State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0071

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ley Enrique Ortiz Calleja,
Appellant.

Filed July 18, 2022
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-19-1861

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Daniel A. McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Julia A. Forbes, Assistant County Attorney,
Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Larkin, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the revocation of his probation. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant Ley Enrique Ortiz Calleja was convicted of third -degree criminal sexual
conduct based on his sexual abuse of a young child. T he district court granted Calleja’s
request for a downward sentencing departure, stayed execution of his sentence, and placed
him on probation for ten years.
In setting forth the conditions of Calleja’s probation at sentencing, the district court
told Calleja that he must refrain from the use of alcohol, complete a sex-offender program,
complete a chemical -dependency evaluation, and notify probation of any change of
address. The state asked the district court to prohibit Calleja from having unsupervised
contact with minors. In response, the district court stated:
[Y]ou will have no unsupervised contact with minors
unless or until approved by your treatment team and your
probation officer. The exception I’m carving out is for your
daughter, and I am going to allow continued contact unless
your treatment provider determines, as they work through the
additional evaluations, that there is a risk to that child. What
I’m weighing here is the potential damage to a child of being
cut off from a parent for reasons that they can’t understand due
to age and what seems like a relative low risk of you sexually
offending against that child at this point in time.

And so if something comes up as you are working
through treatment that causes the treatment providers to
believe that there is a risk that I was not aware of at this time,
then they can direct that you have no contact until you’ve made
sufficient progress in your treatment program so I’ll just
require that you cooperate with that.

(Emphasis added.) The district court asked Calleja if he understood the no -contact
condition, and he said, “Yes.” The prosecutor then stated that the treatment program would
likely require “a family victim polygraph” for Calleja to “have contact.”
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The district court issued a sentencing order containing the aforementioned probation
conditions and specifically stating, “Have no unsupervised contact with males and females
under the age of 18. Exception is with daughter.” The order also directed Calleja to follow
all recommendations of his sex-offender treatment providers.
Several months after sentencing, the probation department filed a report alleging
that Calleja violated the terms of his probation by (1) using alcohol multiple times ; (2)
failing to complete a sex-offender program; (3) failing to complete a chemical-dependency
evaluation; (4) residing with his wife and child instead of at his designated residence; and
(5) having contact with minors, including “his daughter, 8th grade sister-in-law, and family
minors at outings.”
Calleja admitted all of the alleged violations and specifically admitted that he had
contact with minors, including his daughter, a sister-in-law, and other minors within his
family. The district court accepted Calleja’s admissions and set the matter for a probation
disposition hearing.
At the disposition hearing, the district court heard testimony from Calleja’s
probation agent. He explained that there were safety concerns regarding the prospect of
contact between Calleja and his daughter. T o address that issue, the probation agent met
with various “stakeholders,” including Calleja’s sex-offender program, and determined
that Calleja must complete a “family victim polygraph” before having contact with his
daughter. Calleja completed the polygraph, and it indicated that there were “other family
victims.” Calleja’s probation agent and sex -offender program determined that Calleja
“could not be around his daughter.” According to the probation agent, despite that
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restriction on contact with his daughter, Calleja resided with his wife and child, spent time
alone with the child, and changed the child’s diapers. Calleja also spent time alone with
his sister-in-law, who was in eighth grade.
The district court revoked Calleja’s probation and executed his sentence. Calleja
appeals.
DECISION
Calleja contends that the district court erred by relying on his contact with his
daughter as a basis for probation revocation because the district court never imposed a
condition restricting such contact. He argues that the district court violated his right to due
process because he never received “fair notice” of the condition.
Before a district court revokes a def endant’s probation, it must (1) “designate the
specific condition or conditions that were violated,” (2) “find that the violation was
intentional or inexcusable,” and (3) “find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the
policies favoring probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). “The
[district] court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke
probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” Id. at
249-50. A district court “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d
162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
“[A] probationer is entitled to procedural due process prior to the revocation of
probation.” State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 2015). This includes fair
notice of any noncriminal acts, the violation of which would subject the probationer to
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incarceration. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251. Additionally, “the condition alleged to have
been violated must be a condition of probation that has in fact been imposed by the district
court.” State v. Ornelas, 675 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Minn. 2004). “Whether a defendant has been
denied due process of law is a question of law that we review de novo.” Beaulieu, 859
N.W.2d at 280.
In Ornelas, a district court revoked a defendant’s probation for having unsupervised
contact with a min or. 675 N.W.2d at 78. The supreme court reversed the revocation
because there was “nothing in the record indicating that the no-contact provision was ever
made a condition” of the defendant’s probation. Id. at 81. There was no such condition
“contained in any district court order or other writing” or “stated as a condition of
probation” at the time of sentencing. Id. at 80-81.
Calleja compares this case to Ornelas and argues that having contact with his
daughter was not prohibited under the terms of his probation. But this case is readily
distinguishable from Ornelas because the record here indicates that the no-contact
provision was stated as a condition of probation at sentencing. The district court clearly
stated on the record that Calleja’s treatment provider could prohibit contact between
Calleja and his daughter if it determined that there was a risk to the child. Moreover,
Calleja told the district court that he understood that condition.
Calleja cites State v. Henderson and argues that the district court improperly
delegated the imposition of the no-contact condition to the treatment provider. 527 N.W.2d
827 (Minn. 1995). In Henderson, the defendant asserted that a corrections department
lacked authority to place him in a special probation program with “several restrictive
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features,” which had not been ordered by the district court at sentencing. Id. at 828. The
supreme court agreed with the defendant because the special probation program was “an
intermediate sanction within the purview of the district court .” Id. at 829. “Intermediate
sanctions” are conditions that may be imposed by a district court in connection with a
stayed sentence, such as jail, home detention, electronic monitoring, intensive probation,
and chemical-dependency or mental-health treatment. See id. at 828-29 (discussing Minn.
Stat. § 609.135 (1994)). Because a corrections department does not have the authority to
impose intermediate sanctions, the supreme court reversed the revocation of the
defendant’s probation. Id. at 829-30.
Again, this case is distinguishable. Here, the district court did not delegate authority
to impose an intermediate sanction. The district court restricted Calleja’s unsupervised
contact with minors, made an exception for his daughter, and authorized his treatment
provider to prohibit contact between Calleja and his daughter if risks were identified. That
is, the district court announced a no- contact condition at sentencing and permitted some
flexibility in the administration of one aspect of that condition relating to Calleja’s
daughter. That approach was consistent with the following statement in Henderson, “We
recognize that some flexibility in the administrative implementation of probation
conditions is desirable and that trial judges s hould not be burdened with administrative
issues relating to the implementation of conditions of probation.” Id. at 829.
This case is more akin to State v. Bradley, 756 N.W.2d 129 (Minn. App. 2008). In
Bradley, a district court required a defendant to complete a chemical -dependency
evaluation and follow any recommendations as a condition of probation. 756 N.W.2d at
7
131. She underwent two evaluations, which recommended inpatient treatment. Id. The
district court found that she violated the terms of her probation by failing to complete
inpatient treatment. Id. at 132. On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court
“improperly delegated to an assessor the authority to impose the intermediate sanction of
chemical-dependency treatment.” Id. at 133. This court held that the district court did not
improperly delegate sentencing authority. Id. at 130. We acknowledged that chemical-
dependency treatment is an intermediate sanction but reasoned that “[t]he district court
simply delegated to the chemical- health assessor the expert determination as to whether
[the defendant] needs treatment and, if so, the type or level of appropriate treatment.” Id.
at 133. We concluded that “allowing a chemical -health assessor to determine a
probationer’s need for treatment and the type or level of treatment needed, if any, delegates
only administrative implementation of a condition imposed by the court.” Id.
The district court’s delegation of authority to the sex-offender treatment
professionals in this case was similar to the delegation in Bradley . The district court
ordered Calleja to complete a sex-offender program and deferred to the expertise of the
treatment provider regarding whether Calleja could safely have unsupervised contact with
his daughter while in treatment. The district court’s approach was a permissible delegation
of administrative implementation of the no-contact condition. See id.
Calleja also argues that no condition of probation dictated where he could reside
and that he therefore did not violate a term of probation by residing with his wife and child.
We agree that there was no condition restricting where Calleja could reside. However, the
district court permitted Calleja’s treatment provider to restrict contact between Calleja and
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his daughter, and the provider did so. By residing with his daughter despite that restriction,
Calleja violated the no-contact condition of his probation.
In conclusion, the district court did not err by relying on Calleja’s contact with his
daughter as a basis for probation revocation. Because Calleja has not shown that the district
court abused its discretion in revoking his probation, we affirm.
Affirmed.