State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0066

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bryan William Fries,
Appellant.

Filed August 15, 2022
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

LeSueur County District Court
File No. 40-CR-20-697

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly Woodgate, Le Sueur City Attorney, Le Sueur, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jacob Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Bryan William Fries challenges his conviction of gross- misdemeanor
driving while impaired (DWI). He argues that the district court erred by denying his motion
to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop because the police officer who stopped
him lacked reasonable suspicion. We affirm.
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A police officer
may conduct a “brief, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Taylor, 965
N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). The reasonable-suspicion standard is
“not high.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011). It requires “more than a
mere ‘hunch’” but “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752 (quotation omitted). The reasonable-suspicion
standard is satisfied when an officer “observes unusual conduct that leads the officer to
reasonably conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may be afoot.”
State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We review
a district court’s determination of reasonable suspicion de novo. State v. Smith, 814
N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012).
The officer who stopped Fries’s vehicle on August 15, 2020, testified at an omnibus
hearing. He explained that, around 9:00 p.m. that evening, he pulled up to a stop sign in
3
his marked police car. While looking around, he noticed a vehicle pull up behind him and
heard “a male and female screaming.” He could not hear distinct words, but it “sounded
like an argument of a domestic in nature.” After a few seconds, the officer heard the male
shout, “Get the f-ck out of my way,” apparently directed at him. The officer turned but
watched where the vehicle went; w hen it turned the other direction, he turned around and
followed.
As he drove behind the vehicle, the officer checked the license plate and learned
that Fries was the owner of the vehicle. The officer knew that Fries had “a long history of
domestic and disturbances.” And as both vehicles stopped at another stop sign, the officer
heard continued yelling from the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, he initiated a traffic stop to
investigate possible domestic violence.
Fries argues the officer lacked a sufficient basis to suspect domestic violence
because (1) the officer merely heard a verbal altercation, which is not domestic violence;
and (2) Fries’s criminal history “alone” cannot establish reasonable suspicion. But an
officer is not required to observe criminal activity to conduct a traffic stop; he merely needs
to be aware of circumstances that, viewed collectively and in light of his training and
experience, reasonably lead him to suspect criminal activity. See Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at
753. The relevant circumstances include not just present observations but contextual
information, such as a suspect’s criminal history. See id. at 754 (stating that officer’s
knowledge that driver’s license was canceled as inimical to public safety contributed to
reasonable suspicion of impaired driving); State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 249 (Minn.
4
2007) (stating that knowledge of a suspect’s criminal record may contribute to probable
cause).
The officer heard ongoing “screaming” and “yelling” between a man and a woman
coming from the vehicle of a man known to have a history of domestic violence. These
circumstances provided ample basis for reasonably suspecting domestic violence and
conducting a brief stop of the vehicle to investigate.
Affirmed.