too remote. 357
N.W.2d at 153, 155. We referenced Morrison, noting that the California Supreme Court
had identified “proximity or remoteness in time” as a factor to be considered in determining
whether alleged immoral conduct indicated an unfitness to teach. Id. at 156. We then
observed that the Morrison test would mandate the same conclusion, that the teacher’s
discharge was proper because “the adverse effec t upon students and the degree of that
adverse effect easily outweigh the remoteness of the conduct charged.” Id. We never
declined to adopt a narrowing construction.
16
We are also persuaded by the analysis applied by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
the context of attorney licensing in the case of In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922 (Minn.
1979), regarding the analogous requirement that lawyers be of good “moral character.”
The supreme court required in Peterson that “moral character” in the arena of attorney
licensing be judged not as a question of “personal morality,” but only “in a professional
context as it relates to one’s capacity to serve the public in the practice of law.” 274
N.W.2d at 925 (stating that “[a] distinction must be drawn between personal . . . and
professional moral character” and that “[t] he responsibility . . . to formulate ethical
principles and standards of professional conduct and to enforce those standards on the
lawyers of this state does not give . . . license to make judgments as to a lawyer’s personal
morality, but only with regard to that lawyer’s professional moral character”).
We thus conclude that the “immoral character or conduct” relied on by the board
must relate to professional morals in the occupation of teaching and indicate that the
individual is unfit to teach.
III. Yanez is entitled to a remand but not an instruction from this court directing
the board to grant his application for a teaching license.

Yanez maintains that legal errors in the board’s decision require that we not only
reverse the decision to deny his license application, but also direct the board to grant his
application for a teaching license. Yanez asserts that the board erred because it used an
incorrect legal standard in judging use of force by a police officer and the legality of
pretextual stops; the board’s decision is barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata; and
the decision violated his constitutional right to assert self -defense and the presumption of
17
innocence. Yanez also argues that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence
and is arbitrary an d capricious. The board contends that there is no merit to Yanez’s
arguments and urges us to affirm without remanding. We conclude that a remand is
appropriate to allow the board to reconsider the evidence in light of the narrowing
construction.
A. The legal issues asserted by Yanez either lack merit or are not sufficient
to warrant reversal without a remand for reconsideration.

Yanez argues that the board erred by applying an incorrect legal standard for the use
of deadly force. We disagree. The board concluded that, “[i]n 2016, the standard for
justifiable use of deadly force in Minnesota was whether it was objectively reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances and necessary to protect police or another from
apparent death or great bodily harm.” The latter part of this statement is an accurate recital
of the standard set out in the Minnesota S tatutes in effect at the time of Yanez’s fatal
shooting of Castile. See Minn. Stat. § 609.066, subd. 2(1). The earlier part—that the use
of force must be “objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances”—is
consistent with the federal constitutional standard articulated in Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
Yanez maintains that the legal standard requires that the use of force be judged based
on his subjective beliefs at the time. This is not accurate. While it is true that the Graham
standard requires an assessment of what the officer knew and could observe at the time,
the review is from the perspective of a reasonable police officer, not that of the involved
officer. 490 U.S. at 396.
18
We also reject Yanez’s argument that his acquittal in the criminal case collaterally
estops or serves as a res judicata bar in this licensing case. The fact that Yanez was
acquitted only means that the state failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the
high standard of proof in criminal cases. The acquittal effectively prevents the board from
characterizing Yanez’s use of force as criminal. But the acquittal does not collaterally
estop or serve as a res judicata bar under the lower civil standard of proof in contested-case
proceedings—preponderance of the evidence . See Beaulieu v. Minn. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 825 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Minn. 2013) (stating that “[t]he doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel . . . do not preclude the State from offering in a civil case evidence of
conduct alleged in an earlier criminal case that ended in an acquittal because the burden of
proof in a criminal case is higher than the burden of proof in a civil case”).
Yanez argues next that the board erred by relying on the fact that Yanez’s articulated
reason for stopping Castile (the inoperable brake light) was a pretext for his real reason
(Yanez’s belief that Castile fit the description of one of the people involved in a recent
robbery). Yanez correctly points out that stops based on violations of law, such as an
inoperable brake light, are not of themselves unlawful. See State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d
69, 69-70 (Minn. 1997) (“If a police officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of a
violation of the law, an investigatory stop of a vehicle is valid and whether the officer has
ulterior motives for the stop is irrelevant.”); see also State v. Beall, 771 N.W.2d 41, 42
(Minn. App. 2009) (holding that “an inoperable center brake light constitutes a specific,
articulable, and objective basis justifying a traffic stop”). He argues that it was thus
improper for the board to conclude that the stop constituted immoral conduct.
19
The board contends in its brief that it never labeled the pretextual stop as illegal and
therefore committed no error. But, in both the board’s decision and its brief, the board
cites the pretextual nature of the stop as one of the grounds upon which it based its decision
to deny the license. This is problematic because it labels as immoral a common practice in
the job of policing that has been upheld by the courts. The pretextual reason for the stop,
however, was just one of the reasons articulated by the board in reaching its decision, with
no articulation of the weight accorded the various reasons. Thus, even if we were to
conclude that the board erred in its application of the law concerning pretextual stops, we
cannot discern that this was a determinative factor. We caution the board on remand,
however, that a neutral review of Yanez’s application requires that the board avoid even
an appearance of bias and, therefore, it should decline to condemn lawful police practices.
Such practices are a subject to be debated in other forums, not in a professional licensure
proceeding.7
We are also not persuaded by Yanez’s argument that the board’s decision violated
his rights to assert self -defense and to be presumed innocent. Neither are apposite in this

7 We note in this regard the reference in the board’s findings to the fact that Yanez said
Castile had a “‘deer in headlights’ expression” on his face. The board relied on this as a
factor in its conclusion that Yanez engaged in immoral conduct. But statements about a
deer-in-the-headlights facial expression are commonplace in caselaw assessing whether a
police officer has articulable, reasonable suspicion to justify a stop under the Fourth
Amendment. There are over a dozen federal appellate decisions, including an opinion from
the Eighth Circuit, where this phrase is cited as a factor that supports the constitutionality
of a stop or search. See, e.g., United States v. Orth, 873 F.3d 349, 352 (1st Cir. 2017);
United States v. Hall, 193 F. App’x. 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Mays, 643
F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Patton, 705 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Hill, 1 F. App’x. 606, 608 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jensen, 41 F.
App’x. 346, 350 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones, 562 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 2008).
20
context because it is a civil, not a criminal, proceeding. In addition, Yanez testified at the
contested-case hearing about his subjective belief that he was justified in using deadly force
and his expert also testified that Yanez’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable.
B. Remand for reconsideration in light of the narrowing construction is the
appropriate disposition.

Yanez argues that the board’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and
that it is arbitrary and capricious such that this court should reverse the denial and direct
the board to grant his application for a teaching license. The board argues that there is no
need for a remand and that we should affirm the board’s decision. We reject both parties’
requests and conclude that it is appropriate for us to remand this case to the board to weigh
the evidence and apply the relevant criteria in light of our narrowing construction.8
In doing so, we caution the board that the “immoral character or conduct” grounds
for denying a teaching license must be used with great circumspection because, even with
the narrowing construction, it is prone to misapplication. On remand, the board must
identify which factors it is relying upon and the weight being accorded those factors in
determining whether Yanez’s conduct violated moral standards for the teaching profession.
Our narrowing construction requires the board to then assess whether and how that conduct

8 As part of his claim, Yanez argues that the board’s decision is faulty because it was largely
based on the impact of the fatal shooting in the St. Paul area when the license he is seeking
is statewide. The board argues, somewhat inconsistently, that the conduct must be assessed
according to the “morals of the community in which it occurred,” but that it “is not limited
to a community-based component” because, by granting a license, the board is
“representing . . . that the applicant is fit to teach . . . in each and every school district in
the state.” In light of our decision to remand for reconsideration, however, we need not
address this issue at this juncture.
21
relates to Yanez’s fitness to teach in the public schools, again identifying the weight being
accorded the factors it considers relevant.9 In undertaking that evaluation, the board must
avoid generalized critiques of policing practices—such as characterizing the practice of
using a pretextual reason for a stop as immoral. The board’s decision must focus
exclusively on Yanez’s conduct and his fitness to be a teacher, not fitness to be a police
officer. We leave it to the discretion of the board to determine whether it is appropriate to
remand the case to the ALJ and to reopen the record.
DECISION
The phrase “immoral character or conduct” in Minn. Stat. § 122A.20, subd. 1(a)(1),
is constitutional with a narrowing construction. Pursuant to that narrowing construction,
the “immoral character or conduct” must relate to professional morals in the occupation of
teaching and indicate that the individual is unfit to teach. We reverse and remand for
reconsideration in light of this narrowing construction.
Reversed and remanded.

9 We further note that the board included in its findings a number of suppositions of
questionable relevance. For example, the board, in an apparent attempt to discount the
significance of the positive testimony by the parochial school principal about Yanez’s
performance as a teacher, found that the student body at the parochial school where Yanez
was teaching “is primarily Catholic.” Bereft of context, this finding could lead to the
disturbing inference that the board believes that children who are Catholic may not be as
impacted as children who are not Catholic.